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Abstract 
WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE? DISTINCTIONS, FURŪQ, AND DEVELOPMENT IN POST-
FORMATIVE ISLAMIC LAW 
Elias Gabriel Saba 
Joseph E. Lowry 
 
This dissertation is a study of the “legal distinctions” (al-furūq al-fiqhiyya) literature and 
its role in the development of Islamic legal thinking. It reconsiders how linguistics, law, 
and public performance intersect with knowledge production to develop new 
packaging of legal information. This study identifies the origins of this tradition in 
linguistic and medical literature which demonstrated the possibilities of ‘distinctions’ 
reasoning. The linguistic furūq literature is largely a theological endeavor aimed as 
denying the existence of synonymy in Arabic while the medical literature was 
interested in diagnosing illnesses. After establishing the trends that led to the writing 
of this genre, I demonstrate the implications of the legal furūq and how changes to this 
genre reflect shifts in the social consumption of Islamic legal knowledge. The earliest 
interest in legal distinctions grew out of the performance of knowledge in formalized 
legal disputation (jadal). Disputation was an important activity for creating and 
defining tools of legal knowledge and distinction played an important part therein. 
From here, the genre of legal distinctions adapted to incorporate elements of play and 
entertainment through interplay with the genre of legal riddles (al-alghāz al-fiqhiyya). 
As play, books of legal distinctions functioned as supplements to performance in 
literary salons, study circles, and court performances (majlis); these books also served 
 xi 
 
as mimetic objects, allowing the reader to participate in the majlis virtually through 
reading. This study demonstrates the analytical strength of genre as a tool for 
understanding the history Islamic law and the social and intellectual practices that 
helped shape its development. 
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  Introduction  
 
What is the social history for changes in the aesthetics of Islamic legal literature? The 
answer to this question remains unclear, even though the history and development of 
Islamic law have long formed the subject of extensive scholarly study. Modern 
scholarship has generally divided the history of Islamic law into three broad periods: an 
early period, a middle period, and the modern. The majority of research into Islamic 
law has focused on the rise and early development of the Islamic legal tradition or the 
subsequent transition from an early modern legal system to multiple modern, national 
ones that selectively incorporate concepts from Islamic law. This division parallels the 
prevailing periodization of the history of Islamic societies generally. Marshall Hodgson 
divided that history into three broad periods, which he labeled “the Classical Age,” “the 
Middle Periods,” and “Gunpowder Empires and Modern Time.”1 The middle periods 
have been sorely understudied. Wael Hallaq, arguably the leading Western scholar of 
Islamic law, has referred to this post-formative period, from approximately 1250 to 
1800, as “a virtual terra incognita.”2 This lack of scholarly attention is due to a belief that 
this period was one of legal and cultural stagnation. The scholars who do study this 
period, however, have shown that Islamic law underwent remarkable changes.  
In part, the misunderstanding about the development of Islamic law during the 
Middle Period has to do with the way in which Islamic law is conceived. In arguments 
                                                             
1 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization. 3 vols. (Chicago; 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
2 Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005), 1. 
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about development or lack thereof, scholars have attempted to look for changes or 
development in either the substantive rules of Islamic law (furūʿ al-fiqh) or in legal 
theory (uṣūl al-fiqh). Since Islamic law is understood as a legal system, it makes sense to 
look for development to occur in manuals of substantive laws or in the theoretical 
writings on legal interpretation. Furūʿ al-fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh are not the two halves of 
Islamic law, however; they are two genres of Islamic legal literature.3 Islamic law can 
also be understood as a scholarly discipline, concerned with the production and 
organization of a specific kind of knowledge. According to this understanding, 
promulgation of new substantive rules and advancements in legal theory are only two 
possible kinds of development. Change and dynamism in Islamic law can also occur 
though the ways in which legal knowledge is packaged, organized and presented; in 
other words, through development and change in genre. A focus on Islamic law as a 
field of learning rather than as part of a legal system requires a greater focus on the 
literary characteristics of its literature.  
This dissertation presents a detailed history of the genre of legal distinctions, al-
furūq al-fiqhiyya. I have found thirty-six works that belong to this genre composed over 
a period of six hundred years. The genre began in the fourth/tenth century, although 
the first work in this genre cannot yet be determined. The fifth/eleventh century saw a 
surge in distinctions writing, as did the seventh/thirteenth and eighth/fourteenth 
                                                             
3 A legal system, of course, is made up of much more than legal theory and substantive laws. In addition, 
a legal system would need at least courts, a state, and enforcement mechanics. See Joseph Raz, The 
Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1980). 
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centuries. Books of legal distinctions were written in all four Sunni schools of law, 
although it found greater currency with the Shāfiʿī school than it did with others. In 
general, Shi’i jurists did not compose works of legal distinctions, although an early 
work is attributed to the Shi’i jurist Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Barqī (d. third/ninth c.) 
and another work is attributed to the Zaydī author ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā ibn Rāshid al-Washlī 
al-Yamanī (d. 777). Unfortunately, neither work is extant. The genre seems to have 
been particularly popular in large urban centers, with an original point of focus in 
Abbasid Baghdad and later in Mamluk Cairo. The manuscripts of books of legal 
distinctions show that these works were copied and recopied often and circulated 
widely.  
This study emphasizes the literary manifestations of Islamic law. In particular, it 
looks to expand the study of genre within Islamic legal writing by carrying out a 
history of one genre in particular, that of legal distinctions (al-furūq al-fiqhiyya). The 
genre of legal distinctions has received almost no scholarly attention. Nevertheless, its 
history is an important part of the development of Islamic law. This study shows genre 
to be a valuable rubric for locating the relevance of later Islamic legal literature, and in 
particular highlights the intellectual and social background from which this genre 
emerged and the specific ways in which the genre of legal distinctions adapted to 
changing social patterns that affected the consumption of Islamic legal knowledge. 
Furūq literature offered a venue that allowed jurists to adapt the law in new packaging 
as a response to social demand for new and different forms of legal knowledge.  
 
 
 4 
 
Legal Background 
The Middle Periods of Islamic history witnessed the downfall of caliphal hegemony as  
well as the rise of non-Arabic Islamic culture. Scholars of the cultural history of the 
Central Islamic lands have long held this period to be one of scholarly stasis and 
cultural decadence. In the realm of Arabic literature, for example, the idea that Arabic 
entered a period of steep decline around the thirteenth century has been accepted for 
well over a century. R.A. Nicholson already took this as a given in his Literary History of 
the Arabs published in 1907. He refers to cultural production in Arabic after the Mongol 
sack of Baghdad in 1258 as “a melancholy conclusion to a glorious history.”4 Ensuing 
scholarship has more recently engaged in a great deal of debate concerning the precise 
moment the age of decline began. In the Cambridge History of Arabic Literature, M.M. 
Badawi argued that the alleged decline began early in the sixteenth century and ended 
in the late nineteenth, declaring that “[t]he period is no doubt characterized by the 
absence of creativity and loss of vigour.”5 While the period of supposed decline is 
shrinking in size, Badawi does not question the decline narrative. It is only very 
recently that scholars of Arabic literature have begun to study this period in earnest. 
Joseph Lowry and Devin Stewart describe the period between 1350 and 1850 as “a 
period of time almost uniformly dismissed by scholars of Arabic literature as lacking in 
                                                             
4 Reynold Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907), 442. 
5 Muhammad Badawi, ed., Modern Arabic Literature: The Cambridge History of Arabic Literature (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1992, 2. 
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literary achievements.”6 Their volume, which surveys some major figures of this 
period, marks a radical shift in the reassessment of cultural production in Arabic.7  
Reinforcing this broad decline narrative, the dominant conception of Islamic 
law, as forcefully argued by Joseph Schacht, is that creative development within Islamic 
law came to an abrupt stop around the middle of the tenth century. At this time, legal 
creativity ossified into a state of total rigidity, or as he called it, “ankylose.”8 As evidence 
for the lack of creativity during this period, Schacht has pointed to several factors: the 
rise of commentary traditions, a decline in innovative legal reasoning, and, most 
importantly, a discursive commitment to adhering diligently to already-established 
legal interpretations, known in Arabic as taqlīd.9 Schacht’s interpretation of Islamic law 
amounts to the dismissal of the majority of Islamic legal history.  
 Wael Hallaq has challenged Schacht’s ideas by adducing evidence of many legal 
scholars who, after the tenth century, offered new and inventive legal interpretations. 
His findings “suggest [that] developments in positive law, legal theory, and the 
judiciary have indeed taken place.”10 Hallaq continued his arguments against Schacht in 
                                                             
6 Joseph E. Lowry and Devin J. Stewart, eds., Essays in Arabic Literary Biography 1350-1850 (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009), 1. 
7 Recently, Thomas Bauer has convincingly put forth a convincing case for the centrality of ambiguity as 
a central aesthetic in Arabic literature. The tolerance for, and even delight in, ambiguity was a central 
motivator of scholarly writing. See Thomas Bauer, Die Kultur der Ambiguität: Eine Andere Geschichte des 
Islams (Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen, 2011). 
8 Joseph Schacht, “Classicisme, traditionalisme et ankylose dans la loi religieuse de l’Islam.” Classicisme et 
déclin culturel dans l’histoire de l’Islam, ed. Robert Brunschvig and G.E. von Grunebaum, 141-61 (Paris: G.P. 
Maisonneuve et Larose, 1977). 
9 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 71. 
10 Wael Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 16 (1984), 33. 
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a second study, “From Fatwās to Furūʿ,” in which he looks at the development of Islamic 
law through the incorporation of legal responsa, fatwas, into legal compendia. With 
this work, Hallaq has shown the potential of new kinds of sources for finding 
development and creativity within the history of Islamic law.11 Baber Johansen and 
David Powers have both demonstrated in greater detail how legal change and creativity 
were expressed through such responsa. Johansen argues that fatwas were not “chiefly 
responsible,” but rather that commentaries on legal compendia also played a major 
role in changing legal doctrine.12 Powers, meanwhile, argues in favor of adhering to 
already-established legal interpretations, “or, what we might call, adherence to the rule 
of law.”13  
Sherman Jackson agrees with Schacht in that jurists from the post-formative 
period did not break free from the restraints of existing legal interpretations. However, 
he rejects Schacht’s assertion of ‘creative ossification,’ seeing the constraints of the 
tradition as an impetus for legal creativity, more so than what was possible without 
these limitations: “In fact, it may not be at all incorrect to say that taqlīd represents a 
more rather than less advanced phase of legal development.”14 Jackson interprets this 
respect for legal tradition as the parameters within and through which later jurists 
                                                             
11 Wael Hallaq, “From Fatwās to Furūʿ: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law.” Islamic Law and 
Society 1 (1994): 29-65. 
12 Baber Johansen, “Legal Literature and the Problem of Change,” in Islam and Public Law: Classical and 
Contemporary Studies, ed. Chibli Malla (London: Graham and Trotman, 1993), 30-31. 
13 David Powers, Law, Society, and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300-1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 94. 
14 Sherman Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī 
(Leiden: Brill, 1996), 227. 
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display their intellectual creativity. Norman Calder takes this idea to an extreme, 
arguing that Islamic law is, in fact, not law for this world at all, but rather a “brilliant 
imitation of reality, sharply characterised, precisely delineated, charmingly 
evocative.”15 With this statement, Schacht’s formulation of Islamic legal history has 
been turned on its head. Taqlīd does not mark a nadir of any kind, but rather the 
beginning of an opening within legal literature for concern with the aesthetics of the 
law, and of the maturation of the craft of legal writing. 
As previously noted, this scholarly debate is incomplete. It deals only with three 
genres of legal writing: legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), legal compendia (fiqh), and responsa 
(fatwas). There are other post-formative genres of legal writing that remain almost 
entirely unexplored. They include works on legal distinctions (furūq), cognate and 
similar legal cases (al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir), legal maxims (qawāʿid), legal riddles (al-alghāz 
al-fiqhiyya) and more. These genres are, further, interrelated. Many books, such as Jalāl 
al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī’s (d. 911/1505) al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, contain extensive sections on all 
three of these topics. To date, there has been little scholarship dealing with any of 
these other genres. More significantly, the subject of this dissertation, legal furūq, has 
received almost no scholarly attention in the Western academy.16 
                                                             
15 Norman Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era, ed. Colin Imber (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 95. 
16 There have been some introductory surveys written in Arabic on legal distinctions, most notably 
Yaʿqūb ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya wa-l-uṣūliyya: muqawwamātuhā shurūṭuhā 
nashʾatuhā taṭawwuruhā dirāsa naẓariyya waṣfiyya tārīkhiyya (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd; Sharikat al-Riyāḍ 
li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1419/1998), and Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū al-Fāris, “Introduction,” 
to Abū al-Faḍl Muslim al-Dimashqī, Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris 
(Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1992). 
 8 
 
This genre is, in fact, radically understudied: there are just two articles in 
European languages dealing specifically with such books and only a handful of 
mentions of them in other research. The first of the two articles on this subject, by 
Joseph Schacht, was published in 1926. In this article, Schacht presents two 
manuscripts within this genre, one attributed to a Najm al-Dīn al-Naysābūrī (d. ?) and 
another by al-Sāmarrī (d. 545/1150). Schacht alludes to the potential importance of the 
genre of legal distinctions, but most of his comments are about the condition of the two 
manuscripts.17 The next article on this topic was published in 2000 by Wolfhart 
Heinrichs. Again, rather than analyze furūq literature, he primarily provides an 
annotated bibliography of some furūq works. He repeats the call for its study and 
asserts that legal distinctions should be studied along with two other similar genres: 
legal maxims and cognate and similar cases. Such research “will lead to a fairer 
assessment of later Islamic legal culture.”18 Since Heinrichs wrote his article, there has 
been work done on the ‘cousins’ of furūq literature—cognate and similar legal cases (al-
ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir), and legal maxims (qawāʿid)—but none on the furūq literature itself. 
 
The Role of Genre 
Genre has not been a central focus of study by scholars of Islamic law. This lacuna has 
led to a lack of understanding surrounding the role and function that genre has had in 
                                                             
17 Joseph Schacht, “Aus zwei arabischen Furūq-Büchern” Islamica 2 (1926): 505-537. 
18 Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law: Remarks on the Furuq Literature,” in Studies in Honour of 
Clifford Edmund Bosworth Volume I: Hunter of the East: Arabic and Semitic Studies edited by Ian Richard Netton, 
332-344 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 340. 
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the development of Islamic legal literature. Some scholars have recently attempted to 
being filling this gap by researching specific genres. These studies have been important 
in advancing knowledge of Islamic legal genre, although they also show the vastly 
different approaches that scholars in Islamic studies have taken when approaching 
genre. This section, which will look at several recent works in an attempt to lay the 
groundwork for an analysis of genre in Islamic law, shows some of the tensions 
between current approaches, and discusses the results with previous studies. In 
particular, I consider work by Ahmad A. Ahmad on the works of al-takhrīj and al-qawāʿid, 
Ahmed El Shamsy’s work on the ḥāshiya literature, Intisar Rabb’s book on al-qawāʿid al-
fiqhiyya, and Khadiga Musa’s study of al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya and al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir.19 
 One issue that immediately arises when attempting to study one particular 
genre is how to define the criteria for inclusion in and exclusion from the genre, or, in 
other words, how to recognize works as being part of one genre. Each of these authors 
takes a different approach to this question. Ahmad Ahmad seems to believe in a general 
notion of genre in Islamic legal writing, although “focusing on the significance of these 
different types of Islamic legal writing is more valuable than squeezing them into 
identifiable genres.”20 In focusing on the significance of writing, he does not tell us how 
he identifies specific genres; nevertheless, he seems to understand the existence of 
various discrete genres within Islamic legal literature. He notes, for instance, “[i]n fact, 
                                                             
19 These works are not explicit attempts at studying genre, but ideas about genre and its function in 
Islamic law seem to guide much of the research they undertake. 
20 Ahmad A. Ahmad, Structural Interrelations of Theory and Practice in Islamic Law: A Study of Six Works of 
Medieval Islamic Jurisprudence (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006), 17. 
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I am not aware of much treatment by Western scholars of any of the particular juristic 
genres that make up the corpus of Islamic legal writings as genres in their own right.”21 
A treatment of particular juristic genres in their own right requires the existence of 
identifiable genres. Unfortunately, Ahmad does not elaborate on this topic.  
Ahmed El Shamsy recently analyzed legal genre in a study of the genre of 
supercommentary (ḥāshiya). Specifically, he hopes to understand “the emergence of the 
ḥāshiya genre in Islamic legal literature.”22 While El Shamsy does not include a 
theoretical discussion of genre or the role of genre in Islamic law, he attempts to state 
parameters for the genre of the ḥāshiya. The characteristic features of the genre include 
“an exercise in a specific kind of erudition,”23 “a linguistic preoccupation,”24 “the sheer 
scholasticism of many of the ḥāshiya authors’ concerns,”25 and “its [very concise] Arabic 
style.”26 The characteristics that El Shamsy describes are useful, but too broad. He also 
leaves out the most obvious characteristic, a formal consideration, that a ḥāshiya is a 
commentary on a previous text. This formal characteristic seems to be what El Shamsy 
is using in designating the works to this genre, even though it is not part of his list of 
“characteristic features.” 
                                                             
21 Ahmad, Structural Interrelations, 45. 
22 Ahmed El Shamsy, “The Ḥāshiya in Islamic Law: A Sketch of Shāfiʿī Literature” Oriens 41 (2013), 290. 
23 El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya” 296-97. 
24 El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya” 297. 
25 El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya” 297. 
26 El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya” 298. 
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Intisar Rabb took a different approach to legal genres in her dissertation. There, 
she studied “the genre of legal maxims,”27 which “emerged as a genre of independent 
literature”28 in the seventh/thirteenth – tenth/sixteenth centuries.29 Rabb understands 
works of legal maxims to be books wholly or primarily devoted to listing and explaining 
legal maxims. Although she does not state this explicitly, it is clear looking at her 
overview of the genre of legal maxims that she classifies works based on content.30 This 
contrasts with El Shamsy’s use of form as a guiding principle in determining genre.  
More recently, Khadiga Musa also completed a survey of the genre of al-qawāʿid 
al-fiqhiyya.31 While she is interested in genre, her study does not contain a theoretical 
discussion of the term genre; she takes genre’s existence in Islamic legal literature as a 
given. In analyzing the genre of al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, Musa bases her understanding of 
the genre on readings of the extant books of that call themselves al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir. 
From these readings, she develops an understanding of the genre and how it developed. 
This is a useful approach for understanding the make-up of the genre; but her 
discussion lacks formal parameters of inclusion and exclusion other than self-
                                                             
27 Rabb, “Doubt’s Benefit: Legal Maxims in Islamic Law, 7th-16th centuries,” PhD Diss., Princeton 
University, 2009, 2. 
28 Rabb, “Doubt’s Benefit,” 16. 
29 Her dissertation focuses on legal maxims as a genre of Islamic writing. Her dissertation has been 
published as a monograph, Doubt in Islamic Law: A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic Criminal 
Law. Doubt in Islamic Law, unlike “Doubt’s Benefit,” takes the idea of doubt and uncertainty as the 
structuring principles of analysis, not genre. Because of the change in focus, I draw my discusion from 
“Doubt’s Benefit,” and not Doubt in Islamic Law. 
30 Rabb, “Doubt’s Benefit,” 458-482. 
31 Khadiga Musa, “Legal Maxims as a Genre of Islamic Law: Origins, Development, and Significance of al-
Qawāʿid al-Fiqhiyya” Islamic Law and Society 21 (2014): 325-65. 
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designation by title.32 Ahmad, however, believes it is “generally untenable” to use the 
title of a work to determine its genre.33 This approach potentially excludes early titles 
written before the formalization of the genre. Musa’s approach also leaves somewhat 
uncertain the criteria for excluding books from the al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir genre and 
including them in the genre al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya. We see in this study, however, a third 
method for identifying legal genre: by title.34  
There have been other recent and relevant studies, but they are less explicit 
about their considerations of genre. For example, in his recent work on genre in Islamic 
legal literature, Mohammad Hashim Kamali gives no insight into what he considers 
constitutive or important about genre.35 He discusses the importance of studying 
various understudied genres and gives a brief explanation of them. Similarly, Wolfhart 
Heinrichs leaves the idea of genre underdetermined in his article on legal distinctions 
and his article on legal maxims.36 Both of these authors seem to approach genre as 
something inherently recognizable. They likely use a combination of the approaches 
described above as their criteria of inclusion and exclusion from particular genres, but 
the criteria they use are not explicit.  
                                                             
32 Musa, “Legal Maxims,” 331-40. 
33 Ahmad A. Ahmad, Strucutral Interrelations, 17. 
34 Devin J. Stewart, “Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī’s al-Bayān ʿan uṣūl al-aḥkām and the Genre of Uṣūl al-Fiqh 
in Ninth-Century Baghdad,” pp. 321-49 in Abbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of Abbasid Studies, 
Cambridge 6-10 July 2002, ed. James Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2004). 
35 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Legal Maxims and Other Genres of Literature in Islamic Jurisprudence,” 
Arab Law Quarterly 20 (2006): 77-101. 
36 Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law;” idem., “Qawāʿid as a Genre of Legal Literature” in Bernard 
Weiss, ed., Studies in Islamic Legal Theory (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2002): 365-84. 
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 One of the benefits of studying Islamic law through genre is that jurists seem to 
have seen themselves participating in established genres, or discursive traditions, 
through the composition of books. A problem arises, however, since the classical Arabo-
Islamic tradition had no term for literary genre. Nevertheless, there are several words 
in Classical Arabic which can have meanings close to those of genre. The lack of an 
equivalent term, however, does not necessarily mean the lack of a similar concept, nor 
that premodern jurists did not have an idea of genre. Although genre has remained a 
somewhat underdeveloped concept in Islamic legal studies, it has nevertheless proved 
productive for scholars who used it as an analytical framework. The unstated belief in 
the existence of genre motivated the above-mentioned studies. 
 It is helpful to look at the various approaches taken by each of these scholars 
and see why they think of genre in such different fashions. The disagreements come, in 
part, from the specific genres chosen as a subject of study. Not all of the genres of 
Islamic legal literature are commensurate, nor would it make sense to analyze them in 
a similar fashion. Not all genres function in a similar way. El Shamsy’s study of 
supercommentaries necessitates his focus on the formal features of the work. Rabb, 
meanwhile, alerts us to the importance of content. It may seem obvious that content 
plays a role in the determination of genre, yet it is an important point which has been 
obscured in the study of Islamic law. Musa’s focus on titles, meanwhile, reveals yet 
another way to think of genre. Ahmad’s caution against a title-based approach to genre 
is important, but this approach nevertheless has merit. Title was one of the few 
straightforward ways that premodern authors had of announcing their participation in 
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one genre or another. Why and how this was accomplished may not be straightforward, 
but titles should not be dismissed. 
 One result that can already be seen from treatments of genre is the 
overemphasis given to two genres of Islamic law, substantive rules (furūʿ al-fiqh) and 
legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh).37 It can seem, at times, that all Islamic legal writing can be 
included in one of these two rubrics. “Most studies of Islamic law tend to portray a 
bipartite arrangement [of substantive legal rules and formalist jurisprudence]…”38 The 
portrayal of a bipartite division of Islamic law does not leave room for legal literature 
that exists outside of this framework. Ahmad comes to a similar conclusion about the 
state of Islamic studies, claiming that legal distinctions and maxims “are but two 
examples of Islamic legal writing that cannot be subsumed under the rubrics of fiqh and 
uṣūl al-fiqh.”39 My dissertation adds to this trend in recent research attempting to 
overcome the uṣūl-furūʿ dichotomy.40 
As much as these approaches are perhaps at odds with one another, they are 
nevertheless complementary. Until further research has been done on the genres of 
Islamic legal literature, such a mix of approaches to understanding genre in premodern 
Islamic law is perhaps the best way forward. It is not completely clear how and why 
authors chose to write in one genre instead of another, nor how and why genres were 
                                                             
37 See also Ahmad, Structural Interrelationships, 16. 
38 Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law, 20. 
39 Ahmad A. Ahmad, Strucutral Interrelations, 29. 
40 Rabb intends to add “legal maxims (qawāʿid al-fiqh) as the third major genre of Islamic law.” Rabb, Doubt 
in Islamic Law, 20. It seems to me, however, that assigning certain genres as the major genres or the 
principle genres before studying the genres of Islamic law as a whole is premature. 
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created, flourished, or waned. This dissertation attempts to answer some of these 
questions for legal distinctions, and perhaps shows a way of thinking about genre that 
can be applied to other types of Islamic legal literature. 
   
A Note on Genre in Islamic Legal Literature 
The notion of genre inspired the analysis in this dissertation. It is therefore important 
to discuss what I mean by the word genre and how I use this idea in my dissertation. 
While genres are “groups of works that belong together because they stand in the same 
tradition,”41 they are also the products of agency, of those who bring the texts together 
and those who construct and determine the contours of a tradition. The Princeton 
Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics explains that “The practice of grouping individual texts 
into distinct categories, called genres, is common to writers and readers of all periods.”42 
Both authors and audiences play a role in determining the genre of a work with the 
result that there emerge shifting conceptions of different genres over time.  
The understanding of genre relied on in this dissertation draws on formalist 
understandings. A formalist interpretation of genre, as explained by Tzvetan Todorov, 
is based on the idea of genre as a category or groupings to which texts can be ascribed. 
Todorov’s ideas about genre are useful for the study of Islamic law because of the 
change and dynamism that he reads into literary genres. On the origins of genre, one of 
the central questions of the first part of this dissertation, Todorov writes, “Where do 
                                                             
41 Alastair Fowler, “Genre” in Encyclopedia of Literature and Criticism, ed. Martin Coyle et. al. (Detroit: Gale 
Research, 1990), 151. 
42 Princeton Encyclopaedia of Poetry and Poetics, s.v. “Genre” (M. Cavitch). 
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genres come from? Quite simply from other genres. A new genre is always the 
transformation of an earlier one, or of several: by inversion, by displacement, by 
combination.”43 Genres should not be seen as static or stable, but rather as constantly 
changing. A genre can undergo change in itself, or it can change into a new genre. 
Todorov sees the origin of the novel arising from a massive series of generic 
transformations, arguing, “[t]he difficulty of the study of the ‘origin of the novel…’ 
arises only from the infinite embedding of speech acts with others.”44 Only a finite 
number of transformations, or embedded speech acts, can be accounted for. While it 
may not be possible to capture all of the transformations that gave way to the creation 
of a new genre, this methodology for understanding Islamic legal genres is quite useful. 
In addition to Todorov’s understanding, genre should also be understood as a 
Wittgensteinian language game.45 For Ludwig Wittgenstein, the term language game 
“suggest[s], first of all, that language was to be understood as an activity,”46or as he 
puts it, language is “recurrent acts of play in time.”47 There are several benefits to be 
gained by thinking of genre as a language game. Most importantly, this formulation 
allows us to think of genre as a continuous activity rather than a rigid category. A 
continuous activity is always open to change and improvisation. Thus, works belonging 
to a genre, “[r]ather than [having] defining characteristics…share family 
                                                             
43 Tzvetan Todorov, Genres in Discourse, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 15. 
44 Todorov, Genres, 26. 
45 Fowler, “Genre,” 157.  
46 Hans Sluga, Wittgenstein (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 60. 
47 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), 68e, ¶519. 
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resemblances.”48 This formulation is particularly useful for the study of Islamic legal 
literature; instead of looking for rigid characteristics, one should look for the kinds of 
rules that each genre qua game follows.49 Each genre is beholden to its particular rules 
and these rules are liable to change over time, as the game plays out in a series of social 
and intellectual contexts. Understanding genre as a game is particularly useful when 
looking at premodern Arabic writers. These writers clearly had ideas of genres, as is 
evident in the title of works, the ways the introductions contextualized books and in 
discussions of literature. A flexible understanding of genre is necessary to study the life 
of any Islamic legal genre, as these were elaborated over centuries, across a wide 
geography, and by several authors belonging to different schools of thought.  
Returning for a moment to the various modern scholarly treatments of genres 
of Islamic legal writing discussed above, it is clear that a more precise formulation of 
genre would help organize a discussion around genre. As noted earlier, Ahmad is 
ambivalent about using genre as a rubric for analyzing Islamic law. “At any rate, an 
application of the term ‘genre’ to Islamic legal writing may be best attested in later 
works of law and legal theory rather than presumed to be found throughout Islamic 
legal literature.”50 For him, genre should be thought of as a relatively well-defined 
category. He therefore has difficulty using this term for an early period. If, however, 
one were to think of genre as a continuous activity, it would not be surprising to find 
                                                             
48 Fowler, “Genre,” 157. 
49 Sluga, Wittgenstein, 61; Ludwig Wittgenstein, Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations:” 
Generally known as The Blue and Brown Books: (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 25-26. 
50 Ahmad, Structural Interrelationships, 16. 
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one set of genres in an early period that evolves in multiple ways. Genres can splinter 
off into new genres and genres can change their rules to adapt to new activities.  
These articles also provide evidence for the usefulness of thinking about genre 
as a language-game. Both El Shamsy and Rabb find evidence of legal content being 
shaped by genre. In other words, they find thought and language conforming to the 
rules of particular language games. El Shamsy suggests that the ḥāshiya’s development 
was a way for jurists to cope with and comprehend the enormity of the legal literary 
tradition, “a product of the logical development of a discipline.”51 In seeing ḥāshiyas as a 
sort of end-point for the legal tradition committed to commentary, jurists were free to 
elaborate on any and all aspects of these texts. It was not simply the legal content that 
was important, but also the linguistic and scholastic concerns of the authors of these 
texts. Rabb, meanwhile, finds that the maxim, “Avoid capital punishment in cases of 
doubt (adraʿū al-ḥudūd bi-l-shubuhāt),” underwent change as it transferred genre. She 
argues that “[t]he sources indicate that the differences in the form of the maxim in the 
early period were a matter not of sequence, but of genre.”52 The changes inherent in 
the doubt canon were not due to history, but rather literature. The maxim changed as 
it played different generic games. This dissertation approaches the genre of legal 
distinction through the understanding described above.  
 
 
                                                             
51 El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya”303. 
52 Rabb, “Doubt’s Benefit,” 61. 
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The Genres of Islamic Law  
As shown in this study, Genre is a productive frame through which to study the 
literature of Islamic law. This dissertation focuses on legal distinctions as a genre in 
Islamic law. We therefore focus on genre as an important aspect of legal literature, 
particularly the post-formative genres. Legal distinctions is one of a series of important 
legal genres that were relevant in this postformative period (after the sixth/twelfth 
century). Some of the prevalent genres are well known continuations of formative 
genres, while others gained prominence or began in the post-formative period. It is 
important, however, to provide a preliminary sketch of the legal genres which appear 
to have been important during the post-formative period in order to understand the 
legal-intellectual context in which legal distinctions operated. 
During the formation of Islamic law, the primary genres were likely the mabsūṭ 
or jāmiʿ (detailed exposition of positive law), the mukhtaṣar (handbook of positive law), 
and uṣūl al-fiqh. It does not seem that the mabsūṭ continued into the post-formative 
period, while mukhtaṣars were produced at least into the eighth/fourteenth century.53 
Related to the elaboration of positive law are works of legal disagreement, ikhtilāf. 
Ikhtilāf works advanced the legal doctrine of one legal school, or of one trend within a 
legal school and argued for its superiority over other doctrine.54 Legal theory, uṣūl al-
fiqh, was also an important genre in the formative period of Islamic law, and seems to 
                                                             
53 See the discussion in EI2 s.v. “Mukhtaṣar” (A. Arazi and H. Ben-Shammay). 
54 See the discussion in Chapter Three. 
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have advanced into the post-formative period.55 The continuation of two of these 
genres into the post-formative period signals the continued importance of these 
genres; their numerical decline during this same period, however, perhaps signals a 
need for a different periodization of Islamic law.  
The genre of fatwas, or legal responsa, have a slightly different history. Fatwas 
are not only a postclassical legal genre, rather fatwas seem to have existed from the 
beginning of Islamic law. The anthologizing of fatwas made by important scholars 
continued through the postclassical period and into the contemporary era. Fatwas have 
been studied as an institution and as a source for social history, but both the fatwa and 
the fatwa collection have received little attention as genres.56 
There are several other genres pertaining to the interactions between 
individuals and the law. Of these, the most studied is likely the genre of inheritance 
law, ʿilm al-farāʾiḍ.57 These works deal with the calculations of inheritance shares and 
dividing property in accordance with the quranically prescribed rules. In addition, 
                                                             
55 See Hallaq, Authority; Atif, 25-37; and Aron Zysow, The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology 
of Islamic Legal Theory (Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2013). 
56 The best source for understanding fatwas is still Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and 
David Powers, eds. Islamic Legal Interpretations: Muftis and Their Fatwas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), see also Kamali, Shari‘ah Law, 162-178. More recently, however, see Omer Awass, “Fatwa: The 
Evolution of an Islamic Legal Practice and its Influence on Muslim Society,” Ph.D. Diss., Temple 
University, 2014. For a worthwhile and alternative approach to the study of fatwas, see Hussein Ali 
Agrama, “Ethics, tradition, authority: Toward an anthropology of the fatwa” American Ethnologist 37.1 
(2010): 2-18. 
57 Noel J. Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1971); and 
David S. Powers, ed. “The Islamic Inheritance System,” special issue, Islamic Law and Society 5.3 (1998). 
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there are form books for various kinds of contracts, shurūṭ,58 guides for market 
inspection, ḥisba,59 and advice literature for judges, muftis, and those seeking their aid, 
works of adab al-qāḍī and adab al-muftī.60 
 Perhaps the most studied genre of the post-classical period is al-qawāʿid al-
fiqhiyya, legal maxims or principles that state general principles of Islamic law.61 Many 
scholars, based on a definition by Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, understood them to be generally 
valid; although other jurists hold them only to lesser degrees of validity.62 This genre is 
closely related to two other genres of post-formative Islamic law: al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir 
and maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. It may be the case that al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir is a distinct genre of 
                                                             
58 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ṭaḥāwī, The Function of Documents in Islamic Law: The Chapters on Sales from 
Ṭaḥāwī’s Kitāb al-shurūṭ al-kabīr, ed. Jeanette A. Wakin (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
1972); Wael Hallaq, “Model Shurūṭ Works and the Dialectic of Doctrine and Practice” Islamic Law and 
Society 2.2 (1994): 109-34. 
59 See Kristen Stilt, Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion, and Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Schacht, Introduction, 230-32. 
60 Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters, and David S. Powers, “Qāḍīs and their Courts: An Historical 
Survey” in Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and their Judgments, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph 
Peters, and David S. Powers, 1-46 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2006); ibid., “Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal 
Interpretation” in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters, and David S. Powers, 3-32 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1996), and al-Qarāfī, The Criterion for Distinguishing Legal Opinions from Judicial 
Rulings and the Administrative Acts of Judges and Rulers, trans. Mohammad H. Fadel (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2017). 
61 Heinrichs, “Qawāʿid as a Genre of Legal Literature;” EI2 s.v., “Ḳawāʾid Fiḳhiyya” (Heinrichs); Birgit 
Krawietz, Hierarchie der Rechtsquellen im tradierten sunnitischen Islam (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002); 
Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Shari‘ah Law: An Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), 141-61. Intisar Rabb, 
“Doubt’s Benefit.” There are many in-depth modern studies written in Arabic. See also Yaʿqūb al-
Bāḥusayn, al-Qawāʿid al-fiqhiyyah: al-mabādiʾ al-muqawwimāt, al-maṣādir al-dalīliyya al-taṭawwur, dirāsa 
naẓariyya taḥlīliyya taʾṣīliyya tārīkhiyya (Riyadh: Maktabat Ibn Rushd, Shirkat al-Riyāḍ, 1418/1998). See, as 
well, the bibliography in Intisar Rabb, “Doubt’s Benefit,” 461-82. 
62 Heinrichs, “Qawāʿid as a Genre of Legal Literature,” 367, quoting Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, al-Ashbāh wa-l-
naẓāʾir, ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muḥuammad ʿIwaḍ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
1411/1991), 1:11 
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its own but that has yet to be fully understood.63 Maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, the purposes of the 
law, is perhaps a subset of the legal maxims literature which seeks to understand the 
primary goals of Islamic law and derive jurisprudence on the basis of attaining these 
goals.64 
Of course, legal maxims are not the only post-formative genre. Furūq, legal 
distinctions, are comparisons of laws which apply to apparently similar situations but 
result is contradictory rulings. Although legal distinctions arose in the fourth/tenth 
century, the genre blossomed in the postformative period, as discussed in the present 
study. Additionally, legal riddles, al-alghāz al-fiqhiyya, were another prominent form of 
intellectual play in the post-formative period.65 Finally, the versification of legal 
knowledge also deserves mention. Legal treatises of various kinds, written in verse 
(manẓūma; naẓm) are prevalent in manuscript libraries, but have not received serious 
scholarly attention. The versification of legal knowledge likely occurred with the 
versification of other scholarly disciplines and was part of a larger aesthetic preference 
towards intellectual play.66 In this regard, books on ḥiyal, legal strategems, deserve 
                                                             
63 Specifically, the genre of al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir is not well understood. While Heinrichs understands al-
ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir to be an extension of qawāʿid, Khadiga Musa states that some premodern jurists 
understood it as an extension of legal distinctions. Khadiga Musa, “Legal Maxims,” 338. 
64 Al-Shāṭibī’s al-Muwāfaqāt fī uṣūl al-sharīʿa seems to have been the first text of this kind. See EI2 s.v. 
“Maḳāṣid al-Sharīʿa” s.v. (Gleave); Krawietz, Hierarchie, 223-241; Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, al-
Muwāfaqāt, ed. Abū ʿUbaydah Mashhūr ibn Ḥasan Āl Salmān, 6 vols. (Riyadh: Dār Ibn Qayyim; Cairo: Dār 
Ibn ʿAffān, 2009); idem, The Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law, trans. Imran Ahsan Khan 
Nyazee (Reading, UK: Garnet, 2011); Kamali, Shari‘ah Law, 123-40. 
65 See Chapter Five of the present study and the references cited therein. 
66 Searching for naẓm and manẓūm in GAS, I found only two works of legal versification mentioned in GAS, 
Naẓm al-durra fī talkhīṣ al-Mudawwana by al-Sārmasāḥī (d. 669/1271; 1:471) and Naẓm Risālat Ibn Abī Zayd by 
Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Miknāsī (d. 919/1513; 1:481). Al-Sārmasāḥī’s seems to be the earliest legal work 
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special mention.67 Ḥiyal works appear early on Islam, the first such work likely being 
Kitāb al-makhārij fī al-ḥiyal of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, and it seems to have 
continued as a small but important genre well into the post-formative period.68 Indeed, 
the fifth chapter of Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir is on legal stragems. 
The post-formative period also saw the rise of takhrīj al-furūʿ ʿalā al-uṣūl 
(elaborating substantive rules on the basis of fundamental legal rules).69 Takhrīj was a 
“creative activity” undertaken by “jurists of the higher ranks” in which they built on 
and elaborated the “opinions of the imam and those of his immediate mujtahid-
followers, not the revealed texts themselves.”70 It is possible that works of takhrīj gained 
popularity as the mukhtaṣar lost popularity, but this needs to be investigated further. In 
this vein, supercommentaries, ḥawāshī, are an interesting genre and sites of legal 
discussion. Commentaries on commentaries on works of substantive law, ḥawāshī are a 
genre defined in large part by their format rather than by their content.71  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that is called a naẓm or manẓūm. There are many more works of legal versification mentioned in GAL, 
fourteen with the title manẓūma and thirteen with the title naẓm. All of these are later than al-
Sārmasāḥī’s work. There are many more possible titles for legal poems, such as qaṣīda or qaṣāʾid, or titles 
based on end-rhyming letters, such as tāʾiyya, mīmiyya, etc.  
67 Joseph Schacht, “Die arabische ḥijal-Literatur. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschungder islāmischen 
Rechtspraxis,” Der Islam 15 (1926): 211-32; Satoe Horii, “Reconsideration of Legal Devices (Ḥiyal) in 
Islamic Jurisprudence: The Ḥanafīs and their ‘Exits’ (Makhārij)” Islamic Law and Society 9.3 (2002): 312-57. 
68 Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, Makhārij fī al-ḥiyal, ed. Joseph Schacht (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 
1930). 
69 Hallaq, Authority, 43-56;  
70 Hallaq, Authority, 22. For a monographic treatment of select works in this genre, see Ahmad A. Atif 
Structural Interrelations of Theory and Practice in Islamic Law: A Study of Six Works of Medieval Jurisprudence 
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007). 
71 See Ahmed El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya.” 
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Finally, two tangential genres should be considered. First, the logically-based 
inquisition known as ādāb al-baḥth (methods of argumentation) deserves more scrutiny. 
This style of argumentation, which began at the end of the seventh/thirteenth century 
and “owed its genesis to the earlier [… works on ʿilm al-khilāf and jadal and] was easy to 
apply across the disciplines.”72 The importance of disputation as jadal has been 
discussed often, but not so in its guise as ādāb al-baḥth. Further, legal biographies 
should also be considered within a discussion of the genres of Islamic Law, a genre that 
includes biobibliographical writing (ṭabaq̄at) as well as individual hagiographies of 
jurists (manāqib).73 
 
Chapter Overview 
This history of the genre of legal distinctions is composed of six chapters. Chapter One 
begins by asking what a legal distinction is, and what a book of legal distinction looks 
                                                             
72 Karabela, “Development of Dialectic,” 2. Karabela’s recent study on this topic offers many insights into 
the way in which ādāb al-baḥth operated and how it different from previous efforts of formalized 
disputation such as ʿilm al-jadal. Karabela demonstrates as well the ways in which it influenced legal 
thinking through its incorporation into the Ottoman legal curriculum. See also Larry B. Miller, “Islamic 
Disputation Theory: A Study in the Development of Dialectic in Islam from the Tenth through Fourteenth 
Centuries,” (PhD Diss., Princeton University, 1984), 196-239.  
73 On ṭabaqāt, see Stephen Humphreys, Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry, Rev. ed. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001), 187-209; Chase F. Robinson, Islamic Historiography (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 55-82; and Michael Cooperson, Classical Arabic Biography: The Heirs of 
the Prophets in the Age of al-Maʾmūn (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and R. 
Kevin Jaques, Authority, Conflict, and the Transmission of Diversity in Medieval Islamic Law (Leiden; Boston: 
Brill, 2006), 10-26. On manāqib, see Christopher Melchert, “Marʿī ibn Yūsuf” in Essays in Arabic Literary 
Biography II: 1350-1850, eds. Joseph E. Lowry and Devin J. Stewart, 284-94 (Weisbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 
2009); and Ibn al-Jawzī, The Virtues of the Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, 2 vols., ed. and trans. Michael Cooperson 
(New York; London: New York University Press, 2013). 
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like. The theoretical question of what a legal distinction ought to be is not one seriously 
taken up by the classical tradition. I have found only three such discussions, which are 
described in this chapter. The earliest and most in-depth is found in al-Farq wa-l-jamʿ, 
also known as Kitāb al-Furūq, by ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī (d. 438/1046), but there are also 
brief analyses in ʿAlam al-jadhal fī ʿilm al-jadal by Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316) and al-
Manthūr fī al-qawāʿid by Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī (d. 794/1392). From this survey, several 
aspects of legal distinctions emerge: the specific form of the comparison carried out in 
a legal distinction; its relationship to analogical reasoning; and the importance of 
formal disputation to the creation of the field of legal distinctions. The chapter then 
pursues this question from a different angle, by looking at books of legal distinctions 
themselves. The chapter closes with a look at the justifications given in books of legal 
distinctions for the composition of such works. 
Having established the general outlines of the genre, the second chapter takes a 
wider view, looking at the field of distinctions writing in the Arabic tradition generally. 
This chapter focuses primarily on the genres of distinctions in linguistics and in 
medicine as parallels to the genre of legal distinctions. Distinctions in linguistics 
focused either on differentiating between letters of the Arabic language, often on 
phonological grounds, or on lexicographic distinctions as semantic differentiation 
between near synonyms. This chapter finds that the genre of lexicographic distinctions 
was an important precursor to legal distinctions; it may perhaps even be said to 
establish some rules of the language game that is the genre of legal distinctions, 
regarding the organization and presentation of information. In medicine, differential 
diagnostics also has a certain resonance with the genre of legal distinctions. This 
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conclusion is complicated by the fact that although classical biobibliographical works 
seem to attest to a small but extant genre of distinctions works in medicine, only one 
work of this genre has survived, in various manuscripts and attributed to a variety of 
authors. Finally, the chapter closes by discussing other areas of intellectual inquiry 
which appear to have traditions of distinctions writing, such as ethics and philosophy. 
These works of distinctions, however, are not genres specific to these disciplines, but 
rather what I term applied lexicographic distinctions. That is, a work of lexicographic 
distinctions applied to the technical vocabulary of a specific scholarly discipline; a 
comparison of words for the soul, for instance, or of admonishing and advising. These 
works of applied lexicographic distinctions are important since they are found in 
almost all areas of Arabo-Islamic scholarship, and relevant to this study since they are 
even found in the field of law, but they are not examples of works of legal distinctions.  
With these foundations in place, the third chapter looks for precursors to legal 
distinctions within other genres within Islamic law. Here, I locate one of the origins of 
legal distinctions, the discussions in manuals of disputation theory (ʿilm al-jadal) on a 
particular method of objection labeled farq (distinction). Farq, as a formal technique, is 
found in manuals of legal disputation, but not in manuals for disputations in 
philosophy or theology. It is an objection to the applicability of a legal rationale (ʿilla) of 
one legal ruling to a second ruling. A farq-objection is used to trap a debate opponent 
into admitting that their statement for the case at hand contradicts a known doctrine 
held by them or their legal school. Books of legal distinctions, however, can be seen as 
attempts to categorize possible farq-objections and the information necessary to 
overcome such objections. In this sense, farq-objections are used offensively to 
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demonstrate contradictions while the genre of legal furūq contain the information 
necessary to defend oneself against such objections, thereby presenting a legal school’s 
substantive doctrines as coherent in terms of the rationales that underlie them.74  
After studying the disputational background of legal distinctions, Chapter Four 
analyzes the logic of legal distinctions in detail. Specifically, this chapter attempts to 
define the relationship between lexicographic distinctions and legal distinctions in 
terms of the analytical framework employed in each genre. The resonances between 
these two genres are clear, but this chapter finds significant differences in the 
reasoning employed in each of these two kinds of distinctions and, consequently, in the 
rules that each genre attempts to follow. In differentiating between near-synonyms, 
the genre of lexicographical distinctions is based on a fundamental similarity between 
the two words being compared. Legal distinctions, however, aim to demonstrate the 
fundamental dissimilarity between the two legal scenarios being compared. This 
chapter’s analysis establishes some of the rules that govern the genre of legal 
distinctions. Chapter Four then closes by attempting to locate the first work of legal 
distinctions, defined for these purposes as the first work that adheres to this 
framework.  
Having established some of the parameters of the genre of legal distinctions, 
Chapter Five turns to works that potentially complicate our understanding of the genre 
                                                             
74 Ahmed El Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (New York, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013); Joseph Lowry, Introduction to The Epistle on Legal Theory by 
Mụhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, ed. and trans. Joseph E. Lowry (New York and London: New York 
University Press, 2013), xviii-ix.. 
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of legal distinctions. In particular, this chapter studies the intersection between the 
genres of legal distinctions and that of legal riddles (al-alghāz al-fiqhiyya). The 
resonances between these two genres are clear, and each genre seems to have affected 
the other, with some works of legal riddles that are almost indistinguishable from 
works of legal distinctions and some works of legal distinctions that present 
distinctions couched in the rhetorical style of riddling. This chapter locates the impetus 
for this convergence in the proliferation of venues at which legal knowledge could be 
performed—teaching sessions, literary salons, and the court of the ruler—and a 
growing taste, particularly in the Mamluk period in Cairo (13th-16th centuries), for the 
aesthetics of riddling. The role of performance is also important since it connects 
changes in literary style with social practice and different reading publics. 
Finally, Chapter Six is a narrative bibliography of all works of legal distinctions 
known to me. The bibliographical work carried out in this chapter builds on and 
improves previous attempts to catalog this genre. I relied on earlier scholarship and 
also incorporated information from editorial discussions in all printed editions of texts 
in this genre, from the biobibliographical tradition, and from my own study of 
manuscript catalogs and collections. My survey locates thirty-six works that belong to 
this genre, and identifies the fifth/eleventh century and the seventh/thirteenth 
through eighth/fourteenth centuries as the peak period of composition in this genre. 
Chapter Six also discusses two Ḥanafī books of legal distinctions that have various 
dubious attributions but no known author. In spite of the uncertainty about the authors 
of these two works, they clearly belong to the genre and were copied and circulated to 
the same extent as other works in the genre whose authors are more easily identifiable.  
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The genre of al-furūq al-fiqhiyya presents a good subject for a case-study of the 
emergence and maturation of a new and distinct genre in Islamic legal literature. 
Through a study of this genre, this dissertation closely ties the intellectual history of 
Islamic law with the social display and consumption of Islamic legal knowledge, and 
specifically it demonstrates a close link between legal distinctions and distinctions in 
other scholarly fields. It also shows that the need for books of legal distinctions arose in 
part from the popularity of legal disputation and the usefulness of these works in 
overcoming farq-objections, which were common in the context of formal disputations. 
Additionally, the following study shows how changes in the genre of distinctions, and 
the genre of riddles, were tied to shifting aesthetic tastes and a changing demand for 
particular ways of packaging legal knowledge.  
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Chapter One: What Is a Legal Distinction? 
 
A book in the genre of legal distinctions is one that consists of a list of legal distinctions 
(al-furūq al-fiqhiyya). A legal distinction (al-farq al-fiqhī), according to the most common 
definition of the concept, explains the difference between “legal problems which are 
similar in appearance, but contradictory in their ruling (aḥkām tatashābahu ṣuwaruhā 
wa-takhtalifu aḥkāmhuhā).”75 These individual legal distinctions are particular kinds of 
comparisons. The collections of such legal comparisons first appear around the early 
fifth/eleventh century in works by Ḥanafī, Mālikī, and Shāfiʿī scholars.  
I begin by discussing what legal distinctions are, as found in books of furūq al-
fiqhiyya, and how they function generally. In looking at the functioning of legal 
distinctions, I explain the epistemological difference between legal distinctions and 
distinctions in lexicography. I conclude with an explanation of the different ways in 
which the terms farq and furūq function within the discourses of Islamic law.  
 
Legal Distinctions Defined 
There is a distinct genre of books on legal distinctions, but not much discussion in the 
premodern tradition about what legal distinctions are. Accordingly, before analyzing 
the history of the genre of legal distinctions, it will be important to gain an overview of 
what they are and how they functioned. Premodern theoretical discussions of legal 
distinctions are few and mostly brief but their similarities suggest a widespread and 
                                                             
75 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 14-15. 
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shared understanding of the topic among both authors and their readers. The works of 
legal distinctions themselves all share a similar conceptual framework and 
organization.  
 The first theoretical discussion of legal distinctions comes in a work of legal 
distinctions by ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, the father of the more famous Imām al-
Ḥaramayn Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085). His work is titled al-Farq wa-l-jamʿ, 
and it is alternatively known as Kitāb al-Furūq. Al-Juwaynī begins his book with a 
lengthy introduction detailing his theory of legal distinctions. His discussion of the 
concept of legal distinctions is unique in its depth and breadth. He gives a typology of 
legal distinctions which has three categories of distinctions. The first category of 
distinction is when “one finds two issues on which the legal school does not disagree, 
which have a similar appearance but a contradictory ruling (an yuṣādifa masʾalatayn lam 
yakhtalif al-madhhab fīhimā).”76 In this category, there is a comparison of different laws 
that only appear to, but do not actually, contradict. This is the most basic and common 
kind of legal distinction, both in al-Juwaynī’s book and in the genre of legal distinctions 
generally. 
Al-Juwaynī’s second and third categories are similar to each other. The second 
category is “when two questions arise which appear to be the same and al-Shāfiʿī [(d. 
204/820)] gave a definitive response to one of the questions and made the other ruling 
dependant on some factor (an tajtamiʿu masʾalatān al-Shāfiʿī qaṭaʿa qawlahu bi-jawābihi fī 
                                                             
76 Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Yūsuf Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Salāmah ibn 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Mazīnī (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1424/2004), 1:39.  
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iḥdāhimā wa-ʿallaqa qawlahu bi-l-ukhrā).”77 The third category is when “two questions 
come up which appear to be the same and our legal scholars have mentioned two legal 
positions for one of them but given a definitive response for the other (tajtamiʿu 
masʾalatān dhakara mashāyikhunā wajhayn fī iḥdāhima wa-qaṭaʿū al-qawl fī al-ukhra).”78 Both 
of these categories involve an uncertainty regarding which legal position is favored in 
the madhhab. The second category involves understanding the particularities of the 
substantive law of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, the eponym of the Shāfiʿī school, 
while the third category relates to the doctrine of school authorities after al-Shāfiʿī.  
This final category can then by divided into two subcategories: (a) “the two 
different rulings have equivalent weight (an yaqwā kull wāḥid min al-wajhayn)”79 and (b) 
“one of the two rulings is weakened by the rationale in the case on which there is no 
disagreement (an yaḍʿufa aḥad al-wajhayn bi-dalīl al-masʾala allatī lam takhtalifū fīhā).”80 
Again, these subcategories seem pretty clear. Category 3a involves deciding between 
two rulings with equal epistemological value, i.e. when there does not seem to be any 
criterion for preferring one ruling over another. Category 3b, however, involves 
evaluating two cases with different rulings and different epistemic values. How should 
a jurist measure a ruling reached by consensus, which applies only indirectly to the 
case at hand versus a directly relevant ruling on which there is no consensus? 
                                                             
77 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:39-41.  
78 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41.  
79 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41. 
80 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41.  
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 Al-Juwaynī’s typology of legal distinctions is complex and shows that, for him, 
not only do distinctions offer ways of resolving apparent contradictions, but also a 
productive method for reasoning through different kinds of seemingly ambiguous legal 
issues. As he presents distinctions, they are a defensive and pedagogical intellectual 
maneuver in which the doctrine of a legal school is justified and through which 
students of Islamic law can learn the rationales for specific points of legal doctrine. 
 Al-Juwaynī’s typology is especially interesting for the heirarchy it seeks to 
establish. He explains the different kinds of furūq that one can encounter and organizes 
them according to epistemic criteria. The first type involves no epistemic conflict, but 
rather disambiguating the scope of applicability of two different laws. The second type 
considers the opinions of al-Shāfiʿī; as the founder of the legal school to which the rest 
of the Shāfiʿī jurists adhere, his opinions enjoy epistemic authority over those of other 
jurists. The third type, meanwhile, involves disagreements at the level of individual 
jurists. These opinions are, epistemically, the weakest. Being able to understand which 
rule to apply and when, however, is an essential part of the academic formation of a 
jurist. 
One way of understanding furūq in his usage is that he is describing the contents 
of his book, Kitāb al-Furūq, i.e. he is giving a typology for the furūq that make up the 
work at hand. His typology does, of course, explain the contents of his work, but to 
understand it as only pertaining to the contents of his work would be to miss the real 
importance of this typology. Al-Juwaynī’s typology, in fact, conveys the possible kinds 
of contradictions of which a Shāfiʿī jurist could be accused of making during a 
disputation (al-mujādala; al-munāẓara). These are not only hypothetical accusations; 
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they correspond to various kinds of objections made in the course of formalized 
disputation, either in a real disputation or in paradigmatic accounts in writing.81 In al-
Juwaynī’s presentation a debate opponent could accuse a Shāfiʿī jurist of contradiction 
because the opponent does not understand (i) the scope of applicability of seemingly 
overlapping rules, (ii) the nuances of al-Shāfiʿī’s vast legal doctrine,82 or (iii) how to 
reason through competing statements of substantive law by other major authorities in 
the Shāfiʿī school. In other words, according to al-Juwaynī, non-Shāfiʿī’s could accuse a 
Shāfiʿī of contradiction because the non-Shāfiʿī did not understand how to make the 
complexity inherent in the substantive doctrine of the Shāfiʿī legal school coherent.  
Of course, it should not be surprising for a Shāfiʿī scholar to claim that others do 
not understand the depth and complexity of Shāfiʿī doctrine. Nevertheless, this claim 
can help us place this typology outside the narrow confines of al-Juwaynī’s book and 
into the larger world of intra-madhhab disputation. His first type of legal distinction (i) 
is the most straightforward. It involves a simple case of mistaken identity, i.e. two 
different issues on which there is no disagreement and which have different rulings 
attached to them that someone wrongly supposes to be the same legal issue. Al-Juwaynī 
confirms that this is the most common kind of distinction and, indeed, both from the 
contents of his book and the contents of other books of legal distinctions it does appear 
                                                             
81 I discuss the importance of jadal to the genre of legal distinctions in Chapter Three. 
82 The history of al-Shāfiʿī’s substantive legal doctrine is complex. Not only was his writing preserved and 
transmitted in slightly different versions by his students, but he is also said to have produced a version of 
his legal doctrine in Iraq and a different and revamped version in Egypt, the so-called old (al-qadīm) and 
new (al-jadīd) doctrines. For more on this issue, see Ahmed El Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law: A 
Social and Intellectual History (New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
 35 
 
that this is the most common type.83 Most legal distinctions are straightforward 
comparisons of laws which have a similar appearance but different outcomes.  
Al-Juwaynī gives the following as an example of this type of distinction: 
A ritual prayer is invalid if it is begun with a temporally prior intention, 
unless this intention is coterminous with the beginning of the prayer (al-ṣalāt lā 
taṣiḥḥu bi-niyya mutaqaddima ḥattā takūna al-niyya muqtarana bi-awwalihā). 
A fast, however, is valid even if the intention to fast was made prior to 
the start of the fast (wa-yaṣiḥḥu al-ṣawm wa-in kānat niyyatuhu mutaqaddima ʿala 
al-ṣawm bi-zamān). 
The distinction between these is the possibility to follow the statement 
of intention directly by the prayer (al-tamakkun min ḍamm al-niyya ilā awwal al-
ṣalāt) and the clear inability to follow the statement of intention directly by the 
fast.84 
In this example, the doctrinal difference centers on making an intention to perform a 
ritual act. One can resolve to pray only immediately preceding the prayer, while one 
can resolve to fast anytime before the start of the fast. These two situations appear 
similar since they both involve resolving one’s intention to perform a ritual duty. The 
rulings seem contradictory, however, since the time between resolving to perform the 
duty and performing the duty is different in these two instances. The supposed 
contradiction, therefore, rests on the incommensurability between the time to resolve 
                                                             
83 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:39. He says they are “practically infinite (naẓāʾir hādhā al-qism akthar min 
an yuḥṣā).” 
84 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:39. 
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performing one ritual duty and another. This confusion further rests on the 
assumption that all ritual duties are legally similar; that is, it must assume that the 
rules regulating ritual prayer are equivalent to those regulating ritual fasting. It is only 
by first thinking that the acts of prayer and fasting must be alike that their difference 
leads to an incongruence.The legal distinction, however, shows how these two rulings 
do not lead to an incongruence. 
 The next two kinds of distinction proposed by al-Juwaynī are different from the 
first type, but similar to each other. These two kinds of distinctions do not involve 
differentiating between different situations, but rather they require determining the 
correct precedent opinion to rely on for a given case. In these types of distinctions, the 
two situations really are similar; resolving the incongruity is no longer a matter of 
correctly understanding the facts of the case, but rather of understanding the 
precedential opinions established by the school’s legal authorities and being able to 
decide between them. Al-Juwaynī gives the following as an example of the second type 
of distinction, in which al-Shāfiʿī gives apparently conflicting opinions. First, I translate 
and discuss al-Juwaynī’s presentation of the legal problem and then move on to his 
solution. 
Al-Shāfiʿī, may God be pleased with him, had two rulings in regard to a 
hired worker (al-ajīr al-mushtarik) in cases when the capital is destroyed while in 
his possession.  
One ruling is that the worker is liable for the value of the capital (innahu 
ḍāmin). 
The other is that he is exempt from any liabilities (barīʾ ʿan al-ḍamāʾin). 
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Thus, if someone hires a man as a worker to perform work in his 
workshop (fī ḥānūtihi) and something is destroyed while in the worker’s 
possession, al-Shāfiʿī has stated definitively (qad qaṭaʿa al-qawl) that he is not 
liable, even though both of them are laborers (kilāhumā ajīr).85 
According to al-Juwaynī, al-Shāfiʿī has, in different circumstances, said both that a 
hired worker is and is not liable for damages to the goods with which he is working. Al-
Juwaynī presents these statements without further explanation or information. He 
does not contextualize this information nor explain where it was that al-Shāfiʿī made 
these statements, i.e. in what book, on what bases, etc. He simply presents this 
contradiction as a known fact — although he offers a partial contextualization later. It 
is likely that al-Juwaynī is addressing an audience expected to be familiar with the 
Shāfiʿī legal school and its doctrines such that this does not need to be explained in full. 
This exposition, however, makes clear not only the contradiction inherent in al-
Shāfiʿī’s doctrine, but also how it manifests itself in an applied setting.  
 Al-Juwaynī then clears up the confusion and resolves the contradiction between 
the two rules. He says: 
The distinction between them is that an independent laborer (al-ajīr al-
mushtarik) has possession of the countervalue that corresponds to the price of 
his labor (yanfaridu bi-l-yad ʿalā mā akhadha al-ʿiwaḍ fī muqābalati ʿamalihi fīhi). 
Thus, he can be held liable for the destruction of the good. A worker in a 
workshop (al-ajīr fī al-ḥānūt), however, is is not in sole possession, but rather the 
                                                             
85 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:40. 
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owner of the workshop has possession (al-yad) of what is in his workshop. Thus 
the destruction of something in the possession of the worker (fī yad al-ajīr) is like 
the death of a slave in the possession of his owner (fī yaday sayyidihi) through 
phlebotomy (bi-l-faṣd) or cupping during an operation (al-jarrāḥa). The 
phlebotomist is not liable.86  
In other words, the distinction between the two cases involves the specific situation of 
the worker who damaged the goods. An independent laborer is not equivalent to an 
employee in a workshop (al-ajīr fī al-ḥānūt) when it comes to damages. The independent 
laborer is liable for damages because he has the goods in his sole possession (al-yad 
lahu); the employee in a workshop is exempt from these damages since the goods are 
within the confines of the store and therefore in the possession of the owner of the 
store (al-yad li-ṣāḥib al-ḥānūt). Al-Juwaynī resolves the apparent contradiction by 
explaining that the determinant of liability in these situations is possession, not the 
legal status of the laborer as a hired worker. In other words, whoever has legal 
possession of the goods is responsible for any damages, not necessarily the person who 
committed the damage. The fact that one worker is held liable while another is not has 
nothing to do with their status as workers but rather where the damages took place.  
 This point is emphasized through the comparison given in the explanation. 
Here, al-Juwaynī brings up the non-liability of a doctor when treating someone’s slave. 
In this example, a doctor who goes to someone’s house to treat a slave through blood-
letting or scarification is not responsible for any damages to the slave. This doctor is 
                                                             
86 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:40-41. 
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not liable because these damages happen while the slave is in the care and custody of 
his master (fī yaday sayyidihi), as al-Juwaynī says when introducing this example. 
Indeed, a doctor making house calls is a kind of independent laborer and thus offers 
another equivalent example to those discussed above. The concept of possession (al-
yad) is an important factor in all three cases. It would seem that a general rule could be 
established here. Liability for damages due to negligence falls on whoever has 
possession of the damaged good. Al-Juwaynī, however, does not go so far as to establish 
this rule.  
 Although al-Juwaynī clears away the contradiction as a part of the active or 
authoritative doctrine of the Shāfiʿī legal school, his explanation ignores the potentially 
contradictory nature of the two statements attributed to al-Shāfiʿī. There are several 
possibilities for harmonizing al-Shāfiʿī’s statements but al-Juwaynī seems uninterested 
in undertaking this specific task. His concern, rather, is with the coherence of the 
Shāfiʿī madhhab as developed over the centuries by later jurists. He may see the two, 
Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī’s substantive doctrine and the substantive doctrine of 
the legal school which bears his name, as extensions of each other, such that resolving 
apparent contradictions found in the doctrine of the Shāfiʿī school implicitly does the 
same work for the doctrine of its eponym. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that al-
Juwaynī’s interest lies primarily in the Shāfiʿī madhhab as an elaborated scholarly-legal 
institution rather than in explicilty defending the specific doctrines of Muḥammad ibn 
Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī. In other words, the authority or validity of the madhhab as expressed 
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here lies in the rationality of its doctrine and is not directly tied to the explicit words 
and writings of its assumed founder.87 
The third category in al-Juwaynī’s heuristic is similar to the second. Instead of 
focusing on the teachings and doctrines of al-Shāfiʿī and the interpretations thereof, 
however, this category is concerned with the teachings and writings of other scholars 
affiliated with the Shāfiʿī madhhab. This category is composed of two subcategories. The 
first of these, 3a, is analogous to category 2. It continues to elaborate the procedures of 
accusation and apologetics as found above. For this reason, Juwaynī says that he omits a 
fuller discussion of it.88  
Al-Juwaynī’s discussion of his second subscategory (3b) is worth quoting in full, 
especially because al-Juwaynī does not give an example of this kind of legal distinction. 
It also reveals a great deal about how ramified legal thought had become already by the 
fifth/eleventh century. It remains unclear whether we can infer from the the lack of 
examples here that this particular sub-type was more theoretical than practical.  
The second subcategory obtains when the applicability of one of the two rulings 
is weakened by an indicant in the unanimously agreed-upon case (an yaḍʿufu 
aḥad al-wajhyan bi-dalīl al-masʾala allatī lam yakhtalifū fīhā). Maintaining a clear 
distinction then becomes impossible (fa-yataʿadhdhur al-farq al-wāḍiḥ). In such a 
                                                             
87 Al-Juwaynī may have seen this distinction as trivial, since a legal school can be seen as a large-scale 
hermeneutic project to harmonize, expand, and perfect the ideas of its eponym. The way in which the 
madhhab is defended, however, is noteworthy. In other words, al-Shāfiʿī’s doctrine and the doctrines of 
his students as recorded in books seem to have been less important than the interpretations of those 
doctrines elaborated by the later Shāfiʿī madhhab.  
88 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41. Specifically, he says, “The discouse of this section is similar to that of 
section two, above (al-kalām fī hādhā al-qism ka-l-kalām fī al-qism al-thānī qablahu).”  
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situation, one should then strive to deem the weaker of the two positions 
untenable and dismiss it, rather than striving to discover the basis for a 
distinction and rationalizing it, not even by extrapolating (takhrīj) from the two 
opinions on the basis of the unanimous accepted ruling (fa-ishtaghil fī mithl hādhā 
al-mawḍiʿ bi-tazyīf aḍʿaf al-wajhayn wa-isqāṭihi wa-lā tashtaghil bi-iltimās al-farq fa-
yataʿadhdharu wa-lā fi-takhrīj al-wajhayn fī al-masʾala al-mujmaʿ ʿalayhā). Wayward 
speculation (al-taʿassuf) and farfetched extrapolations (takhrījāt) are rampant in 
this category (qism). Expending great energy on invalidating weaker opinions is 
more important than both wayward speculation and a rampant proliferation in 
authoritative legal opinions and extrapolating from them (wa-ṣarf al-ʿināya ilā 
isqāṭ baʿḍ al-wujūh al-ḍaʿīfa awlā min al-taʿassuf wa-l-wulūʿ bi-istikthār al-wujūh wa-
takhrījihā).89 When we come across examples of this subcategory (qism), we will 
mention them (dhakarnāhā) but we have already explained the reasoning in 
these cases (wa-mahhadnā hādhihi al-ṭarīqa fīhā).90 
Legal distinctions of this kind function as a control on the spread of authoritative legal 
doctrine. Extrapolation (takhrīj) seems to have been one of, if not the, primary method 
of legal derivation after the onset of the so-called “regime of taqlīd.”91 The formalization 
                                                             
89 This statement should be understood as promoting the rigor of the madhhab in order to prevail in a 
legal disputation, not as related to the desirability of ijmāʿ. 
90 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41. 
91 The idea of taqlīd has long been a subject of scholarly attention. Taqlīd, in this context, refers to the 
faithfulness on the part of jurists to the juristic authority of earlier jurists. On taqlīd, see Sherman 
Jackson, “Taqlīd, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal Injunctions in Post-Formative Theory Muṭlaq 
and ʿĀmm in the Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī” Islamic Law and Society 3.2 (1996): 165-92; 
Mohammad Fadel, “The Social Logic of Taqlīd and the Rise of the Mukhtaṣar,” Islamic Law and Society 3.2 
 
 42 
 
of Islamic law involved the formalization of distinct legal schools following the doctrine 
of their eponyms, Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nuʿmān ibn Thābit (d. 150/767), Mālik ibn Anas (d. 
179/795), Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855).92 Taqlīd 
can perhaps be understood best as a discursive commitment to adhering diligently to 
already-established legal interpretations set out by the earliest figures in a legal school. 
Discursive adherence implied a shift away from labeling one’s own juristic techniques 
as ijtihād, independent legal reasoning, since one’s legal reasoning should occur within 
the established bounds of the legal school.  
Operating under the regime of taqlīd imposed certain strictures on the 
reasoning of jurists and on the way they discuss their reasoning. Instead of 
independent legal reasoning, jurists called their reasoning extrapolation (takhrīj), based 
on the writings of previous authorities.93 When later jurists based their reasoning and 
interpretations on the works of earlier master jurists this gave those later jurists a way 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(1996): 193-223; Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim, Pragmatism in Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (Syracuse, 
NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015), 1-30. On takhrīj, see Wael Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change in 
Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 43-56; ibid., “Takhrīj and the Construction of 
Juristic Authority” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002), 317-
335; and Ahmed A. Ahmed, Structural Interrelations of Theory and Practice in Islamic Law: A Study of Six Works 
of Medieval Islamic Jurisprudence (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006), 1-4, 49-72. 
92 Christopher Melchert has studied the rise of the legal schools in detail. He locates the emergence of the 
legal schools to the fourth/tenth century. In his account, Ibn Surayj (d. 306/918) established the Shāfiʿī 
school, Abū Bakr al-Khallāl (d. 311/923) established the Ḥanbali school, and Abū Ḥasan al-Karkhī (d. 
340/952) established the Ḥanafī school. All three of these figures lived in Baghdad. The Mālikī school had 
a double history, according to Melchert. In al-Andalus, it was established by ʿĪsā ibn Dīnār (d. 212/827-28) 
and Yaḥya ibn Yaḥya al-Laythī (d. 234/849) in Toledo. The Eastern Mālikī school was established by Abū 
Bakr al-Abharī (d. 375/986) in Baghdad but only lasted seventy-five years. See Chrisopher Melchert, The 
Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th centuries C.E. (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1997). 
93 Hallaq, Authority, 43-56; Ahmed, Structural Interrelations, 1-4, 57-59, 189-92. 
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to elaborate on substantive law and engage in legal reasoning while allowing them to 
argue that they were remaining within the institutional confines of their various legal 
schools. Modern Western scholarship has tended to see this legal methodology as a 
kind of decadence in Islamic law, although recent scholarship has challenged this 
narrative of taqlīd as decay.94 More productively, taqlīd can be understood as a 
discursive move rather than practical adherence to a state of stability, and further, as 
David Powers describes it “[taqlīd is] what we might call adherence to the rule of law,” 
or as Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim puts it, “legal conformism.”95 In using this phrase, Powers is 
referring to the potential for taqlīd to establish known rules with predictable 
application in a legal system that functions reliably rather than one functioning ad-hoc. 
In this regard, taqlīd contributes to the establishment of fixed norms.  
The possibility of extrapolating new opinions based on previous ones, however, 
poses a problem for the discursive adherence expected in taqlīd. The problem is not the 
                                                             
94 Joseph Schacht famously referred to Islamic law as being in a state of “ankylose,” i.e. a state of rigidity, 
as a result of the imposition of taqlīd. See Joseph Schacht, “Classicisme, traditionalisme et ankylose dans 
la loi religieuse de l’Islam” in Classicisme et decline culturel dans l’histoire de l’Islam, 141-61, ed. R. Brunschvig 
and G.E. von Grunebaum « Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve et Larose). 
95 David S. Powers, Law, Society, and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300-1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 94 ; Ibrahim, Pragmatism, 10. Powers and Ibrahim ares by no means the only scholar to have 
challenged the previously prevailing negative view of taqlīd. Wael Hallaq, among other scholars, has also 
taken issue with that view in various books and articles. The bibliography on this topic is quite vast. see, 
for example, Wael Hallaq, “From Fatwās to Furūʿ: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law.” Islamic 
Law and Society 1 (1994): 29-65; and more recently, idem., Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Sherman Jackson, Islamic Law and the State The 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1996); and Norman Calder, 
Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era, ed. Colin Imber and Robert Gleave (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).  
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exercise of legal reasoning, but rather the infinite potential that extrapolation holds.96 
In order to impose bounds on the seemingly unrestricted nature of extrapolation, al-
Juwaynī calls upon the logic of legal distinctions. This subset of distinctions, rare 
enough in occurrence for him not to cite an example but discuss only theoretically, 
exists as a way of limiting the ambit of speculative extrapolation. In order to constrain 
the scope of such speculation, al-Juwaynī emphasizes the importance of expending 
energy invalidating weak points of legal doctrine.97  
Interestingly, the usual logic of legal distinctions involves simultaneously 
validating two potentially contradictory opinions in order to show the internal 
consistency within the doctrine of a particular school of Islamic law, yet in this case, 
category 3b, al-Juwaynī clearly sought to apply the logic of distinctions to invalidate or 
undermine certain legal opinions. Al-Juwaynī, unlikely later jurists, likely uses 
distinctions-based argumentation offensively due to the tie between legal distinctions 
and formal disputation (jadal) and the earliness of his book. Learning about distinctions 
in the context of preparing for disputations allows al-Juwaynī to present his 
distinctions both as ways to overcome the accusation of farq qua contradiction and 
potentially to make this charge himself against others. 
                                                             
96 Ibrahim, “The Codification Episteme in Islamic Juristic Discourse between Inertia and Change” Islamic 
Law and Society 22 (2015): 257-220. 
97 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41. A concern for controlling the growth of legal doctrine was a 
recurring topic in post-formative Islamic legal writing. See, Wael Hallaq, Authority, 236-41; and Norman 
Calder, “al-Nawawī’s Typology of Muftis and Its Significance for a General Theory of Islamic Law” Islamic 
Law and Society 3.2 (1996), 137-64, especially 137-43.  
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Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī includes a discussion of furūq in his ʿAlam al-jadhal fī ʿilm al-
jadal, a manual for legal disputation.98 This discussion comes under the section titled 
“Counter-Objections Based on Qiyās.” The seventeenth objection based on qiyās is 
distinction (farq). This discussion is couched in the terms of legal dialectics and is at the 
same time a clear discussion of the material found in books of legal distinctions and 
their underlying logic. In his understanding, farq is “discovering the legally relevant 
and unique characteristic in either the precedent case or the instant case (ibdāʾ waṣf fī 
al-aṣl aw al-farʿ yunāsibu mā akhtaṣṣa bihi min al-ḥukm).”99 Al-Ṭūfī details how to recognize 
when a farq objection may be lodged in a disputation. “The necessary condition for a 
distinction is that the two scenarios share multiple legally relevant characterstics, 
otherwise the difference between the two cases is a fundamental difference and an 
objection based on distinction would be ineffective (wa-sharṭuhu ishtirāk al-ṣūratayn fī 
baʿḍ al-awṣāf wa-illā la-kāna al-farq baynahumā aṣliyyatan fa-lā yuʾaththiru farq al-
muʿtariḍ).”100 According to this statement, in order to use a farq objection, one must 
compare two situations which share several relevant characteristics. The similarities 
shared by two scenarios not only invite their comparison, but also allows the possibility 
that they should be treated the same way legally. If situations are too different, then 
comparing them in this way would be fruitless. Different situations do not necessarily 
need to be regulated in similar ways. This information is helpful for a debate 
                                                             
98 I discuss the relationship between distinctions and disputation in Chapter Three. 
99 Najm al-Dīn Sulaymān ibn ʿAbd al-Qawī al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal fī ʿilm al-jadal, ed. Wolfhart Heinrichs. 
(Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1408/1987), 71 
100 Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 71. 
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participant to understand how farq-objections are made and at the same time to know 
how to overcome the objection.  
Al-Ṭūfī’s focus on farq in the context of disputation should be unsurprising, 
given that his book is a disputation manual. Nevertheless, his analysis of legal 
distinctions is quite similar to that by al-Juwaynī. The shared characteristics that allow 
legal problems to be compared are the potential legal rationales (ʿilal) that would result 
in similar rulings. The differing characteristic (al-fāriq), however, is the actual legal 
rationale that gives each of the two compared situations different legal outcomes. This 
is very similar to al-Juwaynī’s first type of legal distinction. Further, even though al-
Ṭūfī’s discussion comes in a heavily disputational context, he follows his description of 
farq with a list of the various books that have been written on this subject. “Scholars 
have written many books on the distinctions between rulings (al-furūq bayna al-
aḥkām).”101 The books he lists are the books of legal distinctions discussed in this 
dissertation.102 He seems to understand books of legal distinctions as a pure extension 
of distinctions qua disputational objections. 
Finally, the Shāfiʿī scholar Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī also includes a short 
discussion of legal distinctions in the introduction to his al-Manthūr fī al-qawāʿid. Al-
Zarkashī notes that the “law has many subdisciplines (iʿlam anna al-fiqh anwāʿ).”103 One 
of the varieties that he mentions is “knowledge of assimilation and distinction (maʿrifat 
                                                             
101 Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 72. 
102 Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 72-73. 
103 Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Bahādur al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr fī al-qawāʿid, ed. Taysīr Fāʾiq Aḥmad 
Maḥmūd and ʿAbd al-Sattār Abū Ghadda, 1:69.  
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al-jamʿ wa-l-farq)” by which he clearly refers to legal distinctions, since he says “among 
the best books written on this topic is the book by the scholar (al-shaykh) Abū 
Muḥammad [ʿAbd Allāh] al-Juwaynī.”104 This is a telling account, in that two of the 
three major discussions of legal distinctions come from Shāfiʿī scholars and that al-
Zarkashī cites al-Juwaynī’s book as one of the two principal books of legal distinctions 
in the course of his discussion.  
Al-Zarkashī provides the following account of legal distinctions and its 
literature: 
The second type of knowledge is knowledge of how to assimilate and draw 
distinctions between cases (maʿrifat al-jamʿ wa-l-farq). This was the basis for most 
of the disputations (munāẓarāt) among the early scholars, so much so that one of 
them said, “Law is nothing other than distinction and assimilation (al-fiqh farq 
wa-jamʿ).”105 Among the best works written on this topic are the books by the 
renowned Abū Muḥammad al-Juwaynī and Abū al-Khayr ibn Jamāʿa al-Maqdisī 
[(d. 480/1086)]. Any distinction that can be drawn between two cases is effective 
as long as they cannot be conjecturally assimilated to each other (anna al-jāmiʿ 
aẓhar).106 The Imam [al-Zarkashī] said, “It is not sufficient to draw distinctions 
merely on the basis of one’s whims. Rather, if two cases can be assimilated to 
each other in a way that seems more probable than drawing a distinction 
between them, then one should rule on the basis that they share a similarity 
                                                             
104 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:69.  
105 I have been unable to locate a source earlier than al-Zarkashī that uses this phrase to describe the law.  
106 This statement should draw to mind al-Ṭūfī’s insistence on the importance of shared characteristics.  
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(wajaba al-qaḍāʾ bi-ijtimāʿihimā). If the two cases are at odds, however, they 
should be held to be distinct (wa-in inqadaḥa faraqa ʿalā buʿd).107 The Imam also 
said, “Understand this well, for it is one of the foundations of the religion (fa-
innahu min qawāʿid al-dīn).108  
According to this definition, legal distinctions are a core component of the multi-
faceted complex that is Islamic law. Al-Zarkashī lists al-farq wa-l-jamʿ second in his list 
of components of Islamic law. His components are: (i) “knowledge of the substantive 
laws, both those mentioned explicitly in revelation and those known through legal 
reasoning;”109 (ii) “al-farq wa-l-jamʿ;”110 (iii) “the scaffolding of legal cases, one on the 
other such that they all result from one underlying principle (banāʾ al-masāʾil baʿḍahā 
ʿalā baʿḍ li-ijtimāʿihā fī maʾkhadh wāḥid);”111 (iv) “difficult questions (al-muṭāraḥāt), i.e. 
obscure questions that are used to test one’s intellect (asʾila ʿawīṣa yuqsad bihā tanqīḥ al-
adhhān);”112 (v) “sophistical argumentation (? mughālaṭāt);”113 (vi) “examinations 
(mumtaḥināt);”114 (vii) “riddles (al-alghāz);”115 (viii) “legal strategems (ḥiyal);”116 (ix) 
“knowledge of individual scholars (maʿrifat al-afrād), what specific positions did each 
                                                             
107 This statement is quite similar to al-Juwaynī’s discussion of distinction type 3b. 
108 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:69. 
109 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:69. 
110 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:69. 
111 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:69-70. On the concept of legal scaffolding, see Sherman Jackson, “Taqlīd.” 
112 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:70-71. 
113 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71. 
114 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71. 
115 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71. 
116 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71. 
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take on issues of substantive law (mā li-kull min al-aṣḥāb min al-awjuh al-qarība);”117 and 
(x) knowledge of the specific precepts (ḍawābiṭ) which assimilate (tajmaʿu jumūʿan) and 
the maxims (qawāʿid) on which legal theory and substantive law depend (allatī turaddu 
ilayhā uṣūlan wa-furuʿan).”118 This list, which al-Zarkashī uses to situate his work on legal 
maxims (qawāʿid), provides a fascinating insight into the prevailing conceptions of 
Islamic law in the ninth/fifteenth century.  
It is clear from this list not only that al-Zarkashī sees distinctions as a core 
component of Islamic law, but also that he sees it as an area of knowledge distinct from 
the knowledge of substantive law, which corresponds to his first category. He refers to 
substantive law here as aḥkām al-ḥawādith (rulings on legal cases). This list is also 
curious in that it does not use the terms furūʿ and uṣūl, the traditional bipartite division 
of Islamic law and legal writing, to denote broad categories of legal discourse.119 It also 
underscores the importance of al-Juwaynī’s book on legal distinctions to the Shāfiʿi 
school and the centrality of disputations in the early rise of legal distinctions, at least 
for the Shāfiʿī madhhab. Al-Ṭūfī also makes a strong connection between books of legal 
distinctions and farq as a kind of objection made in a legal disputation. Still, al-
Zarkashī’s discussion adds little to our understanding of what legal distinctions are. 
These are the only three theoretical discussions of the genre of legal distinctions of 
                                                             
117 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71. 
118 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71. 
119 Interestingly, at the end of his entry on ḍawābiṭ and qawāʿid, al-Zarkashī says “These are the true 
foundations of the law (wa-huwa uṣūl al-fiqh ʿalā al-ḥaqīqa)” (1:71). Dividing Islamic Law into either furūʿ or 
uṣūl seems to be traditional in the Western study of Islamic law, but it may not be a reflection of the ways 
in which the Islamic legal tradition has always understood itself.  
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which I am aware. Al-Juwaynī and al-Zarkashī are interested in discussing legal 
distinctions as a methodology of legal argumentation and legal reasoning. For them, 
the focus in this field is on resolving apparent contradictions. 
The introductions to premodern works of legal distinctions tend to be quite 
short and lack such discussions, so these three passages reveal interesting information 
about the importance and function of such works, which I discuss below, but they do 
not give us insights into the reasoning that underlies the activity of drawing legal 
distinctions.  
 There is a modest amount of secondary literature, in Arabic and European 
languages, on legal distinctions.120 The majority of these discussions occur in editors’ 
introductions to printed editions of works of legal distinctions. In such cases, however, 
most of the discussions list major works of legal distinctions and their authors with a 
short lexicographical discussion of the triliteral root f -r-q and its morphological 
derivates. These works, in general, do not include typological or theoretical discussions 
of legal distinctions beyond what has been discussed above. One major modern study of 
legal distinctions, however, is Yaʿqūb al-Bāḥusayn’s al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya wa-l-uṣūliyya - 
muqawwimātuhā - shurūtuhā - taṭawwuruhā - dirāsa naẓariyya - waṣfiyya – tārīkhiyya.121 In 
                                                             
120 As I was editing this dissertation for final submission, I became aware of Necmettin Kızılkaya’s recent 
monograph on the topic of legal distinctions, İslâm hukukunda farklar. Kızılkaya begins his monograph 
with a discussion of the concept of furūq in various Islamic sciences. He does not discuss differential 
diagnosis, but he does include an insightful discussion of furūq in Quran commentary. The main part of 
Kızılkaya’s study consists of a chonology and description of works of legal distinctions. See Necmettin 
Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar: Furûk literatürü üzerine bir inceleme (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2016). I thank 
Mariam Sheibani for alerting me to this work.  
121 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya. 
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this work, al-Bāḥusayn provides a brief theoretical discussion of the kinds of furūq 
writing. His presentation of legal distinctions is quite different from that discussed by 
al-Juwaynī. 
Al-Baḥusayn finds two different kinds of distinctions in legal writing, legal 
distinctions (al-furūq al-fiqhiyya) and legal-theoretical distinctions (al-furūq al-uṣūliyya). 
In his understanding, legal distinctions focus on correctly determining the legal 
principles and rationales (al-ʿilal) on which rulings are based. By understanding why a 
legal rationale applies to a given case, a jurist can understand how to correctly derive 
and then apply this rationale to other cases. In other words, al-Bāḥusayn understands 
legal distinctions as relating to proper understanding and exercise of legal analogies 
(qiyās). Unlike al-Juwaynī, al-Bāḥusayn does not categorize legal distinctions according 
to epistemological status, and in fact he disregards epistemology in his categorization 
of legal distinctions.  
Al-Bāḥusayn says that writings on legal distinction “have taken various 
different forms.”122 He lists two matters on which all books on legal distinctions agree 
and a few in which they differ. According to him, all books of legal distinctions discuss 
individual laws and the distinction(s) between them, sometimes they also discuss 
shared characteristics (al-jāmiʿ), and they all “follow the traditional legal 
organization.”123 According to al-Bāḥusayn, however, they differ in their particular 
content. He sees four kinds of works that address legal distinctions: (i) some works 
                                                             
122 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 79-82. 
123 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 79. 
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discuss only substantive laws that are similar outwardly but have conflicting rulings 
and the distinctions between them (dhikr al-furūʿ al-fiqhiyya al-mutashābiha fī al-ṣūra wa-l-
mukhtalifa fī al-ḥukm maʿa bayān al-farq baynahumā);124 (ii) some discuss maxims (qawāʿid) 
and precepts (ḍawābiṭ) in addition to a discussion of legal distinctions;125 (iii) some 
address distinctions related to a specific legal issue;126 and (iv) some larger works 
devote one section to legal distinctions.127  
The second section of al-Bāḥusayn’s book is on legal-theoretical distinctions. 
These distinctions are, according to him, entirely different from substantive legal 
distinctions. His categorizations parallels one made in the present study, which 
understands legal distinctions to be different from what I term applied lexicographical 
                                                             
124 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 79-81. He gives the following as examples of this kind of work: Al-
Furūq by Asʿad ibn Muḥammad al-Karābīsī (d. 570/1174-75), ʿIddat al-burūq by Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Wansharīsī 
(d. 914/1508), al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya by Abū al-Faḍl Muslim ibn ʿAlī al-Dimashqī (fl. fifth/eleventh c.), and 
Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī al-farq bayna al-masāʾil by ʿAbd al-Rahīm al-Zarīrānī (d. 841/1341).  
125 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, 81-82. He gives the following as examples of this kind of work: Kitāb 
al-Munāqaḍāt fī al-ḥaṣr wa-l-istithnāʾ by Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Fattākī (d. 448/1056-57) and al-
Istighnāʾ fī al-farq wa-l-istithnāʾ by Badr al-Dīn al-Bakrī (d. ninth/fifteenth c.). Al-Bakrī’s book is also known 
by the title al-Iʿtināʾ fī al-farq wa-l-istithnāʾ. It has been published twice, once under each name. 
Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr al-Bakrī, al-Istighnāʾ fī al-farq wa-l-istithnāʾ, ed. Saʿūd ibn Musʿad ibn Musāʿid al-
Thubaytī (Mecca: al-Mamlaka al-ʿArabiyya al-Saʿūdiyya, Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, Maʿhad al-Buḥūth al-
ʿIlmiyya wa-Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, Markaz Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1988) and ibid., al-Iʿtināʾ fī al-farq 
wa-l-istihnāʾ kitāb yabḥathu fī qawāʿid al-fiqh al-islāmī wa-furūʿihi, ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī 
Muḥammad Muʿawwad (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1991).  
126 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, 82. Al-Bāḥusayn does not give any examples, but it seems that he is 
referring to the kinds of books that contain what I term applied linguistic distinctions, see Chapter Two. 
127 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, 82. Al-Bāḥusayn also does not give an example of this kind of book, 
but rather says that it happens in “books on legal maxims (muʾallafāt fī al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya).” This kind of 
discussion can be found in books such as al-Ashbāh wa-l-Naẓāʾir by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) and 
al-Ashbāh wa-l-Naẓāʾir of Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī (d. 970/1563). 
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distinctions. Al-Bāḥusayn’s legal-theoretical distinctions are roughly equivalent to 
what I term an applied lexicographical distinction.128 
Wolfhart Heinrichs sees legal distinctions as being part of a larger complex of 
various “inductive” reasoning processes in Islamic law, in conjunction with “qawāʿid, 
and asbhāh wa naẓāʾir.”129 He contrasts these three categories of inductive reasoning 
based on existing substantive laws with uṣūl al-fiqh, which is “a deductive and 
hermeneutical procedure trying to establish juridical determinations (aḥkām) by 
deducing them from a correct interpretation of the sources (Quran, Sunna, etc.).”130 
More importantly for Heinrichs, however, is the role of furūq as a productive area of 
legal investigation for so-called muqallids in that works on furūq allow us to see “the 
muqallid as a thinking jurisprudent, not just a parrot.”131 His understanding of furūq as 
one part of a larger complex of understudied productive areas of Isalmic law is useful. 
While al-Juwaynī discusses the use of distinctions for limiting the juristic production of 
rules, Heinrich’s statements nevertheless correspond to how jurists after al-Juwaynī 
understood the field of distinctions and related activities.  
Joseph Schacht also wrote an article on legal distinctions in which he provided 
an introduction to the genre.132 Schacht’s short article is more concerned with the place 
of the literature of legal distinctions within Islamic legal writing than an engaged study 
of the genre or the concept of legal distinctions. In attempting to describe works of 
                                                             
128 See Chapter Four, pp. 187-191.  
129 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 335. 
130 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 335. 
131 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 340. 
132 Joseph Schacht, “Aus zwei arabischen Furūq-Büchern” Islamica 2 (1926): 505-537. 
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legal distinctions, he only repeats the definition given by the classical tradition, “the 
outward findings of the cases are similar, but the legal assessments differ.”133 
Additionally, Schacht dimisses works such as Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Farq al-mubīn bayn al-
ṭalāq wa-l-yamīn, and works that I have classified as applied linguistic distinctions, as 
not truly fitting into the genre of legal distinctions.134 He also provides lengthy excerpts 
in Arabic from the distinctions books entitled al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab al-Imām Aḥmad ibn 
Ḥanbal by Ibn Sunayna (d. 616/1219) and Kitāb al-Furūq attributed to Najm al-Dīn al-
Naysābūrī to demonstrate the aesthetics of the genre.135  
One noteworthy feature of al-Bāḥusayn’s book is his discussion of the function 
of legal distinctions, in which he explains how books of legal distinctions ought, in 
theory, to work.136 His methodology here is interesting. First, he assumes that legal 
distinctions function in one of two ways. The first is “a distinction between the 
precedent case and the instant case (al-aṣl wa-l-farʿ), or between a case resulting from an 
analogy and the principal case (al-maqīs wa-l-maqīs ʿalayhi).”137 Here, legal distinctions 
function as a measure to control legal analogy and there is little difference between 
drawing a legal distinction and analyses of individual exercises of analogical reasoning.  
The second way in which al-Bāḥusayn claims that legal distinctions function is 
is by elucidating “a distinction between a descriptive characteristic and a rule (al-waṣf 
                                                             
133 Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 512. He says, “die ihrem äußeren Tatbestande nach gleich, in ihrer 
juristischen Beurteilung aber verschieden sind.” 
134 Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 511. See also, below, Chapter Two, pp. 126-29. 
135 I will discuss the work by al-Naysābūrī in Chapter Six, pp. 341-43. 
136 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, 35-58. 
137 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, 40. 
 55 
 
wa-l-ḥukm).”138 This second category, he says, overlaps with the first, and is related to 
the applicability of a specific ruling to a particular situation. His discussion, however, 
focuses only on distinctions as they appear in manuals of legal disputation (jadal), not 
in books of legal distinctions. He treats both kinds of distinctions as if they were 
coterminous, even though the purpose of referring to a distinction in disputation is 
different from doing so in books of distinctions.139 In disputation, a farq-based objection 
is an attempt to trap one’s debate opponent in a doctrinal contradiction; in books of 
furūq, a series of comparisons are brought forward in order to show the lack of 
doctrinal contradictions within a particular legal school. Al-Bāḥusayn assimilates a farq 
in the context of disputation and a farq in the context of the genre of legal distinctions. 
His discussion, however, does not quote from any book of legal distinctions, neither to 
supplement the theoretical component nor to give substantive examples. 
We learn from all of the above discussions of distinctions, however, that books 
of legal distinctions focus on apparently conflicting substantive laws. One implication 
of this oft-repeated fact is that the concept of legal distinctions, and consequently, 
books on legal distinctions, concern themselves with the subtantive legal rulings of one 
particular madhhab. It is not necessarily problematic that two different legal schools 
will have different rulings for particular actions. This is a normal feature of the Islamic 
legal system and in and of itself does not engender the supposed systemic 
contradictions brought about by conflicting laws within one legal school. Authors of 
                                                             
138 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, 40. 
139 See Chapter Three.  
 56 
 
furūq works are concerned with explaining legal distinctions, that is, comparisons of 
seemingly contradictory laws that arise within a given school’s doctrine. 
 
Justifications for Legal Distinctions 
In reading the introductions to works of legal distinctions themselves, it becomes 
apparent that works on legal distinctions have very particular ways of understanding 
themselves. In these introductions, the study of legal distinctions is portrayed as a way 
to understand the subtleties of a legal school’s doctrine. Al-Juwaynī’s introduction is 
noteworthy in this regard, in that he approaches the topic as if it were a new subject 
with which the reader is not necessarily familiar. He starts by saying:  
Legal problems (masāʾil al-sharʿ) can resemble each other outwardly but have 
contrasting outcomes (qad tatashābahu ṣuwaruhā wa-takhtalifu aḥkāmhuhā) 
because of legal rationales (ʿilal) that require different rulings. Those who seek 
true answers cannot do so without careful study of these legal rationales which 
necessitate distinguishing what needs to be distinguished and assimilating what 
needs to be assimilated (iftirāq mā aftaraqa minhā wa-ijtimāʿ mā ijtamaʿa minhā). 
Thus, through God’s will, may He be exalted, and His providence (tawfīq), we 
have collected in this book legal issues and distinctions, some of which are more 
obscure than others.140  
He begins his book by introducing the topic of legal distinctions through a definition 
and an apology. Distinctions are important for understanding legal rules with 
                                                             
140 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:37.  
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precision. It is clear that he sees legal distinctions as a way of understanding the 
intricacies of the doctrines of the Shāfiʿī school, but cannot take his audience’s 
knowledge of the concept or genre of distinctions as a given. This implies, for instance, 
that the Shāfiʿī jurist Ibn Surayj (d. 306/918) did not compose a book of legal 
distinctions, even though he is occassionally credited with having done so.141 Al-
Juwaynī’s detailed explanation of legal distinctions and lack of reference to similar 
works is circumstantial evidence of the earliness of his work in the genre of legal 
distinctions. His view, however, that legal distinctions are a way of understanding the 
intricacies of Islamic law or of a legal school’s doctrine is echoed in other works of this 
genre.  
Books on legal distinctions do not generally begin with a theoretical discussion 
of legal distinctions; instead many authors introduce their works by saying that they 
are writing their book on legal distinctions in response to a request from students or 
others intererested in Islamic law. Such apologetic introductions are, of course, a 
common literary trope of Arabic writing in general. It was a common trope to begin a 
book by framing it as a response to the requests of students, friends, and others; doing 
so gave scholars a pretext for writing a book and sharing their knowledge. The 
recurrence of this trope, however, in books of legal distinctions, at the expense of other 
                                                             
141 It is interesting that Ibn Surayj is remembered in the biographical tradition as being a proponent of 
the Shāfiʿī school, but not a reliable source of s knowledge. Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfarāʾinī (d. 406/1026) is 
remembered as saying “We agree with (najrī maʿa) Abū al-ʿAbbās [Ibn Surayj] on the generalities of the 
law, but not so much on its particulars (ẓawāhir al-fiqh dūn al-daqāʾiq).” See Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt 
al-fuqahāʾ, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-Rāʾid al-ʿArabī, 1970), 1:109; also Chapter Three, pp. 207-209. 
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introductory formulae is instructive. For example, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣiqillī (d. 466/1073-
74) says:  
A student of Mālikī law asked me for help in collecting the particular legal 
questions from al-Mudawwana and al-Mukhtaliṭa142 that novice and beginning 
students need to learn, together with issues (min nukta) that I find important to 
understand, distinctions between legal issues, and the differences between the 
rulings that would otherwise would be impossible for students to know (tafrīq 
bayna masʾalatayn qad yataʿadhdharu ʿalā al-ṭālib maʿrifat ikhtilāf ḥukmihā).143  
By introducing his book with this claim, al-Ṣiqillī notes that the intended audience for 
his book is students still learning the law. This should not necessarily be understood to 
mean something akin to first-year or introductory students, but rather that the book is 
not aimed at fully formed jurists and thus it is meant to be a part of legal education 
whether formally in a madrasa or informally in a study circle.144  
                                                             
142 Al-Mudawwana and al-Mukhtaliṭa are two of the foundational texts of the Mālikī legal school. Both texts 
were compiled by the Mālikī scholar Saḥnūn ibn Saʿīd (d. 240/855). Al-Mudawwana contains legal opinions 
from the school’s eponym, Mālik ibn Anas, with some additions by Ibn al-Qāsim (d. 191/806) through 
Saḥnūn. Al-Mukhtaliṭa primarily contains opinions going back to Saḥnūn himself. See Miklos Muranyi, Die 
Rechtsbücher der Qairawāners Saḥnūn B. Saʿīd: Entstehungsgeschichte und Werküberlieferung (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft: Kommissionsverlag, F. Steiner, 1999), 1-22. 
143 ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq ibn Muḥammad al-Ṣiqillī, al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-mudawwana qism al-ʿibādāt, ed. 
Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥabīb, PhD Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1416/1996, 148; idem., Kitāb 
al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-Mudawwana wa-l-Mukhtalaṭa, ed. Abū Faḍl al-Dimyāṭī Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī 
(Casablanca: Markaz al-Turāth al-Thaqafī; Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2009), 1:23. 
144 The Mālikī scholar Ibn Farḥūn reiterates the importance of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s work for students. He says 
that this “is a useful book for developing scholars who show promise (al-nāshiʾīn min ḥudhdhāq al-ṭalaba).” 
Although this seems to complement ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s words, Ibn Farḥūn continues this with the following 
sentence. “It is said that he later regretted writing this book (nadama baʿda dhālika ʿalā taʾlīfihi), and that 
he withdrew many of the citations and comments he included therein, and corrected much of what he 
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ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s al-Nukat wa-l-furūq was an early book in the genre of legal 
distinctions and ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq signals that this is a new form of legal composition. 
Nevertheless, the existence of distinctions between similar laws has, unsurprisingly, 
long been a part of Islamic law. “Most of what I discuss,” he continues, “is that which I 
learned from my own teachers in their study circles (majālis).”145 Again, this statement 
continues the trope of modesty; al-Ṣiqillī credits the insights of his book to his teachers, 
not to himself. Nevertheless, we see here that legal distinctions, or rather the 
comparison of similar yet distinct points of substantive doctrine, formed a part of 
Mālikī legal study before al-Ṣiqillī. Al-Ṣiqillī was not the first jurist to notice these 
similar and apparently contradictory laws. Rather, his work marked the beginning of 
the activity of enumerating, listing, and using them as a way to think through issues in 
Islamic law.146  
The desire to write a book of legal distinctions for the benefit of students is not 
just seen in these two jurists, it is a goal reiterated by many authors of books of legal 
distinctions. Abū Faḍl Muslim al-Dimashqī (d. fourth/tenth c.) says that he wrote his 
book of legal distinctions, again after being asked to do so, because “for someone who 
so wishes, memorizing them is very difficult since they cannot find a treatise dedicated 
to them but rather have to find them among multitudes of different books (taḍāʿīf al-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
said. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq was reported to have said, “were I able to collect the book again and hide it, I would do 
so (law qadartu ʿalā jamʿihi wa-ikhfāʾihi la-faʿaltu).” Ibn Farḥūn, Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī, al-Dībāj al-mudhahhab fī 
maʿrifat aʿyān ʿulamāʾ al-madhhab, no ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004), 1:174. 
145 ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣiqillī, al-Nukat wa-l-Furūq, 149; ed. Aḥmad ʿAlī, 1:24. 
146 It could very well be the case that interest in legal distinctions is part of a response to a greater 
necessity to have ready responses for charges of farq in formal disputation, but this is not stated by al-
Ṣiqillī. 
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kutub).”147 Here, Muslim al-Dimashqī highlights many of the aforementioned tropes in 
one sentence. Someone, presumably someone not yet a fully formed jurist, wants to 
learn about the subtle distinctions between laws but cannot find a book dedicated to 
this topic. He indicates, further, the relative lack of books on legal distinctions, at least 
for the Mālikī school, and their usefulness for beginning students.  
Much later, al-Sāmarrī (d. 616/1219), who wrote one of the earliest books of 
legal distinctions for the Ḥanbalī legal school, echoes this theme. He states that he is 
writing his book in response to “repeated requests from one of his colleagues (baʿḍ 
aṣḥābinā).”148 His book deals not only with the conflicting laws that make up the 
substance of legal distinctions, but also clarifies “their legal indicants and rationales 
(adillatahā wa-ʿilalahā), to explain to a jurist the derivations of legal rulings (ṭuruq al-
aḥkām) so that his legal reasoning (qiyāsuhu) for substantive rules might be in 
accordance with legal theoretical principles (al-uṣūl) and they so that they might form a 
coherent system (muttasiq al-niẓām).”149 With these words, he echoes the idea expressed 
two centuries earlier by al-Juwaynī, that the importance of understanding legal 
distinctions is not simply about understanding the scope of applicability of individual 
substantive laws, but also about refining one’s understanding of the legal theoretical 
underpinnings of Islamic law in general. In other words, books on legal distinctions 
help jurists to understand how legal rationales (ʿilal) and analogical reasoning (qiyās) 
                                                             
147 Abū al-Faḍl Muslim al-Dimashqī, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris 
(Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1992), 62. 
148 Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sunayna al-Sāmurrī, Kitāb al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab al-Imām Aḥmad ibn 
Ḥanbal, ed. Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā (Riyadh: Dār al-Ṣamīʿī, 1418/1997), 115. 
149 Al-Sāmarrī, Kitāb al-Furūq, 115. 
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are applied. Legal distinctions provide an opportunity to reason backwards from very 
specific situations to the rationales behind those rules.  
Social demand is not the only reason given, of course, for writing books on legal 
distinctions. Often authors cite, as another reason for writing these books, the need for 
a way to learn and understand obscure or difficult points of law. The Ḥanafī jurist Asʿad 
ibn Muḥammad al-Karābīsī (d. 570/1174-75), for instance, says about his book of legal 
distinctions: 
These are legal issues (masāʾil) which I collected from books, questions on which 
the authorities of our madhhab have not agreed upon standard rulings and 
exceptions (laysa fīhā qiyās wa-lā istiḥsān illā khilāf mashhūr bayna aṣḥābinā)… I 
intended to single out these cases, to aid in their memorization (li-yusahhila 
ḥifẓahā).150  
The Shāfiʿī Jamāl al-Dīn Al-Asnawī (d. 772/1370), takes a similar approach, although he 
situates his book clearly within an existing and established legal-literary genre. He 
notes in regard to his book: “I have seen that other Shāfiʿī scholars have written (li-
aṣḥābinā) books (taṣānīf) in this subject (maʿnā) and I have discovered many tomes by 
them. Some are written exclusively on this topic, while others encompass a broader 
focus.”151 Al-Asnawī, writing within an already well-defined literary tradition, can no 
longer claim to be writing on legal distinctions because of the lack of such books. 
                                                             
150 Asʿad al-Karābīsī, al-Furūq li-l-Karābīsī, ed. Muḥammad Ṭammūm and ʿAbd al-Sattār Abū Ghadda, 
1402/1982, 1:133.  
151 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq, ed. Naṣr al-Dīn Farīd 
Muḥammad Wāṣil (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 200), 2:7.  
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Instead, al-Asnawī says “This topic (bāb) is very wide, encompassing both minimal and 
maximal discussions of issues (al-ghathth wa-l-samīn), so I asked God for guidance (fa-
istakhtartu Allāh) in writing a book in this subject (maʿnā), following the above-
mentioned scholars.”152 In other words, he is consciously adopting the model set out by 
his predecessors and participating in this tradition.  
Muḥammad al-Baqqūrī (d. 707/1307) is in a position similar to that of al-Asnawī, 
participating in an extant tradition. The Mālikī tradition of furūq is influenced to a great 
degree by Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī’s (d. 684/1285) al-Furūq. Al-Qarāfī’s book is peculiar, 
but because of his importance within Mamlūk juristic culture and in the Mālikī legal 
school, it became the focal point for further writings on legal distinctions among Mālikī 
scholars. Thus, al-Baqqūrī says the following in introducing his book: “When I studied 
(waqaftu ʿalā) [Qarāfī’s] al-Furūq…, it became clear to me that al-Qarāfī, may God have 
mercy on him, was unable to organize it in a reader-friendly fashion (rattabahu tartīban 
yusahhil ʿalā al-nāẓir fī muʿṭālaʿatihi) because the book was published while he was still 
composing it and copies were distributed in this state (kharaja min yadihi bi-ithr jamʿihi 
fa-intasharat minhu nusakh ʿala mā huwa ʿalayhi). This stopped him from being able to 
change the book (aʿjazahu dhālika wa-ʿāqahu an yughayyirahu).”153 To solve this problem 
that Baqqūrī sees in al-Qarāfī’s text, he composed his own work, an abridged and 
reorganized presentation of al-Qarāfī’s work on legal distinctions. The relative lack of 
organzation and clarity is a problem that other Mālikī scholars also see in al-Qarāfī’s 
                                                             
152 Al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, 2:9. 
153 Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Baqqūrī, Tartīb al-Furūq wa-ikhtiṣārihā, ed. ʿUmar ibn ʿAbbād ([Morocco]: al-
Mamlakah al-Maghribiyya Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1414/1994), 1:19.  
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work, and therefore build their own works on legal distinctions with reference to al-
Qarāfī’s seminal book. 
Interestingly, and finally, in an example from yet another later book, the furūq 
book attributed to a Najm al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Bakr al-Naysābūrī, we find a new idealized 
audience.154 It is not clear exactly who this Najm al-Dīn was nor are there more 
biographical details evident about the author from manuscripts. Nevertheless, this 
work on legal distinctions from a later period actively participates in an existing genre. 
Najm al-Dīn wrote his book, he claims, in response to  
a colleague (baʿḍ ikhwānī) [who] asked me to write a book on (an uhadhdhiba) 
legal issues that agree in their structure (tattafiqu mabānīhā) but differ in their 
rulings (takhtalif maʿānīhā) that is concise but effective in its presentation 
(mūjizan iʿtibāratihā muʾaththirān ishāratihā), easy to understand and hard to 
disagree with, a book that can be relied on in study circles (yastadilluhu fī al-
majālis) and from which you can find guidance in schools (yastaḍīʾ bihi min al-
madāris).155  
Tellingly, the audience for this book is still students, both in study circles or salons, 
majālis, and formal contexts, law colleges. His book thus helps them prepare for and 
participate in conversations about Islamic law. One of the things that this 
                                                             
154 This work has yet to be edited; I have found eight manuscripts of this work, see Appendix V. 
155 See Najm al-Dīn al-Naysābūrī, Kitāb al-Furūq, MS. Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul, Giresun Yazmalar 44, 
1b. Other manuscripts of this work have variants here. In Joseph Schacht’s article, a transcription of 
Leiden Or 481, 3a, it reads: “yastahziʾu bihā fī al-majālis wa-yastaḍīʿu bihā fī al-madāris,” and in Anon., Kitāb 
al-Furūq, MS. Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul, Halet Efendi 780, 2b, “li-yantafiʿa bihā fī al-majālis wa-yastaghnī 
ʿan al-madāris.”  
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demonstrates, however, is how the genre of legal distinctions could and did respond to 
a changing reading public. No longer was it only students who desired to read these 
books, but also interested non-jurists who sought access to highly specialized and 
erudite legal knowledge.156 
 
                                                             
156 I discuss this issue at length in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Two: A General History of Distinctions 
 
This dissertation is a study of the genre I have termed legal distinctions (al-furūq al-
fiqhiyya). Before analyzing legal distinctions literature in detail, this chapter traces the 
rise and interest in distinctions (sg. farq, pl. furūq) in Arabic letters more broadly. The 
first step in understanding the history of legal distinctions is to understand the 
contexts from which legal distinctions arose—accordingly, this chapter offers a sort of 
prehistory of legal distinctions. There is not, of course, a straightforward progression 
leading to the evolution or development of legal distinctions. There are, however, at 
least three distinct threads that serve as prehistories to legal distinctions. These three 
threads are (i) the use of distinctions in non-legal contexts, (ii) the use of farq as one 
kind of objection within formal disputation (ʿilm al-jadal), and (iii) the organization and 
systematization of substantive legal doctrine. This chapter focuses on the first of these 
threads, the use of distinctions in non-legal contexts.  
The most prominent books of furūq outside of legal writings dealt primarily with 
philology (both grammar, naḥw, and lexicography, lugha) and medicine. The work that 
has been done on legal distinctions identifies these earlier writings in other fields as 
possible sources for the development of the legal genre.157 Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and 
Ḥamza Abū Fāris identify additional parallel genres—furūq writing in disciplines other 
                                                             
157 See Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris “Introduction” to Abū Faḍl Muslim ibn ʿAlī al-
Dimashqī, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-
Islāmī, 1992), 26-43, and Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law” 1:332-344 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2000). 
Heinrichs’s discussion relies heavily on the introduction by Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris. 
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than medicine and linguistics. These further writings are not in themselves 
independent genres, however, but specific instantiations of what I term applied 
linguistic distinctions.158 As will be shown below distinctions in medicine, language, and 
law all function under their own particular logic. Two studies have mentioned non-fiqh 
precedents for the tradition of legal distinctions, but they only allude to potential 
connections. Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris say that “furūq appeared in all scholarly 
disciplines to better distinguish, to classify, and better explain (li-l-tamyīz wa-l-faṣl wa-
mazīd al-bayān).”159 They do not, however, provide an in-depth analysis of the 
connections between furūq in various fields. Heinrichs, meanwhile, is forthright in 
stating that his study “is no more than a preliminary characterisation of the notion and 
function of furūq…”160 Both studies, therefore, raise similar historical questions but do 
not attempt to answer them. 
This chapter seeks to explicate the concept and function of furūq in a more 
thorough fashion than previous attempts. It explores the various parallels and 
chronological predecessors to legal furūq and sketches out a rough history and 
categorization of these genres. I focus primarily on the philological genres, with some 
attention paid to the medical genre of differential diagnostics (al-furūq bayna al-
amrāḍ).161 I then take up other fields of study that incorporated writing on distinctions 
and argue, contrary to Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, that these represent an extension of 
                                                             
158 See below, as well as Chapter Four.  
159 Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 28. 
160 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 340. 
161 The existence of differential diagnostics as a genre of writing is not clear. See below Chapter Two, pp. 
69-71. 
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linguistic furūq and not a novel and independent realm of ‘distinctions-thinking,’162 In 
discussing these parallel genres, I do not claim that they directly influenced legal 
thinking. Rather these genres show how the concept of distinctions was being adapted 
by scholars for a variety of purposes at the time in which legal distinctions rose to 
prominence in the fourth/tenth century. It seems important, however, that the genres 
of distinctions writing in linguistics and in law arose simultaneously and for similar 
reasons; books of distinctions in these two disciplines are similar in terms of 
organization, presentation, and methodology.163  
By pursuing a historical epistemology of distinctions-thinking generally, this 
chapter demonstrates shifting conceptualizations of farq and furūq as modes of analysis 
across different disciplines.164 These two concepts, farq and furūq, also inspired genres of 
writing that took on lives of their own. In medicine, books on distinctions were 
exclusively diagnostic handbooks to be used in differential diagnostics, and all of the 
                                                             
162 For a full discussion of the concept of distinctions and what I refer to as ‘distinctions-thinking,’ see 
Chapter Four. 
163 The similarities between these two genres are clear from an initial reading; further study, however, 
shows that these two genres are similar only at a surface level. 
164 Historical epistemology, as used in this chapter, refers to the “study of epistemological concepts as 
objects that evolve and mutate” (Hacking 9). Historical epistemology understands that “fundamental 
epistemic concepts and standards are subject to historical change” (Feest and Strum 290). In other words, 
it is a methodology that tries to understanding the historical contingency of knowledge and knowledge 
standards. I take the drawing of distinctions—comparison—as an epistemic concept that helps to divide 
objects of knowledge and establish their identities. In part, this chapter attempts to show how the idea of 
a comparison “evolve[d] and mutate[d]” in response to various social and intellectual currents. Ian 
Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Uljana Feest and Thomas 
Sturm, “What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? Editor’s Introduction” Erkenntnis 75 (2011): 285-302. The 
75th volume of Erkenntnis is devoted to historical epistemology. For more on historical epistemology, see 
Arnold Davidson, The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
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information therein follows this purpose. There is no discussion of medical treatment, 
nor of theoretical analysis of maladies.165 Works of linguistic distinctions, however, do 
not function in the same way. Lexicographic distinctions focus on the subtle distinction 
in meaning or connotation between apparent synonyms, and they operate on both a 
practical and theological level.  
Practically, they were used as thesauruses. On this level, these works are a kind 
of reference for chancery secretaries and other writers. They could also, however, 
function on a theological level making claims about the cultural superiority of Arabs 
and the ontological superiority of the Arabic language. Here, books of lexicographic 
distinctions provide a series of examples showing the perfection of the Arabic language 
and its utter lack of redudancies (i.e. synonyms). In so arguing for these minute 
distinctions, lexicographers also showed how comparing two similar words can 
productively lead to the establishment of rigid differences between them. This 
technique, which I term applied linguistic distinctions, is then used productively, to 
coin new terms and cement definitions, in almost all scholarly disciplines, including, 
but not limited to, ethics, philosophy, and law.  
                                                             
165 It is possible as well that the discussion in this text of medical diagnosis was also implicitly arguing 
about the possibility of induction as a tool of diagnosis. Understanding when induction was appropriate 
in medical reasoning was an important concern of Galen and later taken up by Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq. See 
Richard Walzer, Introduction to Galen on medical experience. First Edition of the Arabic Version with English 
Translation and Notes by R. Walzer, ed. and trans. Richard Walzer (London; New York: Pub. For the trustees 
of the late Sir Henry Wellcome by the Oxford University Press, [1947]). 
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This chapter discusses the three major trends in distinctions literatures. The 
mainly practical manuals of medical distinctions, the practical and theoretical 
distinctions of lexicography, and the productive genre of applied linguistic distinctions. 
 
Furūq in Medicine 
The earliest discipline to produce books of furūq appears to be medicine, a discpline 
which, as noted above, dealt with differential diagnostics. These books describe 
illnesses with similar symptoms and discuss the ways to distinguish between them to 
diagnose a patient correctly. Few books written in this genre in Arabic can be attested 
to, and so although it may have been early, it does not seem to have been particularly 
prominent in the premodern period.166 Through an expansive search of bibliographical 
sources and digital databases, I have located only four works on differential diagnostics. 
These works were written by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 313/925), Ibn al-Jazzār (d. 369/979), 
Aḥmad ibn Asʿad Ibn Ḥalwān al-Dimashqī, also known as Ibn al-ʿĀlima (d. 652/1255),167 
and Yūsuf ibn Ismāʾīl Ibn al-Kutubī (d. ca 754/1353).168 Four of these works are extant, 
and it is likely that further scholarly attention will yield more. Ibn Ḥalwān’s treatise 
                                                             
166 Peter E. Pormann and Emilie Savage-Smith state that differential diagnostics was often included in 
works of medical ethics. See Peter E. Pormann and Emilie Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 86, 89. 
167 See Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, 265-66; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-islām wa-
wafayāt al-mashāhīr wa-l-aʿlām, ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 
1419/1999), 48:115-16, 224. According to Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, this scholar was unrivalled in formal 
disputation (lā yalḥiquhu fī al-jadal). Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa mentions this work with the title Kitāb al-Tadqīq fī al-
jamʿ wa-l-tafrīq (266).  
168 Al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 8:217; GAS S2:218. 
 70 
 
and that of Ibn al-Kutubī survive in manuscript, although both are still unpublished.169 
One book on differential diagnostics has been published, in two editions, one 
attributing the work to Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and the other attributing the same work to Ibn 
al-Jazzār.170 Interestingly, this is the same text attributed to Ibn Ḥalwān in Ayasofya 
4838.171 My study of medical furūq has two important findings: First, the precedence of 
these works to other writings on distinctions. Second and more importantly, the 
                                                             
169 Ibn Ḥalwān’s manuscript survives in a collection (mujmūʿa) of medical texts, which includes a Kitāb al-
furūq by Aḥmad Ibn Ḥalwān al-Ṭabīb. This manuscript is housed in the Suleymaniye Library in Istanbul, 
Suleymaniye Library Ayasofya 4838; a microfilm of this manuscript can be found at the University of 
Utah, reel 190 of the Levey microfilm collection. Ibn al-Kutubī’s work is also housed in the Suleymaniye 
Library, Ahmet III 2120, and at the University of Utah, Levey reel 131. Thus far, I have been unable to 
consult Ibn al-Kutubī’s work. This is not, however, the Kitāb Mā lā yasaʿu al-ṭabīb jahluhu, a treatise on 
pharmacology. See Ibn al-Kutubī, Mā lā yasaʿu al-ṭabīb jahluhu, MS. Library of Congress, Washington DC, 
Mansuri Collection R128.3.I127 1682, available online 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/amed/amed0001/2001/200149140/200149140.pdf (accessed March 24, 
2017).  
170 See Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Kitāb Mā al-fāriq aw al-furūq aw kalām fī al-furūq bayna al-amrāḍ, ed. Salmān Qaṭāya 
(Aleppo: Jāmiʿat Ḥalab, Maʿhad al-Turāth al-ʿIlmī al-ʿArabī, 1398/1978) and Ibn al-Jazzār, Al-Furūq bayna 
ishtibāhāt al-ʿilal, ed. Ramziyya al-Aṭraqjī (Baghdad: Wizārat al-Taʻlīm al-ʻĀlī wa-al-Baḥth al-ʻIlmī, Jāmiʻat 
Baghdād, Bayt al-Ḥikmah, 1989). 
171 The main difference between the published texts and that found in the Ayasofya manuscript is that 
the text in Ayasofya 4838 begins with a statement specifically attributing the book to “Abū al-ʿAbbās 
Aḥmad ibn Abū al-Faḍl Asʿad ibn Ḥalwān al-Ṭabīb” (109b). Neither al-Rāzī nor Ibn al-Jazzār are identified 
as the author in their respective texts. Ibn Ḥalwān’s manuscript is found in a collected volume (majmūʿ), 
the title page of which reads: “This is a collection (majmūʿ) of medical texts. The first book is Tadbīr al-
amrāḍ al-ḥādda by Hippocrates, and also containing the book Asrār al-nisāʾ by Galen and al-Furūq by Ibn 
Ḥalwān Ṭabīb.” This is followed by a table of contents showing the nine books which make up this 
medical collection. It is striking that Ibn Ḥalwān is identified as the author three times in this 
manuscript, and that his book was prominent enough to be included in the sentence summarizing the 
collection. The manuscript is missing a few folios after the introduction. The first page is 109b, which 
ends in the middle of the introduction, but page 110a is in the middle of chapter one, section one (al-
maqāla al-ūlā al-faṣl al-awwal). Based on the available evidence, it is difficult to ascertain who the author of 
this work is. It is clear, however, that this issue needs further research. I am currently working on an 
article addressing this issue. 
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earliest works and biobibliographic writing show how furūq as a meaningful concept 
had not yet taken hold in the tenth century; it was not yet a specific concept but rather 
a word used in its plain-sense meaning. Biobiliographical sources do not consistently 
refer to al-Rāzī or Ibn al-Jazzār’s books as Kitāb al-Furūq. These sources use a variety of 
titles, such as al-Furūq bayna al-ʿilal or al-ʿIlal al-mushkila. Titles such as these indicate 
that the term furūq had not yet become a stable marker of a literary genre. 
Consequently, this points to the difficulty in understanding the content of works based 
on title alone.  
Salmān Qaṭāya was the first to edit and publish the work in question in 1978. In 
his edition, he attributes the text to al-Rāzī on the basis of in-text citations to al-Rāzī’s 
works, the general style of the writing, biobibliographic sources, and the manuscript 
evidence.172 Ramziyya al-Aṭraqjī, who edited this work in 1989, attributes it to Ibn al-
Jazzār. In a preface to al-Aṭraqjī’s edition, ʿĀdil al-Bakrī engages directly with Qaṭāya’s 
earlier attribution. He follows the arguments laid out by al-Aṭraqjī and says the writing 
style is not necessarily similar to that of al-Rāzī, but rather indicative of medical 
writing in the ninth and tenth centuries. Further, he argues, the three citations to al-
Rāzī do not prove his authorship. In fact, “in these three places, the author of this book 
[i.e., the author of the Furūq] speaks of al-Rāzī in the third person, as a critic of al-Rāzī 
                                                             
172 Qaṭāya bases his edition on the manuscript of this work found in the Wellcome Historical Medical 
Library. Interestingly, Ibn Sīnā is listed as the author of this manuscript on its title page. A.Z. Iskandar, 
who compiled the catalogue of Arabic works in the Wellcome collection, rejects this attribution and 
posits intead that this work was written by al-Rāzī. Qaṭāya does not mention this in his introduction. See 
A.Z. Iskandar, A Catalogue of Arabic manuscripts on medicine in the Wellcome Historical Medical Library (London: 
The Wellcome Historical Medical Library, 1967), 67.  
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correcting al-Rāzī’s views and opinions (muṣaḥḥiḥan lahu ārāʾahu wa-mustadrikan ʿalayhi 
aqwālahu).”173 Al-Bakrī assumes that if al-Rāzī were citing himself, he would not take an 
oppositional approach to his earlier writings. Al-Bakrī continues, “This is not the 
language of someone speaking about himself, the author says, ‘In his book, al-Rāzī 
says… but I say.’ (fa-huwa yaqūlu qāla al-Rāzī fī kitābihi kadhā… wa-aqūlu kadhā).”174 Al-
Bakrī is content that this argument disproves the attribution to al-Rāzī. He also rejects 
the possibility that the author of this work is Najm al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Abī al-Faḍl Ibn al-
ʿĀlima, since he lived much later than the ninth century.  
Al-Bakrī’s claim of an early date for the work is based on the author’s own claim 
at the beginning that “my predecessors have not written a book like this one (lam 
yasbaq ilā mithlihi man taqaddama).”175 Al-Bakrī concludes that, “based on this, what is 
most probable is that this work was written by Ibn al-Jazzār al-Qayrawānī.”176 Al-Bakrī 
credits the editor of this text, Ramziyya al-Aṭraqjī, with this attribution and appears 
quite convinced. He does not explain why he considers only these three names as 
possible authors, but to my mind, this appears to be a consequence of the paucity of 
authors who wrote works on differential diagnostics. This extant early book on 
differential diagnostics claims it is the first such book ever written. Al-Rāzī and Ibn al-
Jazzār are both remembered as having written a book on differential diagnostics. Since 
more sources point to al-Rāzī as the author of this text, I will discuss in brief his 
                                                             
173 ʿĀdil al-Bakrī, “Introduction” to Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, ب. 
174 ʿĀdil al-Bakrī, “Introduction” to Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, ب. 
175 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 2; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 14. 
176 ʿĀdil al-Bakrī, Introduction to Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, ب – ج. 
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importance to the history of Islamic medicine; many of the tropes found in biographies 
of al-Rāzī, however, appear in biographies of Ibn al-Jazzār as well.177 
As mentioned above, Heinrichs uses this work to typify the case for the 
importance of medical furūq as a parallel genre to works on legal distinctions. He says: 
The term furūq occurs not only in legal studies, but also in two other fields: 
lexicography and medicine… The medicinal parallel, embodied in such works as 
Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s (d. 313/925), seems much more convincing. Here the term 
furūq designates the element or elements which, in a syndrome of mostly similar 
symptoms, allow the differential diagnostics of the illness at hand. In the way in 
which two or more cases are similar in appearance but distinguishable by a 
crucial element of difference, the medicinal and the legal situation have much 
in common, and the differential diagnostics of the physician would yield a 
fitting metaphor for the work of the faqīh as a mufarriq.178  
                                                             
177 The earliest biography about Ibn al-Jazzār comes from Ibn Juljul. Ibn Juljul’s biographical entry does 
not cite any specific information on Ibn al-Jazzār’s writings, although it does mention that Ibn al-Jazzār 
came from a family of physicians (ṭabīb ibn ṭabīb wa-ʿammuhu ṭabīb). As with al-Rāzī, Ibn al-Jazzār’s 
biography reads like a hagiography. The sources tell us that Ibn al-Jazzār abstained from earthly 
pleasures but occupied himself with intellectual and religious pursuits. “He would participate in funerals 
and weddings, but would not eat at the receptions.” Similarly, Ibn al-Jazzār, we are told, provided 
treatment for al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān’s nephew of an unspecified illness. Once he recuperated, al-Qāḍī al-
Nuʿmān sent a messenger to Ibn al-Jazzār with “fine clothes and 300 gold coins.” Ibn al-Jazzār thanked 
the messenger, but sent him back with the gifts. Although he was said to live a simple life, he left behind 
25 qinṭars of books and 24,000 dinars. See Aḥmad ibn al-Qāsim Ibn Abī Uṣaybīʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-
aṭibbāʾ, ed. Nizār Riḍā (Beirut: Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāt, [1965]), 481 and Sulaymān ibn Ḥassān Ibn Juljul, 
Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibba wa-l-ḥukamāʾ, ed. Fuʾād Sayyid (Cairo: Imprimerie de l’Insitut Français d’Archéologie 
orientale, 1955), 88. 
178 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 334-35. 
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Heinrichs claims that the parallel between medicine and law “seems much more 
convincing [than that between lexicography and law].” However the impact of this 
“medicinal parallel” on law remains unaddressed by Heinrichs. His claim, which seems 
to focus on the formal parallels, is credible, although it does not tell us about the 
history of these genres nor the ways they may have impacted each other. The following 
section will attempt to address some of these uncertainties, through an analysis of this 
book of medical distinctions entitled al-Furūq.  
Qaṭāya emphasizes that diagnosis is the aim of this book. “It is clear that his 
interest in this field (ilā hādhihi al-nāḥiya) comes from the difficulty of practicing this 
craft[, medicine,] daily and his confronting the difficulties and complications of 
differential diagnostics (al-tashkhīṣ al-tafrīqī).”179 Qaṭāya further says this is the first 
book ever written on differential diagnostics. He bases this conclusion on several 
things. The first is that al-Rāzī normally cites his sources extensively but does not cite 
past authorities in this work.180 Qaṭāya also mentions that his search in biographical 
and bibliographical sources did not yield anyone before al-Rāzī who wrote such a work, 
a claim the author also makes explicitly in the introduction.181  
Abū Bakr Zakariyyā al-Rāzī does appear to have written the first book on 
differential diagnostics. It is preserved with three titles, Kitāb Mā al-fāriq, al-Furūq, and 
                                                             
179 Salmān Qaṭāya, “Introduction” to Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Kitāb Mā al-fāriq aw al-furūq aw kalām fī al-furūq 
bayna al-amrāḍ, ed. Salmān Qaṭāya (Aleppo: Jāmiʿat Ḥalab, Maʿhad al-Turāth al-ʿIlmī al-ʿArabī, 1398/1978), 
د. 
180 This claim is heard often in the traditional sources on al-Rāzī’s life. Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa says that”[h]e 
attributed everything he cites in [the Ḥāwī] to the person who said it” (yunsab kull shayʾ naqalahu fīhi ilā 
qāʾilihi; 1:315). 
181 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 2; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 14.  
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Kalām fī al-furūq bayna al-amrāḍ.182 Al-Rāzī was born in Rayy around 251/865. He is said 
to have traveled to Baghdad in his thirties.183 The sources tell various stories about his 
interest in medicine, but they are clear that it was while working in a hospital in 
Baghdad that he became the most prominent physician of his day.184 Al-Rāzī was a 
polymath and in addition to his interest in medicine, he also wrote works in 
philosophy, mathematics, and alchemy. Reading the medieval sources, one gets a 
detailed picture of al-Rāzī as a consummate physician. These works, full of stories about 
his interest in and preternatural skill for medicine, portray his seemingly mythical 
devotion to his craft. He writes ceaselessly, reads constantly, and is always practicing 
medicine. Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (d. 668/1270), for instance, relates that al-Rāzī had a friend 
who “would stay up late with [him] (yusāmiru[hu]) reading the books of Hippocrates 
and Galen.”185 Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 380/990) reports that al-Rāzī lived in a constant state of 
writing, always either “composing a draft or completing a work (yusawwidu aw 
                                                             
182 The printed edition of this work is based on three manuscripts. The first, entitled, Mā al-fāriq, is an 
undated copy found in the Wellcome collection in London likely from the 18th century according to 
Qaṭāya, the second in the Malek National Library in Tehran apparently with no title and also dating from 
around the 18th century, and finally a version from the Public Awqāf Library in Baghdad with the title 
Kitāb al-Furūq bayna al-ishtibāhāt fī al-ʿilal, which dates from Ramaḍān 1220/1805 (pp. و-ز). 
183 Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 1:309. 
184 See Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 1:309-21; Sulaymān ibn Ḥassān Ibn Juljul, Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibba, 77-80; 
ʿAlī ibn Yūsuf Ibn al-Qifṭī, Ibn al-Qifṭī’s Taʾrīh al-ḥukamāʾ, auf Grund der Vorarbeiten Aug. Müllers, ed. Julius 
Lippert (Leipzig: Dieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1903), 271-277; and Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq Ibn al-
Nadīm, al-Fihrist li-l-Nadīm, ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid (London: Muʾassasat al-Furqān li-l-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 
1340/2009), 2.1:305-313. 
185 Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 1:311. 
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yubayyiḍu).”186 Towards the end of his life, he returned to his native Rayy, where he died 
around 320/932.187 
These biographical sources also tell us much about his vast bibliography. The 
earliest sources on al-Rāzī are Ibn al-Nadīm and Ibn Juljul (d. after 384/994), on which 
both the later Ibn al-Qifṭī (d. 646/1248) and Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa rely.188 Ibn Juljul lists a 
bibliography of the works written by al-Rāzī but does not mention the Furūq nor any 
work that could be construed as the Furūq. Ibn al-Nadīm, however, lists a book entitled 
al-Risāla fī al-ʿilal al-mushkila which very well could refer to this book.189 This is the only 
mention of a likely title that is roughly contemporaneous with al-Rāzī’s life. Ibn Abī 
Uṣaybiʿa also attributes to al-Rāzī a work with a similar title, the Risāla fī al-ʿilal al-
mushkila wa-ʿudhr al-ṭabīb wa-ghayr dhālika,190 although he additionally ascribes a Kalām fī 
al-furūq bayna al-amrāḍ to him.191 Finally, Ibn al-Qifṭī also lists the Risāla fī al-ʿilal al-
mushkila.192 It is also worth noting that al-Rāzī is credited with another work, on 
                                                             
186 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 2.1:306; and Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 1:311. 
187 The date of his death remains unclear. Ibn al-Qifṭī, for instance, says that al-Rāzī died around 320/932, 
according to Qāḍī Ṣāʿid ibn al-Ḥasan al-Andalusī. He also says that according to Ibn Shīrān, al-Rāzī died in 
362/972-73 (Ibn al-Qifṭī, 277). The printed edition of the Furūq lists his death date as 313/925. See also Ibn 
Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 1:314. 
188 Abū al-Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī (d. 973/1048) also wrote a biobibliography of al-Rāzī, but he does not mention 
this work therein. 
189 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 2.1:312. The title of this book can be translated as A Treatise on Ambiguous 
Illnesses. 
190 Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 1:319. The title of this book can be translated as A Treatise on Ambiguous 
Illnesses, an Excuse for the Physician, and More. 
191 Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 1:321. The title of this book can be translated as A Work on the 
Distinctions between Illnesses. 
192 Ibn al-Qifṭī, Taʾrīkh al-ḥukamāʾ, 277. 
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distinguishing ominous dreams from other kinds of dreams, the Kitāb al-Farq bayna al-
ruʾyā al-mundhira wa-sāʾir ḍurūb al-ruʾyā, though it does not appear to have survived.193  
None of these authors discusses the contents of these works, so only 
circumstantial evidence links this book to al-Rāzī. If the Risāla fī al-ʿilal al-mushkila does 
refer to this work, then it clearly predates the furūq tradition in lexicography and law 
by approximately a century. Its later reception would then perhaps explain why later 
authors referred to it as Kitāb al-Furūq. These later authors were familiar with a formal 
furūq genre and potentially recognized this work as a part of it. Nevertheless, they 
included the alternate title “Risāla fī al-ʿilal al-mushkila” in their bibliographies, since it is 
attested in the earliest bibliographic works in this form.194 It was only later scholars, 
familiar with furūq as a style of writing, who referred to it as Kitāb al-Furūq. One cannot 
disagree with Heinrichs that differential diagnostics—the topic of furūq in medicine—
appears “a fitting metaphor” for furūq in law, but there is no evidence that the 
resemblance is more than superficial. 
The genre of medical furūq is difficult to discuss in detail or with any certainty. 
The bibliographical tradition lists several works in the genre, although only one or two 
have survived, attributed to various authors.195 This work aims to provide a handbook 
for practicing physicians. The author claims explicitly that his book is to be used in this 
way, as a diagnostic manual. In describing his approach, he says: 
                                                             
193 Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 1:315-16; Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 2.1:308. The title of this book can be 
translated as The Difference between Dreams of Premonition and Other Kinds of Dreams. 
194 A similar trend is seen with works of linguistic distinction, see below, pp. 96-104. 
195 There are several manuscripts of this work attributed to different authors, but each manuscript is 
nevertheless a copy of the same work. See above pp. 69-70. 
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I have seen that the doctors of today (aṭibbāʾ al-zamān) know about maladies 
(amrāḍ) only what they can imagine on the basis of books, and the symptoms 
and causes (bi-dalāʾilihi wa-asbābihi) mentioned therein. These symptoms and 
causes, may, however, be shared between illnesses (qad tashtarik) and illnesses 
can resemble one another. The aspirations (al-himam) of physicians fall short of 
comprehensive knowledge of how to engage in inductive and deductive 
thinking using the principles and rules of medicine (bi-l-qiyās wa-l-istikhrāj min 
al-uṣūl wa-l-qawāʿid). I have therefore seen a need to compose a book on causes, 
symptoms, and illnesses that are similar to each other (fīmā yashtabih min al-
asbāb wa-l-dalāʾil wa-l-amrāḍ). I gather here every pair that resemble each other 
or are shared between illnesses, and then I distinguish (ufarriqu) between 
them.196 
This work, as he describes in the introduction, is a practical handbook for diagnosis. It 
is organized as a series of questions and answers. The book itself has five chapters, each 
with several subsections consisting of numbered pairs of illnesses between which the 
author distinguishes.197 Salmān Qaṭāya states that this work is split up, “according to 
the organization followed at that time (ḥasab al-ʿāda al-mutbaʿa fī dhālika al-zamān).”198 
                                                             
196 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 1-2; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 14. 
197 The manuscripts of this work were all copied much later than al-Rāzī’s life. It is therefore unclear 
when the numbering system was introduced to this text. It does, however, make consultation easier, 
suggesting that it was seen as having this use through its life as a text copied and recopied. This 
numbering is added to the margins of the Ibn Ḥalwān manuscript in the same hand that copied the text. 
It is included in the main text of the two published editions. 
198 Qaṭāya “Introduction,” ح. 
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The book’s five chapters cover: (1) the parts of the head (ajzāʾ al-raʾs);199 (2) the 
respiratory system (ālāt al-tanaffus);200 (3) the stomach, the liver, the spleen, the kidneys, 
the bladder, and the reproductive system (al-maʿda wa-l-kabd wa-l-ṭiḥāl wa-l-kulā wa-l-
mathāna wa-ālāt al-tanāsul);201 (4) the whole body (al-badan kulluhu);202 and (5) pulse and 
urine (al-nabaḍ wa-l-bawl).203 Each pair of maladies is introduced with the phrase “What 
is the distinction between [X] and [Y] (mā al-farq bayna [kadhā] wa-[kadhā]).” The answer 
to the question, the elucidation of the distinction, is introduced with “The answer is… 
(wa-l-jawāb).”  
In contrast to lexicographical distinctions, which focus exclusively on the 
differences and take the similarities for granted, the author performs a complete 
comparison. He begins by explaining the similarities between the comparands and then 
explains the distinctions in detail.204 There is often more than one distinction and, 
consonant with its stated purpose, the explanation is intended solely to help physicians 
diagnose the illness. The distinction does not cover cures or treatments for different 
illnesses, is limited to the information needed for performing a diagnosis, and the 
                                                             
199 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 29-85; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 27-45. 
200 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 87-128; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 45-58. 
201 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 129-231; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 59-90. 
202 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 233-263; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 90-99. 
203 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 265-299; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 99-108. 
204 The printed edition of this text is heavily annotated. Salmān Qaṭāya, notes that he has done so in order 
to make the text easy to understand by physicians and relatable to contemporary medicine. He starts the 
edition with a short explanation of Hippocratic medicine. He also includes a glossary of classical Arabic 
medical terms and contemporary French and Arabic translations. Only the odd pages contain al-Rāzī’s 
text, while the following even page has extensive commentary from Qaṭāya. 
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author does not elaborate further or give an explanation of the treatments required or 
the physical description of how such a symptom came about.  
The practical purpose of this book is relevant to any assessment of its possible 
parallels in the legal tradition. First, we can look at this book’s own conception of what 
a distinction is, and the kind of intellectual work that comparison can do. In 
introducing his work, the author defines what he means by the term. “As for 
distinction,” he says, “it is that by means of which one distinguishes between two 
things that are easily confused, when affirming or excluding a characteristic after their 
having been combined in one thing (ammā al-farq fa-huwa mā bihi al-tamyīz bayna al-
dhawāt al-mushtabaha ʿinda ilḥāq ḥukm wa-nafyihi ʿan al-ākhar baʿd ijtimāʿihi fī amr 
khāṣṣ).”205 A distinction occurs only through the process of comparison between two 
similar things which are opposed. The distinction relies on the affirmation of one 
characteristic and the resulting denial of the other characteristic. He continues:  
Once you understand the realities of an issue, the question of distinction does 
not refer to differences in reality. It only refers to them with respect to the fact 
that there is something shared between the comparands. This is like what the 
animate and the inanimate have in common that occurs through the medium of 
the body, since both of these occupy three dimensions. No one would ask about 
the distinction between the animate and the inanimate unless one had no 
knowledge of what differentiates the one from the other (wa-suʾāl al-farq lā 
yaruddu ʿalā al-mukhtalifāt bi-l-ḥaqīqa baʿd al-ʿilm bi-ḥaqāʾiqihā illa min wajh waqaʿa 
                                                             
205 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 23; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 26. 
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baynahumā fīhi min al-ishtrirāk wa-dhālika ka-ishtirāk al-ḥayawān aw al-jamād bi-
tawassuṭ al-jism fī kawn kull wāḥid minhumā dhā abʿād thalātha fa-lā yusʾal bimā al-
farq bayna al-ḥayawān wa-l-jamād illā maʿ ʿadam al-ʿilm bi-l-mumayyiz li-kull wāḥid 
minhumā ʿan al-ākhar.)206  
In bringing out the example of the animate and the inanimate, the author resorts to a 
clear example of predicability. Here, a body serves as a the object on which animacy 
and inanimacy can be predicated. Animacy and inanimacy are two contradictory 
predicates, thus they cannot simultaneously be predicated to any one body. Because 
any one thing cannot be both in motion and at rest at the same time, the distinction 
between the two qualities is evident. Nevertheless, they share the attribute that they 
can both be predicated on physically existing bodies. They are distinct—in fact they are 
opposites—while at the same time they are possible predicates of a physical body. 
Medical distinctions, the author would have us understand, are conceptually similar to 
this example, even if they are not as evident or widely known. 
This work of medical distinctions follows this framework of comparison. As 
mentioned above, all of these distinctions are presented in the form of a question. One 
such question is: “What is the distinction between a stroke occurring from matter 
blocking the interior of the brain (al-mādda al-sādda li-buṭūn al-dimāgh) and that 
occurring from a tumor (waram) therein?”207 Keeping in mind that this book is a 
handbook for diagnostics, the distinction given helps to diagnose each ailment, 
                                                             
206 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 23 Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 26.  
207 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 37; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 30, 
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presumably since they require different treatments. The answer, according to this 
work, is straightforward. They are indeed alike in the way they “outwardly manifest 
themselves (ishtarakā fī al-ḥaqīqa),” but they are different in the “cause (sabab)” and “the 
manner of removing the illness from it (kayfiyyat wujūb al-ḥukm ʿanhu)”.208 The author 
then explains each of these two differences in more detail. As for the difference in 
cause, he says, “It is evident. One is a blockage (sadda), while the other a tumor.”209 The 
difference in how the illness is cured relates to the symptoms of these two kinds of 
strokes. A stroke resulting from a blockage to the brain, he says, occurs as this blockage 
occurs, that is, the symptoms occur suddenly and severely, “in one moment (takūnu 
dafʿatan).” A stroke resulting from a tumor, however, happens “gradually (qalīlan 
qalīlan).” As the tumor grows, we are told, the vital spirit (al-rūḥ al-nafsāniyya) is slowly 
prevented from spreading to the body. It is the blockage of the vital spirit, which, 
presumably, is the direct cause of the stroke. Lastly, a stroke caused by a tumor is often 
accompanied by a fever whereas a stroke resulting from sudden a blockage is not. The 
physician thus has the tools to diagnose these different kinds of strokes, looking at the 
onset of the stroke and the presence of fever.  
Unlike books of law and lexicography, medical distinctions texts do not discuss 
anything beyond the immediate phenomenon that presents itself. As will be shown 
below, lexicographic furūq books could and did participate in broader theological 
                                                             
208 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 37; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 30. 
209 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 37; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 30. 
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debates about the nature of the Arabic language while also engaging in discussions of 
discrete lexicographic differences. 
Consider the way in which the author lays out his explanations in the following 
example, as well as the kind of information that he includes and what he leaves out. 
What is the distinction between the sediment found in urine that is the 
result of illnesses in the liver (mā yaʾtī fī al-rasūb min ʿilal al-kabad) and that which 
is the result of illnesses of the kidneys?  
The answer: They are similar in reality (ishtarakā fī al-ḥaqīqa), but they 
differ in what they indicate (iftaraqā fī madlūlihimā) and how they are deduced 
(kayfiyyat al-istidlāl bihimā). That which comes from the liver is more red 
(ashaddu ḥamratan) while that which comes from the kidney leans more towards 
yellow. It is possible that that from the kidneys is black. In the case of the liver, 
urine is always opaque (al-bawl lā takūnu maʿa al-awwal naḍījan), while the kidney 
ailments can result in clear urine.210 The distinction is fully realized (tamām al-
farq) with the other symptoms of liver failure (āfat al-kabad) or the symptoms of 
pain in the kidneys (aʿrāḍ wajʿ al-kalā).211 
The author again gives detailed explanations of the illnesses to aid in diagnosis. His 
discussion focuses on the specific ways in which liver and kidney ailments manifest 
                                                             
210 I an unsure of the precise meaning of naḍīj in this context. My understanding is that it means opaque 
or turbid. This is based on the discussion of Arabic urology in Max Neuberger, “The Early History of 
Urology” trans., David Riesman, Bulletin of the Medical Library Association 25.3 (1937), 156. I thank Dr. 
Paulina Giusti for this reference. 
211 Al-Rāzī, Mā al-fāriq, 293; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 106. 
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themselves in urine. He does not discuss how to treat liver or kidney ailments, but gives 
the information that is sufficient for a diagnosis.  
The author’s claim that this work should serve as a diagnostic manual is evident 
in the distinctions themselves—that claim is no mere trope with which the author 
begins his book. In general, however, the paucity of books on medical diagnosis 
generally precludes the conclusion that they had a significant impact on the genre of 
legal distinctions.  
 
Furūq in Philology 
To better understand the rise of legal furūq, the following section will trace the 
rise of distinctions-thinking in Arabic linguistic and lexicographic writing prior to the 
prominence of furūq in legal literatures. Linguistic distinctions tracts most often 
developed from the study of rare and obscure words and focus on language and 
grammar (al-lugha wa-l-naḥw). Writing about distinctions spread into other aspects of 
language in the form of simple comparison (farq). Driven in part by theological 
concerns, simple comparisons gave way to distinctions-thinking (furūq) in discussions 
of synonyms. Simple comparisons of words gave way to robust explanations of the 
various differences between them. By tracing the practical and polemical uses of 
lexicographical distinction literature from the earliest appearance of the notion up 
through Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī’s Kitāb al-Furūq, it will become possible to see valences that 
this genre may have offered jurists when they adapted its techniques and procedures 
for their own purposes. 
 85 
 
Furūq were a regular part of philology from very early on in the premodern 
study of the Arabic language. As with the study of origins generally, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to date precisely when this linguistic genre began, although a rough lineage 
of early books of distinctions will be provided below. These works are of two types: 
distinctions in lexicography, and distinctions between the letters of the Arabic 
alphabet. The distinctions that concern lexicographers are between different words 
that appear to have the same meaning, i.e. between synonyms. The task of the scholar 
is to show the nuances between these words; he looks to identify the different contexts 
in which each word can best be employed. The premodern Arabic philologists focus on 
analyzing words (signifiers) and their meanings (signifieds) rather than diagnosing 
illnesses. The distinctions they make are about the implicit connotation of known 
words, not the explicit manifestations of unknown illnesses. 
 In this section on philology I show how the earliest precursors to books on 
distinctions were writings on gharīb and nawādir, words with rare or obscure usages. 
Lexical lists were attempts to delineate the edges of the Arabic lexicon. These works led 
to books comparing specialized vocabulary for the body parts and for the life-cycles of 
animals and humans, often titled Khalq al-insān (The Physical Constitution of Humans). 
Books on Khalq al-insān were also known by the title Kitāb al-Farq (Book of Distinguishing). 
These books are direct precursors to those lexical works entitled Furūq. Not only is 
there a direct connection between their titles, the use of a singlar and then its plural, 
but there is a further connection in terms of content. The logic of distinguishing, 
however, that functions in books of farq is quite different from that found in books of 
furūq. 
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A typical example of a linguistic furūq book is Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī’s (d. ca. 
400/1010) al-Furūq al-lughawiyya. This book consists of easily recognizable pairs of 
linguistic furūq and is evidence for the existence of a well-developed scholarly tradition 
in lexicographical distinctions in the fourth/tenth century. This style of work became 
so characteristic of the genre that much of the same organization, presentation and 
content remains evident even as late as the 17th century furūq work written by İsmail 
Hakkı Bursevi (d. 1137/1725), which was composed to reinforce the knowledge of 
Arabic among non-Arabophone elites in the Anatolian peninsula at the time.212 We can 
infer several things from the example of al-ʿAskarī’s al-Furūq al-lughawiyya as a 
“mature” form of the genre. First, by the time of al-ʿAskarī, lexicographical furūq 
writing had evolved into a stable literary genre. Earlier works on the topic focused, by 
contrast, on “distinguishing” i.e. Kitāb al-Farq. Second, works in the genre of linguistic 
furūq began to function as a kind of thesaurus. Third, the early examples of these works 
were motivated in part by theological concerns about the nature of the Arabic 
language.  
The thesauric goal is seen already at work in Ibn Qutayba’s (d. 276/885) manual 
for chancery secretaries, Adab al-kātib.213 Ibn Qutayba understood the importance of 
distinctions between near-synonyms. He also suggested that the ability to draw 
lexicographical distinctions was required knowledge for secretaries writing for the 
                                                             
212 There are many surviving manuscripts of this work. It is also available in a lithograph edition, İsmail 
Hakkı Bursevi, al-Furūq, no ed. (Dersaʻādet: Şirket-i Ṣaḥḥāfīye-ʼi ʻOmā̧nīye, 1308/1890/1) which is 
available online, at https://archive.org/details/furqbursal00smaiuoft.  
213 A section in this work is entitled “Chapters on Distinctions (abwāb al-furūq).” Ibn Qutayba, Adab al-kātib, 
ed. Muḥammad al-Dālī (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1967), 144-162. 
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state bureaucracy, part of the skill set that they needed in order to craft well-drafted 
correspondence, whether for communicating with other secretaries or showing off 
their deep erudition. In addition, the tradition of linguistic furūq was an extension of 
the early lexicographical concern with the study of aḍdād (contronyms, words which 
can mean one thing and its opposite) and abdāl (phonologically or semantically related 
letter pairs), as well as synonym groupings (gharīb and nawādir), which were essentially 
lists of, for example, different words for sword, camel, horse, etc.214 It is likely that the 
practical aspect of linguistic furūq was on factor that helped it to last over the centuries. 
The applied aspect is at work in Ibn Qutayba’s text, and it is also the motivating factor 
in Bursevi’s text nine centuries later. 
While the thesauric works focused on semantic differences of varying degrees, 
such as those listed above, furūq books could also operate on a theological level. In this 
sense, the possibility for using furūq works polemically is also evident in works from 
around the fourth/tenth century. As represented by al-ʿAskarī, the linguistic furūq 
literature sought to demonstrate the differences between supposed synonyms. The 
books were not solely discussing lexicography, but also theological doctrine regarding 
the perfection of the Arabic language. The debate over the existence of synonyms in 
Arabic went to the heart of contentions about the nature of Arabic, God’s language. In 
establishing such differences the authors of these works sought to disprove the 
existence of true synonyms in Arabic. By denying the existence of complete synonymy, 
                                                             
214 See, for instance, Al-Ḥusayn ibn Aḥmad Ibn Khālawayh, Names of the Lion, trans. David Larsen (Seattle: 
Wave Books, 2017). 
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such authors also denied the existence of superfluous elements in the language and by 
extension could deny the existence of superfluous elements in revelation, which is 
God’s speech.  
Since Arabic does not contain any redundancies, it is argued, it must be a 
perfect language employed for a perfect revelation. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī makes this 
point explicitly as follows:  
The proof (al-shāhid) that a difference in expressions and words requires a 
difference in meaning is the following. A noun is a word that refers to a concept 
denoted. When you indicate a concept one time, it is understood. A second or 
third indication, therefore, does not convey additional meaning (ghayr mufīda). 
God, who established the Arabic language (wāḍiʿ al-lugha), is wise (ḥakīm) and did 
not include that which does not convey any meaning… Every two words that are 
used for one concept or entity in a given language—each one of these words—
requires a difference in meaning that the other does not require. Otherwise, the 
second word would be redundant and there would be no need for it.215 
The theological point is clear and it is al-ʿAskarī’s explicit purpose for writing the book. 
The theological and polemical concerns expressed in this lexicographical genre may 
suggest that a similar set of concerns can be found within the legal tradition.  
Not all authors of works of lexicographic distinctions were primarily interested 
in denying synonymy. Al-ʿAskari’s al-Furūq, however was not alone in making theology 
                                                             
215 Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, al-Furūq al-Lughawiyya, ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Salīm (Cairo: Dār al-ʿIlm wa-l-
Thaqāfa li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1998), 22. 
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primary. There are other works of furūq that explicitly reject synonymy, such as, for 
instance, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s (d. 320/932) al-Furūq wa-manʿ al-tarāduf (Distinctions in 
Meaning and the Impossibility of Synonymy).216 The author of a work on distinctions 
did not necessarily deny the existence of synonymy in Arabic, but denial of synonymy 
was implicit in the literary enterprise in which they engaged.  
 
Early Lexicographical Activity  
The tradition of Arabic philology was one of the first scholarly disciplines undertaken 
by the early Muslim community. At this time, philology involved the study of grammar, 
phonology, and lexicography. While each of these areas became a discrete scholastic 
discipline during the Abbasid era, they began as three “tracks” within a single 
discipline, known interchangeably as “naḥw” or “lugha.” Practicioners of one field could 
be referred to as taking part in either discipline.217 It is not straightforward to know in 
which field a scholar was active. That is to say, a “grammarian (naḥwī)” was not 
necessarily someone involved exclusively or even primarily with grammar but could 
also practice lexicography. This means, then, that these are not fields that can be easily 
discussed in isolation—factors driving development in one field must have influenced 
the other. They were, after all, composed largely of the same individuals working with 
                                                             
216 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq wa-manʿ al-tarāduf, ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Juyūshī (Cairo: al-Nahār, 
1998). 
217 Monique Bernards “Grammarians’ Circle of Learning: A Social Network Analysis” in ʿAbbasid Studies II: 
Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies, Leuven, 28 June – 1 July 2004. Ed. John Nawas (Leuven; Paris; 
Walpole, MA: Uitgeverij Peeters en Departement Oosterse Studies, 2010), 144n2. See also Michael Carter, 
“Arabic Grammar,” in Cambridge History of Arabic Literature: Religion, Learning and Science in the ʿAbbāsid 
Period, ed. M.J.L. Young et al. (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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similar concerns, even if at different purposes. It was only once these tracks became 
separate disciplines that differences emerged between a naḥwī and a lughawī.  
Contemporary scholarship has overwhelmingly favored research on the 
grammatical legacy over the lexicographical. Consequently, there is a shortage of 
research into Arabic lexicography, particularly in its earliest phase. Moreover, 
monographs on lexicography tend to look at the tradition of general dictionaries, such 
as Khalīl ibn Aḥmad’s (d. ca. 170/786) Kitāb al-ʿAyn or Abū ʿAmr al-Shaybānī’s (d. ca. 
210/825) Kitāb al-Jīm, rather than specialized or narrow dictionaries or lexica, that is 
dictionaries of plants, lists of arabicized words (al-muʿarrab), books of homonyms, and 
so on.218 Most of the scholarship comes in the form of articles, which while useful, are 
necessarily limited in scope. A notable recent exception to this is Ramzi Baalbaki’s 
monograph The Arabic Lexicographical Tradition: From the 2nd/8th to the 12th/18th century. 
Baalbaki has split this book into three sections, (i) an analytical study of early 
lexicographical efforts, (ii) a historical study on specialized lexica, and (iii) a historical 
study of general lexica.219  
                                                             
218 Comprehensive dictionaries in particular have been examined in detail. See especially John Haywood, 
Arabic Lexicography: Its History and Its Place in the General History of Lexicography (Leiden: Brill, 1965); Stefan 
Wild, Das Kitāb al-ʿain und die arabische Lexicographie (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1965); and Ḥusayn Naṣṣār, 
Al-Muʿjam al-ʿarabī: nashʾatuhu wa-taṭawwuruhu, expanded edition, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār Miṣr li-l-Ṭibāʿa, 
1408/1988). For further discussion, see Ramzi Baalbaki, The Arabic Lexicographical Tradition: From the 
2nd/8th to the 12th/18th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2014), vii-x. 
219 The second part of his study is the first major survey of specialized Arabic lexica in a Western 
language and is a key resource for further lexicographic study. 
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The early Arabic lexicographical tradition was concerned with gathering the 
Arabic lexicon and organizing its words into a useable linguistic resource.220 As part of 
these efforts towards compilation, lexicographers made explicit efforts to collect and 
explain very rare or obscure words and usages. Michael Carter has referred to this 
activity as a forerunner to the large comprehensive dictionaries of the fourth/tenth 
century. 
The results… were entirely secular word-lists, names of animals, meteorological 
features, near-homonyms, difficult genders and morphologies, etc., more useful 
to the collector of poetry than the religious scholar, for which reason some 
philologists shunned the subject.221  
The statement that specialized lexica were simply “forerunners” to comprehensive 
dictionaries is, however, not entirely clear and seems also to be based on a model 
developed by Aḥmad Amīn, who proposes a three-stage process for the development of 
Arabic lexicography: collection, then classification, then compilation.222  
Baalbaki argues convincingly that this model, while logical, does not accurately 
reflect the historical record. “The mere existence of Kitāb al-ʿAyn is proof that the 
chronological order of the three stages is incorrect.”223 These three phases, he argues, 
occurred concurrently, not sequentially. That is to say, the “word-lists” were written 
                                                             
220 John A. Haywood, Arabic Lexicography, 12-19. 
221 Michael Carter, “Lexicography, Medieval,” in Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature, ed. Julie Scott Meisami 
and Paul Starkey (London, New York: Ashgate, 1998), 2:467.  
222 Aḥmad Amīn, Duḥā al-islām. 2nd ed. 3 vols. (Cairo: Lajnat al-Taʾlīf wa-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1938). This 
claim has been repeated often by others, not always with reference to Amīn. Amīn’s contribution is 
discussed by Baalbaki in Arabic Lexicographical Tradition, 46n233.  
223 Baalbaki, Lexicographical Tradition, 47. 
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and compiled contemporaneously with the first comprehensive dictionary—Khalīl ibn 
Aḥmad’s Kitāb al-ʿAyn; it cannot be the case that these specialized lists were simply 
precursors to larger dictionaries. Scholarly interest in compiling and discussing 
specialized word-lists expanded well past the time that “the great dictionaries” were 
compiled. These two lexicographic tracks represent complementary, not competing, 
approaches to the study of Arabic lexicography. It is in part for this reason that 
Baalbaki devotes separate sections of his work to each of these—the specialized 
(mubawwab) and the general alphabetically arranged (mujannas) lexicographical works. 
“Yet boundaries between the two types… are not always clear. Other than the fact that 
they are contemporaneous and do not represent successive stages in lexicographical 
writing, it is not always easy to determine under which type certain work should be 
discussed.”224 This is also true, since production of these shorter works continued after 
comprehensive dictionaries began to be written.225 
In the Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature, Michael Carter claims that these word-
lists were secular, which is why some lexicographers with an interest in the Quran 
disregarded these works.226 I will argue below that these works were not “entirely 
secular,” 227 but rather that many demonstrate certain theological tendencies. It will 
become quite clear that lexicography as a whole was decidedly not secular. The 
discipline of lexicography began, at least in part, as an attempt to understand the 
                                                             
224 Baalbaki, Arabic Lexicographical Tradition, viii-xi. 
225 I discuss the existence of later lexicographic furūq works below. For more, see Chapter Two of 
Baalbaki’s Arabic Lexicographical Tradition. 
226 Michael Carter, “Lexicography, Medieval,” 467. 
227 Michael Carter, “Lexicography, Medieval,” 467.  
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language of the Quran and this religious character never fully left the tradition. This 
does not mean that lexicography was solely used to advance theological arguments, but 
that its religious underpinning cannot be ignored. The theological character of 
specialized word-lists directs us to consider lexicographic furūq in a theological 
context. We will therefore turn to the early history of writing on synonyms as part of 
our attempt to trace the emergence of furūq. 
Some of the earliest scholarly lexicographical activity focused on rare words 
and obscure usages (al-gharīb wa-l-nawādir).228 “Interest in ġarīb material is often 
associated in the sources with the very early period of philological activity.”229 Among 
the impetuses for collecting gharīb material was a concern with understanding and 
explaining fully the Arabic language as used in the Quran. This concern is found among 
some scholars who used their scholarship to push for particular quranic 
interpretations. Not all philologists, however, agreed with the exegetical explorations 
of their colleagues. “Several of the philologists… also expressed strong reservations 
against Qurʾānic interpretation by fellow philologists.”230 The point to note in this 
discussion is not whether or not any particular strain of lexicography was theological, 
but that it could be used to serve a theological agenda. Of course not every 
lexicographer pursued lexicography out of piety or theological commitments to further 
the understanding of Islam’s sacred text; rather, the theological was one of various 
                                                             
228 These two words, gharīb and nawādir, are often said to refer to different kinds of words, gharīb to rare 
words and nawādir to obscure usages of more known words. In reality, however, there is a great deal of 
overlap in the use of these terms.  
229 Baalbaki, Arabic Lexicographical Tradition, 63.  
230 Baalbaki, Arabic Lexicographical Tradition, 41. 
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motives that drove lexicography. The controversy over the legitimacy of 
lexicographers performing interpretations of the Quran points to the fact that 
lexicographers were, in fact, involved in religious debates. 
Most of the lexical data found in works of distinctions was recorded by 
philologists performing “fieldwork,” to borrow an expression from the contemporary 
academy. Lexicographers would go out into the desert and collect linguistic data from 
nomadic Bedouins. “The data which the philologists recorded on the authority of the 
Bedouin fuṣaḥāʾ provided much of the raw material for the early monographs that dealt 
with ġarīb and nawādir or with specific semantic fields…”231 Nomadic Bedouins were 
picked for their knowledge of Arabic because they were viewed as pure Arabs, 
untainted by urban cosmopolitan life. They lived only among and with Arabs, the 
thinking went, and thus would speak an unadulterated form of the language. Indeed, 
the amount of linguistic data gathered by the lexicographers is remarkable. We learn 
from such informants, for example, that the word shifa refers to a human’s lips, while 
mishfar to those of a camel, those of hoofed animals are called jaḥfal but for animals 
with cloven-hoofs you should use the term miqamma or miramma.232 This is only a 
                                                             
231 Baalbaki, Arabic Lexicographical Tradition, 20. Monique Bernards, however, has argued strongly against 
this view. While the Arabic sources are intent on informing us that both lexicographers and 
grammarians gathered their data through exhaustive travel, she notes that biographical sources do not 
provide any support for this idea. The idea of travelling for knowledge (al-ṭalab fī al-ʿilm) was a literary 
trope, she argues, and not a lived reality. See Monique Bernards, “Ṭalab al-ʿIlm amongst the Linguist of 
Arabic during the ʿAbbāsid Period” in ʿAbbāsid Studies: Occassional Papers of the School of ʿAbbāsid Studies, 
Cambridge, 6-10 July 2002, ed. J.E. Montgomery: 111-128 (Leuven; Dudley, MA: Uitgeverij Peeters en 
Departement Oosterse Studies, 2004).  
232 Thābit ibn Abī Thābit, Kitāb al-Farq, 3rd printing, ed. Ḥātim Ṣaliḥ al-Ḍāmin (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 
1408/1988), 18. Some sources record this word as marimma, see Lane’s Lexicon s.v. “marimma.” 
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partial listing of the various words for lips adduced by Thābit ibn Abī Thābit (fl. 
third/ninth c.), but it shows the kind of work that early lexicographers were doing, 
namely the collection of obscure or rare words, from Bedouin informants, in a scientific 
manner.  
The collection of these words was done as a way of recording the scope of the 
Arabic language. It was not a guide per se to correct usage, which was instead the goal 
pursued by works of furūq proper. In fact, Thābit says, “Occasionally, one of these words 
is used in place of another (rubbamā uqīma baʿḍ hādhihi al-ḥurūf maqām baʿḍ)… for 
reasons of poetic necessity.”233 He then cites a poem by Abū Duʿād al-Iyādī (fl. mid-sixth 
c.), a pre-Islamic poet, wherein he uses the word “shifa” to refer to a horse’s lips, even 
though he should have used the term jaḥfal. This concession to poetic license, however, 
is the exception that proves the rule. Thābit ibn Abī Thābit shows that the occasional 
misuse of a word only occurs in times of linguistic duress, i.e. when trying to fit a poetic 
meter. In fact, even the Bedouin poets, the authorities for such usages, do so when they 
see fit. There is, thus, no reason to criticize the usage found in Abū Duʾād’s poem.  
As collections of gharīb material became more prevalent in the third/ninth 
century, authors found different ways to organize them. Gharīb already represents one 
level of sorting and classifying information. Only particular words are chosen as gharīb. 
Such collections were not attempts to capture the entirety of the Arabic language, nor 
did they attempt, as other books do, to document solecisms (laḥn) or list contronyms 
                                                             
233 Thābit ibn Abī Thābit, Kitāb al-Farq, 20. 
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(aḍḍād). Even so, these works grew as more and more entries were collected. As they 
grew, these works required further organizational refinement.  
Words identified as gharīb and nawādir were organized thematically, 
alphabetically, or sometimes not at all; these organizational rubrics were similar to 
those employed in other specialized lexica. Books would be alphabetized in a variety of 
different ways: sometimes according to the first letter of the trilateral root of the term, 
sometimes according to the final letter within the root, sometimes according to the 
abjadī ordering of the Arabic alphabet, and sometimes according to the alifbāʾī 
sequence.234 As Tilman Seidensticker writes, “[m]any books on ʾaḍdād did not order the 
words treated; [Abū Ṭayyib] al-Luġawī groups them according to the first radical; and 
aṣ-Ṣaġānī (d. 650/1252) uses a fully alphabetical arrangement. Books on homonyms 
were also composed from the beginning of the ninth century,” though they do not have 
clear discernible ordering patterns.235 Since it is the books of farq that are of primary 
interest to this study, we will look at the ways in which they were organized in the 
following section. 
 
Books of Farq 
The thematic organization of books of farq is directly relevant to the furūq tradition. As 
gharīb works spread, their particular focus and organizing principles narrowed. 
                                                             
234 For more on alphabetization, see Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics s.v. “Lexicography: 
Classical Arabic” (Tilman Seidensticker), 3:30-37. 
235 Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics s.v. “Lexicography: Classical Arabic, 7. Specialized Lexica” 
(Tilman Seidensticker), 3:34. 
 97 
 
Thematic works often based themselves on particular areas of the Arabic language. 
Specifically, gharīb works began to draw only from scriptural and related material, as in 
collections of gharīb al-ḥadīth (obscure words found in the hadith) and gharīb al-Qurʾān 
(obscure words found in the Quran). In addition to these religious works, gharīb 
scholarship also grew in another, notably less religious direction. Some books collected 
all of the words related to discrete topics, such as plants (nabāt), horses (khayl), insects 
(ḥasharāt) and the physical constitution of humans (khalq al-insān). These topical gharīb 
books functioned as repositories of lexical data for particular subject areas. They are 
attempts to capture all of the Arabic words within a given field as well as to represent 
the dialectal richness found within the language. “To take the genre of nabāt (plants) as 
an example, one finds in it references to the dialects of Ḥiğaz, Nağd, Madīna, Yamāma, 
Nağrān, Tihāma, Baḥrayn, Baṣra, Kūfa, Ḥīra, Sā̆m, Tamīm, Balḥāriṯ b. Kaʿb, etc.”236 Not 
only did lexicographers often refer to words found in specific dialects, but in fact, most 
of the lexical diversity was found across particular dialects.  
Early books on “al-farq” are not written as direct comparisons of apparent 
synonyms. In this, farq books are quite different from those of furūq. They are a sub-
genre of works on the body parts and life-stages of animals. The focus of works of farq is 
on explaining the various technical terms for the body and life-cycle, not on clarifying 
distinctions between pairs of closely related words. As an example, the book written by 
Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn al-Mustanīr (d. 206), better known as Quṭrub, is divided into 
the following sections, as given by Khalīl Ibrāhīm al-ʿAṭiyya and Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-
                                                             
236 Baalbaki, Arabic Lexicographical Tradition, 133-34. 
 98 
 
Tawwāb, the editors of this book. Their edition, from 1987, is based on a manuscript 
from the early fourth/tenth century manuscript housed in Vienna (a very early date 
for the manuscript of an Arabic book). While these division titles are not Quṭrub’s, they 
provide insight into the way this work is indeed organized. 
1) Divisions of the Body (aqsām al-khalq) 
2) Birth, Pregnancy, and Terms for Offspring (al-walāda baʿd al-ḥaml wa-tasmiyat 
al-mawālīd) 
3) Voices and Cries of Humans, Animals, and Birds (aswāt al-insān wa-l-bahāʾim 
wa-l-ṭayr) 
4) Sounds of Humans, Animals, and Birds (zajr al-insān wa-l-bahāʾim wa-l-ṭayr) 
5) Groups of Humans and Animals (al-jamāʿa min al-nās wa-l-bahāʾim) 
6) Death of Humans and Animals (al-mawt min al-insān wa-l-bahāʾim) 237 
The division shows the relatively straightforward, but, nevertheless, conscious, 
organization and grouping that structures the book. The body is divided from head to 
toe and the rest of the divisions progress from life to death. The lexicographic 
precursors to furūq are not concerned with distinction-making; they take it as a given 
that distinctions occur. The books on farq assume a diversity of terminology within a 
broad category, while books on furūq assume confusion based on a similar specific 
meaning. The latter confusion is what authors of works on furūq want to solve by 
                                                             
237 Quṭrub, Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn al-Mustanīr, Kitāb al-Farq, ed. Khalīl Ibrāhīm al-ʿAṭiyya and Ramaḍān 
ʿAbd al-Tawwāb (Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 1987), 28, see pp. 32-34 for a description of the Vienna 
manuscript. 
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drawing their distinctions, whereas authors of books on farq take distinctions for 
granted.  
Works that focused on humans and animals were often organized according to 
the body and cycles of life as shown above. These works took on titles of the form “The 
Physical Constitution of X” (khalq al-shayʾ), such as “The Physical Constitution of 
Humans” (khalq al-insān) or “The Physical Constitution of Horses” (khalq al-fars). While 
these topics were of interest to early lexicographers, as were camels and swords, it was 
insects that seem to have been the subject of the first works. Ḥusayn Naṣṣār writes that 
“the reason for this could be that the Quran mentions groups of insects, such as ants, 
bees, flies, scorpions, locusts, and mosquitoes (buʿūḍ), and Quran commentators had 
studies and discussions about them which drew the attention of the lexicographers.”238 
Ḥasharāt in these works refers to insects and reptiles (zawāḥif wa-hawāmm).239 Naṣṣār 
claims that the first of these authors was Abū Khayra al-Aʿrābī (d. early third/ninth c.), 
then Abū ʿAmr al-Shaybānī (d. ca. 210/825), then Abū ʿUbayda (d. ca. 210/825), al-Aṣmaʿī 
(d. ca. 213/828), etc.240 These books were at first written as independent works, but later 
incorporated as chapters or sections of encyclopedic works like Ibn Qutayba’s Adab al-
kātib and more integrally al-Thaʿālabī’s (d. 429/1037) Fiqh al-lugha, both of which had 
chapters titled khalq al-insān.  
There was also extensive writing on horses (al-khayl), camels, and other animals, 
both those used in war and those not used in war. The first book on horses was by Abū 
                                                             
238 Naṣṣār, al-Muʿjam al-ʿArabī, 100. 
239 Naṣṣār, al-Muʿjam al-ʿArabī, 100. 
240 Naṣṣār, al-Muʿjam al-ʿArabī, 101. 
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Mālik ʿAmr ibn Kirkira (fl. second half of the second/eighth c.).241 Later lexicographers 
called their books Kitāb al-khayl or Khalq al-faras. While writing individual treatises on 
ḥasharat seems to have ended, books on horses continued to be composed into the 
seventh/thirteenth century, such as Muḥammad ibn Raḍwān al-Numayrī’s (d. 
657/1257) Kitāb al-Khayl. “All of the authors depended on the first books in regard to 
content and organization.”242 Abū Mālik ʿAmr ibn Kirkira was also the first to write a 
book on Khalq al-insān, according to Ḥusayn Naṣṣār.243 This tradition continued for 
centuries and even the 15th-century scholar Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī wrote a book in this 
genre.244 Naṣṣār implies that Ibn Qutayba, in his Adab al-kātib, was the first to include a 
“a section on some defects of humans and their illnesses as well as distinctions between 
words that people take to be synonyms regarding the human body. These two sections, 
however, are short and of negligible value.”245 The tradition of writings on farq, 
distinguishing, appears to be a precursor to the tradition of writing on furūq, which is 
perhaps not surprising since both deal with roughly the same subject matter, 
synonymy, and furūq is the plural of farq. 
The first work of lexicographic distinction (al-farq) appears to be that of the 
lexicographer Abū Ziyād al-Kilābī (d. ca. 200/815).246 Shortly thereafter, Quṭrub wrote 
                                                             
241 Naṣṣār, al-Muʿjam al-ʿArabī, 102. 
242 Naṣṣār, al-Muʿjam al-ʿArabī, 105. 
243 Naṣṣār, al-Muʿjam al-ʿArabī, 106. 
244 Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Kutub Khalq al-insān Maʿ taḥqīq kitāb Ghayāt al-iḥsān fī khalq al-insān li-l-Suyūṭī, ed. 
Nihād Ḥasūbī Ṣāliḥ (Baghdad: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Iʿlām, 1989). 
245 Ḥusayn Naṣṣār, al-Muʿjam al-ʿArabī, 107. 
246 Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-Tawwāb, “Introduction” to Kitāb al-farq, by Ibn Fāris al-Lughawī, ed. Ramaḍān ʿAbd 
al-Tawwāb (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khātimī; Riyadh: Dār al-Rifāʿī, 1402/1982), 42. Ibn al-Nadīm also credits 
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what is the earliest extant work on linguistic distinction, entitled al-Farq fī al-lugha.247 
Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-Tawwāb discusses the early history of this genre in the introduction 
to his edition of Quṭrub’s al-Farq fī al-lugha:  
In spite of having lost most of the tradition of linguistic distinctions in Arabic, 
what has come down to us adds up to a small quantity. Absolutely the oldest of 
what remains is Quṭrub’s book followed by that of Abū Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Malik ibn 
Qurayb al-Aṣmaʿī… [The] next is the book by Thābit ibn Abī Thābit, who was a 
student of Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Salām [(d. 224/838-39)]… These books are 
followed by Abū Ḥātim al-Sijistānī’s [(d. 255/869)], and the fifth book in the farq 
tradition to reach us is by Ibn Fāris al-Lughawī [(d. 395/1004)].248 
Although efforts to reconstruct this early history are hampered by the loss of the 
earliest works many of the concerns and questions that were important to these early 
authors in this genre can still be perceived. 
The very earliest examples of works on linguistic distinction (al-farq) are 
concerned with distinguishing the words used for the limbs, appendages, and actions of 
humans versus other animal groups, including livestock, birds, predatory beasts, 
insects, etc. Quṭrub’s work is quite similar to the works entitled Kitāb al-Farq of both al-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Abū Ziyād as the earliest philologist to write on distinctions, Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 1.1:118-90. The entry 
on Abū Ziyād is on 1.1:121. 
247 This work has been edited and published twice. The first publication, based on an incomplete 
manuscript was done by Rudolf Geyer in 1888 under the title Mā khālafa fīhi al-insān al-bahīm fī asmā’ al-
wuḥūsh wa-ṣifātihi. More recently, Khalīl Ibrāhīm ʿAṭiyya and Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-Tawwāb have published a 
critical edition of this work,. 
248 Quṭrub Kitāb al-farq, 6. 
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Aṣmaʿī and Thābit ibn Thābit, both of which are alternatively titled Khalq al-insān.249 The 
entries themselves are grouped around body parts so that, for instance, they start with 
bāb al-fam (Chapter on Mouths), followed by bāb al-anf (Chapter on Noses), bāb al-ẓufur 
(Chapter on Nails), and so on. Each chapter is arranged such that the different 
‘synonyms’ are explained as referring to a distinct kind or class of animal. Thābit ibn 
Abī Thābit states this in the following way in the introduction to his book.  
This is a book on that in which the names of human limbs is not the same as the 
names of limbs of four-legged domestic animals, wild animals, etc. [This is also a 
book on] that which al-Aṣmaʿī, Ibn al-Aʿrābī, Abū ʿUbayd, Abū Naṣr and other 
scholars agree (wāfaqa ʿan).250  
The tradition of farq writing was clearly a scholarly tradition, passed down from 
teacher to student. Thābit ibn Abī Thābit’s book, for example, is almost identical to that 
of his instructor al-Aṣmaʿī’s. Thābit quotes al-Aṣmaʿī verbatim for long passages—
normally with explicit attribution. Quṭrub’s book is arranged in basically the same way 
as Aṣmaʿī’s.  
The organization of Ibn al-Sikkīt’s (d. 244/858) Kitāb al-Alfāẓ, on the other hand 
is not nearly as straightforward. It appears at times to be organized in a vein similar to 
that of other early works, but its overall form is neither readily apparent nor explicitly 
stated. Some individual groupings can be discerned, but the order of these groupings 
remains elusive. In other words, the comparison in certain entries is quite obvious, but 
                                                             
249 Al-Aṣmaʿī, ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Qurayb, Kitāb al-Farq, ed. Ṣabīḥ al-Tamīmī (Beirut: Dār Usāmah, 1987). 
250 Thābit ibn Abī Thābit, Kitāb al-Farq, 17. 
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the ordering of the entries is not. For instance, the first two chapters are on wealth (al-
ghinā wa-l-khiṣb) and poverty (al-faqr wa-l-jadb) respectively while the next two are on 
groups (jamāʿa) and on battalions (katāʾib). Both of these pairs are seem logically 
related—wealth and poverty are antonyms; groups and battalions are near-synonyms—
but the logic that puts wealth and poverty next to groups and battalions is not clear. 
Ibn al-Sikkīt accepts that there is synonymy in Arabic. For example, in the 
section Bāb mā lā budda minhu he lists synonyms for the phrase lā budda minhu, “there is 
no way out; one must do something.” It begins, on the authority of al-Aṣmaʿī: “There is 
no ḥumma from that nor a rumma. That is to say, there is no escape from this (lā ḥumma 
min dhālika wa-lā rumma, ayy lā budda minhu).”251 His putting the terms ḥumma and 
rumma in apposition (badal) suggests their semantic equivalence; Ibn al-Sikkīt uses one 
to stand for the other. While many of the scholars who wrote in the genre of linguistic 
distinctions were Muʿtazilīs concerned with highlighting the perfection of the Arabic 
language, this was not the case for all such authors. Quṭrub, who wrote the earliest 
work on distinctions, for instance, does seem to believe in the existence of synonymy in 
the Arabic language. He is quoted in al-Suyūṭī’s al-Muzhir fī ʿulūm al-lugha, for instance, 
as saying the following. “The Arabs used (awqaʿat) two words for one meaning to prove 
the breadth of their language (kalāmihim).”252 
                                                             
251 Ibn Sikkīt, Yaʿqūb ibn Isḥāq, Kitāb al-Alfāẓ: Aqdam Muʿjam fī al-Maʿānī, ed. Fakhr al-Dīn Qabbāwa (Beirut: 
Maktabat Lubnān Nāshirūn, 1998), 183. 
252 Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, al-Muzhir fī ʿulūm al-lugha wa-anwāʿihā, vol. 1, ed. Muḥammad Aḥmad Jād al-Mawlā 
Bek, Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, and ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī (Cairo: Maktabat Dār al-Turāth, 
n.d.), 400.  
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While the content can tell us about the early transmission of ideas about 
language, the preserved material might not always tell us about the ways in which 
authors organized and presented their work. Since the extant manuscripts are usually 
from centuries after the author’s autograph, we cannot know whether the intentional 
organization of these earliest works is preserved. “The preserved manuscripts may turn 
out to be half a millennium later than their originals and, though this may not be 
indicated in the manuscripts themselves, they may have undergone various recensions 
and redactions during this time.”253 Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila is correct in doubting the 
provenance of the organization. Not only can works be changed as they undergo 
copying and recopying, but there is still controversy over the nature of the earliest 
Arabic books as such. We do not know to what extent they were given a final redaction 
by the author, to what extent they could be considered authored works and to what 
extent were they more open and receptive to further change and emendation.254 
 
Kutub al-Furūq fī al-Lugha 
In the fourth/tenth century the new concept of furūq clearly emerges among 
lexicographers. The earlier books of farq fall within the nawādir and gharīb frameworks. 
These works limited themselves, in the style of Kitāb al-Alfāẓ, to singular topics or 
                                                             
253 Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, “Al-Aṣmaʿī, Early Arabic Lexicography, and Kutub al-Farq” Zeitschrift für 
Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften 16 (2005): 141-148, 141.  
254 See Gregor Schoeler, The Genesis of Literature in Islam: From the Aural to the Read. trans., Shawkat M. 
Toorawa (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). The Kitāb al-ʿAyn of Khalīl ibn Aḥmad is a great 
example. Many of the passages in this book seem to have actually been written by Ibn Durayd. See Ramzi 
Baalbaki, “Kitāb al-ʿAyn and Jamharat al-Lugha” in Early Medieval Arabic: Studies on al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad, ed. 
Karin C. Ryding, 44-62 (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998). 
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themes. By the time that al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī composes his Furūq wa-manʿ al-tarāduf in 
the third/ninth century, the term furūq is not simply synonymous with rare or strange 
usage, but is fundamentally driven by concerns about synonymy. It is important to note 
that the change in focus towards synonymy came with a change of terminology. The 
furūq works that were composed in this century are, for the first time, given titles using 
the term furūq. This is not the same as the farq of Thābit ibn Abī Thābi or al-Aṣmaʿī. 
While it is a continuation of the tradition in lexicographic scholarship, and in other 
fields as well, as discussed above, as furūq, it represents a separate, more solidified 
concept and takes on a stronger theological impulse. The next section takes Abū Hilāl 
al-ʿAskarī’s Kitāb Furūq as an example of the genre, since it is among the earliest 
exemplars and highlights the theological stakes in this genre. 
 
Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī 
Abū Hilāl al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿAskarī seems to have left us a great number of 
extant works, yet he does not seem to have been a prominent figure in his own time. 
According to George Kanazi, “[o]ur information about Abū Hilāl is very meagre, 
uninteresting and lacking in detail, because the early sources mentioning him are very 
few.”255 In part, this obscurity is because he has been and still is often confused with his 
similarly named teacher, Abū Aḥmad al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿAskarī (d. 382/993). 
Biographers did not always distinguish between Abū Hilāl and Abū Aḥmad. This 
confusion makes reconstructing the biography of the author of Kitāb al-Furūq, Abū Hilāl 
                                                             
255 George Kanazi, Studies in the Kitāb aṣ-Ṣināʾatayn of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (Brill: Leiden, 1989), 1. 
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al-ʿAskarī, complicated. Because of the confusion surrounding Abū Hilāl and his 
teacher, a detailed consideration of these two figures is worthwhile. 
Abū Hilāl seems to have been less important in the bibliographic sources than 
his teacher, even though more of his works than of his teacher’s are preserved.256 “As 
early as the year 510 A.H.[/1116-17), al-Silafī could point to a confusion between the 
two ʿAskaris [sic], Abū Aḥmad (293-382 A.H.) and Abū Hilāl (d. after 400 A.H.).”257 Abū 
Ṭāhir Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Silafī258 is quoted in Yāqūt’s Muʾjam al-udabāʾ as 
undertsanding the confusion between these two figures as arising from their similar 
names, stating that “probably one was mentioned when the other was meant (rubbamā 
ashtabaha dhikruhu bi-dhikrihi).”259 In fact, in order to resolve this misunderstanding, al-
Silafī had to consult Abū al-Muẓaffar Muḥammad ibn Abī al-ʿAbbās al-Abīwardī (d. 
507/1113), the foremost linguist (al-raʾīs) in Hamadan.260  
                                                             
256 See, for example, their respective entries in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edition. Both entries are 
written by Beatrice Gruendler. While she devotes 1,158 words to Abū Aḥmad, Abū Hilāl received about 
half that number, 680 words. EI3 s.v., “al-ʿAskarī, Abū Aḥmad” (B. Gruendler) and EI3 s.v., “al-ʿAskarī, Abū 
Hilāl” (B. Gruendler). 
257 George Kanazi, Studies in the Kitāb aṣ-Ṣināʾatayn, 2. 
258 Al-Silafī was a noted hadith scholar and grammarian. He was born in Isfahān, travelled to Baghdad for 
his education, and then to Tyre and Alexandria where he later settled. He was a noted scholar and 
teacher there. He was born in 472/1079 or 478/1097 and died in Alexandria on 5 Rabīʿ II, 576/8 August, 
1180. Al-Silafī himself merits only a short biography in Ibn Khallikān’s Wafayāt al-Aʿyān. See Shams al-Dīn 
Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ al-zamān, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: 
Dār Ṣādir, 1398/1978), 1:105-107, no.44, see also Mac-Guckin de Slane, Ibn Khallikan’s Wafayat al-A’yan wa 
Anba’ Abna’ al-Zaman (M. de Slane’s English Translation), ed. S Moinul Haq vol. 1 (Karachi: Pakistan Historical 
Society, 1961), 152-156. 
259 Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī al-Rūmī, Muʿjam al-udabāʾ: irshād al-arīb ilā maʿrifat al-adīb, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: 
Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1993), 2:918. 
260 On al-Abīwardī, see EI3 s.v., “al-Abīwardī, Abū al-Muẓaffar Muḥammad” (Geert Jan van Gelder) and 
Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, Muʿjam al-udabāʾ, 5:2360-2376. 
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Although al-Silafī went to great lengths to resolve this confusion, later scholars 
continued to confuse these two al-ʿAskarīs. In fact, Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī (d. 
764/1363) uses this case to highlight the importance of ascertaining a scholar’s full 
name before studying him, in order to distinguish him from others with similar names. 
After relating a comical story about the puzzlement that arose from using incomplete 
names during the hajj, al-Ṣafadī cites the example of the two al-ʿAskarīs as a real world 
example of misunderstandings that occur because of similar names, a kind of 
biographical distinction:  
The same confusion about names exists between al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-
ʿAskarī, Abū Aḥmad al-Lughawī, who wrote Kitāb al-Taṣḥīf and al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAbd 
Allāh al-ʿAskarī, Abū Hilāl, who wrote Kitāb al-Awāʾil. Both of them are al-Ḥasan 
ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿAskarī. The former passed away in the year 382 while the 
latter was still alive in the year 395. They happen to have the same name, as did 
their fathers, the same nisba, and the same scholarly vocation (ʿilm). Their death 
dates are also fairly close (taqārabā fī al-zamān). You can only tell them apart by 
their kunya, since the first is Abū Aḥmad and the second Abū Hilāl. The first is 
Ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Saʿīd ibn Ismāʿīl while the second Ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sahl ibn 
Saʿīd. Because of these similarities, many historians did not distinguish between 
them and assumed (yaẓunnūna) they were the same person.261 
                                                             
261 Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī bi-l-wafāyāt, ed. Aḥmad al-Arnaʾūṭ and Turkī Muṣṭafā (Beirut: Dār 
Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī), 1:48. 
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Al-Ṣafadī’s warning about a careless approach to names, and in particular to the two 
Ḥasan ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿAskarīs, went unheeded. This confusion has persisted into the 
21st century. Due to this misperception it is hard to know much about Abū Hilāl or his 
thought with certainty. 
George Kanazi mentions that “[t]he information provided by al-Silafī seems to 
be inaccurate in one place at least… Though this is by no means a serious inaccuracy, 
one should perhaps not put too much reliance on this treatise.”262 The uncertainty over 
the identity of the two al-ʿAskarīs in the biographical sources prior to Yāqūt 
complicates our attempt to identify specific ideas as those either of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī 
or Abū Aḥmad for that matter. Al-Silafī attempted to clear up this confusion which 
became proverbial when al-Ṣafadī wrote his Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt in the 14th century. 
However that may be, there is a great deal of circumstantial evidence for the 
theological ideas of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī that points to his affiliation with Muʿtazilī 
theology. George Kanazi, who believes “that Abū Hilāl belonged to the Muʿtazilites,”263 
bases this conclusion primarily on three moments in Abū Hilāl’s oeuvre. First, Abū Hilāl 
claims that Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭāʾ (d. 131/748-49) was the first Muslim to write on theology 
(kalām) and offers a long defense of him and his intellectual originality.264 Second, Abū 
Hilāl also hints at his Muʿtazilī affiliations in his Kitāb al-Ṣināʿatayn. In a discussion on 
using proofs in one’s thinking (al-baṣar bi-l-ḥujja), he brings up the fact of the 
                                                             
262 Kanazi, Studies, 2n11. 
263 Kanazi, Studies, 14. 
264 Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, Kitāb al-awāʾil, ed. Muḥammad al-Miṣrī and Walīd Qaṣṣāb, 2 vols. (Damascus: 
Manshūrāt Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1975), 2:134-138. Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭāʾ was the theologian 
credited with founding the Muʿtazila school of theology. See EI2 s.v. “Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ” (J. Van Ess). 
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createdness of the Quran, one of the central tenets of the Muʿtazila. “Someone265 asked 
Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb [d. 303/915-16], ‘What proof is there that the 
Quran is created?’ ‘God could create something like it (Allāh qādir ʿalā mithlihi),’ he 
answered.”266 Finally, in the introduction to the same book, al-ʿAskarī mentions his 
commitment to the principle of “the reward and punishment in the afterlife (al-waʿd 
wa-l-waʿīd),” a central tenet in Muʿtazilī theology.267 In a study of his literary theory, 
Amal al-Mashāyikh also infers from Abū Hilāl’s style of argumentation and his 
preference for badīʿ that he was a Muʿtazilī.268 
The biographical dictionaries tell us the names of many of Abū Hilāl’s teachers 
and students but do not provide any substantial information about them, perhaps “due 
to their Shīʿite or Muʿtazilite sympathies.”269 This lack of information holds true for all 
of Abū Hilāl’s teachers save the aforementioned, Abū Aḥmad al-ʿAskarī, about whom, 
again, not much can be known with confidence. We do know, however, that: 
“Abū Aḥmad al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿīd al-ʿAskarī (293–382/906–93) was a prolific 
                                                             
265 A supporter of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān. 
266 Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, Kitāb al-Ṣināʿatayn al-kitāba wa-l-shiʿr, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī and 
Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm ([Cairo:] Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, 1371/1952), 14. 
267 Al-ʿAskarī, al-Ṣināʿatayn, 2. For more on the “promised good and the promised evil” see Richard M. 
Frank, Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Muʿtazila in the Classical Period 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1978). 
268 Amal al-Mashāyikh, Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī nāqidan, (Amman: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa, 2002), 72, 296. This claim 
is somewhat unclear. Badīʿ refers to the liberal use of figures of speech and paranomasia in writing. It was 
first espoused by ‘modern’ (muḥdath) poets in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries and later 
adopted by many Arabic writers. See EI3 s.v. “badīʿ” (Geert Jan van Gelder) and Suzanne P. 
Stetkevych, Abū Tammām and the poetics of the ʿAbbāsid age (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1991). 
269 George Kanazi, Studies, 9. 
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author and the leading scholar of his day in hadith, lugha, and adab.”270 Importantly, he 
was accused of being a Muʿtazilī.271 He is included in the modern work, Aʿyān al-shīʿa 
“because (a) he was a teacher of the prominent shiʿite figure, al-Ṣadūq (Muḥammad b. 
ʿAlī b. Bābawayh, d. 391 A.H.), (b) he was a student of Ibn Durayd, and (c) of Ibn ʿAbbād’s 
eagerness to meet him.”272 Ibn Bābawayh in particular, although not a Muʿtazilī, wrote 
one of the authoritative books of Imāmī hadith and law, Man lam yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh.273 
Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād was “a tireless champion of [Basran] Muʿtazili rationalism.”274 Abū 
Aḥmad was one of Abū Hilāl’s main teachers, if not his most important one.275  
Abū Hilāl produced many students of his own, although, we lack information on 
the majority of them. One of his students, however, Abū Saʿd Ismāʿīl ibn ʿAlī al-Rāzī al-
Sammām, is mentioned as having been a prominent Muʿtazilī. “According to Dhahabī, 
who mentioned him under the year 445 A.H., he studied in Iraq, Mecca, Egypt and 
Damascus. He was an authority on different readings of the Koran, on hadīth [sic] and 
fiqh. He had a deep knowledge of the Ḥanafite and Shafiʿite schools of law, and was at 
                                                             
270 EI3 s.v. “al-ʿAskarī, Abū Aḥmad” (B. Gruendler). 
271 Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntaẓam fī tawārīkh al-mulūk wa-l-umam, ed. Sabīl Zakkār (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr li-l-Ṭibāʿa 
wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1415/1995), 4265/9:43. Curiously, Ibn al-Jawzī includes al-Ḥasan’s death notice in 
the chapter on the year 387/997, and mentions a story told by Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyā ibn ʿAlī al-Tabrīzī 
about an encounter al-Tabrīzī had with Abū al-Ḥasan. This story mentions that Abū al-Ḥasan passed 
away on 8 Dhū al-Ḥijja 379/9 March 990. 
272 George Kanazi, Studies, 5. See also, Muḥsin al-Ḥusaynī al-ʿĀmilī, Aʿyān al-Shīʿa, ed. Ḥasan al-Amīn and 
Muḥsin al-Amīn (Beirut: Dār al-Taʿāruf li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, 1998) 8:216. 
273 See also Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. “Ebn Bābawayh (2)” (M. McDermott). 
274 Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. “Ebn ʿAbbād, Esmāʾīl, al-Ṣāheb Kāfī al-Kofāt” (M. Pomerantz). According to 
the entry in EI2, “[s]ome Sẖ̱īʿīs like Ibn Bābūya… claim [Ibn ʿAbbād] as one of them,” and that ʿAbd al-
Jabbār accused him of being Shi’i as well. His Muʿtazilism, however, does not seem to have been in doubt. 
EI2 s.v., “Ibn ʿAbbād” (Cl. Cahen and Ch. Pellat). 
275 George Kanazi, Studies, 7. 
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the same time one of the leading scholars of the Muʿtazila.”276 However circumstantial, 
there is nevertheless a great deal of evidence pointing to Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī as leaning 
towards Muʿtazilī theology.277  
Regardless of his actual views, his works could be and were interpreted as part 
of a development within a Muʿtazilite framework, a view that seems to gain support 
from the Kitāb al-Furūq. His discussion about the absence of complete synonymy in 
Arabic—a principle that he interestingly and explicitly applies to all languages—must 
have resonated well with Muʿtazilī understandings of the language and the divine. 
Regarding the lack of synonymy in Arabic, he writes: 
God… did not include [in the Arabic language] that which does not convey 
meaning… Every two words which are used for one concept or entity in one 
language, each one of these words requires a difference in meaning that the first 
does not entail. Otherwise, the second word would be redundant and there 
would be no need for it.278 
In this passage, Abū Hilāl could not be clearer about the complete lack of true 
synonymy in Arabic. His argument is that God created a perfect language, which, in 
order to be perfect, cannot have two signifiers for any one signified. In such a case, one 
                                                             
276 George Kanazi, Studies, 9, citing Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Siyar aʿlām al-nubalāʾ, 
ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ and Muḥammad Taʿyīm al-ʿAraqsūsī (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1317/1996), 
18:55-60. 
277 In addition, ʿAskar Mukram, Abū Hilāl’s hometown, was the center of the “Jubbāʿī school” of Muʿtazilī 
theology, see EI2, “Muʿtazila” (D. Gimaret). Josef Van Ess makes this claim as well in his Theologie und 
Gesellschaft, that Abū Hilāl was”vermutlich Muʿtazilit.” His only citation for this claim, however, is 
Kanazi’s book cited here. Van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 4:246 
278 Abū Hilāl, Furūq, 22. 
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of these two signifiers would be redundant, i.e. words that could be removed from the 
language without reducing the language’s semantic content. Such a redudancy would 
be an imperfection, since it would be an unnecessary part.  
It is important to note the strong theological overtones that run throughout his 
biography and works. While it seems likely that Abū Hilāl was a Muʿtazilī, it is equally 
important to see how his work was theological. It was not explicitly engaged in 
systematic theological debate, but rather applied theological postulates in order to 
resolve linguistic questions and to further lexicographical analysis.279 I will argue that 
the implicit theological underpinnings of works like Abū Hillāl’s are a nexus point, if 
not a direct influence, on the theological aspects of the furūq of the jurists. In this vein, 
what Abū Hilāl himself says of the ambit of his Furūq should be noted. “I turned my 
discussions in this book towards (wa-jaʿaltu kalāmī fīhi [hādhā al-kitāb] ʿalā) what is found 
in God’s book, what is common in the words of the jurists and theologians (al-fuqahāʾ 
wa-l-mutakallimīn), and the rest of the discussions of the learned (wa-sāʾir miḥwārāt al-
nās).”280 
 
Farq and the Arabic Alphabet 
In related scholarship within the realm of language, there was a great interest among 
grammarians and lexicographers on writing about phonetic distinctions between 
                                                             
279 It should be unsurprising that many intellectual works were making implicit theological or 
philosophical claims in the context of other discussions. See James E. Montgomery, “Speech and Nature: 
al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn, 2.175–207,” Parts 1-4, Middle Eastern Literatures 11.2 (2008): 169-91; 12.1 
(2009): 1-25; 12.2 (2009): 107-25; 12.3 (2009), 213-32. 
280 Abū Hilāl, Furūq, 21. 
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individual letters, most notably between the letters ḍād and ẓāʾ. It will be important to 
our argument to consider the phonetics-based origins of the genre as well as its scope. 
Similar to what is discussed above in regard to lexicographic distinctions, distinctions 
between individual letters often had theological implications. The correct spelling and 
pronunciation of the letters of the Quran had to be ensured in order to safeguard 
correct religious understanding, i.e. for recitation, for correct exegesis, and for 
understanding the metaphysics of Arabic as God’s divine language. This work was more 
than just lexicographical: the ḍād was imagined as pivotal to the self-understanding of 
Arabic as a unique language. As Jonathan Brown notes , “[w]ritings on the difference 
between ḍād and ẓāʾ or lists of [ḍ] – [ẓ] minimal pairs281 constitute a long-lived genre in 
Arabic philology and belles-lettres.”282 Although it is impossible in these contexts to 
discuss one letter without the other, these texts are written explicitly as focused on 
understanding the ḍād, not the ẓāʾ. The particular focus on the ḍād is due to the 
centrality of the ḍād to early conceptions of the Arabic language. Arabic was believed to 
be the only language containing the letter ḍād. For this reason, Arabic was called the 
language of the ḍād (lughat al-ḍād). In dictionaries, for instance, the main discussion for 
the word ḍād centers on its place within the Arabic language. The Tāj al-ʿarūs says “The 
ḍād is exclusively Arab (li-l-ʿArab khāṣṣatan), i.e. it is exclusive to their language and it is 
                                                             
281 Minimal pairs refers to words that only differ in one letter. In this case, this refers to words that are 
spelled the same save for a ḍād is being replaced by a ẓāʾ or vice-versa. 
282 Jonathan A. C. Brown, “New Data on the Delateralization of Ḍād and its Merger with Ẓāʾ in Classical Arabic: 
Contributions from Old South Arabic and the Earliest Islamic Texts on Ḍ / Ẓ Minimal Pairs” Journal of Semitic 
Studies 52.2 (2007): 335-368; 345. 
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not found in the languages of non-Arabs (lughāt al-ʿajam), this is the truth on which 
everyone agrees (aṭbaqa ʿalayhi al-jamāhīr).”283 
In spite of this identification of the Arabic language with the letter ḍād, the 
pronunciation of this letter has always been a source of doubt and discomfort. Most 
Arabic letters, it seems, have no stable pronunciation, and the ḍād is in fact one of the 
most often confused letters in the Arabic alphabet. The difficulty in pronouncing this 
letter was proverbial. There is a spurious hadith report in which Muḥammad states that 
he is the best to ever pronounce the letter ḍād. “I am the most eloquent at enunciating 
the ḍād since I am from Quraysh (anā afṣaḥ man naṭiqa bi-l-ḍād bayda annī min 
Quraysh).”284 Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373) brings up this hadith in his commentary on the 
Quran, in discussing the last verse of the Fātiḥa. The last verse in this sura contains two 
words with the ḍād, maghḍūb (angered) and ḍāllīn (those who go astray). Ibn Kathīr 
therefore includes a discussion on how to pronounce the ḍād and its resemblance to the 
ẓāʾ. He ends his dicussion by saying “As for the hadith ‘I am the most eloquent at 
pronouncing the ḍād,’ there is no basis to believe its authenticity (lā aṣla lahu).”285 Like 
                                                             
283 Muḥammad Murtaḍā al-Ḥusaynī al-Zabīdī, Tāj al-ʿarūs min jawāhir al-Qāmūs, ed. ʿAbd al-Sattār Aḥmad 
Farrāj, vol. 8 (Kuwait: Maṭbaʿat Ḥukūmat al-Kuwayt 1970), 315-16. See, however, Abū al-Fatḥ ʿUthmān Ibn 
Jinnī, Sirr ṣināʿat al-iʿrāb, ed. Ḥasan Hindāwī (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1985), 1:214-15, where he says that 
“The ḍād is not found in non-Arabic languages, with minor exceptions (lā tūjidu fī kalām al-ʿajam illā fī 
qalīl).”  
284 This can also be taken to mean that Muḥammad is saying that he is “the most eloquent person to speak the 
Arabic language.” Books about the letter ḍād, however, take Muḥammad to be making a phonological point. 
285 Ismāʿīl Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm, ed. Muṣtafā al-Sayyid Muḥammad et al. (Jīza: Muʾassasat Qurṭubah, 
2000), 1:228. 
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other sources, Ibn Kathīr denies the veracity of the report, but nevertheless affirms the 
idea it conveys.286 
Interestingly, it appears that the ḍād never had one particular, discrete 
pronunciation. This was not just a feature of spoken Arabic, but of other Semitic 
languages that existed in Late Antiquity. Scholars of Old South Arabian, for instance, 
have stated that the distinction ḍād/ẓāʾ was already fading during the Late Antique 
period. Stefan Weninger notes occasional free variation between these graphemes: “In 
the later minuscule script, as here, both phonemes /ḍ/ and /ẓ/ are represented by the 
letter ḍ.”287 Christian Julien Robin finds similar evidence in other South Arabian 
inscriptions: “It is interesting to note for these purposes that the letter ẓ is replaced 
quite regularly by a ḍ, which implies a probable confusion between these two 
phonemes.”288 The merging of these two letters in script from this time period suggests 
the contemporaneous merging of these two phonemes in speech. This evidence points 
to at least a partial merging between the two phonemes in the pre-Islamic Arabian 
Peninsula. These results do not tell us that this was the case for Arabic speakers, nor 
how exactly this phoneme was pronounced. These were two phonemes that were not 
stable in Semitic languages, and further, the documented variability between these two 
phonemes in Arabic is very early and further points to their instability relative to each 
other. David Cohen lists the “disappearance of the ḍād” as a characteristic feature of 
                                                             
286 As a non-canonical hadith, it does not appear in the major collections nor in Wensinck’s concordance. 
287 Stefan Weninger, “More Sabaic minuscule texts from Munich” Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 32 
(2002), 218. 
288 Christian Julien Robin, “Les inscriptions de l’arabie antique et les études arabe” Arabica 68.4 (2001), 534. 
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spoken Arabic in the “classical” period.289 Although he calls it a disappearance, Cohen 
argues that it is more than this, that “ḍād disappeared by fusing with another 
phoneme[, the ẓāʾ].”290 In addition to this merger, he notes the lateralization of the ḍād 
in al-Andalus that resulted in, for instance, al-qāḍī becoming the Spanish alcalde, as yet 
another pronunciation.291  
Jonathan Brown, in a 2007 article, divides medieval writings on ḍād and ẓāʾ into 
four groups: (1) “wordsmithing,” that is, a written performance in which you lament 
the current level of people’s Arabic as a way to launch a discussion of beautiful poetry. 
This includes a statement such as, “Such a word is written with a ḍ, which can be seen 
from the following poem;”292 (2) philological, with a focus on teasing out the precise 
distinction in signification between synonymous words like ʿaḍḍa and ʿaẓẓa (to grab 
with the teeth, to bite), which, while likely dialectic variants, convey different 
connotations. “People say (yuqāl), ‘A matter that distresses me has reached me, i.e. it 
torments me (warada ʿalayya amr ʿaẓẓanī yaʿnī ʿaḍḍanī).”293 This is also evident in the 
expressions ʿaḍḍathu al-ḥarb vs. ʿaẓẓathu al-ḥarb;294 (3) phonological books that discuss 
the proper way to pronounce these letters for reciting the Quran,295 and (4) a category 
comprised of only one example, the book al-Rawḥa fī al-ẓāʾ wa-l-ḍād by by al-Jarbādhqānī 
                                                             
289 David Cohen, “Koiné, langues communes et dialectes arabes” Arabica 9.2 (1962), 135. 
290 Cohen, “Koiné,” 136. 
291 Cohen, “Koiné,” 136. 
292 Brown, “New Data,” 351-52. 
293 Al-Ṣāḥib Ibn ʿAbbād, Abū al-Qāsim Ismāʿīl, al-Farq bayna al-ḍād wa-l-ẓāʾ, ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Āl Yā Sīn 
(Baghdad: Maktabat al-Nahḍa and al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmiyya, Maṭbaʿa al-Maʿārif, 1377/1958), 4. 
294 These expressions, which mean “the war seized him,” are both used, although it is said to be more 
correct to say ʿaẓẓathu al-ḥarb. See Lane’s Lexicon, s.v. “ʿẓẓ;” Brown, “New Data,” 352. 
295 Brown, “New Data,” 352 
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(d. ca. 996), which covers all three of these areas. “The work is exhaustive rather than 
practical or enjoyable,” says Brown.296 Brown considers this a separate group, although 
al-Rawḥa can also been seen as an anthology of the three previous groups. 
Let us consider an example of this writing. Al-Ṣāhib Ibn ʿAbbād’s discussion of 
these two letters is about distinguishing ḍād from ẓāʾ both in speaking and spelling. He 
seems to envision something close to a full confusion, “because of the closeness of 
these letters for listeners (taqārub ajnāsihima fī al-masāmiʿ)… and the confusion of the 
correct way to write them (iltibās ḥaqīqat kitābatihim).”297 In discussing the importance 
of elucidating and understanding the distinction between the two letters, he says “Do 
you not understand that if you said, ‘qarraẓtu al-rajul wa-qarraḍtuhu’ (I praised the man 
and denigrated him) that taqrīẓ (eulogizing) is your praise of him and taqrīḍ 
(denigration) is disparagement and faultfinding?”298 It is curious that al-Ṣāḥib Ibn 
ʿAbbād chooses this distinction, since qarraẓa means to praise and qarraḍa can mean 
either to denigrate or to praise.299 That is to say that qarraẓa and qarraḍa can mean the 
same thing, thus rendering the distinction between the ẓāʾ and ḍād in these words 
negligible, depending on the speaker’s intent.  
It is clear that the ḍād had a particular importance to early Muslim 
communities, which led to the interest in writing and discussion about this letter. What 
                                                             
296 Brown, “New Data,” 352. 
297 al-Ṣāḥib Ibn ʿAbbād, al-Farq bayna al-ḍād wa-l-ẓāʾ, 3 
298 al-Ṣāḥib Ibn ʿAbbād, al-Farq bayna al-ḍād wa-l-ẓāʾ, 3. 
299 Lane’s Lexicon, s.v. “qarraḍa;” Lisān al-ʿarab, s.v. “q-r-ḍ.”  
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was it about this issue that drew the attention of Muslim scholars? Brown sees a strong 
theological component to this discussion.  
Although philologists might have enjoyed such harmless dialectical curiosities, 
the actual phonological identity of a word was sacrosanct. In the language of 
God’s revelation, each word and the root from which it was formed possessed a 
specific meaning inherently appropriate for the thing it indicated. As it became 
widely established in Arabic linguistic theory, ‘the assumption in language is the 
absence of synonymy (al-aṣl fī al-lugha ʿadam al-tarāduf);’ each root had a unique 
meaning. After all, for most great Muslim linguistic theorists, language was the 
result of divine inspiration and not human convention.300 
Brown distinguishes between two different levels on which these texts are operating. 
On one level, he finds the medieval philologists “enjoy[ing] dialectical curiosities.” Such 
writing seems to represent a large percentage of the writing on ḍād-ẓāʾ pairs. Ṣāḥib Ibn 
ʿAbbād’s discussions of, for instance, ʿaḍḍa and ʿaẓẓa fits this description. Distinguishing 
between these two words grants an opportunity for such scholars to attempt to control 
and delineate the parameters of Arabic and affords an opportunity for a creative 
(re)reading of the poetic tradition.  
Brown argues convincingly that this approach has theological goals. Assigning 
particular meanings to individual words reaffirms the divine nature of the Arabic 
language as found in the Quran, God’s speech. The claim is not that these scholars were 
motivated exclusively or even primarily by this theological drive, but that this kind of 
                                                             
300 Brown, “New Data,” 365. 
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writing about the distinction between the ḍād and the ẓāʾ has a theological component. 
In particular, the divine nature of Arabic and the associated belief in the absence of 
synonymy motivates the exploration of distinction in words and letters alike. The 
search for an underlying consistency is a theme that runs throughout almost all of the 
literature examined in this study. 
 
Farq and Furūq in Other Fields 
The primary endeavors in distinctions thinking were in medicine and linguistics. There 
are nevertheless works on distinctions in a myriad of other fields. Abū al-Ajfān and Abū 
al-Fāris mention that writings in furūq “flourished in all of the sciences.”301 They 
mention primarily philology and medicine, citing Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī’s Furūq and 
Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn al-Jazzār’s al-Farq bayn al-ʿilal. Additionally, however, they 
mention: in logic and grammar Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Sarakhsī’s (d. 
286/899) Al-Farq bayna al-naḥw wa-l-manṭiq; in theology, Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī’s (d. 
403/1013) Taṣarruf al-ʿibād wa-l-farq bayna al-khalq wa-l-iktisāb and his al-Farq bayna 
muʿjizāt al-anbiyāʾ wa-karāmāt al-awliyāʾ; in uṣūl al-fiqh, ʿUmar ibn Raslān al-Bulqīnī’s (d. 
805/1403) Risālat al-farq bayna al-ḥukm bi-l-ṣiḥḥa wa-l-ḥukm bi-l-mūjib.302 Most of the 
works they cite are not extant and/or of dubious attribution. For instance, in a footnote 
to the mention of al-Sarakhsī’s Farq bayn al-naḥw wa-l-manṭiq, they cite Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s (d. 
1657) Kashf al-ẓunūn. They also mention, however, that there is an entry for al-Sarakhsī 
                                                             
301 Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 28. 
302 Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 29-30. 
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in al-Ziriklī’s al-Aʿlām which does not mention this work.303 This same situation of 
dubious attribution holds, in their telling, for Ibn al-Jazzār’s Farq bayna al-ʿilal, a work 
attributed to various other scholars.304 This may say more about how these two sources, 
Kashf al-ẓunūn and al-Aʿlām, are occasionally unreliable as reference works, than about 
furūq writing itself. There are more examples of scholarly disciplines producing books 
about distinctions. In Sufism, for example, we find the book Bayān al-farq bayn al-ṣadr 
wa-l-qalb wa-l-fuʾād wa-l-lubb, attributed to al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. Yusūf Marʿī puts this 
attribution in question in his recent edition of the text, although he does not expound 
further on this point.305  
The present section briefly surveys furūq writing in these other fields. I argue 
that these writings can be analyzed together since they do not represent new forms of 
distinctions-thinking, but are rather discipline-specific versions of applied linguistic 
furūq. That is to say, they take the logic of lexicographic furūq—distinguishing between 
                                                             
303 Al-Ziriklī bases his entry on information in Ibn al-Qifṭī’s Akhbār al-ḥukamāʾ, Yāqūt’s Muʿjam al-buldān, 
and al-Dhahabī’s Siyar al-Nubalāʾ. Al-Dhahabī does not list any work by this al-Sarakhsī and neither does 
Yāqūt. Ibn al-Qifṭī notes several works by al-Sarakhsī, but not the al-Farq bayna al-naḥw wa-l-manṭiq. Khayr 
al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām qāmūs tarājim li-ashhar al-rijāl wa-l-nisāʾ min al-ʿarab wa-l-mustaʿribīn wa-l-
mustashriqīn, 15th printing (Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 2002), 1:205. See Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, Siyar 
aʿlām al-nubalāʾ, ed. Bashshār ʿAwwād Maʿrūf (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1996-2011), 19:147-48; Yāqūt, 
Muʿjam al-Buldān, 3:210; Ibn al-Qifṭī, Akhbār al-ḥukamāʾ, 77. 
304 In this instance, Ziriklī bases his entry on Ibn al-Jazzār on Yāqūt’s Irshād al-arīb ilā maʿrifat al-adīb and 
Dhahabī’s Siyar al-aʿlām wa-l-nubalāʾ. There is, as one would expect, no mention of this work neither in 
either Dhahabī’s Siyar al-aʿlām nor in Yāqūt’s Irshād. Al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 1:85-86; Dhahabī, Siyar, 15:561-62; 
Yāqūt, Irshād, 1:187-88. 
305 He does not say that this book was written by al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, only that it is attributed to him, 
and does not discuss this uncertainty further. See Yūsuf Marʿī, ed., Bayān al-farq bayna al-ṣadr wa-l-qalb wa-
l-fuʾād wa-l-lubb al-mansūb li-Abī ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (Amman: al-Markaz al-
Malikī li-l-Buḥūth wa-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya, 2009). 
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apparently synonymous words—and apply this to particular concepts within a 
discipline. These works do not represent new modalities of drawing distinctions or of 
making comparisons. They are, instead, applied usages of the tool of lexicographic 
distinctions. Scholars often used applied lexicographic distinction to tease out 
differences between similar concepts in specific fields of study. 
  
Philosophy 
The philosopher and polymath Qusṭā ibn Lūqā (d. ca. 300/912-13) wrote a work of 
applied lexicographic distinction within philosophy, the Risāla fī al-farq bayna al-rūḥ wa-
l-nafs.306 As its title indicates this short work is focused on the distinction between the 
two concepts of spirit (rūḥ) and soul (nafs). Qusṭā ibn Lūqā states at the beginning of his 
text that it is written in response to a question he received. “You, may God grant you 
honor, asked about the difference between the spirit and the soul, and what the 
                                                             
306 There is a disagreement about the author of this text. According to ʿAlī Muḥammad Isbir, who edited 
this text in 2006, there is unanimity among the classical sources that Qusṭā ibn Lūqā is its author of (19-
20). The other edition of this text, by Louis Cheikho, attributes it to Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq. This is because 
Cheikho’s edition is a diplomatic transcription of the manuscript in the Khālidiyya Library in Jerusalem, 
which attributes this text, cautiously, to Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq. Cheikho was the first to publish the Arabic of 
this text, but he mentions that it has been translated several times into Latin, always with the ascription 
to Qusṭā ibn Lūqā. The manuscript begins with the title, and then says “composed by Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq 
al-ʿAbbādī for Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Munajjim. There has been disagreement regarding this. A group 
of scholars says that it is by Ḥunayn and another group that says it was written by Qusṭā ibn Lūqā for ʿĪsā 
ibn [Farrukhān Shāh].” (245-46). Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, Risāla fī al-farq bayna al-nafs wa-l-rūḥ, ed. Louis 
Cheikho, repr. in Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq: Texts and Studies, ed. Fuat Sezgin et. al. (Frankfurt am Main: Institute for 
the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, 1999), and Qusṭā ibn 
Lūqā, Risāla fī al-farq bayna al-rūḥ wa-l-nafs, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad Isbir (Damascus: Dār al-Yanābīʿ, 2006). 
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ancients had to say on this.”307 Qusṭā’s method of analysis in this work is to unpack, 
define, and then explain the concepts of the spirit and the soul. He starts by discussing 
the spirit which he understands to be of two kinds, the animal spirit (al-rūḥ al-ḥayawānī) 
and the vital spirit (al-rūḥ al-nafsānī).308 The first section of this epistle is on the animal 
spirit. He begins with a definition: “Know that the spirit is a subtle substance which 
spreads throughout the human body.”309 He continues this section by elaborating on 
the definition, providing a clear description of the animal spirit and its functions. We 
learn that the animal spirit resides in the heart, and then in the next section, on the 
vital spirit, we learn that “it is emitted by the brain (yanbawaʿahu al-dimāgh).”310 He then 
continues to describe the vital spirit, its location and its functions. “What we have said 
is true, namely that the spirit resides in the cavities of the brain (tajwīfāt al-dimāgh) and 
that it performs different actions.”311 Qusṭā follows with a short section on the soul, 
wherein he explains that it cannot really be defined. “Describing the soul according to 
its true nature is difficult, nearly impossible (muʿtāṣ jiddan). The proof of this is the 
disagreement among the generations of philosophers, i.e. Plato, Aristotle, Thales, and 
Chrysippus,312 and likewise philosophers after them.”313 Qusṭā follows this with three 
                                                             
307 Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Risāla fī al-farq bayna al-rūḥ wa-l-nafs, 37; Cheikho, ed., 248. 
308 Cheikho’s introduction to this work says “With rūḥ, [the author] means that which the Greeks knew as 
πνεὑμα and the Byzantines as spiritus.” Cheikho also defines rūḥ ḥayawānī as “esprit vital” and rūḥ nafsānī 
as “esprit animal.” See Cheikho, ed. Risāla fī al-farq bayna al-nafs wa-l-rūḥ, 245. 
309 Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Risāla fī al-farq bayna al-rūḥ wa-l-nafs, 41; Cheikho, ed., 249. 
310 Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Risāla fī al-farq bayna al-rūḥ wa-l-nafs, 48; Cheikho, ed., 251. 
311 Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Risāla fī al-farq bayna al-rūḥ wa-l-nafs, 55; Cheikho, ed., 253. 
312 In both editions, this name is rendered Kharūstas. ʿAlī Muḥammad Isbir explains that this is a mistake, 
and that the correct Arabic name for this philosopher is either Kharusibus or Karsūbūs. In modern Arabic, 
however, Chryssipus is normally given as Kharīsībūs. 
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sections on the soul, one on the definition of the soul according to Plato, another on 
how the soul moves the body and how this occurs (al-kalām ʿalā taḥrīk al-nafs li-l-badan 
ʿalā ayy jiha huwa), and finally one on the faculties of the soul (quwā al-nafs). These long 
discussions serve to establish the concepts being discussed. He wants to explain the 
nuances behind the two concepts, soul and spirit.  
His application of distinctions thinking is entirely lexicographical. In comparing 
these two concepts, Qusṭā gives a full definition and explanation of each one. From an 
understanding of these definitions, the distinctions between these two concepts 
become apparent. Comparison based on comparing definitions is the key feature of 
lexicographic distinctions. This is why I term this style of distinction an applied 
linguistic distinction. 
 
Ethics 
Applied linguistic distinctions, as a style of analysis, is found throughout Arabic 
writings. An example from the field of ethics is Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī’s (d. 795/1392), al-
Farq bayn al-naṣīḥa wa-l-taʿyīr (The Difference between Giving Advice and Admonishing). 
Again, I choose this work because it exemplifies the approach of applied linguistic 
distinctions as a style of analysis found in Arabic letters. “This is a comprehensive yet 
abridged discussion on the difference between giving advice and admonishing. They 
both share a meaning in that they both mean to say something to someone that that 
person does not want said (kilā minhumā dhihkr li-l-insān bimā yakrahu dhikrahu). The 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
313 Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Risāla fī al-farq bayna al-rūḥ wa-l-nafs, 57; Cheikho, ed., 254. 
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distinction between these concepts can be confusing for a lot of people.”314 He has seen 
that these two concepts are often confused, and wants to do away with this confusion. 
The idea underpinning Ibn Rajab’s work is that giving advice is a virtue, but that 
admonishing others is a vice. In other words, the two concepts are similar in their 
outward appearance, but near opposites in their intention. For this reason, it is 
important to clarify the distinction between these two similar concepts, to make sure 
that people understand what advice is and what admonishment is.  
Much as we see with Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Ibn Rajab begins with definitions. “Know 
that saying something to someone that they do not want said is prohibited (dhikr al-
insān bimā yakrahu muḥarram), if the intention behind it is only to disparage, blame, and 
fault (al-dhamm wa-l-ʿayb wa-l-naqṣ).”315 He does not explicitly tell the reader at the 
outset what he seeks to define, although contextually it becomes clear from his 
condemnations that he means to define admonishment, taʿyīr. Ibn Rajab continues with 
another definition. “If, however, there was a benefit (maṣlaḥa) for the majority of 
Muslims, or even for just one of them (li-ʿāmmat al-muslimīn aw khāṣṣa li-baʿḍihim) and 
the intention behind talking to this person was to bring about this benefit, then it is not 
prohibited. Indeed, it is a recommended act.”316 Again, Ibn Rajab does not explicitly 
identify this statement with giving advice, but it is clear from context to what he refers. 
The reader knows that naṣīḥa is a virtue and taʿyīr a vice. From this beginning, Ibn Rajab 
                                                             
314 Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī, al-Farq bayna al-naṣīḥa wa-l-taʿyīr, 3rd ed. ed. Najam ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (Damascus, 
Beirut: Dār al-Maʾmūn li-l-Turāth, 1405[/1980]), 25. 
315 Ibn Rajab, Farq bayna al-naṣīḥa, 25. 
316 Ibn Rajab, Farq bayna al-nasīḥa, 25. 
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makes his argument by showing various examples of others who have said or held that 
giving advice is a commendable act while admonishing is not. He brings up the example 
of hadith transmitters inquiring about and ensuring the probity of other transmitters 
(al-jarḥ wa-l-taʿdīl), accepting the reports of worthy transmitters while disavowing 
reports of less trustworthy authorities. He also cites examples from the hadith 
reinforcing the idea of giving advice and speaking against admonishment. He closes out 
his treatise with a warning that God will give everyone a just recompense.  
Having described what Ibn Rajab does, it is important to see what he does not 
do. As with Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, he does not use distinction-thinking as a way of 
investigating a particular discipline, i.e. ethics. The traditions of writing on distinctions 
in medicine, philology, and law, are about uncovering minute differences between two 
specific entities that resemble each other, whether illnesses, words, or substantive 
laws. Qusṭā ibn Lūqā and Ibn Rajab, however, are not distinguishing philosophical or 
ethical postulates. Instead, they distinguish between the meanings of related technical 
coinages in their respective fields. 
Like lexicographers, their analysis is based on definitions. The differences they 
discuss rest on a seemingly minor point, but the thrust of their efforts is toward the 
large, fundamental difference that exists between the two concepts that outwardly 
resemble each other. In each of these works, understanding the concepts being 
distinguished is necessary to begin to understand the topic being discussed. These 
works focus on two important or potential points of confusion that they seek to 
elucidate. In the case of Ibn Rajab, he focuses on two concepts which are similar in 
outward appearance but opposed in their ethico-legal status. In this sense, he is trying 
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to show why an apparent contradiction in the field of ethics is not a contradicton after 
all. Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, on the other hand, is clarifying a source of potential confusion—the 
soul is not the spirit. Soul and spirit are two completely different entities, but they are 
complementary, not opposed. Both of these works employ the logic of lexicographic 
distinctions in their analyses to explain philosophical and ethical concepts, 
respectively.  
 
Farq in Law 
There are many similar legal works that follow this same approach in using applied 
linguistic distinctions. An example is the work on legal principles called Furūq al-uṣūl 
(Distinctions between Legal Principles) attributed to Kemalpaşazade (Ibn Kamāl Pāsha, 
d. 940/1534). At first glance, this might seem different than the two works discussed 
above on philosophy and ethics. The two works discussed earlier in this section revolve 
around distinguishing between two specific terms or concepts, whereas this work 
contrasts many pairs of legal concepts. Kemalpaşazade compares a series of pairs of 
uṣul, legal principles or precepts. This may seem to be a work of legal distinctions, since 
it draws distinctions within a legal context. His distinctions, however, are all drawn 
between individual items of legal jargon, not between laws or rules (aḥkām); they are all 
applied linguistic distinctions. Among the uṣūl he compares, for instance, are the 
“necessary condition (al-sharṭ al-lāzim)” and the “optional condition (al-sharṭ al-ghayr al-
lāzim);”317 “restricting the reading of a revealed source (takhṣīṣ al-naṣṣ)” and “restricting 
                                                             
317 Kemalpaşazade, Furūq al-uṣūl, ed. Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Mubārak (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 
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the application of a legal cause (takhṣīṣ al-ʿilla);”318 and “literal language (ḥaqīqa)” and 
“figurative language (majāz),”319 to give just a few examples. These are concepts central 
to juristic thought but Kemalpaşazade’s work is one of applied lexicographic 
distinctions. In this case, the strategy employed in lexicographic distinctions is applied 
to the technical terms used in the study of Islamic law. 
Kemalpaşazade introduces each pair of uṣūl being distinguished with the phrase 
“another distinction, between… (wa-farq ākhar bayna…).” He explains the relevant 
concepts and occasionally gives examples of their applicability. For instance, he says: 
Another distinction, between restriction (al-takhṣīṣ) and exception (al-istithnāʾ): 
We say: The indication (dalīl) of restriction can either be coupled with the 
modified phrase or be postponed (muqtaranan aw mutarākhiyan) because 
restriction is understood on its own (mustaqill bi-dhātihi). Exception, however, is 
not understood on its own because it is the completion of a phrase (min tatimmat 
al-kalām). If you said, for instance, “I owe that person ten dinars minus one,” 
they would be owed nine. If you said, however, “I owe that person ten dinars,” 
and then paused, and later said “Minus one,” you would owe him ten.320 
Here, Kemalpaşazade draws a distinction between takhṣīṣ and istithnāʾ, two concepts 
used in legal hermeneutics. They both limit the scope of applicability of a revealed 
source, which is the source of potential confusion. The distinction, he explains, is that a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2009), 65. 
318 Kemalpaşazade, Furūq al-uṣūl, 72. 
319 Kemalpaşazade, Furūq al-uṣūl, 91. 
320 Kemalpaşazade, Furūq al-uṣūl, 76. 
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restriction obtains when one clause establishes a fact or rule and then a separate clause 
restricts the scope of this first clause. Exception, on the other hand, happens when a 
single clause both establishes a fact or rule and restricts its scope at once. 
The phrases given in the above example demonstrate the fact that exception 
needs to be directly connected to the clause it affects. The first phrase consists of one 
sentence. The exceptive clause “minus one” is connected to the clause “I owe that 
person ten dinars.” The exceptive clause gains meaning through its connection to the 
rest of the sentence. The second phrase, with a pause between the two clauses, is an 
example of a failed exceptive phrase. The pause indicates the completion of a sentence, 
and the exceptive phrase “minus one” is therefore understood on its own, unconnected 
to the statement “I owe that person ten dinars.” This phrase understood on its own 
bears no meaning, and, more importantly, does not affect the previous clause. The 
distinction that Kemalpaşazade draws is between these two technical terms in legal 
theory, which are two terms of art. They are not laws or judgments themselves. 
One more example will clarify this point: 
Another distinction, between a consensus reached on a revealed text that 
requires explanation (al-naṣṣ al-mujmal) and a consensus reached on a revealed 
text the meaning of which is self-evident (al-naṣṣ al-mufassar), we say: When 
consensus is reached on a revealed text that requires explanation, the rule is 
attributed to the consensus (kāna al-ḥukm muḍāfan ilā al-ijmāʿ). However, when 
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consensus is reached on a revealed text that has been explained, the rule is 
attributed to the text itself, not to the consensus.321 
With this distinction, Kemalpaşazade distinguishes between the epistemological status 
of laws that are established by consensus. Specifically, he is describing consensus that 
forms on the meaning of passages in the Quran. Certain passages are said to be obscure 
enough as to require additional explanation; their meaning is not self-evident. Because 
of this, the certainty of the rule that results has a lower epistemological status. That is, 
it acquires the level of epistemological certainty of consensus. This is not the situation 
for a quranic passage the meaning of which is self-evident. When there is consensus 
reached on such verses, the resulting rule acquires the epistemological status of the 
Quran itself. In the case of self-evident verses, the consensus is pro forma, since (in 
theory) there is no interpretation necessary to understand the divinely intended law. 
Since there is no interpretation necessary, it is as if the law results directly from the 
Quran. In the case of verses needing explanation, however, the law is clearly a result of 
the consensus on the explanation. For this reason, it is attributed to the consensus. 
Again, Kemalpaşazade uses only applied linguistic distinctions in this discussion. This is 
not a use of legal distinctions—a comparison of two legal problems and their outcomes.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has surveyed the different genres in which distinctions-literature 
flourished as well as possible motivations and impulses for this kind of writing. 
                                                             
321 Kemalpaşazade, Furūq al-uṣūl, 98. 
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Although perhaps physicians were writing about differential diagnostics from an early 
date, it was in lexicography that a genre calling itself furūq really flourished. In both of 
these disciplines the structure and organization of the writing is quite similar. We 
might consider, on the basis of the potential chronological priority of the medical 
distinctions literature, that medicine established a path along which lexicography then 
followed. Perhaps, however, the coincidence of style is due instead to broader factors in 
the classification of Islamicate varieties of knowledge in the third/ninth and 
fourth/tenth centuries. These two genres show the potential uses for this kind of 
writing; the medical example as a manual for practitioners and the lexicographical 
example shows how a seemingly straightforward practical book—a thesaurus—can be 
used to explore polemical theological positions.  
Medical distinctions involve a general symptom that has two subtypes that each 
indicate a different underlying disease. Lexicographic distinctions involve a general 
concept that is thought to be signified equally by two different words, but then it is 
shown that the two words actually signify two different subtypes of the concept in 
question. One difference is that a symptom is visible whereas a concept thought to be 
signified equally by two words is an abstraction. Perhaps the more important 
difference is that the two differentiated diseases are different diseases whereas the two 
subtypes of the concept in lexicography are conceptually related in some way. The way 
in which two illnesses are compared is not easily transferrable beween fields of 
knolwedge, as was the comparison between two words or technical terms.  
Additionally, as will be made clearer in Chapter Four, legal distinctions are yet a 
third kind of comparison. The style of reasoning used in works of legal distinctions is 
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not simply a straightforward comparison, as it is in the works distinguishing letters, i.e. 
the ḍād and ẓāʾ or in the farq works which I have termed applied linguistic distinctions. 
Rather legal distinctions involve a particular kind of comparison in which laws, that is 
the judgements applying to actions, are compared. A legal distinction involves not only 
an understanding of two specific legal problems, but also of the legal reasoning that 
gives rise to the judgement applied in each of the two legal cases.  
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Chapter Three: Jadal as a Source for Legal Writings: The Cases of Khilāf and Furūq 
 
In the previous chapter, we explored the rise of a distinct mode of literary and 
intellectual production that self-consciously referred to itself as furūq. We traced the 
epistemological history of the concepts of farq and furūq to see the way in which 
distinctions-thinking operated in a variety of separate but related scholarly disciplines 
in the classical Arabic tradition. This chapter will take a different approach by studying 
the rise of distinctions in explicitly legal contexts. Just as Chapter Two explored the 
epistemological differences between the ways scholars use the term farq (distinction) in 
the singular and the term furūq (distinctions) in the plural, this chapter will study the 
early usage of these terms in the legal tradition. The two terms emerged in legal 
discourse as part of the theory of dialectics, also referred to as disputation theory (ʿilm 
al-jadal), and became transformed in observable ways before the genre of furūq came 
into being as a self-concious and distinct category of legal writing.322  
This chapter will begin by looking at the idea of distinction (farq) in early 
discussions of dialectic. Specialists in various disciplines used the the term farq 
(distinction, distinguishing characteristic) in dialectics handbooks. It was often 
included along with, or subsumed under, the category of counter-objection (muʿāraḍa). 
As discussed below, a questioner used the technique of farq during a formal disputation 
in an attempt to show how the respondent’s opinion is contradictory to another 
                                                             
322 It was only after formal disputation had become a feature of Islamic intellectual activity that the 
Hellenic-Aristotelian tradition was elaborated by Muslim scholars. I discuss this influence below.  
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opinion he held in a closely related case. As Walter E. Young has demonstrated, 
dialectics was pervasive in the early Muslim scholarly circles and was the arena in 
which legal thoughts and concepts were “forged.”323 It was in the course of such 
formalized disputations that many key concepts and ideas of law were developed and 
refined. In addition to this technical usage and discussion in theoretical works on 
dialectics, the concept of distinction played a prominent role in the early Islamic legal 
discourse on dialectics. After demonstrating the uses of the term distinction and 
etymologically related words, i.e. derived from the same linguistic root (f-r-q), I analyze 
an early book of legal distinctions, ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī’s al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq,324 which 
contains repeated and sustained dialectical argumentation and I demonstrate how al-
Juwaynī envisioned and wrote his book as part of an existing tradition of juristic 
dialectic.  
 
Disputation and Distinction 
The discourse of dialectics (jadal) in the Arabo-Islamic tradition was a rigorous and 
formalized “method for attaining truth.”325 It was a method for finding and establishing 
                                                             
323 Walter E. Young, “The Dialectical Forge, Part I: Proto-System Juridical Disputation in the Kitāb Ikhtilāf 
al-ʿIrāqiyyīn,” 2 vols. (PhD Diss., McGill University, 2012). Young’s dissertation will be published as a book 
soon, but too late to be consulted for the present study. Walter E. Young, The Dialectical Forge: Juridical 
Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law (Cham: Springer, 2017). 
324 There is a book of legal distinctions attributed to Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī (d. 322/933). This is 
almost a century before the life of ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī. The attribution of Muḥammad al-Karābīsī’s 
work, however, is tenuous and highly suspect. I address this attribution in Chapter Four. 
325 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 24. 
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the truth through adversarial inquisition, “synonymous with question and answer,”326 
as well as a way to package and manipulate ideas and theories. Young has identified 
dialectics as a “forge” in which many concepts in many areas of Islamic juristic inquiry 
were formed, not only the content of legal theory but that of substantive law as well. 
“The exigencies of dialectical debate provided key motives, and forged key structures, 
elements, principles, and concepts for… many juristic ʿulūm (e.g., furūq; ashbāh wa-
naẓāʾir; etc.)”327 Important though it was for law, disputation did not arise in the Islamic 
world through the field of law. 
Larry B. Miller has identified theology as the field in which Arab dialectic began, 
and he identifies Adab al-jadal by Ibn al-Rēwandī (fl. fourth/tenth c.) as the first book on 
the formal science of dialectics.328 Miller argues that this theological undertaking 
quickly spread to the study of philosophy and jurisprudence. Young takes issue with 
Miller’s genealogical model and believes that an interest in dialectics was not, as Miller 
claims, discipline specific, but rather a broad academic interest among early Muslim 
scholars. In other words, dialectics was not limited only to the fields of theology, 
Islamic law, and philosophy, as Miller claims. Rather, dialectics developed non-
                                                             
326 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 15. The importance of Muslim dialectics for the sic-et-non 
method and the connections of Muslim dialectics to medieval European scholastic culture have been 
noted and discussed in George Makdisi, Rise of Colleges, 245-53. 
327 Young, “The Dialectical Forge,” 1:2. 
328 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 5. This scholar’s name is given variously as Ibn al-Rāwandī, Ibn 
al-Rīwandī, or Ibn al-Rēwandī. Miller gives it consistently as Ibn al-Rīwandī, although al-Rāwandī appears 
to be the more common form. See EI2 s.v. “Ibn al-Rāwandī or al-Rēwendī,” (P. Kraus and G. Vajda) where 
he is referred to as Ibn al-Rāwandī throughout. I prefer al-Rēwendī, as in Josef Van Ess, Theologie und 
Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam, 6 vols. 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1991-97). 
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linearly.329 Both agree, however, in the widespread importance of ʿilm al-jadal for Islamic 
knowledge in general and for Islamic law in particular.  
 Young’s dissertation clearly shows that the commitment to dialectics on the 
part of Muslim jurists existed quite early in the development of Islamic law, 
overturning Miller’s genealogical model. Young performs a careful and in-depth study 
of the use of dialectics in al-Shāfiʿī’s Kitāb Ikhtilāf al-ʿIrāqiyyīn, one of the many texts that 
make up al-Shāfiʿī’s al-Umm. Nevertheless, Miller’s study shows that an explicit theory 
of dialectics first emerged in theology, even if the legal tradition was already 
employing dialectical structures and methodologies in earlier writings. That is to say, 
jurists may have been employing a practiced system of dialectics before they wrote 
handbooks on the theory of dialectics, but legal handbooks for dialectics came later 
than those from philosophers or theologians.  
This section will first survey theoretical writings on dialectics, to see the ways 
in which “distinction” was used therein. While the word distinction (farq) became a 
formalized concept in theoretical writings on legal dialectics, my discussion in this 
chapter considers the various uses of the word farq as well as other words derived from 
the root, i.e. afraqa, iftaraqa, mufāriq, etc. With this background in mind, this section 
provides a brief survey of theological writings on dialectics to see the ways that 
distinction as a broad category was employed. I start with the theological discussions of 
disputation, since they preceded the legal discussions. I then move to an analysis of 
legal handbooks and their discussions of farq. 
                                                             
329 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:24. 
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 Miller argues that dialectical theory emerged at the time of Ibn al-Rēwandī. Ibn 
al-Rēwandī’s book, however, has not survived. Miller identifies the earliest extant 
works as being continuations or refutations of Ibn al-Rēwandī. Among these early 
scholars are al-Qirqisānī (fl. 4th/10th c), Muṭahhar ibn Ṭāhir al-Maqdisī (fl. ca. 355/966), 
and Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064). Since Miller has highlighted these early texts as reflective 
of the state of theological dialectic, our analysis will focus largely on these texts. While 
Miller believes that these texts reflect an exlusively theological mode of dialectic, 
Young has shown how many of these works could also be considered juristic. 
Specifically, he says that al-Madqisī’s Badʾ fī al-tārīkh does not describe theological jadal, 
but jadal generally, which encompasses theological and juridical dialectic.330 Young also 
argues against Miller’s idea that there was only one theological view of dialectic. He 
argues that this view simplifies the complexity of the dialectical tradition, presenting a 
unified understanding of jadal when in reality there was a plurality of understandings 
of dialectic.331  
 Miller claims that the earliest dialectical discussions were theological in nature. 
Young, however, argues that the earliest sources for dialectic can already be seen in 
some of the earliest books devoted to Islamic law. Young gives convincing arguments 
for some correspondence between the dialectical techniques found in al-Shāfiʿī's Ikhtilāf 
al-ʿirāqiyyīn and those recorded in later handbooks. Much of his evidence is compelling, 
but it shows that formalized conceptions of dialectical techniques existed before 
                                                             
330 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:23-25. 
331 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:23. 
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written handbooks of these techniques. Miller’s argument that theological discourse 
was the original site of dialectical practice seems to me the most compelling. In 
addition to the evidence supplied by Miller, other scholars have also shown a robust 
tradition of theological disputation in the Eastern Mediterranean in late antiquity. Most 
notably, Michael A. Cook has shown how Christian Syriac theological texts contain the 
same general framework as Arabic theological texts, but that these Syriac documents 
also contain blueprints for disputations with other sects and religions.332 
Young is correct when he states that medieval Muslim scholars were 
“polymaths wearing ‘many hats,’” and I recognize the inherent cross-disciplinarity in 
the work of these early scholars.333 Still, I use the term “theological” to describe the 
writings of these early authors for two reasons. First, because this category retains 
explanatory power for these books, even if the books do aim to cover more than 
theology. Miller convincingly shows the ways in which these scholars reacted against 
or were influenced by Ibn al-Rēwandī. These handbooks for disputation were thus also 
sites of theological disagreement. Second, these theoretical works on disputations were 
all written in roughly the same time period, in the early fourth/tenth century, before 
scholars began composing theoretical works on dialectic that were embedded within a 
juristic context. That is to say, the authors of these works were all involved in theology 
and in conversation with each other. These authors were important and vibrant 
                                                             
332 The general framework is a blueprint structured by a back and forth presented with the terms “if they 
say…, we reply…” See Michael A. Cook, “The Origins of 'Kalām'“ Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies 43.1 (1980): 32-43. See also C. H. Becker, 'Christliche Polemik und islamische Dogmenbildung,' 
Zeitschrift für Assyriololgie und verwandte Bebiete, 26 (1912): 171-195. 
333 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:23, quoting a verbal communication with Wael Hallaq. 
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scholars engaged in the intellectual world of the time, and their works and 
contributions contain not only detailed expositions of their own views, but rich and 
sustained engagements with the views of other scholars.334  
 
Farq in Theological Disputation 
Based on the sources quoted by Miller, the theological tradition uses the term farq as a 
form of muʿāraḍa, counter-objection.335 Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī, a Karaite scholar, 
discusses dialectical method in his book Kitāb al-Anwār wa-l-Marāqib. Al-Qirqisānī’s text 
repeatedly quotes a certain unnamed Muslim scholar as the authority on dialectical 
theory. Miller argues that this scholar is Ibn al-Rēwandī: “That al-Qirqisānī’s source was 
Ibn al-Rīwandī is suggested by the similarity between his reasoning and that of al-
Ashʿarī…”336 Al-Qirqisānī includes a short discussion of the rules for dialectic, going 
through the kinds of questions one should ask and the correct ordering of the 
questions. At the end of this short discussion he uses the verb, “draw a distinction 
                                                             
334 A striking example of an author fully engaged in a vibrant intellectual context can be seen in the 
works by al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān. Devin Stewart has attempted to reconstruct Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd al-
Ẓāhiri’s Wusūl ilā maʿrifat al-ʿuṣūl based on al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān’s Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib. See Devin Stewart 
“Muḥammad b. Dāʾūd al-Ẓāhirī’s Manual of Jurisprudence: Al-Wuṣūl ilā maʿrifat al-uṣūl” in Studies in Islamic 
Legal Theory, ed. Bernard G. Weiss (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2002). He discusses the historical value of 
al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān’s text in the introduction to his recent edition and translation. See al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān, 
The Disagreements of the Jurists: A Manual of Islamic Legal Theory, ed. and trans. Devin J. Stewart (New York; 
London: New York University Press, 2015). 
335 Miller uses the term “counter-objection” to translate this word. Young disagrees with this translation, 
although he prefers to keep the term untranslated (1:xii). I discuss the specific relationship between farq 
and muʿāraḍa below, but some authors explicitly subsume farq under muʿāraḍa, while other authors use 
these two terms refer to separate categories. 
336 Miller, “Islamic Disptuation Theory,” 24. 
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(faraqa)”. In describing how to refute someone else’s position, al-Qirqisānī says one 
ought to say, “I concede that your rationale (ʿillataka) necessitates this opinion, but it 
also necessitates that you apply it to something that comes more quickly to mind… 
Therefore, either show how the two cases are both true or both false, or explain how 
they differ (wa-illā fa-friq baynahumā).”337 Here, al-Qirqisānī does not define a strategy 
called farq, but nevertheless he describes a particular kind of objection in which the 
questioner attempts to catch the respondent in a contradiction. The questioner finishes 
by asking the respondent to “explain how they differ” and uses the verbal form faraqa; 
that is, he wants his interlocutor to explain the distinction between them.  
 Al-Qirqisānī uses the word farq again in discussing the styles of objections 
(muʿāraḍa) used by some theologians (qawm min al-mutakallimīn). Again, distinction is 
not explicitly identified by al-Qirqisānī as a specific technique, but he nevertheless 
alludes to an idea strikingly similar to formal disputational farq. He explains this with 
the following contrafactual:  
If a Muslim were to say, ‘I affirm the prophecy (nubuwwa) of Moses based on the 
unanimous agreement (iṭbāq) of the Jews on the validity of his prophecy,’ then 
he must necessarily (lazimahu) affirm the prophecy of Aaron because of the 
Jew’s unanimous agreement on his prophecy. If this person were then to deny 
Aaron’s prophecy while still affirming that of Moses, he would have 
distinguished between them inconsistently, and thus erroneously, in affirming 
                                                             
337 Yaʿqūb ibn Iṣḥāq al-Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār wal-marāqib: code of Karaite law, ed. Leon Nemoy (New 
York: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1939), 1:472, translation based on Miller, “Islamic 
Disputation Theory,” 23. 
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Moses while rejecting Aaron, in spite of the equivalent proofs for affirming their 
prophecies (qad faraqa baynahumā fī al-iqrār wa-l-inkār maʿa istiwāʾ al-iqrār 
bihimā).338  
In this example, al-Qirqisānī envisions a debate between a Muslim and a Jew. By 
accepting the agreement of the Jews as a valid indicator of Moses’ prophecy, this 
Muslim would also have to accept the prophecy of Aaron, since the Jews are also in 
agreement that Aaron was a prophet. The problem for this hypothetical Muslim is that 
Aaron is not accepted as a prophet (nabī) by Muslims.339 This example is similar to the 
one above in that the disputational maneuver employing the term farq is an attempt by 
the questioner to use the respondent’s own reasoning to demonstrate that the 
respondent’s own rationale contradicts him in another problem.340  
                                                             
338 Al-Qirqisānī, al-Anwār wa-l-marāqib, 1:475. 
339 This seems to be the intent of this passage, although the actual status of Aaron is not clear cut. The 
Quran names Aaron in its listing of prophets twice, once in al-Nisāʾ 4:163 and again in al-Anʿām 6:84. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between Moses and Aaron was likened to that between Muḥammad and 
ʿAlī, since Muḥammad said, “ʿAlī, you are to me like Aaron to Moses, but there shall be no Prophet after 
me.” The implication of this hadith is that ʿAlī’s eloquence was helpful in spreading Muḥammad’s 
message, just as Aaron’s eloquence helped Moses communicate with Pharaoh. See EI3 s.v. “Aaron” 
(Andrew Rippin). It may be the case, however, that al-Qirqisānī wants to make a point about 
contrafactuals, namely that the rules of logic still obtain. In this case, the logical tool used is the reductio 
ad absurdum (ilzām). I thank Professor Daniel Frank for help understanding this passage.  
340 Al-Qirqisānī uses this phrase two more times in this discussion with a similar meaning. He continues 
this discussion by stating, “One must also ask him (wajaba ayḍan an yuqāl lahu), ‘What is the distinction 
(mā al-farq) between you and someone who affirms the prophecy of Aaron while denying that of Moses?” 
(1:475). This latter possibility is clearly preposterous, since the prophecy of Moses is widely accepted by 
the Abrahamic faiths. This question, however, shows the untenable position of the Muslim in attempting 
to affirm the prophecy of Moses while rejecting that of Aaron. In the example, the inverse opinions of 
the second scenario rest on the same faulty logic as that of the Muslim and are on their face absurd. Al-
Qirqisānī uses the phrsae mā al-farq (what is the distinction…?) throughout this paragraph. He also uses 
the term mufāriq (distinction), however, to denote the distinguishing trait that follows the verbs farq and 
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 In al-Qirqisānī's discussion, the term farq has not yet crystallized into a 
technical term, and he often uses faṣl and farq synonymously. Nevertheless, his theory 
of farq and faṣl is similar to what is later found in the books of legal disputation 
regarding farq. Al-Qirqisānī's thirty-third chapter, for example, is “on a question of 
distinction (faṣl) and that it requires that there be two answers (wa-annahu yaḥtāju an 
yakūna fīhi jawābayn.)”341 The thirty-third chapter explicates how questions that elicit 
distinctions (faṣl) work, and how, in order to be a valid disputational technique, such 
questions must be asked in regard to issues that have two different and contradictory 
answers. He begins this chapter by saying “Know that when you ask about the 
distinction between two things (al-farq bayna shayʾayn), that you have already 
distinguished between them as being either affirmed or denied (fa-qad faraqta 
baynahumā bi-l-ithbāt wa-bi-l-ibṭāl).” The terms faṣl and farq are synonymous; the chapter 
on faṣl starts with the verb faraqa. Interestingly, al-Qirqisānī says, “As when you 
distinguish between two things, you deny one of them and affirm the other (kamā 
annaka ḥīna faraqta baynahumā abṭalta aḥadahumā wa-saḥḥaḥta al-ākhar).”342 This logic is 
at work in the example of the prophecy of Aaron and Moses, when the questioner asked 
farq-based contrafactual questions that could only be answered through affirmation or 
denial. This same logic, however, does not carry over into the later books of legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
iftirāq. He also makes mention of tafriqa (distinction) in a similar context. “Whoever rules (ḥakama) in 
disputed issues with a distinction must be asked for proof (kull man ḥakama fī mawāḍiʿ al-ikhtilāf bi-l-jamʿ 
[wa-fī mawāḍiʿ al-jamʿ] bi-l-tafriqa fa-l-muṭālaba bi-l-burhān wājib ʿalayhi).” 
341 Al-Qirqisānī, al-Anwār wa-l-marāqib, 1:480. 
342 Al-Qirqisānī, al-Anwār wa-l-marāqib, 1:481. 
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distinction, which are not aimed at denying one thing or the other, but denying the 
very contradiction itself. 
 
Farq in Legal Disputation 
 In handbooks of legal dialectics, discussions of farq are more formalized than the 
discussions of farq in theological books of disputation. Discussions of farq in legal 
dialectics follow in large part al-Qirqisānī's understanding of distinction, but the legal 
works give greater prominence to the word farq as a technical term. It loses its plain-
sense meaning of a simple “comparison” or “difference,”343 and refers instead to a 
particular method of dialectical argumentation.  
The process can be best understood through an example. Here the Andalusian 
Mālikī jurist, Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 474/1081) explains farq in the context of a Mālikī 
scholar debating a Ḥanafī scholar. 
M: “Whoever kills someone with a blunt object shall be punished by retaliation 
(al-qiṣāṣ). This is the case since the killer has unlawfully killed someone who is 
socially equal with an object that will likely kill him (bi-mā al-ghālib an ḥatafahu 
fīhi), and this deserves retaliatory punishment, just as if the killer has used a 
sharp object (muḥaddad.)” 
Ḥ: “A sharp object is something that is used to ritually slaughter animals (al-
dhakāt). It is because of this that we say that retaliation is required for a crime 
                                                             
343 The meanings and applications of this word as a technical term in other fields are discussed in Chapter 
Two of the present study. 
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committed using such an object (inna al-qiṣāṣ yuthbat bihi). The legal issue at 
hand, the blunt object, is not comparable (laysa kadhālika fīmā ʿāda ilā 
masʾalatinā), since animals cannot be slaughtered with a blunt object. This 
means that there is no punishment by retaliation (al-qiṣāṣ) for a murder 
committed with a blunt object, such as a small stick.344  
In this example, the Mālikī has attempted to explain why it is that the Mālikī madhhab 
imposes a retaliatory punishment on murder committed with both a blunt object and a 
sharp object, for example, a club and a knife. The Mālikī treats both killings as equal; 
irrespective of the weapon used, both are indicative of intentional homicide, a tort 
offense warranting qiṣāṣ. The club, he argues, is a deadly weapon similar to a knife and 
thus its wielder is deserving of the same legal treatment as the knife-wielding killer. 
The Ḥanafī then responds and makes a distinction between these two cases. For him, 
murder with a knife is the more serious offense, presumably the knife is prima facie a 
deadly weapon, but a club is not. The use of knives to slaughter animals suggests that 
their primary purpose is killing. This status, in turn, allows the jurist to distinguish 
between the intent in both cases. For the Ḥanafī, a knife is evidence of clear intent for 
homicide and therefore leads to a charge of murder. A club, meanwhile, only allows for 
a change of unintentional murder, manslaughter, because the intent of murder is not 
clear. Here, it is the everyday use of these objects which allows the inference that 
determines the legal consequences of their use in homicide. In other words, the ʿilla at 
                                                             
344 Sulaymān ibn Khalaf al-Bājī, Kitāb al-Minhāj fī tartīb al-ḥijāj, ed. ʿAbd al-Majīd Turkī (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb 
al-Islāmī, 1987), 203, ¶460. This section is also translated in Young, “Disputational Forge,” 1:180-81. 
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work is the normal use of the object. Knives are used for killing living beings, while 
clubs are not normally used in this way.  
At this point, the Ḥanafī seems to have made a more convincing argument than 
the Mālikī. In effect, the Mālikī claimed that these cases are similar since striking 
someone with either a sharp or a blunt object will likely result in their death. In this 
sense, they are similar and the presumed intent of the killer is equivalent. The Ḥanafī, 
however, disagrees. According to him, the cases are distinct and not at all similar. The 
distinction, in his view, lies in the legal rationale that is used to determine intent. In his 
view, this legal rationale (ʿilla) is that since sharp objects are used for the ritual 
slaughter of animals, that is, to cut their throat such that all of the blood drains out of 
the animal. Using an object that can be used to kill animals in this way demonstrates 
the clear intent of the killer and necessitates qiṣāṣ, retaliatory killing of the perpetrator. 
Since a blunt object cannot be used to cut the throat of an animal, the intent of a 
homicide with such an object cannot clearly be determined. Thus the two kinds of 
killing are legally distinct, and therefore they occasion different punishments because 
of the underlying legal rationales. 
Several scholars devote a specific chapter to distinction in handbooks of 
dialectics. Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, for instance, writes the twelfth chapter of his 
book entitled al-Kāfiya fī al-jadal on “How to Answer a Distinction (fī al-jawāb ʿan al-
farq).” His discussion of farq in this chapter focuses on the use of farq as a disputational 
technique, however, not as a category of legal writing and analysis. Farq describes a 
particular objection to be overcome and the method for doing so. Al-Juwaynī says: 
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Know that to ask about (mā yatawajjahu ʿalā) the first term in an analogy 
(mubtadaʾ al-qiyās) regarding its impossibility or inconsistency (min al-manʿ wa-l-
naqḍ),345 false construction (fasād al-waḍʿ),346 lack of consistent applicability 
(ʿadam al-taʾthīr),347 inversion of the conclusion (qalb),348 and counter-objection 
(muʿāraḍa),349 is to ask about distinction (fa-huwa mutawajjih ʿalā al-farq). This 
kind of objection can be responded to using any of the above rubrics.350  
According to Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, drawing attention to the non-
transferability of a legal rationale, a charge of farq, can be responded to by referring to 
one of various hermeneutic tools. In other words, in order to overcome a question of 
farq, one can use any of the above-mentioned tactics, contradiction, negating the 
condition, etc.  
Interestingly, in his telling, muʿāraḍa seems to be a particular kind of farq, 
instead of the other way around, as found in the writings of other theorists. For 
example, some scholars maintain the conception of farq as “a special case of counter-
objection, and, thus, they mention it in their chapters on counter-objection.”351 Abū al-
                                                             
345 For manʿ, see Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 113-118; for naqḍ, see Miller, “Islamic Disputation 
Theory,” 127-29. 
346 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 118-20. 
347 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 120-22. 
348 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 122-27. 
349 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 133-34. 
350 Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, al-Kāfiya fī al-jadal, ed. Fawqiyya Ḥusayn Maḥmūd (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Īsā 
al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī wa-Shurakāʾuhu, 1399/1979), 322. The translation of the technical terms is largely 
adapted from, but not identical to the terms used by Miller. He translates ʿadam al-taʾthīr as “ineffective 
ratio legis,” and qalb as “methodos kata peritropēn” (120, 122). In his discussion of manʿ, he does not give a 
definitive translation of the term (113-16). 
351 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 130. 
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Walīd al-Bājī states that a farq is “a counter-objection to the rationale (ʿilla) of the 
principal case” and that “it is the most legal kind (afqah) of objection that can occur in a 
debate since the legal issue inherent in the problem becomes known in this way.”352 In 
other words, a farq is an objection based on a perceived incompatibility between the 
rationale (ʿilla) that is (or is implied to be) operative in two legal cases (ḥukmān). In fact, 
all objections based on a rationale are categorized as farq by al-Bājī.  
 Al-Bājī’s comprehensive account of distinction discusses two kinds of farq that 
can be raised. The first type of farq claims that the two cases should be treated with 
reference to two different ʿillas. The questioner (Q) asserts that the legal rationale (ʿilla) 
relied on by the respondent (R) is improper, and he then identifies a different legal 
rationale that properly pertains to the case at hand. The objection is that the rationale 
does not work in a second case, thus the comparison based on a similarity is erroneous.   
The second type of farq claims a mistake regarding the rationale that occasions a 
judgment. R identifies a legal rationale; Q claims that R’s legal rationale has been 
derived incorrectly. Q therefore attributes the original judgment to a different 
rationale than does R. R and Q disagree over the rationale that occasions the 
judgement. The objection focuses on the correct rationale which applies to a particular 
case.353  
 These two styles of farq operate with a related but distinct form of logic. In each 
of these, however, the contention of the questioner revolves around the precise 
                                                             
352 Al-Bājī, al-Minhāj, 201, ¶456. Translation adapted from Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 130. 
353 Al-Bājī, Minhāj, 202, ¶457; see also Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,”147. 
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relationships between similar cases with similar legal rationales (ʿilal). Q aims to show 
that R’s two proposed rulings (ḥukmān) should be treated in distinct ways, even though 
R has treated them using identical legal rationales. In this sense, these authors consider 
farq to be a kind of counter-objection. Farq refers to this particular dialectical method.  
Al-Bājī defines a counter-objection as “Q’s opposing the demonstrator (R) with a 
piece of evidence of similar or greater probative force.”354 When Q presents a piece of 
evidence as an objection, the roles of Q and R can switch because R may now argue that 
Q’s evidence is either lacking or being used incorrectly. Muʿāraḍa refers to this whole 
procedure. Farq, a subset of muʿāraḍa, refers to a particular instantiation of this 
procedure. A counter-objection can take issue with any aspect of R’s legal reasoning 
regarding the legal situation in question. A farq was a particular kind of counter-
objection, as discussed above, because it related specifically to the ʿilla under 
consideration. Young discusses why farq was seen to be a subset of the broader category 
of counter-objection, “through the process of making a charge of farq, Q has in effect 
claimed an opposing ʿilla, which he then links to a different aṣl — and in this latter case 
the counter-ʿilla occasions the opposite ḥukm.”355 Again, the farq is not a simply 
difference, but rather the assertation of a fundamental distinction in rationale between 
two cases. 
 As can be seen from this discussion about farq, it was a formalized and highly 
elaborate disputation technique. Understanding how to use farq offensively and how to 
                                                             
354 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 111; quoting al-Bājī, Minhāj, 41 ¶78. 
355 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:181. 
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overcome this objection required a thorough knowledge of substantive law, legal 
theory, and the connections between them. The formalization of farq required an 
already elaborated system of legal thought and an established tradition of disputation. 
In this sense, it is not a surprise to see the term farq appear in disputation manuals at 
the time that the doctrines of the Islamic legal schools were being formalized.  
 Miller finds that authors incorporated this technique (farq) in the dialectical 
manuals of the fourth/tenth century. He notes, however, that muʿāraḍa was an “old 
technique” that existed prior to the systematization of disputation theory.356 This is 
confirmed by Young, who finds dialectical strategies similar not only to muʿāraḍa, but 
also farq, and other techniques utilized in early works of Islamic substantive law. “[A]s a 
dialectical move employing verbs and nouns of root f-r-q, it [farq] is ubiquitous 
throughout the Umm… Whatever the date we may consider farq to have crystallized as a 
uniform technical term, its practice and teaching as a dialectical move stretch back at 
least to the second century H.”357 Altough Young does not find explicit discussions of 
farq in the Umm, he nevertheless finds instances of disputations within this text in 
which scholars employ questions and responses in ways that are identical to the formal 
technique that came to be known as farq. It is, indeed, a scholarly practice used in early 
moments of Islamic law.  
The earliest uses of the term farq to describe that technique, such as those 
Young finds in al-Umm and even those used in disputation manuals in areas other than 
                                                             
356 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 33. 
357 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:181. 
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Islamic law, suggest that the term had not yet taken on a technical meaning. Young 
finds the technique referred to as farq, but this was not the exclusive term for such 
arguments or objections and it was also refered to by other etymologically related 
words. While these sources all have ideas of eliciting, or ascribing, distinction and 
employ such reasoning in their debates, there does not yet seem to be a scholarly 
consensus on the precise technical definition of this concept nor an agreement on what 
words should be used to refer to such procedures. It was not until the fourth/tenth 
century that farq emerged as a term that referred specifically to a known disputational 
technique.  
 The field of dialectics in Islamic intellectual culture, jadal, generally draws 
heavily from the Greek Aristotelian tradition.358 While there seems to be a tradition of 
dialectics before the introduction of Aristotle, jadal quickly incorporated many of the 
formal features of the Aristotelian tradition. Early dialectics both as seen in handbooks 
and in records of disputation, are fairly free of Aristotelian influences, “But after 
jurisprudence had assimilated the techniques of theological dialectic, its own theory 
became influenced by logical terminology and techniques.”359 Part of this pre-
Aristotelian tradition involved some aspects of the counter-objection (muʿāraḍa). Miller 
                                                             
358 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 199-223; George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam 
and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 107, 264-65; Miller, “Islamic Disputation 
Theory,” 1-4, 52-77. 
359 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” iii. Miller's study carefully shows how the Arabo-Islamic 
tradition of disputation existed independently of Aristotle, adopted Aristotelian techniques and 
frameworks, and then transformed into a fully formalized system called “methods of investigation (ādāb 
al-baḥth).” See also Mehmet Karabela, “The Development of Dialectic and Argumentation Theory in Post-
Classical Islamic Intellectual History” PhD Diss., McGill University, 2011. 
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argues that there is a general category of muʿāraḍa, which is part of the “native” pre-
systematic techniques of disputation.360 As the existing styles of disputation were being 
formalized, muʿāraḍa, due to its importance, needed to be incorporated into the formal 
system. “Everything possible was done to bring it into the new system, even though the 
arguments brought forth cloud the difference between it and distinction (faṣl, farq).”361 
Distinction is thus often, but not always, seen as a subset of muʿāraḍa, a tradition that 
preceded Aristotelian influence. Miller seems to situate distinction as part of the 
dialectical tradition introduced by Aristotle but he does not elaborate on this point in 
his discussion of distinction.  
 The question of the status of farq with regard to muʿāraḍa is left in doubt. Miller 
claims that some of his primary sources portray muʿāraḍa as a broad category under 
which farq can be subsumed, while others see them as two distinct kinds of counter-
objection.362 Young sees farq as wholly subsumed under counter-objection. For him 
muʿāraḍa is part of an older tradition of disputation that pre-dated recorded 
disputations or manuals of disputation.363 He argues, based on Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī and 
al-Bājī, that a proper muʿāraḍa entails the construction of a new legal analogy. Farq 
involves the production of a new legal case, related to the case at hand by way of the 
legal rationale. It is the applicability of this rationale which is at stake in a farq 
objection. Since farq is one of the techniques through which a new analogy is 
                                                             
360 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 38. 
361 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 38; Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 31n46. 
362 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 130-31. 
363 Both Miller and Young agree that muʿāraḍa was a particularly Arab, pre-jadal technique. Miller, 
“Islamic Disputation Theory,” 37-38; Young “Dialectical Forge,” 1:31n46. 
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constructed, it must be subsumed by muʿāraḍa, a broader category encompassing all 
techniques in which a counter-analogy is created.364 
 In other words, Young believes that the muʿāraḍa was a disputational technique 
which existed prior to the creation of farq as a technique. He holds, however, that the 
process of farq itself is and only can be a subsection of muʿāraḍa. Certainly, the farq is, as 
Young explains, the creation of a different set of comparisons of the legal discussion at 
hand. To take the above example, the Mālikī scholar compares the blunt object and the 
sharp object. They are alike in the legal rationale (ʿilla), their predisposition for use as 
instruments of killing, and they are alike in their legal ruling, the imposition of 
retaliatory killing. The Ḥanafī scholar, who makes the case for a distinction (farq), 
produces a counter-analogy. For the Mālikī, the two instruments are analogous or 
comparable; for the Ḥanafī, however, they are incompatible and disanalogous. For the 
Ḥanafī, this means that there are two legal outcomes in the two cases, one is the 
imposition of qiṣāṣ for the sharp object and lack of qiṣāṣ for the blunt object. This result 
is what Young calls the counter-ḥukm. Young claims, therefore, that this is simply one 
of the many kinds of counter-objection (muʿāraḍa), and that farq is subsumed within the 
counter-objection since the counter-objection is both a broader category and an older 
category. While Young’s argument that, logically speaking, farq is a subsection of 
muʿāraḍa is convincing on its face, he does not address the scholars who treat farq as a 
separate category. Nevertheless, these two concepts, muʿāraḍa and farq, are clearly 
quite closely related. 
                                                             
364 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:31n46. 
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 Young, however, seems to suggest a parallel between farq and one of the 
refutations offered by Aristotle in his Sophistical Refutations, specifically Aristotle's 
advice to “look for contradictions between the answerers’ views and either his own 
statements or the views of those whose words and actions he admits to be right or 
those who are generally held to bear a like character and to resemble them.”365 Young 
explicitly says that we may find parallels between these techniques and inconsistency 
(naqḍ), contradictions with the Quran, hadith, or scholarly consensus, and 
“contradiction of one’s own doctrinal madhhab.”366 While Young does not use the term 
farq in this discussion, the dialectical technique of evaluating Quran, hadith, and legal 
questions seems to be dialectical farq. This interpretation of Young’s statement requires 
understanding Aristotle’s statement “those whose works and actions [the questioner] 
admits to be right” as applying, in legal disputations, to the assumption that the 
doctrines of a particular legal school are assumed to be correct. Based on this statement 
by Young, it seems possible that farq developed as a formal technique of disputation in 
connection with the reception of Aristotle’s Sophistcal Refutations. This supposition, 
however, follows naturally from the understanding that any participant in a legal 
disputation is an adherent to a particular legal school and defending the view of his 
school. 
 According to Young, dialectics was a “forge” in which fiqh developed. Through 
disputation, the earliest Muslim jurists turned the raw materials of Islamic law into a 
                                                             
365 Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations. On Coming-to-be and Passing Away. On the Cosmos, trans. by E.S. Forster 
and D.J. Furley. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955), 85. 
366 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 222. 
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complex and refined body of doctrine. In Young’s analysis, farq was one of the 
important dialectical maneuvers for the systematization of legal rulings, through what 
Young has called “farq-extension.” He defines farq-extension as a “dialectical motive: 
avoiding charges of invalid inference and internal/doctrinal inconsistency; proto-
system legal theory.”367 It is a part of what he terms “proto-system legal theory,” by 
which Young seems to mean something like “pre-formative legal theory.”368 What he 
means, I think, by farq-extension is a full-scale review of one’s doctrinal consistency so 
as to avoid being charged with interal inconsistencies.369 While farq was a disputational 
technique that could occur within a disputation, farq-extension was a way of 
attempting to control for consistency within legal doctrine by spreading the particular 
applicatory ambit of a legal rationale (ʿilla).  
                                                             
367 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:544. 
368 Unfortunately, Young does not define this term explicitly. He says: “Moving on to more technical terms, we 
have already employed ‘proto-system’ on more than one occasion. This is an important distinction to maintain, 
and ‘proto-system’ will only be applied to jadal teaching and practice before the appearance of the first, 
comprehensive ‘full-system’ theory treatises in the fourth and fifth centuries H. This same important distinction 
will be maintained with regard to ‘proto-system legal-theory’ and ‘full-system uṣūl al-fiqh’” (1:14). It seems that in 
Young’s terminology, a ‘proto-system’ is defined in large part by the fact of what was to come. In other words, the 
proto-system dialectic seems to become full-system dialectic when the later tradition wrote manuals of jadal. 
Similarly, proto-system legal theory becomes full-system once works of uṣūl al-fiqh are written. Other than this 
seeming maturation, it is not clear what differentiates the two. Young finds the proto-system dialectics, for 
instance, to be almost rich, if not richer, than full-system jadal. “Even in the small amount of dialectical material I 
analyzed within this relatively small treatise, I found nearly the full gamut of istidlālāt treated by our jadal 
theorists, and a fairly large sampling of their iʿtirāḍāt, ajwiba, and tarjīḥāt. However — and this is important — I 
also found much more than our jadal-theorists discuss” (1:10). 
369 Ahmed El Shamsy has identified the search for analogical consistency as a characteristic feature of 
early Iraqi-Hanafi reasoning which also influenced the legal thinking of al-Shāfiʿī. See Ahmed El Shamsy, 
The Canonization of Early Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 44-68; this is also discussed in Joseph Lowry, Introduction to The Epistle on Legal Theory, xviii-
ix. 
 154 
 
And as for farq-extension, to demand that the farq between two types of legal 
entity be observed across relevant genera of substantive rulings is to 
simultaneously extend two sets of opposing ʿilal occasioning opposing ḥukms 
across those genera… [it is] marked by a concern with consistency and an 
aversion to doctrinal contradiction; and we might claim that [it is] prompted, in 
the end, by an anticipation of naqḍ [contradiction] and its avoidance.370  
As a component in the dialectical forge, the technique of farq-extension was concerned 
with anticipating and avoiding contradictory legal positions (naqḍ). Farq-extension 
starts with the logic of a farq objection as discussed by the jadal theorists. It helps to 
identify these seeming inconsistencies and attempts to harmonize them. Jurists using 
farq-extension extend this reasoning not simply to one dispute as it occurs, but rather 
to a broad, general, and cohesive system of legal rules. 
 
Disputational Theory and Practice (Khilāf) 
Furūq was not the only genre of legal writing that arose out of the larger world of 
dialectics; khilāf was another, more prominent, genre. Indeed the relationship between 
these two disciplines, furūq and jadal, has gone relatively unnoticed.371 Young claims 
that disputation had a profound effect on the entirety of Islamic legal literature. He 
argues that every genre of pre-modern Islamic legal wriring is influenced by the 
                                                             
370 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:441. 
371 The only study of which I am aware that mentions such a link is Young’s dissertation. Al-Ḥabīb’s 
introduction to ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣiqillī’s al-Nukat wa-l-furūq hints at such a connection as well. Al-Ḥabīb, 
“Introduction,” 79-81. 
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practice of dialectics or its theory, but that of these genres, khilāf, has been impacted 
most clearly.372 While Young’s dissertation shows how many of the concepts used in 
Islamic law were elaborated within disputational contexts, the development of legal 
genres and their particular connections to jadal in legal contexts remain unclear in his 
presentation. The genre most clearly related to disputation, however, is that of khilāf, 
which is also referred to as ikhtilāf.373 This genre is mentioned by Young: “[a]s regards 
these latter genres[ qawāʿid fiqhiyya, furūq, ashbāh wa naẓāʾir, maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa, etc.,] the 
most important for our purposes is that which comprises the categories of Ikhtilāf and 
ʿIlm al-Khilāf.”374 In such contexts, khilāf does not refer to a particular technical term of 
disputation, nor a style thereof. It refers, in a way, to the act of disputation itself, 
especially when used in the context of a literary genre.  
Joseph Schacht describes ikhtilāf “as a technical term, the differences of opinion 
amongst authorities of religious law, both between the several schools and within each 
of them.”375 Elsewhere, he describes the compilation of such works: “There are, further, 
comparative accounts of the doctrines of several schools (ikhtilāf, ‘disagreement’); the 
older ones reflect the discussions between the several schools, the later ones are simple 
handbooks.”376 The books reflecting discussions between schools relate to (real or 
imagined) discussions between schools on particular points of law. In part, their 
                                                             
372 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:70. 
373 These two terms seem to be used synonymously in the tradition to refer to contradictory legal 
opinions which cannot be harmonized. 
374 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:70. 
375 EI2 s.v. “Ikhtilāf” (Schacht). 
376 Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, 114. 
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purpose was to show which school was superior. Those books that Schacht refers to as 
“simple handbooks,” are actually khilāf books that attempt to establish a particular 
opinion as prevalent within a school. It was also important to catalog and resolve 
disagreements in order to “arrive at consensus on any doctrine of practice.”377 Khilāf 
therefore serves to upset the epistemological certainty that arises from consensus and 
leads only to probable certainty.378 
 In this respect, furūq and khilāf are quite different and almost opposite concepts. 
Works of khilāf function offensively. These works seek to establish one school’s opinion 
as better than another’s, or to establish one opinion as the school’s dominant opinion 
(muʿtamad) at the expense of minority opinions. They achieve this through dialectical 
argumentation that leads to one right answer. Furūq, on the other hand, are all placed 
within the legal rulings of one particular school and thus function defensively. Instead 
of attempting to show which conflicting legal opinion is better, they attempt to show 
how seemingly contradictory opinions are mutually consistent. Because of this, the 
laws compared in these books of khilāf and furūq are presented very differently. Furūq 
works do not necessarily attempt to harmonize laws that are in fact khilāf. The laws 
discussed in works of khilāf are actually contradictory while those discussed in works of 
furūq are only apparently, but not actually, contradictory. Works of furūq do not contain 
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debates that affirm one thing while denying another; they contain discussions that 
affirm two things simultaneously.  
Looking at this from a dialectical perspective, the “farq” of furūq is the particular 
kind of counter-objection discussed above or rather, the way to overcome such 
objections. The questioner attempts to catch the proponent in a contradiction—
upholding a certain ʿilla in one case, but unable to do so in another—by bringing up a 
separate legal problem and its ruling. The proponent responds by explaining the subtle 
distinction between both apparently “contradictory” cases.  
 The connection between khilāf and jadal is readily apparent: works of khilāf are 
works of disputational theory in practice. Young’s analysis of jurists using dialectical 
method comes from a book attributed to al-Shāfiʿī, the Ikhtilāf al-ʿiraqiyyīn. Al-Shāfiʿī’s 
Umm itself contains many such works exemplifying khilāf-dialectics, including the Risāla 
and Ikhtilāf Mālik wa-l-Shāfiʿī, which contains the disputed points of doctrine between 
Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī.379 This genre seems to have been particularly prominent in early 
periods of Islamic law; Wael Hallaq attributes the presence of many contradictory 
opinions to the informal institutional context in which early jurists operated. “This 
individual ijtihād — that is, the ijtihād of the individual mujtahid — explains the plurality 
of opinion in Islamic law, known as khilāf or ikhtilāf.”380 In this context, in which 
affiliation with a legal school was not yet the norm, a plurality of opinions arose and 
                                                             
379 See Ahmed El Shamsy, “Al-Shāfiʿī’s Written Corpus: A Source-Critical Study” Journal of the American 
Oriental Society 132.2 (2012): 199-210. 
380 Wael Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practices, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
82. 
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were reflected in writings that sought to bring some order to scholars and their 
doctrine. “The recording of these differences of opinion has produced a considerable 
literature since the beginnings of the study of fiḳh.”381 When formulated in this manner, 
legal dialectics seem to be almost identical to the discpline of khilāf.382  
 One might then see the works of khilāf as records of formal disputation adhering 
to particular rules and strictures, and works about ʿilm al-jadal, the science of 
disputation, as the theoretical science describing the rules thereof. This seems to be 
Young’s implicit understanding of the dialectical tradition. His criticism of Miller’s 
dating of the tradition stems from a belief in khilāf works representing a developed and 
deployed theory of dialectics that is only later canonized by the books that Miller 
studies. This division between the works of disputation in practice (khilāf) and 
disputation in theory (jadal) has a certain resonance with the distinction between legal 
compendia (furūʿ) and works of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), which describe the 
procedures for deriving the substantive law found in legal compendia.  
 This brief survey of khilāf and its relationship with disputation shows an 
intimate connection between the sciences of khilāf and jadal. While it may be that most, 
if not all, genres of Islamic legal writing are indebted to an early and vigorous 
disputational environment, khilāf seems particularly tied to disputation. This debt has 
long been recognized and the two fields of inquiry, khilāf and jadal, have often been 
                                                             
381 EI2 s.v. “Ikhtilāf” (Schacht). 
382 It should be noted, as mentioned above, that the history of formalized disputation also tracks closely 
with the history of formalized theology, especially the defensive apologetic tradition of kalām. See Cook, 
“Origins of Kalām.” 
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conflated with each other.383 Although khilāf and jadal do have an important connection, 
khilāf also served a purpose beyond that of dialectics—it served as a tool to impede the 
formation of consensus. As George Makdisi has pointed out:  
Ijma’, consensus, had its counterpart in khilaf, disagreement, difference of 
opinion. This situation gave rise, very early in Islam, to the need for codifying 
all opinion on which there was disagreement among the authoritative 
doctors.384  
Since consensus, once formed, conferred a high epistemological status on a given result 
of legal interpretation, formal expressions of disagreement served as an important 
means to prevent the formation of a consensus.  
Aron Zysow explain the somewhat counterintuitive relationship between 
consensus and disputation.  
Consensus is a substitute for the infallible guidance of the Prophet. It is as close 
as one can come to the renewal of the Prophetic Mission which has come to an 
end with Muḥammad… At the same time, however, the uniqueness of the 
Prophet must be preserved. Through consensus, ordinary Muslims must not 
gain prerogatives that surpass those of the Prophet.385  
Both consensus and disputation were methods for generating true doctrine. At the 
same time, however, one way of stopping the formation of consensus is to voice 
                                                             
383 This conflation perhaps signals a need to differentiate legal dialectic from philosophical and 
theological dialectic. 
384 Makdisi, Rise of Colleges, 106. 
385 Aron Zysow, The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory (Atlanta: 
Lockwood Press, 2013), 236. 
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dissent. Khilāf thus serves not only as a way to voice such dissent, but also as a kind of 
forum for structuring and voicing dissent in convincing fashion. Therefore, disputation 
can also serve to present certainty, since certainty should only be conferred when 
there is unanimity on an issue. The khilāf engenders only probablistic knowledge 
instead of certain knowledge. The theological goal is certainty, but at the sane time, 
because certainty is so difficult to achieve, disagreement and probability substitute for 
certainty. Books on khilāf serve this purpose twice, since they also enshrine the 
disagreement textually.  
The strong connection between these two disciplines, khilāf and jadal, however, 
has long been noted. George Makdisi mentions this connection in Rise of Colleges and 
quotes Ḥājjī Khalīfa (d. 1068/1657) making exactly this point. “Hajji Khalifa identified 
‘ilm al-khilaf, the science of differences of opinion, of controversy, with jadal, dialectic, 
which was itself a part of mantiq, logic, adding: ‘except that this science (jadal) is 
applied particularly to religious matters’, —religious, as distinct from ‘foreign 
sciences.’”386 Indeed, Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s discussion of ʿilm al-khilāf reads like a discussion of 
dialectic itself. He explicitly equates the two, “ʿIlm al-khilāf … is dialectics (wa-huwa al-
jadal).”387 He mentions that the people involved in khilāf are either “the respondent” (al-
mujīb) or questioner (al-sāʾil),” the two protagonists found in works of disputation.388 For 
Ḥājjī Khalīfa, there seems to be no substantial difference between these two fields. Ḥājjī 
                                                             
386 Makdisi, Rise of Colleges, 110, quoting Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn fī asāmī al-kutub wa-l-funūn, ed. 
Şerefettin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1971), 1:721: “ʿilm al-khilāf wa-
huwa al-jadal alladhī huwa qism min al-manṭiq illā annahu khuṣṣa bi-l-maqāyīs al-dīniyya.”  
387 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:721. 
388 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:721. 
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Khalīfa’s mention of this science within his biobibliograpic work warrants further 
discussion.  
It has been noted that much of his information regarding the various scholarly 
disciplines comes from the Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn 
Ṭaşköprüzāde (d. 968/1561), a work that, in turn, owes a debt of gratitude to Ibn al-
Akfānī’s (d. 749/1348) Irshād al-qāṣid ilā asnā al-maqāṣid. Jan Just Witkam alludes to this 
connection when he says that Ḥājjī Khalīfa “probably did not use the Irsā̆d al-Qāṣid 
(although he was familiar with the text and knew Ṭaşköprüzāde’s debt to it), but he was 
highly dependent on, among other works, Ṭaşköprüzāde’s encyclopedia, which he 
quotes on numerous occasions.”389 This flow of bibliographic knowledge, from the 
relatively unknown Ibn al-Akfānī to the monumental work by Ḥājjī Khalīfa deserves 
greater study,390 given that “[f]rom Kātib Cĕlebī[i.e. Ḥājjī Khalīfa] the line [of knowledge 
transmission] goes straight to the great bibliographical surveys which are the product 
of Arabic studies in Western Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries: Ahlwardt’s 
catalogue of the Berlin MS collection and Brockelmann’s History of Arabic 
Literature.”391 These three works—Ibn al-Akfānī, Ṭaşköprüzāde, and Ḥājjī Khalīfa—
should be seen as a cohesive tradition, a multigenerational current in Islamicate 
bibliographical writing. 
                                                             
389 Jan Just Witkam, “Ibn al-Akfānī (d. 749/1348) and his bibliography of the sciences,” Manuscripts of the 
Middle East 2 (1987), 40. 
390 In particular, Witkam’s study shows how Ibn al-Akfānī’s Irshād al-qāṣid served as the node of 
transmission for some of the earlier classifications of the sciences, including works by Ibn Sīnā, al-Farābī, 
Ibn al-Nadīm and al-Shahrastānī. See Witkam, “Ibn al-Akfānī,” 39. 
391 Jan Just Witkam, “Ibn al-Akfānī,” 40. 
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 The discussion of khilāf in this bibliographic tradition is quite interesting, since 
the authors are not in much agreement among themselves over what, exactly, the 
discipline of khilāf is or what it entails. I have already mentioned Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s 
identification of this science with disputation. In his Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, Ṭaşköprüzāde 
includes separate discussions of both jadal and khilāf. The first of these discussions 
occurs in a section on the “sciences that protect one from error in debate and 
learning.”392 The second mention is in his section on the “sciences of legal theory.”393 
His understanding and discussion of both jadal and khilāf are almost indistinguishable 
conceptually in both of these sections. In the first discussion, he states that “the 
principles (mabādiʾ) of khilāf are derived from the science of jadal (mustanbaṭa min ʿilm al-
jadal); jadal acts as the substance and khilāf as the form it takes (fa-l-jadal bi-manzilat al-
mādda wa-l-khilāf bi-manzilat al-ṣūra).”394 Ṭaşköprüzāde however, maintains a strict 
distinction between these two sciences, although he laments the ignorance of scholars 
of his time, in which this has been largely forgotten, “To the point,” he says, “that 
students of our time do not comprehend (ṭalabat zamāninā lā yatafaṭṭanūna) the 
difference between khilāf, jadal, and munāẓara.”395 His understanding of a distinction 
                                                             
392 Aḥmad ibn Muṣtafā Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda fī mawḍūʿāt al-ʿulūm, ed. (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1405/1985), 1:283. The other disciplines that he lists alongside khilāf and jadal in 
this section are Rules for Studying (ʿilm ādāb al-dars) and the science of speculation (ʿilm al-naẓar). 
393 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 2:556. The other disciplines that he lists alongside khilāf and jadal in this 
section are the science of reasoning (ʿilm al-naẓar) and the science of debate (ʿilm al-munāẓara).  
394 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 1:283. In the previous discussion of jadal and khilāf, he says, “the 
distinction between khilāf and jadal is in the form and substance. Jadal investigates the substance of the 
disputational proofs (mawādd al-adilla al-khilāfiyya) while khilāf investigates their form (ṣuwarihā)” (2:556). 
395 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 1:283. 
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between all three of these disciplines is mentioned here, but he repeats this distinction 
in the section on the sciences of legal theory. 
In categorizing khilāf alongside jadal, Ṭaşköprüzāde suggest that these two 
disciplines be treated as separate fields. Of disputation, he says: 
It is the science that investigates the ways through which one confirms any 
situation he so wishes (ibrām ayy waḍʿ urīda) or attacks any situation that may 
arise (hadm ayy waḍʿ kāna). This is one of the branches of speculation and the 
foundation of this science is disagreement (wa-mabnī al-ʿilm al-khilāf). Khilāf is 
based on disputation, which is one part of the investigations of logic, although it 
is specific to the religious sciences.396  
This section on disputation is similar in many ways to Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s discussion of khilāf, 
even though it treats a different discipline. Both authors mention the close connection 
of khilāf to the religious sciences as well as to the field of logic.  
 What, then, is the science of khilāf according to Ṭaşköprüzāde? He provides two 
definitions. First, he says, “it is the science that investigates the different ways of 
applying deductive reasoning from particular and general indicants.”397 Khilāf is, 
therefore, in this definition, not concerned with the technique of defending or 
attacking particular opinions or viewpoints, but rather directly tied in with differing 
interpretations of legal indicants. In other words, khilāf, according to Ṭaşköprüzāde is 
                                                             
396 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 1:281. The discussion of jadal in legal theory is almost identical. “It is 
the confirmation of any situation that may arise (ithbāt ayy waḍʿ kāna) or an attack against any situation 
that may arise (hadm ayy waḍʿ kāna). It is one of the rational sciences (al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya) although it is 
also a branch of the science of legal theory” (2:555). 
397 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 1:283. 
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inseparable from its legal context. This point is reaffirmed in the second definition, 
from the chapter on uṣūl al-fiqh. “It is the disputation that occurs between the 
adherents of the legal schools (bayna aṣḥāb al-madhāhib al-farʿiyya), such as Abū Ḥanīfa, 
al-Shāfiʿī and their peers (amthālihimā).”398 Not only is khilāf intrinsically legal, but it is 
the disputation that is exclusively based on the extrapolated reasoning of the founders 
of the legal schools. Ḥājjī Khalīfa, however, thinks of khilāf as simply disputation. 
Ṭaşköprüzāde had already dismissed this very definition as misinformed.  
Ṭaşköprüzāde closes his discussion by stating that “it is possible (yumkin) to 
place the science of disputation and khilāf within the branches of the discipline of legal 
theory.”399 Ṭaşköprüzāde categorizes khilāf as falling under the rubric of legal theory 
(uṣūl al-fiqh), while Ḥājjī Khalīfa considers it part of substantive law or law in general. 
He does not mention that it is part of uṣūl al-fiqh, instead referring to the necessity of 
“knowing the qawāʿid by means of which one understands the derivation of positive 
laws (yutawaṣṣalu bihā ilā istinbāṭ al-aḥkām)” and “memorizing those disputed laws.”400 
While khilāf requires the knowledge of these things, Ṭaşköprüzāde clearly notes that it 
does not require understanding how to deduce positive laws; that is the work of a 
mujtahid. Someone involved in khilāf need only be able to understand the work, 
teachings, and writings of a mujtahid. 
 Ibn al-Akfānī, the third author of this bibliographic group, offers a third, 
different approach. He does not consider khilāf an independent science and thus has no 
                                                             
398 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 2:556. 
399 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 1:284. 
400 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:721. 
 165 
 
entry for khilāf. Rather, he sees khilāf as a subdiscipline of jadal and mentions this khilāf 
within his entry on disputational theory. Of ʿilm al-jadal, he says:  
The Science of Disputation. A science through which the following is known: 
how to present legal proofs, how to refute doubt, impugn legal proofs (qawādiḥ 
al-adilla), and structure points in a khilāf debate. The science of disputation came 
about from jadal which is a part of logic, but it is restricted to religious 
investigations. There are many methods of disputation, but the best of them 
(ashbahuhā) is al-ʿAmīdī’s method.401  
For Ibn al-Akfānī, it is not khilāf that is a religious science, but rather the science of 
disputation itself. He makes this point explicit in his entry, but it is also clear from his 
categorization. Ibn al-Akfānī’s book presents a clear hierarchy of the sciences: for him, 
jadal belongs to the science of laws (ʿilm al-nawāmīs) or the legal sciences (al-ʿulūm al-
sharʿiyya). These sciences, in turn, fall under what he calls the “the highest order of the 
religious sciences (ʿilm aʿlā; al-ʿilm al-ilāhī),” which itself is a part of “the speculative 
philosophical sciences (al-ʿulūm al-ḥikmiyya al-naẓariyya).” The speculative philosophical 
sciences themselves are a part of “philosophical sciences, or what is studied for its own 
sake (al-ʿulūm al-ḥikmiyya; mā yakūnu maqṣūdan li-dhātihi),” as opposed to the ancillary 
sciences.  
                                                             
401 Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Sāʿid al-Ansārī, Ibn al-Akfānī al-Ḥakīm al-Mutaṭayyib, Irshād al-qāṣid ilā 
asnā al-maqāṣid fī anwāʿ al-ʿulūm, ed. ʿAbd al-Munʿim Muḥammad ʿUmar and Aḥmad Ḥilmī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 
(Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, [1990]), 163; Januarius Justus Witkam, ed., De Egyptische Arts Ibn al-Akfānī (gest. 
749/1348) En Zijn Indeling Van de Wetenschappen (Leiden: Ter Lugt Pers, 1989), 44, ll.580-83. This is a 
reference to the work of Rukn al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-ʿAmīdī (d. 615/1218), a Central Asian 
scholar who wrote two works on legal disputation, al-Ṭarīqa al-ʿamīdiyyah fī-l-khilāf wa-l-jadal and Irshād al-
ṭarīqa. See also the praise for al-ʿAmīdī and his method in Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddima, 3:33-34. 
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 These three bibliographers present conceptions of both disputation and khilāf 
that are radically different. They present quite different histories, uses, and identities 
of both of these sciences. For Ḥājjī Khalīfa, the technical term khilāf is of great 
importance. He devotes an entry to this discipline, but the identity of this discipline is 
interchangeable with that of disputation; they are equivalents to him, and they reside 
in what he understands as the substantive areas of the law.402 Here, the legal is given 
precedence over the philosophical or the speculative. It is purely a branch of legal 
studies. For Ṭaşköprüzāde, they are distinct sciences, although they are both disciplines 
concerned with discovering truth. In this sense, they correspond to what both Miller 
and Young find to be the chief aim of early dialectical theory, a method for attaining 
and refining knowledge. He would certainly not approve of Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s definition. 
Ṭaşköprüzāde laments the ignorance of those who conflate khilāf and jadal. As for Ibn 
al-Akfānī, he presents jadal as an important discipline, while khilāf is only subsumed by 
jadal entirely. For him, it is only jadal that is important, and it is important for its 
relationship to both law and philosophy.  
 Modern scholars have drawn connections between the three bibliographical 
works in large part because of shared passages between them. Witkam says 
“Ṭaşköprüzāde devised his own division of the sciences, but he incorporated much of 
Ibn al-Akfānī’s text within the framework of his [Miftāḥ].”403 This statement is paralleled 
                                                             
402 This may result from his work’s vision of scholarship and scholarly life as entirely book-centered. 
Kashf al-ẓunūn focuses almost exclusively on texts as the primary form of intellectual capital, although 
such a focus is not necessarily indicative of Ottoman views of knowledge more broadly. 
403 Witkam, “Ibn al-Akfānī,” 40. 
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in Gerhard Endress’s study of encyclopedias in the Arabic tradition. Endress says that 
Ibn al-Akfānī’s work “became the model” for Ṭaşköprüzāde because they “both present 
the ‘highest aim’, al-maqṣad al-asnā, attained by Muslim scholarship in the later Middle 
Ages in uniting both traditions, the Islamic and the Hellenistic.”404 Ḥājjī Khalīfa later 
used Ṭaşköprüzāde as a model for his own work. This ‘borrowing’ is detectable even in 
their discussions of khilāf and jadal, in spite of the distinct approaches taken by each of 
the three authors. There are verbatim passages that are shared between all three 
works.  
The most straightforward example of this borrowing is in Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s 
discussion of jadal which entry begins with a long quotation from Ṭaşköprüzāde’s Miftāh 
al-saʿāda and ends with the phrase “as in (kadhā fī) the Miftāḥ al-saʿāda.”405 Ḥājjī Khalīfa 
adds, however, that it is not far-fetched to say that ʿilm al-jadal is the same thing as ʿilm 
al-munāẓara, the very statement lamented by Ṭaşköprüzāde as ignorance in his Miftāḥ. 
Another obvious borrowing is the phrase that disputation is a part of logic, although 
devoted primarily for religious sciences.406  
The connection drawn by the bibliographers between khilāf and jadal is framed 
largely in terms of debating difference between schools, although later books 
                                                             
404 Gerhard Endress, “The Cycle of Knowledge: Intellectual Traditions and Encyclopaedias of the Rational Sciences 
in Arabic Islamic Hellenism” in Organizing Knowledge: Encyclopaedic Activities in the Pre-Eighteenth Century Islamic 
World, ed. Gerhard Endress (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006), 133. 
405 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:579-80.  
406 The phrase is found in all three texts, but not with identical wording. Ibn al-Akfānī says, “al-jadal 
alladhī huwa aḥad ajẓāʾ al-manṭiq lakinnahu khuṣṣiṣa bi-l-mabāḥith al-dīniyya” (163). In Ṭaşköprüzāde, the 
phrase is “al-jadal alladhī huwa aḥad ajzāʾ mabāḥith al-manṭiq lakinnahu khuṣṣa bi-l-ʿulūm al-dīniyya” (1:281). 
Ḥājjī Khalīfa quotes this phrase in his entry on jadal, on 1:579. In his entry on khilāf, he says, “wa-huwa al-
jadal alladhī huwa qism min al-manṭiq illā annahu khuṣṣa bi-l-maqāṣid al-diniyya” (1:721). 
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sometimes focus on disputed rulings within schools. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn 
Sulaymān al-Mardāwī’s (d. 885/1480-81) al-Inṣāf fī maʿrifat al-rājiḥ min al-khilāf ʿalā 
madhhab al-imām al-mubajjal Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal is a prime example of a work of khilāf 
written within a legal school. His book is concerned with explaining and clarifying the 
khilāf found in the Muqniʿ of Muwaffaq al-Dīn Ibn Qudāmā (d. 620/1223). Al-Mardāwī’s 
interest lies in clarifying some of the conflicting opinions given by Ibn Qudāmā and 
explaining which ones are more reliable. He praises the Muqniʿ as one of the “most 
useful and greatest” books in the Ḥanbalī school, “however, [Ibn Qudāmā] gives 
conflicting opinions on some issues without giving preference to either (aṭlaqa fī baʿḍ al-
masāʾil al-khilāf min ghayr al-tarjīḥ). Weak and sound opinions thus appear alike to those 
who contemplate this book (fa-ashtabaha ʿalā al-nāẓir fīhi al-ḍaʿīf min al-ṣaḥīḥ).”407 Al-
Mardāwī writes his book to clarify which opinions are dependable (muʿtamad, madhhab) 
and which are not. Interestingly, in his introduction he gives a detailed explanation of 
the formulations that Ibn Qudāmā uses that lead to such confusions.408 While khilāf 
could perhaps be a way of voicing and, through its association with disputation, 
resolving disagreements, not all disagreements could be resolved. 
Thus far, this chapter has shown that the history of furūq as a genre seems to be 
found in farq’s past as a disputational technique; furūq seems to leave part of this 
argumentative history behind, something that cannot be said for khilāf. Nevertheless, 
                                                             
407 Alāʾ al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Sulaymān Mardāwī, al-Inṣāf fī maʿrifat al-rājiḥ min al-khilāf ʿalā madhhab 
al-imām al-mubajjal Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Faqī (Cairo: Maṭbūʿat al-Sunna al-
Muḥammadiyyah, 1374/1955), 1:3. 
408 Mardāwī, al-Inṣāf, 1:4-13. 
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this section shows one way in which the two disciplines of khilāf and jadal evolved 
alongside of and by means of interactions with each other and in this regard they 
provide a useful parallel to the distinctions tradition. The following section will show 
how the disputational background of farq can be understood to be present, even if 
latent, in works of legal distinctions. 
 
Disputation in Furūq 
The earliest extant work on legal distinctions is likely al-Farq wa-l-Jamʿ by ʿAbd Allāh ibn 
Yūsuf al-Juwaynī, the father of Imām al-Ḥaramayn Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī. Abū 
Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Yūsuf ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī was, as his name indicates, a 
scholar from Juwayn, a small town outside of Nishapur. He was born into a family of 
well-known scholars. His father, Yūsuf ibn ʿAbd Allāh, was a noted litterateur and his 
brother, Shaykh al-Ḥijāz Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Yūsuf, was a hadith transmitter who also 
wrote a book on Sufism, Kitāb al-Salwah. ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī’s son, Abū al-Maʿālī ʿAbd 
al-Malik ibn ʿAbd Allāh, was a very well-known Shāfiʿī jurist and Ashʿarī theologian 
whose tenure living in Mecca and Medina earned him the nickname Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
(Imam of the Two Holy Cities).  
 ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī began his education in Juwayn, where he studied adab as 
well as Islamic law (fiqh) with his father, and Islamic law with Abū Yaʿqūb al-Abīwardī 
(d. ca. 400/1010). From there, al-Juwaynī travelled to Nishapur where he continued his 
study of fiqh with Abū Ṭayyib Sahl ibn Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-Suʿlūkī (d. 369/980). 
Finally he went to Marw to finish his studies with Abū Bakr ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad al-
Qaffāl al-Marwazī (d. 417/1026-27). Al-Juwaynī studied with al-Qaffāl until he mastered 
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the teachings of the Shāfiʿī school (al-madhhab) and the points of disputation with other 
schools (al-khilāf). After this, he returned to Nishapur in 407/1016-17, and “he remained 
there teaching, giving fatwas and engaging in disputation, educating the general public 
and the learned (qaʿada li-l-tadrīs wa-l-fatwā wa-majlis al-munāẓara wa-taʿlīm al-ʿāmm wa-l-
khāṣṣ).”409 
 Al-Juwaynī, nicknamed Rukn al-Islām, the Cornerstone of Islam, was known for 
his great learning and teaching. He had many important students who are recorded in 
the biographical literature. Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 769/1368), for instance, includes 
entries for ten scholars who studied with al-Juwaynī.410 His most famous student, of 
course, was his own son, Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī, who, it turns out, wrote an early and 
important manual of disputation (jadal).  
 It was not only in his scholarship and teaching that the elder al-Juwaynī was 
prominent, but also in his legal opinions. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Muʾadhdhin said: “I 
washed his corpse, and when I turned him over in the coffin, I saw his right hand up to 
the armpit shining like the light of the moon. I was amazed (fa-taḥayyartu) and I said, 
                                                             
409 Muḥyī al-Dīn Zakariyyāʾ Yaḥyā ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī, Mukhtaṣar ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, ed. ʿĀdil ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and 
ʿAlī Muʿawwiḍ (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyya, 1995), 449. For information on ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī’s 
biography, see: al-Nawawī, Mukhtaṣar Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 449-50; Tāj al-Dīn Abū Naṣr ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn ʿAlī al-
Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubra, 5:73-93; Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn ʿAlī Al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya. ed. 
Kamāl Yūsuf al-Ḥūt (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1407/1987), 1:165-67, no.305; and Taqī al-Dīn Abū Bakr ibn 
Aḥmad Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya, ed. al-Ḥāfiẓ ʿAbd al-ʿAlīm Khān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
1407[/1986]), 1:210. 
410 I chose to focus on those scholars who have an entry in this work as a way of demonstrating the 
importance of al-Juwaynī’s students. For those listed in Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba’s dictionary of Shāfiʿī’ jurists, I 
give the reference to their entries as well. Al-Juwaynī had many other students who are listed in his 
entry in these dictionaries. 
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‘This is the blessing (baraka) of his fatwas.”411 In spite of such laurels, however, al-
Juwaynī appears, after his death, to have been forgotten after his death outside of 
Central Asia. 
 From Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī’s (d. 476/1083) Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ we learn the 
surprising fact that information on the life and works of Shāfiʿī jurists from Khurasan 
and Transoxiana did not travel widely during his lifetime. Al-Shīrāzī reports that “In 
Khurasan and Transoxiana, there are many scholars in our madhhab (min aṣḥābinā khalq 
kathīr), such as…Abū Muḥammad al-Juwaynī and others whose death dates are 
unknown to me (lam yaḥḍurnī tārīkh mawtihim).’412 Al-Shīrāzī, who spent most of life in 
the caliphal center of Baghdad, was a contemporary to these Central Asian scholars, but 
he could only conjure up the names of a few of these jurists and did not have much, if 
any, familiarity with their life and works. In spite of this unfamiliarity, al-Juwaynī and 
his Central Asian colleagues seem to have become better known in the following 
centuries. 
The information that later sources provide about al-Juwaynī and other Central 
Asian jurists signals that information about them did become available and more 
current a few centuries after al-Shīrāzī. Al-Juwaynī came to occupy an important place 
in the Shāfiʿī madhhab. It was perhaps this initial lack of biographical information about 
him that led to uncertainty surrounding his works. Although his work on legal 
distinctions is often mentioned in his biographies, there is a disagreement as to its title. 
                                                             
411 Ibn Qadī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ al-shāfiʿiyya, 1:210; al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiya al-kubrā, 5:75. 
412 Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyyah al-kubrā, 4:87. Al-Subkī is citing Shīrāzī’s Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ. 
The quoted passage can be found in al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt, 132-33. 
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Biographies refer to it only as Kitāb al-Furūq, though the manuscript tradition records 
its title as al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq. It is unclear where this title comes from. Al-Juwaynī does 
not mention the title of his book in his introduction to this work.413 Other works from 
the Shāfiʿī legal school also refer to this book as Kitāb al-Furūq. The Shāfiʿī jurist Muḥyī 
al-Dīn al-Nawawī (676/1277), for instance, refers repeatedly to this book in his Majmūʿ 
citing it as “Kitāb al-Furūq.”414 Other jurists, such as Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī415 and Jalāl 
al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī416 refer to this work as Kitāb al-Furūq. In spite of this evidence, however, 
al-Muzaynī titles his edition of al-Juwaynī’s work al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq because this title is 
given on the majority of the manuscripts. According to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Muzaynī, 
“What happened with al-Nawawī and others in their citations from this book and their 
calling it al-Furūq is essentially that the subject matter of the book made a greater 
impression than its title (min qabīl taghlīb mawḍūʿ al-kitāb ʿalā ismihi).”417 The tradition 
rightly considered it a work of furūq.  
 Al-Qaffāl, one of al-Juwaynī’s teachers, is mentioned in Ṭaşköprüzāde’s Miftāḥ al-
saʿāda and Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s Kashf al-ẓunūn, in their discussions of jadal. Ṭaşköprüzāde says, 
                                                             
413 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:37. 
414 Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab, no ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1996), 1:58, 1:100, 
1:105, 1:164-65, 1:176, 1:193, 1:324, 1:406, 1:441, 1:450, 1:454, 1:466, 1:470, 1:508, 1:518, 1:528, 2:11, 2:38, 2:44, 
2:68, 2:96, 2:109, 2:126, 2:145, 2:224-25, 2:236, 2:247, 2:327, 2:358, 2:398, 2:399, 2:425, 2:552, 3:88, 3:100, 5:189, 
5:248, 5:261, 5:299, 5:412, 5:490, 7:148, 9:127, 11:259. 
415 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:100, 1:143, 1:210, 1:211, 1:230, 1:244, 1:247, 1:256, 1:277, 2:165, 3:116, 3:198, 
3:348-49. 
416 Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir fī qawāʿid wa furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyyah, ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Faḍīlī 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1411/1990), 116, 441. 
417 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Salāma ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Muzaynī, “Introduction” to ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ 
wa-l-farq, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Salāma ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Muzaynī (Beirut; Cairo; Tunis: Dār al-Jīl, 
1424/2004), 1:24. 
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“The first jurist to write about proper jadal (al-jadal al-ḥasan) was Abū Bakr Muḥammad 
ibn ʿAlī ibn Ismāʿīl al-Qaffāl al-Shāshī al-Shāfiʿī.”418 Perhaps relying on Ṭaşköprüzāde, 
Ḥājjī Khalīfa also mentions al-Qaffāl as the first jurist to write on jadal.419 Al-Juwaynī, 
then, studied law and khilāf with one of the earliest prominent jurists to write on jadal 
and so must have been quite familiar with disputation and its techniques, even though 
he did not write a book on the subject.420 
In his explanation of the distinctions between seemingly contradictory laws in 
his furūq work, al-Juwaynī often follows his explanation of the distinction with a 
blueprint for a disputation. For example, in the fifth distinction in the chapter on 
purity, he says, “Some of the scholars in our school distinguished (faṣala) between 
mineral salt (al-milḥ al-jabalī) and sea salt (al-milḥ al-māʾī) dissolving in water. They hold 
that it is permissible to perform ablutions with water that has sea salt dissolved in it 
but it is not permissible with water that has mineral salt.”421 Al-Juwaynī explains that 
the distinction rests on the underlying substance of the salt. Sea salt is coagulated 
water and is thus equivalent to water (māʾ fī al-aṣl). It is, therefore, pure. Mineral salt, 
however, is not made of water and is thus a polluting substance.422  
After giving a detailed explanation of this idea and the legal distinction arising 
from the difference between these two kinds of salt, al-Juwaynī includes a brief 
example of dialectic, a discussion between someone challenging this view and someone 
                                                             
418 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāh al-saʿāda, 1:282. 
419 Ḥājjī Khalīfa Çelebi, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:580. 
420 As noted above, his son did write such a book. 
421 ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:56-57.  
422 ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:57. 
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attempting to support it. “If someone says, ‘But even mineral salt is coagulated water 
(māʾ inʿaqada). All salt is just water in its essence (mā min milḥ illā wa-l-māʾ aṣluhu).’ We 
respond, ‘The matter is not all the same, as you have described it (laysa al-amr ʿalā 
hādhihi al-jumla)…’”423 Al-Juwaynī thus inscribes dialectical argumentation into his 
discussion of a distinction. This is a simple argument, with one objection to al-Juwaynī’s 
claim and a counterobjection, but it nevertheless brings to the fore the disputational 
framework in which works of legal distinctions could be used. These mini-disputations 
feature regularly in al-Juwaynī’s book. In al-Juwaynī’s chapter on ritual purity, we find 
them in twenty-two of the 172 numbered distinctions. If we look closely as this short 
disputation, we can see that it tracks closely with the farq objection of the jadal-
theorists.  
 In the above discussion from the Furūq, the first term in the analogy would be 
the salt water. In terms of building a legal qiyās, the situation can be thought of as 
follows: the precedent (aṣl) is sea salt. The ruling (ḥukm) is that it is ritually pure. The 
legal rationale (ʿilla) for this ruling is that the sea salt is nothing more than water in a 
different physical state. In this comparison, then, the instant case (farʿ) is that of 
mountain salt. When one tries to apply the legal rationale (ʿilla) of the precedent to the 
instant case, it turns out to be inappropriate. Salt found in a cave is simply not water in 
a different physical state; legally speaking it is an entirely different substance. 
Therefore, the rationale is not found in the second case, the precedent ruling cannot 
                                                             
423 ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:57. 
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apply to it, and the ruling for mountain salt becomes that it is not ritually pure, since it 
is not simply coagulated water. 
 As mentioned above in the discussion of dialectics, Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-
Juwaynī stated that “asking about the first term in an analogy… is asking about a 
distinction,”424 just as in this example of a distinction and mini-disputation. ʿAbd Allāh 
al-Juwaynī distinguishes between these two cases by implicitly appealing to a lack of 
applicability, what Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī refers to as “ʿadam al-taʾthīr” in his 
manual of disputation. Similarly, when al-Bājī calls farq, “the most legal kind of 
objection,” he does this because it deals exclusively with the legal rationale (ʿilla) 
underlying the legal rulings.425 A disagreement and ensuing disputation about the lack 
of applicability of the effective cause in one ruling to another is exactly what is 
described in al-Juwaynī’s text.  
 One more example will illustrate the connection between books of furūq and 
dialectic. In this same chapter on purity, al-Juwaynī says, “If a person defecates (qaḍā 
ḥājatahu), then performs an ablution with sand (tayammama), then wipes themself 
(istanjā), their ablution is not valid. Were, however, a person to defecate, perform an 
ablution with water, and then wipe themselves without touching the anus or vagina 
(min ghayr mass al-farj), their ablution is valid. Al-Shāfiʿī took an explicit position in 
favor of both rulings (al-masʾalatān manṣūṣatān) in the recension of al-Rabīʿ ibn 
Sulaymān.”426 In this situation, the distinction is being drawn between the normal 
                                                             
424 Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, Kāfiya, 322, see also above page 136. 
425 Al-Bājī, Minhāj, 201, ¶456. 
426 ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq 1:118. 
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ablutions, al-wuḍūʾ, and the special dispensation made for an ablution with sand, 
tayammum. The latter ablution is only allowed when there is not enough pure water 
available to perform the normal ablution, and, as a special dispensation, is not 
purifying in the same way that wuḍūʿ is. This, therefore, is the “clearest of the 
distinctions between them” according to al-Juwaynī. “Wuḍūʾ is more purifying (aqwā) 
and tayammum is less purifying (aḍʿaf).”427 This distinction is clear, ritual purification 
with water is more purifying than a ritual purification with sand. 
 There is, however, another distinction between these two situations. Tayammum 
is only permissible where water cannot be found, and searching for water after the 
tayammum renders it ineffective. It can only be done when there is no water to be 
found, not as a substitute for finding water. Searching for water after the tayammum 
“voids his ablution, whether he finds water or not.” Searching for water does not void 
an ablution in cases of wuḍūʿ, since an ablution with water is routine and a lack of water 
was not an issue. This issue, however, is not necessarily so simple, and al-Juwaynī 
mentions a disagreement in this regard and provides the following example of a 
disputation. 
 If, however, someone says (fa-in qāla qāʾil), ‘Is it not sufficient to use rocks 
for wiping [i.e., and not have recourse to water]?’ 
 We say, ‘Yes, but there are two kinds of required duties: an actual, 
required duty (wājib mutaʿayyan) and a substitute duty (wājib mutamaththil). A 
required duty, for example, is a rich person freeing a slave as a penance for a 
                                                             
427 ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:18. 
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ẓihār divorce.428 An example of a subsitute duty is a rich person freeing a slave as 
a penance for breaking an oath. Both of these actions are characterized as 
required (mawṣūf bi-l-wujūb). Similarly, when a man defecates (qaḍā al-rajul 
ḥājatahu), the required duty is that he wipe himself with water, and the 
substitute duty is to do so with stones. If someone who has performed 
tayammum is then required to search for water because of an external impurity 
(li-ḥukm al-najāsa al-khārija), his tayammum becomes void.’ 
 If someone then says, ‘Is it not the case that, were he to have completed 
his tayammum with an impurity on his backside, you would consider his 
tayammum void because of his having to search for water to clean this 
impurity?’ 
 We reply, ‘This impurity is different than impurity from excrement, 
because the impurity from excrement is the one that originally necessitated the 
ablution, either wuḍūʿ or tayammum. Any impurity which necessitates an 
ablution is assigned a particular set of legal rules and is unlike any other (wa-li-
makānihā aḥkām makhṣūṣa laysat ka-ghayrihā). Do you not agree that when he 
completes his tayammum, it is not permissible for him to begin his prayer as 
long as he does not wipe himself, but that he should begin his prayer with an 
impurity which was on his backside? This is the case, although many times we 
                                                             
428 Ẓihār refers to a legally valid, but detestable form of divorce. The husband repudiates his wife by 
comparing her to his mother by uttering the formula “You are to me like my mother’s back (anti ʿalayya 
ka-ẓahr ummī).” With this formula, the husband causes an immediate divorce. Since this is a valid 
formula, the divorce takes hold, but since according to the jurists it is immoral, the husband is required 
to make penance. 
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would prefer he perform the prayer again at a later time (a-lā tarā annahu idhā 
farigha min al-tayammum lam yajuz lahu al-shurūʿ fī al-ṣalāt mā lam yastanja wa-
yashraʿ fī al-ṣalāt maʿa al-najāsa allatī ʿalā ẓahrihi wa-in kunnā naʾmuruhu fī baʿḍ al-
mawāḍiʿ bi-qaḍāʾ tilka al-ṣalāt).429 
This second distinction between wuḍūʾ and tayammum is much more detailed. Because 
this distinction rests on a finer point of law than the basic status of these two ablutions, 
there is greater ground for disagreement. Indeed, the disagreement here rests not on 
any distinction between wuḍūʾ and tayammum, but rather on the ancillary issue of the 
impurities related to defecation and wiping the anus. The first objection reported by al-
Juwaynī rests on the requirements for wiping the anus after defecation. Al-Juwaynī’s 
discussion of the distinction implies that water is required for this, and the objection is 
that water is not required, as using clean rocks can be sufficient. This would make al-
Juwaynī’s distinction meaningless, since wiping does not necessarily require searching 
for water. Al-Juwaynī counters this objection, however, by creating a hierarchy of 
distinctions. He introduces the concept of wājib mutamaththil, a stand-in/substitute 
duty. Yes, one can sometimes wipe with rocks instead of water, but that is only when 
water is not available. This situation still calls for searching for water, which renders 
the tayammum void.  
The final objection continues in a similar vein. The questioner notes that if 
someone performs tayammum with an impurity on his body, he would still have to 
search for water to clean this impurity eventually, but nevertheless the tayammum is 
                                                             
429 ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:118-20. 
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valid. Implicit in this charge is that al-Juwaynī is contradicting himself in the way he 
treats tayammum and the search for water. The questioner has found an example in 
which the person who performs a valid tayammum was and still is in search of water, 
but it is a situation that does not render void his ablution. Al-Juwaynī responds to this 
by making a further distinction between these impurities. The impurity on your back 
can be, for ritual purposes, ignored for prayer if the affected person performs a 
tayammum. In other words, for the purposes at hand, he is considered legally pure in 
spite of the presence of actual impurity on his person. Therefore, the need to search for 
water is not urgent and this does not render his tayammum void. After defecation, 
however, the impurity that arises is directly a result of the defecation. It is the same act 
that both engenders the need for water for purification and, separately, the need for 
water for wiping. Since one act brings about both circumstances, and both require 
water, you cannot perform tayammum first and search for water later. One should 
perhaps search for water, use rocks for wiping, and then perform tayammum. 
Again, connecting the disputation here with the descriptions of farq found in 
manuals of disputation is straightforward. The questioner puts in doubt the situation 
(fasād al-waḍʿ)430 set up by ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī. That is to say, he disagrees with the 
way that al-Juwaynī sets up this legal scenario and denies the distinction that al-
Juwaynī has established. There is no requirement to search for water when wiping after 
defecation, he says implicitly. Al-Juwaynī counters this objection by explaining why the 
situation is, in fact, as he describes. The second objection is an attempt to draw out a 
                                                             
430 Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, Kāfiya, 322. 
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contradiction (naqḍ) in al-Juwaynī’s reasoning, another strategy found in the manuals 
of disputation discussed above. The questioner then mentions what he finds to be an 
equivalent situation with a divergent ruling, to show al-Juwaynī why he is wrong. Al-
Juwaynī then distinguishes these two situations and overcomes this objection by 
showing the coherence in his thought and the lack of commensurability between these 
two kinds of impurity. This is nothing less than an example of jadal at work, employed 
in a book of legal distinctions. 
This text does not explain what the exact relationship is between actual legal 
disputations happening in scholastic contexts, manuals of legal disputation explaining 
the rules for holding and judging disputations, and the list of particular counter-
objection furūq compiled by al-Juwaynī. Nevertheless, it is clear that he sees his book as 
contributing to an advanced and highly specialized kind of legal debate, one in which 
jurists have to defend any and all of the points held by their legal school. Al-Juwaynī 
even alludes to such a scenario at the beginning of his book. He states, “Legal issues 
may have similar appearances but different rulings (masāʾil al-sharʿ rubbamā tatashābahu 
ṣuwaruhā wa-takhtalifu aḥkāmuhā) because of legal rationales (ʿilal) that require different 
rulings.”431 Al-Juwaynī also comments that his predecessors wrote some works “on this 
topic (fī hādha al-bāb)” but that it was restricted to a “very limited number of cases.”432 
This is to say, al-Juwaynī was not the first jurist to put together a book of legal 
distinctions; others wrote works on this topic as well. It was al-Juwaynī’s goal, however, 
                                                             
431 ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:37. 
432 ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:37. 
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to be exhaustive, and in this he was most likely successful when one considers the 
legacy and popularity of his work. 
 
Conclusion 
As seen in this chapter, the dialectical context in which Islamic law arose as a scholastic 
activity was instrumental in the rise of legal distinctions as a form of legal writing. As 
dialectic became more and more formalized and institutionalized, new forms and rules 
of argumentation developed. One such form of argumentation was the distinction (farq, 
faṣl). In disputation, positing a distinction was one of several formalized procedures for 
objecting to an opponent’s statement. It was a particular way of locating and utilizing a 
potential contradiction in an opponent’s reasoning, based on their reliance on specific 
rationales (ʿilal) in particular cases. It went right to the heart of the legal matter, and 
must therefore have proven to be a successful and powerful strategy in disputation. 
Books of legal distinctions incorporated much of the logic that went into the 
disputational farq. There are two key differences between these understandings of farq, 
however. First, while disputational farq was a particular procedure for debating, to be 
introduced at a certain point in the debate and to be countered in particular ways, 
works of furūq focused solely on the characterization of two laws as apparently 
contradictory. Secondly, disputational farq was a strategy for showing contradiction—a 
method to show an inconsistency—while books of legal furūq are written under the 
assumption that doctrine is internally consistent. In almost perfect opposition to 
disputational farq, books of furūq prove that there is no contradiction in the law, or, 
more specifically, in the rulings discussed in these works. Legal furūq likely arose first 
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as a blueprint for defending against farq in disputation, but quickly took on a literary 
and aesthetic life of its own.  
 This impetus for writing works of legal furūq stands in stark contrast to that 
behind another genre that arose from the disputational nature of early Islamic law, that 
of khilāf. Khilāf continues the argumentative style of disputation and the genre of khilāf 
is undergirded by the idea that the law, as developed within and between the legal 
schools, will inevitably lead to disagreement and contradiction. Authors of khilāf works 
might have particular understandings of what is correct and thus privilege one ruling 
or understanding over others, but those authors also lay bare the potential 
inconsistences and disagreements found at the deeper level of legal justifications found 
in fiqh. Those inconsistencies, however, are exactly what legal furūq seeks to remedy. 
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Chapter Four: The Logic of Legal Distinctions 
 
In Chapter Two, we discussed the rise of distinctions as a concept in the Arabic 
intellectual tradition. In that chapter, we saw that distinctions arose as a concept based 
on, but distinct from that of ‘distinction.’ The use of the Arabic term furūq, in the plural, 
signals a different logic from that of farq (distinction) in the singular. The change from 
farq to furūq was traced in part by looking at the titles of books in various fields, 
particularly lexicography. Books titled farq and furūq both dealt with synonyms, but 
each word signalled a different conceptual approach. Farq books were organized around 
broad conceptual groupings—such as the parts of the body or the stages of the life-
cycle. Synonyms in books of farq are then distinguished based on their applicability to 
the conceptual grouping. Furūq books, on the other hand, directly compare apparent 
synonyms to tease out the minute differences between them. The organization of these 
two styles of books is radically different and this difference in organization results in a 
different logic for discussing synonymy, or the the lack of synonymy between near-
synonyms. 
Chapter Two explored the difference between these two approaches and the 
correlation between the use of farq or furūq in the title and the organization of a book. 
The different logic inherent in each approach was mentioned, but discussed only 
briefly. The present chapter explores the logic particular to books of lexicographical 
and legal distinctions, to show the conceptual difference between these two 
applications of distinctions-thinking. Furūq as a term for comparison emerged in the 
fourth/tenth century. This chapter also explores this connection between 
 184 
 
lexicographic and legal distinctions further. Here, I interrogate the general logic at 
work in each of these disciplines and show how these two kinds of distinctions are 
fundamentally different. While similar motivations may lie behind the emergence of 
books of furūq, the way they emerged involved different kinds of intellectual activities. 
The logic of legal distinctions, of course, is evidenced almost exclusively in books of 
legal distinctions. Therefore, this chapter ends by tracing the rise of the legal genre and 
outlining its contours. 
This difference between the singular and plural use of the term ‘distinction’ is 
all the more relevant for legal distinctions, where the singular, farq, is routinely used to 
signify an applied linguistic distinction while the plural, furūq, is used almost 
exclusively to denote legal distinctions, because legal distinctions, furūq, operate with a 
logic particular to them and distinct from that of distinctions in lexicography. The 
difference between farq and furūq is not simply the difference between a word in the 
singular and a word in the plural, the difference is similar to that between a book of 
legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) and a discussion of one specific tool of legal reasoning (aṣl).433 
There is, of course, a relationship between legal theory and legal-theoretical tools of 
reasoning, not only in terms of content, but even, etymologically, just as with 
distinctions. A work on uṣūl al-fiqh, however, treats the subject of legal theory broadly, 
while a treatment of one precept, such as analogy, looks at the function and operation 
                                                             
433 See Devin Stewart, “Muḥammad b. Dāʾūd al-Ẓāhirī’s Manual of Jurisprudence, al-Wuṣūl ilā maʿrifat al-
uṣūl” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss, 99-158 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002). 
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of one such tool for legal thinking. It is therefore worth understanding the difference 
between a legal distinction (al-farq al-fiqhī) and legal distinctions (al-furūq al-fiqhiyya).  
Chapter Two also contained a discussion of what I term applied linguistic 
distinctions, that is, a distinction based on the lexicographic model, such as the work by 
Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī, al-Farq bayn al-naṣīḥa wa-l-taʿyīr, or Ibn Taymiyya’s (728/1328) al-
Farq bayn al-ḥadd wa-l-taʿzīr. Works such as these are not actually about laws, they are 
about legal concepts.434 As such, they might explain what each of these words means in 
its plain-sense meaning or normal usage (fī al-lugha, lughatan) and in its technical 
meaning. They can discuss the references in the Quran and the hadith that inform the 
legal meaning, and the kinds of instances in which those meanings might apply. As 
such, they do not explain the difference(s) between two laws or farʿs or ḥukms. Instead, 
these works seeks to distinguish between technical terms within Islamic law; these 
epistles are applied linguistic furūq. They compare and contrast technical vocabulary, 
and the discussion hinges on meaning, technical and general, and the understanding of 
specific terms within the realm of law. While these lexical distinctions are preserved 
within the realm of fiqh, the works in question nonetheless explore a difference in 
terminology and not a distinction drawn between two legal rules. 
On the other hand, books on legal furūq do not adopt this lexical framework and 
instead use a legal framework whereby laws take the place of words. It is not that the 
                                                             
434 Among the many kinds of treatises devoted to one particular distinction, there are many on the 
distinction between bribes and gifts. See, for instance, ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, Taḥqīq al-qaḍiyya fī al-
farq bayn al-rishwa wa-l-hadīya, eds. ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ and ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd (Cairo: 
Maktabat al-Zahrāʾ, 1412/1991).  
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reasoning of a lexical distinction is applied in a legal realm, but rather that the concept 
of “distinction” itself is transformed. In a linguistic distinction, two signifiers are 
juxtaposed and their true signifieds, as opposed to their assumed signifieds, are 
explained. It is in this explanation of the true signifieds that the distinction between 
the two signifiers becomes clear. The existence of minute distinctions was easily 
grasped within the field of Arabic language. It was, after all, God’s perfect creation, and 
the existence of synonyms therein could be seen as unnecessary redundancies, a 
blemish on God’s creation. Lexicographic distinctions allowed for the creation of 
important differentiation in language, such that each supposed synonym 
complemented and expanded the semantic scope of the language, rather than simply 
overlapping with other similar words. But Arabic was not God’s only perfect creation, so 
the concept must be translatable to the field of Islamic law, another of God’s perfect 
creations. Arabic grammar and Islamic law are the two matrices of laws that God 
created for the world and they should be mutually relatable, even if not entirely 
equivalent.  
A legal distinction does not contrast two signifiers, but rather two legal 
problems or rulings. They are not signifiers that can refer to a particular signified that 
can be explained linguistically. The legal rulings themselves have to be unpacked and 
the particularities of the situations to which they refer have to be explained. The 
explanation of the situation which gives rise to the legal ruling and of the rationale that 
connects that situation to that ruling clarifies the distinction between the two rulings. 
The reasoning used reflects essential differences between legal categories which 
undergird the two different legal problems. These categories might not be readily 
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apparent in the ruling itself, but once they are brought to light by the author’s 
explanation, the distinction at issue becomes readily apparent. It is in this sense that I 
mean that the concept of a distinction is transformed. It is not simply the comparison 
of two linguistic definitions, but rather the comparison of underlying legal rationales. 
In lexicography, the distinction involves the relationship between signifier and 
signified, while in law, the distinction involves a situation, a ruling, and a rationale 
which connects the ruling to the situation.435 
 
Understanding Lexicographic Distinctions 
To better understand how a lexicographic distinction works, we first need to 
understand the components that go into the comparison. A straightforward example of 
a linguistic distinction comes from Ibn Qutayba’s Adab al-kātib, his manual for chancery 
secretaries discussed in Chapter Two. This work covers all of the material considered 
necessary for being a competent secretary, and much of this work is focused on proper 
writing. As part of this endeavor, Ibn Qutayba includes a discussion of lexicographic 
distinctions, the minute differences between supposed synonyms, since a good 
secretary should always use the precise and correct word for every circumstance. Most 
                                                             
435 It is worth explaining, in brief, the logic of a distinction in medicine. In medicine, the surface 
coherence between the two comparands invites a comparison. The comparison reveals that the 
underlying cause of the comparands is radically different. Once fully understood, the two symptoms are 
understood to be caused by different illnesses and share no more than a mere surface coherence. In this 
regard, they may be seen as somewhat similar to legal distinctions. Our analysis of distinctions in 
medicine, differential diagnostics, relies entirely on one book with dubious attribution. While intriguing, 
more evidence of the spread and chronology of differential diagnostics is needed before drawing strong 
conclusions about its role in the history of legal distinctions. 
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of the elements of this comparison go unstated by Ibn Qutayba, but they are crucial for 
understanding the intellectual work lying behind this comparison. In this example, 
while discussing lexicographic distinctions related to the human body, Ibn Qutayba 
discusses two words that are apparently widely thought to be synonyms for the word 
“skin” (jild): adama and bashara. 
The visible side of a person’s skin—from his head and the rest of his body—is 
called bashara, and the interior side is called adama.436 
This distinction compares two signifiers, bashara and adama. The general signified for 
both of these words is skin (jild). Although Ibn Qutayba attempts to show that the two 
words at issue are not actually synonymous, the comparison depends on a pre-existing 
idea of complete synonymity. This assumption of equivalence is what suggests 
comparison. The first component of this analysis rests on the supposed conflation of 
the terms, that is, as referring to the same referent. 
In addition to the general concept being discussed—in this case skin—linguistic 
distinctions present two near-synonyms that refer to different varieties subsumed 
under the general concept. The author of a work on lexicographic distinctions clears up 
the confusion of the referents through exposition. In this case, Ibn Qutayba resolves the 
confusion between the two words adama and bashara. He explains exactly what each 
one means and the reader understands that they in fact refer to different specific 
                                                             
436 Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muslim Ibn Qutayba, Adab al-kātib, ed. Muḥammad al-Dālī (Beirut: 
Mu’assasat al-Risāla, 1981), 144.  
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referents. On understanding this, the total synonymy of these words fades and the 
reader understands that they are in fact, not true synonyms, only partially so. 
The same analysis can be applied to the lexicographic pairs discussed in Abū 
Hilāl al-ʿAskarī’s al-Furūq al-lughawiyya. He says: 
The distinction between mithl and naẓīr: Two mithls are fully complementary in 
their essence (takāfaʿā fī al-dhāt) as mentioned above.437 A naẓīr, meanwhile, is 
that which corresponds to another in regards to similar actions of which they 
are capable (al-naẓīr mā qābala naẓīrahu fī jins afʿālihi wa-huwa mutamakkin minhā). 
For example, a grammarian (al-naḥwī) is the naẓīr of another grammarian, even 
if what they say or write about grammar is different (wa-in lam yakun lahu mithl 
kalāmihi fī al-naḥw aw kutubihi fīhi). It is not correct to say, “a grammarian is a 
mithl of another grammarian (wa-lā yuqāl al-naḥwī mithl al-naḥwī),” because 
equivalence (tamāthul) refers, in reality, to the most characteristic attributes 
which are the essence (li-anna al-tamāthul yakūn ḥaqīqatan fī akhaṣṣ al-awṣāf wa-
huwa al-dhāt).438 
In this situation, both the words mithl and naẓīr are the signifiers. These two words are 
used to refer to equivalence or interchangeability, which is the general idea signified. 
This is the overarching concept linking the two words together. The distinction 
between them is not as straightforward as that between adama and bashara. 
                                                             
437 Here, al-ʿAskarī is referring to his first discussion of the meaning of the word. There, al-ʿAskarī says of 
mithl “Two mithls are two things that are equivalent in their essence (al-mithlayn mā takāfaʾa fī al-dhāt)” 
(154). 
438 Abu Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, al-Furūq, 155.  
 190 
 
Nevertheless, Abū Hilāl says, they are indeed different. Mithl, which he describes 
briefly, refers to an equivalence in the very essence of a thing. In other words, two 
different oranges can be said to be the mithl of each other since they are equivalent in 
their essence. They are both oranges and equivalent in this regard. They may be 
different sizes or have ripened to different levels but they are both oranges. A naẓīr, 
however, is a resemblance between two things, one of which can fulfill the function of 
the other; naẓīr refers to a superficial or functional, not essential equivalence.  
In Abū Hilāl’s example, a grammarian is the naẓīr of another grammarian since 
they have equivalent training and qualifications. One can perform the function of the 
other, generally speaking; i.e. they are functionally equivalent even if their particular 
scholarly ideas or output differ. They are not mithl, however, since each grammarian is 
a different soul and a different being; their essences are not interchangeable. Thus, 
naẓīr and mithl are quite different words, even if they may appear to mean something 
similar or refer to the same thing. They are not really synonyms. Linguistic distinctions 
function through the combination of three signifieds, one general and two specific. 
Two are expressed explicitly while one is implied through the comparison. With these 
elements in place, the author then explains each of these items so that the difference 
between the signifiers is made clear. The close relationship between the three 
signifieds is real; while they are not identical, the difference between them is subtle. 
Resonances of such a framework, in which the structure of linguistic and legal 
relations are seen to be highly congruent, can also be found in works of uṣūl al-fiqh. Éric 
Chaumont argues that this is one of the foundations upon which Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī 
bases his al-Lumaʿ fī uṣūl al-fiqh. “In a word, the language of legal discourse is formally 
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identical to the language of the Arabs.”439 The legal furūq provide another window into 
how jurists relate the fields of grammar and Islamic law. Chaumont’s comparison 
involves discursive similarities between law and grammar. The example of comparative 
furūq, however, allows for a one-to-one comparison of the structure of legal and 
grammatical tools of reasoning, and it is instructive, in this regard, to compare the 
assumptions underlying lexicographic and legal distinctions.  
I showed in Chapter Three that the genre of legal distinctions arises, in part, as 
an extension and continuation of the disputational technique of distinction. Distinction 
as a method for objecting in formal disputations was specific to the field of legal 
disputation, with al-Bājī going as far as to call it “the most legal of objections.”440 This 
might explain the intellectual background behind legal distinctions, but it raises the 
question of the relationship between legal disputation and distinctions writing in 
disciplines other than law. Writing about subtle but important distinctions between 
related elements arose slightly earlier in lexicography than it did in law. The known 
interrelations between law and lexicography suggest that there were relationships and 
exchange between these disciplines beyond what appears in the historical record.  
 
 
 
                                                             
439 Éric Chaumont, Introduction to Kitāb al-Lumaʿ fī uṣūl al-fiqh; le Livre des Rais illuminant les fondements de la 
compréhsion de la Loi; Traité de théorie légale musulmane, trans. Éric Chaumont (Berkeley, Robbins Collection, 
1999), p. 23 
440 Al-Bājī, al-Minhāj, 201 par. 456.  
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Understanding Legal Distinctions  
These same relationships are not found in the comparisons known as legal 
distinctions. Legal distinctions functions through the comparison of two laws which 
are, in reality, wholly separate. A legal distinction differentiates two laws that are 
superficially similar, but actually quite disparate. The potential contradiction is 
resolved once the reader understands how the contrasted laws are only similar in 
appearance but apply to completely different situations. Any potential confusion 
between them is a result of not understanding the reasoning behind the law, which is 
what the distinction explains. An example from Asʿad al-Karābīsī’s Kitāb al-Furūq helps 
to illustrate this point. 
Abū Ḥanīfa says, “If a worm (dūda) exits the body through one of the two 
excretory passages, the anus or the urethra (aḥad al-sabīlayn), it nullifies a minor 
ablution (yantaqiḍ al-wuḍūʾ). If it exits through a wound, however, it does not.” 
The distinction is that the worm is always somewhat moist (lā yakhlū min 
qalil billa takūn maʿahā wa-taṣḥabuhā) and this moisture is slightly impure (qalīl 
najāsa). Slight impurity, if it exits the body through one of the two passages, 
nullifies a minor ablution. As for a worm exiting through a wound, it is also 
always somewhat moist. This moisture, too, is slightly impure (najāsa qalīla). 
Slight impurity, if it exits the body through somewhere other than one of two 
passages, does not nullify impurity. Further, the worm is an animal and is 
therefore assumed to be pure (ṭāhir fī al-aṣl). A pure thing, such as air (ka-l-rīḥ), if 
it exits through one of the two passages, necessarily nullifies a minor ablution 
(awjaba naqḍ al-wuḍūʿ). If, however, it exits through somewhere other than one 
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of the two passages, it does not nullify a minor ablution, such as with tears and 
sweat (ka-l-damʿ wa-l-ʿirq). 
Muḥammad ibn Shujāʿ [(d. 266/880)] distinguished between these cases 
as follows. The worm that exits through a wound is generated from flesh 
(yatawalladu min al-laḥm). Therefore, it is akin to a piece of flesh separating from 
the body without bleeding and not through the two passages. If such a thing 
were to happen, it would not nullify a minor ablution. The worm exiting 
through a wound is equivalent to a piece of skin detaching from the body 
without bleeding. As for a worm that exits from one of the two passages, 
however, it is generated from impurity (yatawalladu min al-najāsa). If only this 
impurity exited the body (law kharajat bi-infirādihā), it would invalidate a minor 
ablution. The same holds for whatever is generated from this impurity 
whenever it exits the body.441 
A legal distinction is composed of two (or more) situations and their outcomes. These 
can be labelled Situation 1, Situatation 2, Outcome 1, Outcome 2, and so on for each 
situation and outcome given. In this example, the two compared laws are about a worm 
exiting the human body. Situation 1 is a worm exiting the body through one of the two 
passages, the urethra or the anus; Situation 2 is a worm exiting the body through a 
wound. These are the situations which resemble each other, what is referred to in 
Arabic as tashābaha fī al-ṣūra (similarity in form), in other words, the similarity that 
gives rise to comparison. The potential contradiction lies in the outcomes. In Outcome 
                                                             
441 Asʿad al-Karābīsī, al-Furūq, 1:34-35.  
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1, a minor ablution is nullified, but in Outcome 2, a minor ablution is not nullified. In 
this case, as happens often, the outcomes are opposites. If Situation 1 and Situation 2 
are indeed similar, then certainly there is something perplexing about their outcomes 
being different, or indeed juxtaposed. 
The distinction rests on the fact that a worm exiting through the urethra or 
anus is, legally, in no way comparable to one exiting through a wound. While one might 
think that these are analogous situations, this could only be the case if one were 
unaware of the particulars of the reasoning behind the substantive law. Once that 
reasoning is made clear, any potential confusion between these two laws is resolved. 
The comparison carried out by Asʿad al-Karābīsī is thus unlike the comparisons seen in 
lexicographical distinctions in which the compared words are ultimately similar. Asʿad 
al-Karābīsī includes two different ways of distinguishing between these two cases. In 
both, however, the lesson to be learned is that these cases are not analogous and 
cannot be treated in a similar fashion. In some way, the confusion that leads these cases 
to look the same is the result of a lack of knowledge of the underlying rationale of the 
two rulings. In order to resolve the confusion, the reader must understand the 
reasoning that generates the rules. Lexicographic distinctions are grouped together 
based on a shared general signification between two signifiers. The difference lies in 
the specific signification between the two. In a sense, however, it is correct to group 
the two signifiers together. Legal distinctions explain why it is wrong to group two 
such situations together. 
One more example will highlight the kind of reasoning at work in legal 
distinctions. This distinction also comes from Asʿad al-Karābīsī’s text: 
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Someone gifts a female slave to someone else, and the donee wishes to 
return the slave. He says, “You gifted her to me when she was a minor, but now 
she has come of age and increased in value.” If the donor contradicts him 
(kadhdhabahu), the presumption is in favor of the donor (al-qawl qawl al-wāhib). 
However, had the gift been land the situation would be different. The 
donee says, “You gifted it to me and it was barren and empty (ṣaḥrāʾ), but I 
planted in it and built some structures on it (gharastu fīhā wa-banaytu).” If the 
donor contradicts him, the presumption is in favor of the donee.442 
The common legal act that ties both of the situations together is a gift that the donee 
then wishes to return. To be precise, Situation A involves the court proceeding in 
which testimony is elicited concerning return of the gift of a female slave, while 
Situation B is a proceeding eliciting testimony about the return of a gift of land.443 It 
appears initially that the two situations are identical, since they both involve testimony 
concerning the return of a gift. The outcomes nevertheless tell a different story. 
Outcome A is that the testimony of the donor of the girl should be accepted over that of 
the donee while Outcome B is that the testimony of the donee of the land should be 
accepted over that of the donor. Again, as with the example above, each outcome is the 
mirror opposite of the other. The discussion of the distinction will shed light on why 
                                                             
442 Asʿad al-Karābīsī, al-Furūq, 2:49.  
443 It seems likely that there is a missing fact here, namely that the donee in each case wants 
compensation for the return of the gift since he claims that what he is returning is more than what he 
got. 
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this seeming contradiction exists. Again, the solution lies in the underlying legal 
reasoning behind the two situations.  
Al-Karābīsī continues: 
The distinction is that, in the case of the female slave, the gift itself (al-
ʿayn) is one thing. The proof of this is that equating the value of the gift (thaman) 
to the gift itself is invalid. He did not claim it was gift of two things, but rather 
he is claiming that he was gifted one thing, and he is claiming the right to 
return the goods exchanged in this transaction. The plain-sense meaning of the 
contract grants him the right to return the good, therefore if he wants to nullify 
this right, he should not be believed.  
Land is not like this, because it constitutes a gift of two things, therefore 
one of them can be singled out as the gift such that he can claim the gift in 
regard to two things, but only affirm the gift of one of the two of them. There is 
no obvious fact that contradicts his testimony in regard to singling out one of 
the two as the gift, since it was possible to have built and planted there in that 
time. Because of this, the presumption goes to the donor. It is like the following 
situation. The donee says, “You have gifted me (wahabta minnī) both of these 
slaves,” but the donor replies, “No, I have gifted you only one of them.” In this 
situation, the presumption goes to the donor. This situation with the two slaves 
is like the situation with the gift of land.444 
                                                             
444 Asʿad al-Karābīsī, al-Furūq, 2:49.  
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Here, we see that the gift contract in each situation is different. There is not simply one 
law that applies to gifts, but rather the particular thing gifted impacts the way that the 
contract is construed, even if this contract exists only implicitly. The gift contract for a 
slave woman is a contract for one thing, the slave. It is therefore clear exactly what the 
gift was intended to be, even if it was underspecified by the gifter. The integral unity of 
the slave leaves no room for doubt as to this intention. In the case of land, however, the 
gift is not quite so simple. A gift of land consists of the land on which structures can be 
built and the use of the land for agriculture. These can be considered two separate uses 
such that it introduces a level of ambiguity as to the exact thing intended to be gifted, 
especially if it is underspecified by the gifter. There is, therefore, a clear distinction 
between these situation A and B, and they are not similar, legally speaking. If they are 
not similar, then the contradiction in the outcomes is no longer a real contradiction. 
Once again, the law has been shown to be consistent. 
 Resolving seeming incongruities within one legal school was the methodology 
common to all works of legal distinctions. The resonances between the legal analysis 
found in these works and the theoretical explanations of farq-objections in handbooks 
of legal disputation are clear. Such resonances perhaps suggest what the inspiration for 
early books of legal distinctions was. This next section will attempt to explore the issue 
of the earliest work in the genre of al-furūq al-fiqhiyya. 
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The Genre of Legal Distinctions445 
A history of legal distinctions should begin before the development of the genre, 
looking at developments outside of the law, in lexicography and medicine, and at legal 
reasoning and legal dialectics into the fifth/eleventh century. It is at this point that 
legal distinctions clearly emerge. From this period, legal distinctions flourished as a 
literary genre for 500 years, until the tenth/sixteenth centuries with the works of Jalāl 
al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Ibn Nujaym, and Aḥmad al-Wansharīsī.  
The genre of legal distinctions was relatively limited. I have found that only 
thirty-six works of legal distinctions were composed. All of the Sunni schools of law 
produced works of legal distinctions, although the Shāfiʿīs seem to have favored this 
genre compared to the other schools. I find the thirteen for the Shāfiʿī school, nine 
Ḥanafī books, eight for the Mālikī, and four Ḥanbalī works. This is a total of thirty-four 
books. The two remaining works were by Shi’i authors, one belonging to the Twelver 
tradition and the other to the Zaydī.  
It is difficult to know when exactly the genre of legal distinctions began and 
what the first book in this genre was. We will attempt to explore this issue in the 
following section of this chapter. Although the earliest books were written around the 
third/ninth-fourth/tenth centuries, it was only in the fifth/eleventh century that the 
first golden age of legal distinctions began; it was the time in which the genre firmly 
established itself in the repetoire of legal literature. Ten new books were produced and 
                                                             
445 A more detailed discussion of this history, with full documentation, can be found in Chapter Six and 
Appendix I of the present study. 
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the Shāfiʿī madhhab accounted for five of these. The distinctions books written in this 
century include al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by ʿAbd Allāh ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī, al-Muʿāyāt by Abū 
al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad al-Jurjānī (d. 482/1089-90), al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-mudawwana 
by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣiqillī. These works signal their adherence to the genre of 
distinctions through their titles and introductions. The biobibliographic literature 
remembers all of these as works of legal distinctions, as does the material record.446 
Moreso, these books in large part resemble later books of legal distinctions; that is to 
say, the works of the fifth/eleventh century set the norms that later books of legal 
distinctions were to follow. 
After the activity of the fifth/eleventh century, the sixth/twelfth century saw 
only one book written on legal distinctions, Kitāb al-Furūq by Abū al-Muẓaffar Asʿad ibn 
Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Naysābūrī al-Karābīsī al-Ḥanafī. This was the first 
cornerstone work of legal distinctions for the Ḥanafī school. Asʿad al-Karābīsī was 
clearly remembered for having authored this work—indeed this book was the primary 
reason for which he is mentioned in the biographical litearture—and the work appears 
to have been important and widespread historically.  
The seventh/thirteenth century heralded a second peak in the composition of 
legal furūq works that lasted through the eighth/fourteenth century. Of note, it was 
only in the seventh/thirteenth century that the Ḥanbalī school produced its first works 
of legal distinctions, al-Furūq fī al-masāʾil al-fiqhiyya by Ibn Surūr al-Maqdisī and al-Furūq 
by Ibn Sunayna. In fact, all of the Ḥanbalī works of legal distinctions until the twentieth 
                                                             
446 In fact, manuscripts of the books by al-Juwaynī and al-Jurjānī often refer to the books as Kitāb al-Furūq. 
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century were written in this two-hundred year period. In addition to the book by Ibn 
Sunayna, al-Furūq by al-Zarīrānī (d. 741/1341) was the most important of the Ḥanbalī 
works, notwithstanding that face that its exists only as a unicum. The Mālikī scholar 
Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī also wrote his work of legal distinctions, Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ 
al-furūq.447 Al-Qarāfī’s book is probably the most well-known book of this genre, 
although it does not conform strictly to the strictures of the genre.448 The Ḥanafī 
scholar Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh al-Maḥbūbī, also known as Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Awwal, 
wrote his Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl in the seventh/thirteenth century. The Talqīḥ 
seems to have been the most widely read premodern Ḥanafī work of legal distinctions, 
directly influencing the chapter on distinctions in Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir. 
Towards the end of the second peak, the Shāfiʿī jurist Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī composed 
his Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq, the final work devoted exclusively to 
legal distinctions by a Shāfiʿī scholar. 
On the one hand, Mamluk Cairo emerged as a clear center for distinctions 
writing during these two centuries. Al-Qarāfī and al-Asnawī both lived in Cairo, as did 
many other less prominent jurists who composed works of legal distinctions. At the 
same time, however, the genre of legal distinctions had, by this time, spread across the 
Muslim world. It was in the eighth/fourteenth century that the Zaydī scholar ʿAlī ibn 
Yaḥyā ibn Rāshid al-Washlī al-Zaydī al-Yamanī wrote his al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq. The Ḥanbalī 
                                                             
447 This title can be translated as “The Flashes of Lightning in the Tempest of Distinctions.” The title is 
sometimes given as Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʿ al-furūq, The Flashes of Lightning Regarding the Different 
Kinds of Distinctions. 
448 Indeed, this work may not actually be a work of legal distinctions, in spite of its title. See the 
discussion in Chapter Six, pp. 316-17. 
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works were written by scholars based in Damascus, known as well as a center of 
Ḥanbalī learning. The writing of distinctions was most prominent in the greatest 
intellectual centers.  
After this peak of activity, the ninth/fifteenth century saw only two new works 
of legal distinctions, one by the well-known Andalusi jurist al-Mawwāq and another by 
an otherwise unknown scholar Shaykh Bāyazīd ibn Isrāʾīl ibn Ḥājjī Dāwūd 
Marghāyatī(?). The tenth/sixteenth century saw the end of premodern writing on legal 
distinctions. In a way, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir signalled the 
transformation of writing on legal distinctions. Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir is a work offering 
a general overview of Islamic law. By dedicating the sixth chapter of this work to legal 
distinctions, al-Suyūṭī shows legal distinctions as a central component of Islamic legal 
knowledge. Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī followed al-Suyūṭī’s model in writing his own book 
entitled al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir. In addition to these two works, Aḥmad al-Wansharīsī’s 
composed his ʿIddat al-burūq during this century. Al-Wansharīsī’s was the last new work 
dedicated to legal distinctions until ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saʿdī wrote his work on Ḥanbalī 
distinctions in the early 20th century.449 
 My research has also found three more works of legal distinctions that cannot 
easily be dated. One of these is a Mālikī work written by Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-
Andalusī al-Anṣārī al-Mālikī. This author shares a name with al-Mawwāq, but it is not 
clear that the unicum manuscript of this undated work should actually be attributed to 
                                                             
449 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Nāṣir al-Saʿdī al-Najdī, Al-Qawāʿid wa-l-uṣūl al-jāmiʿa wa-l-furūq wa-l-taqāsīm al-badīʿa 
al-nāfiʿa (Riyad: Maṭbaʿat al-Madanīf, 1956). 
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al-Mawwāq, in part because there is another Mālikī jurist by the name of Muḥammad 
ibn Yūsuf who was known to have written a work of legal distinctions.450 I have also 
found two Ḥanafī works, both in multiple manuscripts, that have an unclear 
attribution. Since they are both titled Kitāb al-Furūq, I refer to them as Furūq-A and 
Furūq-B. The attribution of Furūq-A is less clear than that of Furūq-B, which is often 
attributed to a scholar named Najm al-Dīn al-Naysābūrī. The prevalence of both Furūq-
A and Furūq-B in multiple manuscripts and in multiple libraries suggest that they 
played a role in the history of Islamic legal writing.  
 
Early Books of Legal Distinctions 
The earliest history of legal distinctions is, unsurprisingly, complicated. In part, 
the earliest development of Islamic law was oral and pre-literary, and thus unfolded 
outside the contexts of books and book-writing. Much of this history remained 
unrecorded, developing instead as a lived, practiced tradition, the records of which 
were only written down later, too late to contain the information necessary for detailed 
historical work. Further, large-scale complex systems, such as Islamic law, undergo 
complicated processes of formalization. This process of formalization is not necessarily 
linear. It can feature many simultaneous changes which push or pull in different 
directions. It is important to keep this in mind to avoid reading tautologies into the 
sources.  
                                                             
450 This scholar is mentioned in Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 73. 
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A search for the development of a concept or a genre can easily fall prey to 
oversimplifications of discursive traditions. Rather than looking for and finding 
something resembling the mature tradition and identifying that something as the 
origin point, this dissertatation identifies a confluence of forces that led into what 
became legal distinctions. By keeping in mind the contingency of discursive traditions, 
such as Islamic law, we have understood not only how law developed as a discipline, 
but also its interactions with broader intellectual and social trends. This methodology 
is inspired in part by Michel Foucault who “accept[s] the groupings that history 
suggests only to subject them at once to interrogation; to break them up and then to 
see whether they can be legitimately reformed.”451 Through such questioning of 
traditions and their origins, we gain a better sense of what the tradition was, what it is, 
and how it came to be. Reinhart Kosselleck uses a similar method, although for him, the 
important factor to understand is the temporality inherent in historical categories and 
events to understand “whatever differentiating conditions must enter so that concrete 
historical motion might be rendered visible.”452 We can see this problematic at play in 
the emergence of legal distinctions as a novel genre in legal litearature and the search 
for its beginnings, i.e. the first book(s) written in the genre of legal distinctions. 
                                                             
451 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge, 2004), 
29. Foucault's interrogation and breaking up of historically suggested groupings is an attempt to recover 
the processes and histories of discursive traditions, such as that of Islamic law and its constituent literary 
genres. 
452 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004), 95. 
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In the introduction to his edition of the Kitāb al-Furūq by Asʿad al-Karābīsī, 
Muḥammad Ṭammūm claims that the first book on legal distinctions was Muḥammad 
ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī’s (d. ca. 189/905) al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr.453 This claim is difficult to 
understand. On the one hand, this work is clearly not a work of legal distinctions; its 
contents do not resemble that of the works that self-identify as belonging to the genre 
of legal distinctions. On the other hand, we know that Asʿad al-Karābīsī’s text belongs 
to the distinctions genre in part because it is called “The Book of Legal Distinctions.” 
The title of al-Shaybānī’s text does not signal its adherence to this genre. Instead, its 
title, al-Jāmīʿ al-kabīr, The Large Comprehensive Book, is a marker of its attempts to 
cover what were the broad areas of Islamic law in the second/eighth century. In 
addition, its name is reminiscent of other works that attempt to encompass substantive 
law, such as al-Mabsūt (The Expansive Law Book). The similarity in title likely signals a 
similarity in content. 
If we understand legal distinctions as both a technical term, describing a 
particular legal reasoning process, and a genre of Islamic legal writing, describing a 
way of organizing legal knowledge, al-Shaybānī’s text falls short of being a text within 
the legal distinctions genre. Even though al-Shaybānī includes some general discussion 
of legal material that made its way into books of legal distinction, such discussions 
occur as routine parts of detailed discussions of substantive law. In order to clearly 
explain laws there are times when potential confusion has to be clarified. This does not 
                                                             
453 Muḥammad Ṭammūm, “Introduction,” to Asʿad ibn Muḥammad al-Karābīsī, Kitāb al-Furūq, ed. 
Muḥammad Ṭammūm and ʿAbd al-Sattār Abū Ghudda (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-
Islāmiyya, 1402/1982), 1:8. 
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mean, however, that his book is a book of legal distinctions, al-furūq al-fiqhiyya. Al-
Shaybānī’s treatment of laws that look similar but are in fact distinct differs little from 
that of other early figures, such as al-Shāfiʿī or Saḥnūn. None of their works, however, 
are works of legal distinctions, they just happen to contain some discussions which 
distinguish the applicability of various laws.454  
In his modern study of legal distinctions, Yaʿqūb al-Bāḥusayn remarks that 
Ṭammūm’s comment “contains some exaggeration.”455 This is because a discussion of 
differences between laws is not enough to qualify as a discussion of legal distinctions. 
The term ‘distinctions,’ al-furūq, became a term of art in the discipline of Islamic law, 
even though it remained underexplained in the medieval legal tradition, a peculiar fate 
for a technical term. Nevertheless, jurists do seem to have a very clear understanding 
of legal distinctions as a concept, what they are, and as a genre, a way of organizing and 
structuring books of legal distinctions. This shared understanding is apparent in books 
that situate themselves within the field of legal distinctions. They all contain direct 
comparisons of laws as discussed earlier in this chapter. Such works are all easily 
recognizable as belonging to the genre, although they sometimes fit more or less easily 
into that genre. Part of what makes a work of legal distinctions belong to this genre, 
however, is the inclusion of lists of legal distinctions, which, are, in addition to much 
                                                             
454 See Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybani al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, ed. Abū al-Wafāʾ al-Afghānī (Hyderabad: 
Lajnat Iḥyāʾ al-Maʿārif al-Nuʿmāniyyah, 1356[/1936]); Muḥammad ibn Idrīs Shāfiʿī Kitāb al-Umm, 11 vols., 
ed. Rifʿat Fawzī ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib (Mansūra: Dar al-Wafāʾ li-l-Ṭibāʿah wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 2008); and 
Saḥnūn ibn Saʿīd al-Tanūkhī, al-Mudawwana al-Kubrā, ed. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Salām, 5 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1415/1994). 
455 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, 66. 
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else, direct legal comparisons. Direct comparisons of this kind are missing from al-
Shaybānī’s al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr. 
Al-Bāḥusayn understands legal distinctions as having developed in the process 
of formalization of the legal schools.456 He claims to follow Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406), 
who says that once “jurists had no way of performing independent judgement or 
analogy, they needed to compare apparently similar legal issues by assimilating them 
or differentiating them (tanẓīr al-masāʾil fī al-ilḥāq wa-tafrīqihā ʿind al-ishtibāh).”457 This is 
all that Ibn Khaldūn says about distinctions. His use of the term tafrīq to mean 
distinction is interesting, but his lack of a fuller discussion limits our capacity to 
understand what exactly he means by it. His statement shares strong resonances with 
al-Zarkashī’s statement that “law is either assimilating or distinguishing (al-fiqh farq wa- 
jamʿ).”458 Ibn Khaldūn further seems to relate the ocurrence of distinctions-like thinking 
to the so-called “closing of the gate of ijtihād.”459 In this way, Ibn Khaldūn presents 
distinctions, and the lack thereof, as a way for jurists to continue legal reasoning in 
ways other than by means of ijtihād. 
Relying on Ibn Khaldūn, al-Bāḥusayn identifies a cluster of early jurists as the 
first authors to write in this genre. These jurists are early, but all come after the legal 
eponyms and operate within the doctrinal boundaries of established schools of law. 
                                                             
456 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, 61-67. 
457 Ibn Khaldūn, Dīwān al-Mubtadaʾ wa-l-khabar fī tārīkh al-ʿarab wa-l-barbar wa-man ʿāṣarahum min dhawī al-
shaʾn al-akbar, ed. Khalīl Shaḥāda (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1408/1988), 1:568. See also Rosenthal’s translation, 
Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, 2nd edition, trans by Franz Rosenthal, 3:13. 
458 Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:69. It is striking that Ibn Khaldūn and al-Zarkashī, two contemporaries, used 
such different language to describe Islamic law in a similar way. 
459 See the discussion in the Chapter One, pp. 42-44. 
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According to al-Bāḥusayn, the tradition of legal distinctions began among Shāfiʿī and 
Ḥanafī scholars, specifically the Shāfiʿī jurists Ibn Surayj and al-Zubayr ibn Aḥmad al-
Zubayrī (d. 317/929-930), as well as the Ḥanafī Abū al-Faḍl Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-
Karābīsī (d. ca. 322/934) as the authors of the first books of legal distinctions. Al-
Bāḥusayn’s identification of these authors as the beginning of distinctions writing 
aligns with his claim that this genre developed during the formation of the legal 
schools. Christopher Melchert identified Ibn Surayj as the founder of the the Shāfiʿī 
legal school, and Abū al-Ḥasan al-Karkhī (d. 340/952) as that of the Ḥanafī school.460 The 
earliest works identified by al-Bāḥusayn occur roughly within this period of school 
formalization identified by Melchert. Al-Bāḥusayn’s attributions also present problems, 
although different ones than those raised by Ṭammūm’s identification of Muḥammad 
ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī’s al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr as the first work on distinctions. The 
attribution of books of legal distinctions to Ibn Surayj and al-Zubayr ibn Aḥmad is 
difficult to confirm since these works do not appear to have survived. The attribution 
of a work of legal distinctions to Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī is also problematic, 
although a work attributed to him has survived. We will first look at the two Shāfiʿī 
jurists before moving on the the Ḥanafī scholar.461 
                                                             
460 See Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law: 9th – 10th Centuries C.E. (Leiden, New 
York: Brill, 1997). 
461 Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-Nasawī (d. ca 420/1030) and al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī are also credited 
with having written works of legal distinctions. The only mention of al-Nasawī is in Ibn al-Nadīm’s al-
Fihrist (2.1:55); I have not found a mention of it in any book or biographical history of the Shāfiʿī school. 
Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī is occassionally credited in secondary literature with having composed a work of 
legal distinctions, but this is almost certainly a confusion surrounding his work of lexicographic 
distinctions, al-Furūq wa-manʿ al-tarāduf. See also the discussion in Chapter Six, p. 286. 
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Sources contemporaneous to Ibn Surayj do not mention his having written a 
book of legal distinctions. Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083) says that Ibn Surayj “wrote 
almost four-hundred books.”462 Al-Shīrāzī’s book contains no discussion of the contents 
of these works or of Ibn Surayj’s particular legal opinions or contributions to the 
doctrine of the Shāfiʿī school. Al-Shīrāzī also mentions that Ibn Surayj was famous for 
his debates (munāẓarāt) with the Ẓāhirī jurist Abū Bakr ibn Dāwūd (d. 294/909).463 This 
information offers no specific support for the idea that Ibn Surayj wrote a book called 
Kitāb al-Furūq. It is unlikely, of course, to find a source contemporaneous with Ibn 
Surayj that denies that he wrote a book of legal distinctions. Ibn Surayj was well-
remembered for having participated in legal disputations with Abū Bakr ibn Dāwūd 
and, given the close relationship between furūq as a form of comparison within Islamic 
law and farq as a disputational technique in formal legal debates, it seems probable that 
Ibn Surayj would have utilized this kind of reasoning in his debates and perhaps his 
teaching. 
Later sources do not add much information about his written ouevre that 
supports the assertion of his having composed a work of legal distinctions. Tāj al-Dīn al-
Subkī, in his biographical dictionary, tells us only that Ibn Surayj wrote two polemics 
against Ibn Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, one on analogical reasoning (qiyās) and another on legal 
positions held by Ibn Dāwūd but reputed by al-Shāfiʿī.464 These books on specific topics 
and possibly in disputational format are emblematic of early legal works. Such early 
                                                             
462 Al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 249. 
463 Al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 249 
464 Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, 2:23. 
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works do not yet evince the highly formal literary structures found in later works of 
Islamic law.465 Al-Subkī does cite a lot of Ibn Surayj’s opinions, but nothing indicative of 
a book on legal distinctions.466 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba (d. 851/1448) says that Ibn Surayj’s 
output consisted of “promoting the madhhab, refuting its opponents, and deducing new 
laws from the books of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (wa-farraʿa ʿalā kutub 
Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan).”467 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī adds that “I own a copy of his book 
(kitābuhu) entitled al-Wadāʾiʿ,468 as well as his commentary on (taṣnīf ʿalā) al-Muzani’s 
Mukhtaṣar in which he answered questions that others had posed about this book.”469 
Ibn Kathīr mentions that Ibn Surayj “composed books in the madhhab and wrote legal 
digests (ṣannafa fī al-madhhab wa-lakhkhaṣahu).”470 Unsurprisingly for such an important 
figure, these historians all devote lengthy entries to Ibn Surayj, yet none of these 
sources mentioned attribute to Ibn Surayj a book of legal distinctions. When they give 
quotations from his work, it does not seem to come from a work recognizably about 
legal distinctions. From the biographical tradition and what remains of Ibn Surayj’s 
work, it seems unlikely that he wrote a book on legal distinctions. 
There is a similar pattern in the biographies of al-Zubayr ibn Aḥmad. Abū Isḥāq 
al-Shīrāzī mentions that he was blind and that he wrote many books (lahu muṣannafāt 
                                                             
465 See, for instance, Norman Calder, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
466 Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, 3:21-38. 
467 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya, 1:90-91. 
468 Aḥmad ibn ʿUmar Ibn Surayj, al-Wadāʾiʿ li-manṣūṣ al-sharāʾiʿ, 2 vols., ed. Ṣāliḥ ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ibrāhīm 
al-Duwayh (Saudi Arabic: no pub., 199-). 
469 Al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya, 1:316, no.593. Ḥājjī Khalīfa mentions that Ibn Surayj’s Kitāb al-Furūq is 
his commentary on Muzanī’s Mukhtaṣar (2:1258). 
470 Ibn Kathīr, Ṭabaqāt, 1:194, the full entry is found in 1:193-196. 
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kathīra), including al-Kāfī, Kitāb al-Niyya, Kitāb Sitr al-ʿawra, Kitāb al-Hadiyya, Kitāb al-
Istishāra wa-l-istikhāra, Kitāb Riyāḍat al-mutaʿallim, and a Kitāb al-Imāra. Ibn Khallikān’s (d. 
681/1282) entry on al-Zubayr has much of the same information, although he clarifies 
that al-Kāfī is a law book and adds that al-Zubayr ibn Aḥmad had “obscure opinions on 
legal issues (wa-lahu fī al-madhhab wujūh gharība).”471 None of these works appears to be 
about legal distinctions.  
Other sources, however, such as Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, and Jamāl 
al-Dīn al-Asnawī also attribute a book, al-Muskit, to al-Zubayr ibn Aḥmad.472 Al-Muskit, in 
spite of its vague title, was considered by these historians to have been a work of legal 
distinctions, though it appears to be no longer extant and it is unclear whether they 
knew it first hand. As Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba states, “al-Muskit, like al-Alghāz, is hard to find 
(wa-l- Muskit wa-l-Alghāz qalīl al-wujūd).”473 It is unclear whether Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba is also 
claiming that al-Zubayr ibn Aḥmad wrote a book of legal riddles entitled al-Alghāz, but 
nevertheless this does indicate that al-Zubayr’s Muskit was not an easy book to obtain.474 
                                                             
471 Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-aʿyān, 2:313. 
472 The title of this works translates roughly as The Book Which Silences Others. It is quite an unusual title for 
a work. In fact, this is the only work with this title, as far as I am aware. It is likely that this book 
“silenced others” in formal disputations. There are, however, works with similar titles. See, for instance, 
the following works found in Ismāʿīl Bāshā al-Baghdādī’s Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn: Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq al-
Ṣaymarī (d. 275/888)’s al-Jawābāt al-Muskita (2:19); Muḥammad ibn Masʿūd Ibn ʿIyāsh (d. 320/932), al-
Ajwiba al-muskita (2:32); Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm al-Anbārī (d. 322/933-34) Kitāb al-Jawābāt al-muskita (1:5); and 
Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), al-Ajwiba al-muskita ʿan al-asʾila al-mubhita (2:79); ʿUbayd 
Ibn Dhakwān al-Baghdādī’s (d. ?) al-Jawāb al-muskit (1:645). Ismāʿīl Bāshā al-Baghdādī’s Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn 
asmāʾ al-muʿallifīn wa-āthār al-muṣannifīn, 2 vols. (1951-55; repr., Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d.). 
473 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya, 1:94. 
474 This potential connection between legal distinctions and legal riddles is interesting in light of the 
partial convergence of these genres, which is discused in Chapter Four. 
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Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ansawī, in his own work on legal distinction, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, credits al-
Muskit as the first Shāfiʿī work on distinctions.475 He does not, however, say anything 
more about the work or its contents. 
Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī includes a small citation from the Muskit in a section in al-
Zubayr ibn Aḥmad’s biography entitled “Some of His Observations and Peculiar 
Opinions (wa-min al-fawāʾid ʿanhu wa-l-gharāʾib).”476 Al-Subkī says:  
In his Muskit, he says in regard to someone who swears an oath that they will 
not eat fruit (al-fākiha), “I hold that he breaks his oath if he eats a banana. Also, 
according to me, the produce of the medlar tree (zaʿrūr) is also a fruit (fākiha).” 
He also makes a statement in regard to someone against whom a claim for 
multiple dirhams is made. Al-Zubayr says, “The command “Weigh and take,” is 
not an affirmation of the debt (lam yakun iqrār). If, however, he says, “Weigh and 
take them,” this is an affirmation of the debt. Our Iraqi colleagues distinguished 
(farraqa) in this manner. According to me, however, both of these statements are 
equivalent. This is because when he says, ‘Weigh and take,’ he may mean to 
weigh for someone else (attazin min fulān), and thus there is no distinction 
between this and between saying, “Weigh and take them” unless he were to say, 
“Weigh and take them from me.” According to me, this would be an affirmation 
of a debt.” This is what he says in the Muskit.477 
                                                             
475 Al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, 2:8. 
476 Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, 3:295-297. 
477 Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, 3:296. 
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Al-Subkī continues with a discussion of al-Zubayr’s opinion on debts, since it seems he 
held contradictory opinions. As an early figure, there are many reports about al-
Zubayr, his doctrine, and his life which are not easy to make coherent. Nevertheless, 
even this short passage contains a fascinating look into his Muskit.  
On the basis of this passage from al-Subkī, it does appear that al-Zubayr ibn 
Aḥmad discusses something akin to formalized legal distinctions in this book. He 
discusses specifics of why there may be a difference between the statements “Weigh 
and take” and “Weigh and take them,” as well as what fruits are encompassed by the 
unrestricted term “fākiha.” This is not, however, a formalized discussion of “cases that 
resemble each other outwardly, but have contradictory rulings.”478 It does not compare 
two laws with different outcomes so that a distinction can be drawn. It is not a formal 
presentation of legal distinctions. This passage offers a tantalizing view into what could 
perhaps be seen as a legal prehistory of distinctions. It is an example of a discussion of 
legal distinctions before the formalization of this kind of thinking and writing. It may, 
perhaps, be similar to the writings of other scholars such as Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan 
al-Shaybānī and Ibn Surayj, although it is nonetheless alluring that the two short 
passages remembered from al-Zubayr’s Muskit are concerned with drawing distinctions. 
Without more of this book, however, its contents remain a mystery and it is only in the 
eighth/fourteenth century that the sources begin to refer to al-Zubayr as the author of 
a book on legal distinctions.  
                                                             
478 This is the most common definition of legal distinctions. See, for instance, al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-
Fiqhiyya, 30ff. and 61ff.; Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 332-333.  
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This situation is very similar to what we saw in Chapter Two. There, it was 
shown how the early biobibliographical tradition was unconcerned, or even unaware, 
of the genres of lexicographical and medical distinctions. It was only after these genres 
became well-established that authors of biobibliographical works identified early texts 
as being part of the furūq genres in both medicine and lexicography. Similarly, the 
biobibliographical tradition contemporaneous to al-Zubayr does not seem to have been 
concerned with the idea of legal distinctions as a genre in which al-Zubayr participated 
or as a concept through which to analyze Islamic law, which perhaps explains the lack 
of discussion of his authorship of such a book in sources contemporaneous with al-
Zubayr.  
What, then, to make of the attribution of a book of legal distinctions to 
Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī? The earliest extant furūq work, which is from the 
Ḥanafī tradition, has often been attributed to Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī. This 
attribution is tenuous. It is not clear whether Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī even 
wrote a work of legal distinctions. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Saʿīd ibn Aḥmad al-Zahrānī, the 
modern editor of this work, justifies this attribution by citing the following 
biobibliographical souces:479 both Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s (d. 1067/1657) Kashf al-ẓunūn and 
Ismāʿīl al-Baghdadī’s (d. 1340/1922) Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn mention Muḥammad al-Karābīsī 
as having written a work on legal distinctions, as do the Geschichte der arabischen 
Litteratur by Carl Brockelmann and the Geschichte des arabischen Schriftums by Fuat 
                                                             
479 For al-Zahrānī’s explanation about this attribution, see ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Saʿīd ibn Aḥmad al-Zahrānī, 
“Introduction” to Kitāb al-Furūq by Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī, ed. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Saʿīd Aḥmad al-
Zahrānī (Ph.D Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1418/1997), 47-53. 
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Sezgin.480 Similarly, Muḥammad al-Karābīsī appears in both Kaḥḥāla’s Muʿjam al-
muʾallifīn and al-Ziriklī’s Aʿlām as having written a work on legal distinctions.481 All three 
sources mention Muḥammad al-Karābīsī as having written a work on legal distinctions, 
but the earliest witness for this claim is Ḥājjī Khalīfa, a book that influenced all of the 
later sources. In other words, the claim that Muḥammad al-Karābīsī wrote a book of 
legal distinctions is first found approximately 700 years after Muḥammad al-Karābīsī’s 
death. As per his usual practice in this book, Ḥājjī Khalīfa does not cite the source from 
which he got his information. If this is indeed the first mention of this connection, it 
seems incredible that Ḥājjī Khalīfa would be the first to commit this to writing after so 
many other scholars would have failed to do so. If, however, he did not read this in a 
previous biographical work, it could be the case that Ḥājjī Khalīfa saw this work in 
manuscript and for that reason cited it in his Kashf al-zunūn.  
The second factor driving al-Zahrānī’s attribution is the manuscript evidence. 
Five of the six extant manuscripts of this work list Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī as 
its author.482 Only the Berlin copy of this work does not list Muḥammad al-Karābīsī as 
its author.483 However, all of these manuscripts seem to be based on the Feyzullah 
Efendi manuscript in Turkey, which Fuat Sezgin has dated to the 9th/15th century, 
approximately 600 years after al-Karābīsī’s lifetime.484 This is a smaller gap than that 
                                                             
480 GAL S 1:295; GAS 1:442-43. 
481 ʿUmar Riḍā Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn tarājim muṣannifī al-kutub al-ʿarabiyya (Damascus: Muʾassasat 
al-Risāla, 1376/1957), 3:355 no.13711; al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 6:162. 
482 See Appendix III. 
483 See Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Or. 5013; Zahrānī 48-53; 57-74.  
484 See GAS 1:443. 
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between al-Karābīsī and Ḥājjī Khalīfa, but still large enough to be problematic. Further, 
these manuscripts all list the author only on the cover page, his name is not found 
mentioned within the text itself. A mention of the author’s name on the title page of a 
manuscript, in a different script and ink than that of the rest of the manuscript, is 
weaker evidence for attribution than the name of the author being included within the 
manuscript. The name could have been added at any point after the copying down of 
the manuscript and does not necessarily indicate something known by the original 
scribe or contained in the text that formed the basis of the manuscript.485 Further, al-
Zahrānī speculates the Feyzullah Efendi manuscript to be the basis for the other five 
manuscript copies of this book.486 That is to say, the copy of this work in the Feyzullah 
Efendi collection was the copy-text from which all remaining copies of this work were 
made.487 He concludes this because of its date, but also because the readings in the 
other manuscripts appear traceable to this copy.  
Based on the surviving evidence, it is possible that Muḥammad al-Karābīsī 
wrote this work. It is also possible that the manuscript in Feyzallah Efendi was 
erroneously attributed to Muḥammad al-Karābīsī, that several copies were then made 
                                                             
485 Adam Gacek, Reading Arabic Manuscripts: A Vademecum for Readers (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009), 277-78. 
486 Al-Zahrānī notes that the Ahmet III copy serves as the direct basis for the Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 
copy, which then served as the basis for the copy in the Azhar library. The correspondence between 
Ahmet III and Dār al-Kutub editions is nearly complete, even the colophons are identical (49). 
487 I draw the term copy-text from the Greg-Bowers-Tanselle tradition. For a general summary, see G. 
Thomas Tanselle, A Rationale of Textual Criticism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989). See 
also W.W. Greg, “The Rationale of the Copy-Text,” Studies in Bibliography 3 (1950-51):16-36; Fredson 
Bowers, “Multiple Authority: New Problems and Concepts of the Copy-Text,” Library 5th ser. 27 (1972): 81-
115; and G.T. Tanselle, “Greg’s Theory of Copy-Text and the Editing of American Literature,” Studies in 
Bibliography 28 (1975): 167-229.  
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with this mistake, and that Ḥājjī Khalīfa based his information on one of these 
misleading witnesses.  
In describing his methodology for writing the Kashf al-ẓunūn, Ḥājjī Khalīfa says 
he included “the names of many thousands of volumes in the libraries that I personally 
examined.”488 The uncertainty surrounding this very early work on legal distinctions is 
in a way surprising. It is remarkable to consider that so many copies of this peculiar 
work have survived, all of them from the same manuscript tree, yet this furūq work also 
seems at one point to have been an unknown text. If the attribution of this extant work 
on legal distinctions to al-Karābīsī was made at or around the time the Feyzallah Efendi 
manuscript was written, it would have meant that this work survived in one form or 
another for six hundred years without authorial attribution and without being 
mentioned in another text.489 More surprising still is the interest taken in this work in 
the 16th and 17th centuries. 
There is one final consideration that al-Zahrānī uses to bolster his attribution, 
that the scholarly content (al-mādda al-ʿilmiyya) of this work is that of a scholar living at 
the turn of the fourth/tenth century.490 With this statement, al-Zahrānī is referring to 
the organization of this work, which is not organized according to legal topic (al-tabwīb 
                                                             
488 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Mīzān al-ḥaqq fī ikhtiyār al-aḥaqq (Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa Abū al-Ḍiyāʾ, 1306/1889), 142. This 
translation comes from Eleazar Birnbaum, “Kātib Chelebi (1609-1657) and alphabetization: a 
methodological investigation of the autographs of his Kashf al-Ẓunūn and Sullam al-Wuṣūl” in Scribes et 
manuscrits du Moyen-Orient, ed. François Déroche and Francis Richard (Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de 
France, 1997), 241. 
489 A similar situation, however, holds for the works of legal distinctions that I label Furūq-A and Furūq-B, 
see Chapter Six, pp. 329-30, 337-43.  
490 Al-Zahrānī, Introduction, 48. 
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al-fiqhī), a form of organization that quickly dominated most legal writing.491 This work 
probably contains no mention of any book or scholar that postdates the life of 
Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī. The latest figure mentioned in the Furūq is Abū al-
Qāsim al-Ṣaffār, a scholar from Samarqand who died in the year 326/938.492 This is 
evidence that the book was written after 326/938, and likely not too long after, but not 
evidence that al-Karābīsī was the author. 
There are only two books mentioned in the text, a Kitāb al-ʿUyūn and a Kitāb al-
Iqrār.493 The identity of these works is unclear, although al-Zahrānī posits that the ʿUyūn 
must be ʿUyūn al-masāʾil by Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī (d. 319/931) and that the Kitāb al-
Iqrār is part of al-Shaybānī’s al-Aṣl.494 Al-Zahrānī uses this evidence to argue that this 
book must have been written in the early part of the fourth/tenth century. Further, he 
                                                             
491 This is, at least, what appears to be the case. I am unaware of many efforts to study the manuscript 
history of specific works of law. Such study may reveal the arrangement and setting of law books to have 
occurred much later than the lifetime of the author. The obvious exception, of course, is Miklos 
Muranyi’s study of early Mālikī works. See above, note 140.  
492 Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī, Furūq, 361. The other figures mentioned in this book are: ʿUmar ibn 
al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 23/644), al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 50/670), al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 
61/680), Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī (d. ca. 70/690), ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 73/693), 
al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf (d. 95/714), Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767), Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798), Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-
Shaybānī (d. 189/804), Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/819), Muḥammad ibn Samāʿa al-Tamīmī (d. 
233/848).  
493 Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī, Furūq, 120, 394. The Kitāb al-Iqrār is cited, but no information about 
its author is given.  
494 Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī, al-Furūq, 120, 394. He mentions an ʿUyūn al-masāʾil by Abū al-Layth 
Naṣr ibn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī (d. 383/993) as another possibility, see Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-
Karābīsī, Furūq, 120. If the ʿUyūn cited in this work were indeed al-Abū Layth al-Samarqandī’s work, then 
the author of this Kitāb al-Furūq cannot be Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī. 
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says, since we know of no Ḥanafī author other than Muḥammad al-Karābīsī to write a 
book on legal distinctions at this time, it follows that this is his book.495  
Al-Zahrānī’s introduction to Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī’s work on legal 
distinctions relates the few biographical details about our author that remain. These 
details are scarce, since the vast biographical tradition has generally overlooked him. 
Al-Zahrānī tells us, for example, that his full name was Abū Faḍl Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ 
ibn Maḥmūd ibn al-Haytham al-Karābīsī al-Ushtābadīzakī al-Samarqandī and that his 
date and place of birth are unknown. Al-Zahrānī speculates that al-Karābīsī was born in 
Ushtābadīza in Samarqand, presumably based on his nisba. Muḥammad al-Karābīsī’s 
nisba relates him to this city, but it is also plausible that his father or grandfather was 
born in Ushtābadīza. In the Muʿjam al-buldān, a geographical reference work, Yāqūt al-
Ḥamawī (d. 656/1229) mentions Muḥammad al-Karābīsī within his entry for 
Ushtābadīza. Of this town, he says: “A large locality (maḥalla kabīra) in Samarqand, 
connected (muttaṣila) to Dastān Gate in Samarqand. A group of scholars (jamāʿa) hail 
from there… Among them was Abū al-Faḍl Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ ibn Muḥammad ibn al-
Haytham al-Karābīsī al-Ushtābadīzakī al-Samarqandī, who had memorized many hadith 
(kāna mukthiran fī al-ḥadīth).”496 Muḥammad al-Karābīsī is the only scholar associated 
with this town that Yāqūt mentions by name. He is here remembered for his knowledge 
                                                             
495 Whoever the author of this book was, it seems clear that this was a book written by someone 
belonging to the Ḥanafī madhhab. The book explicitly endorses opinions by Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, and 
Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, the three early “founders” of the Ḥanafī legal school. 
496 Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, Muʿjam al-buldān, no ed. (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 2010), v.1, p.195. 
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of hadith, not of Islamic law. Curiously, none of the biographical dictionaries before 
Kashf al-ẓunūn remember Muḥammad al-Karābīsī as a jurist. 
  The biographical sources do not convey much information about Muḥammad 
al-Karābīsī. While they remember him as having been a hadith transmitter of some 
prominence—enough, at least, to warrant mention—he is not remembered as having 
authored a single work or as having been a jurist. Al-Zahrānī is surprised by this. “In 
spite of the intellectual prominence that was apparent to me while reading his book, I 
have not found him mentioned in works of ṭabaqāt, rijāl, or tārīkh, other than in the 
above mentioned sources [al-Ansāb, al-Qand, Muʿjam al-buldān, Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn, and al-
Aʿlām]. Further, I did not find a complete biographical notice for him nor information 
about his works.”497 Al-Zahrānī says this is due to his marginal location in Samarqand, 
and that this lack of attention is common for scholars from the eastern Islamic world 
                                                             
497 Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī, al-Furūq, 23 f.1. Of the five sources that al-Zahrānī cites, three are 
premodern, the Kitāb al-Ansāb by ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Samʿānī (d. 562/1166), al-Qand fī dhikr ʿulamāʾ 
Samarqand by ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Nasafī (d. 537/1142), and Muʿjām al-buldān by Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (d. 
626/1229), and the other two are modern sources, Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn by İsmail Paşa (d. 1399/1920) and al-
Aʿlām by Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī (d. 1396/1976). It is strange that al-Zahrānī cites al-Qand in his discussion 
since this work does not include an entry for Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī. This work is organized 
alphabetically by name (ism) and only the section between khāʾ and kāf is extant (and published). The 
entry for Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ, if there is one, is therefore lost, since it would come either in hijāʾī 
alphabetical order and therefore after the kāf, or it would come at the very beginning of the book if it 
began with the section on the name Muḥammad. In either case the section is not extant. There are a few 
mentions of Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ in the extant portion, as a part of the chain of transmitters in hadith 
reports. Al-Zahrānī cites page 141 which has an entry on Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ’s father, “Ṣāliḥ ibn 
Maḥmūd ibn al-Haytham al-Samarqandī.” In this entry, Muḥammad is in the middle of the isnād although 
interestingly, he does not narrate a hadith that he himself knows, but rather one that he “found in [his] 
father’s book.” Transmitting a hadith from one’s father was a common occurrence and not by itself 
evidence of scholarly training. ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Nasafī, al-Qand fī dhikr ʿulamāʾ Samarqand, ed. 
Naẓar Muḥammad Fāryābī (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Kawthar, 1991). 
 220 
 
during this period. While we did see in the discussion of Abū Muḥammad al-Juwaynī 
that information on eastern schoars before the fourth/tenth century is scarce, the 
names and ideas of important scholars still made their way into the historical record. 
There seems to be something unusual about the late and widespread popularity of 
Muḥammad al-Karābīsī’s work in spite of the almost complete forgetting of his 
biography and reputation. 
  
Conclusion 
Books of legal distinctions retain a cohesive generic identity over a vast chronological 
and geographical range. Books from the fifth/eleventh century in Baghdad share an 
understanding of what a legal distinction is with books from North Africa and Cairo in 
the ninth/fifteenth century. Nevertheless, the classical Islamic tradition lacks any 
detailed surviving theoretical discussion of legal distinctions, their functions, and their 
purpose, save that found in Abu Yūsuf al-Juwaynī’s al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, the earliest extant 
work of legal distinctions. The shared understanding of legal distinctions that can be 
seen in these texts is generally undetectable in the theoretical writing on Islamic law. 
There is disconnect between the theory of legal distinctions and the composing books 
in this genre.  
The question of difference between Islamic law in theory and practice is usually 
studied with an eye towards the theory of Islamic legal literature and the practice of a 
lived reality on the ground. Leaving aside the question of the historical application of 
Islamic law, this disconnect between a theory and practice can be seen simply from the 
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legal-literary record. A seeming divergence between the genres of legal theory and 
substantive law has been noted previously.498  
In the case of legal distinctions, however, the divergence comes not from the 
application or creation of norms, but with regards to a category of analysis. This 
divergence between a more practical concern with understanding legal distinctions 
and theoretical explanations of Islamic law and legal writing that overlooks legal 
distinctions becomes all the more interesting when seen in light of the pervasiveness of 
legal distinctions throughout the history of Islamic law. Legal distinctions were 
prominent in early legal disputation, a topic studied above in Chapter Three, and the 
material history of legal distinctions shows the pervasiveness of the genre lasting until 
at least the 19th century and spreading from the Western Mediterranean into Central 
Asia and beyond.499  
                                                             
498 See Sherman Jackson, “Fiction and Formalism: Toward a Functional Analysis of Uṣūl al-fiqh” in Studies 
in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2002), 177-204, and more recently 
Joseph Lowry, “Is There Something Postmodern about Uṣūl al-Fiqh? Ijmāʿ, Constraint, and Interpretive 
Communities” in Islamic Law in Theory: Studies on Jurisprudence in Honor of Bernard Weiss, ed. A. Kevin 
Reinhart and Robert Gleave (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2014): 285-315. 
499 See Chapter Six, pp. 330-33. 
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Chapter Five: Riddles and Entertainment 
 
There are several books that self-identify as something other than works on 
legal distinctions but read nearly indentically to the books of distinctions examined in 
earlier chapters. These works fall under the ambit of what is termed legal riddles, al-
alghāz al-fiqhiyya. The existence of these books shows the elasticity of legal distinctions 
as a confined genre and challenges our understanding of legal genres, particularly 
those of legal riddles and legal distinctions. It seems likely to me that this elasticity is 
also present in some of the other ‘secondary’ genres of Islamic law. By secondary legal 
genres, I mean all genres except for legal theory, legal compendia, and legal digests.500 
Aside from the two genres listed in this chapter, with the phrase other secondary 
genres, I am referring to genres such as legal maxims (al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya), purposes 
of the law (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa), al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, among others. This chapter 
explores the porous boundary between the two genres of legal furūq and legal riddles 
and shows the importance of social practice to the development and partial 
convergence between legal riddles and legal distinctions. In particular, the 
performance of legal knowledge in majālis created a demand for a particular packaging 
of this information, and books of riddles and distinctions sometimes converged as a 
way of creating a supply to satisfy this particular demand.  
The modern academic study of Islamic legal riddles is almost entirely 
nonexistent, as is the study of riddles generally in the Arabo-Islamic tradition. There 
                                                             
500 See the discussion in the Introduction, pp. 19-24. 
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are almost certainly important relationships between riddles and dialectical question 
and answer. A discussion of alghāz likely also relates to the various terms that refer to 
riddles but perhaps indicate slightly different activities and therefore different kinds of 
texts. The terms alghāz, muʿammayāt, aḥājī, and imtiḥān, can all be translated as “riddle,” 
although there does appear to be a discursive commitment to differentiating between 
these genres. This issue is discussed briefly below. Further research into legal riddles is 
a great desideratum.  
The previous chapters have demonstrated a certain unity in their 
understanding of the genre of legal distinctions. One of the assumptions made 
throughout this study is that unified groups that one can call ‘genres’ exist within 
Islamic legal literature. I have taken this supposition a step further in assuming that 
one such genre is that of legal distinctions. This study has been careful to differentiate 
between the concept of legal distinctions, which refers to a particular way of reasoning 
within Islamic law, and the genre of legal distinctions, which refers to a particular way 
of organizing books of law. The previous chapters have attempted to prove the 
existence of legal distinctions as a concept, with a distinct genealogy, epistemology, 
and logic. In so doing, they have also demonstrated the existence of the genre of legal 
distinctions. This chapter shows, however, that the genre of legal distinctions impinged 
on and was impinged on by other closely related kind of legal writing. It is, in part, an 
attempt to understand how to discuss this genre in the broader context of Islamic legal 
literature. 
According to one understanding of genre within the classical Arabo-Islamic 
tradition, authors classify their books within particular genres by stating this explicitly 
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in their titles.501 One similarity between almost all of the books of legal distinctions 
discussed in the previous chapters is that they have some variant of the the Arabic 
word for distinction (farq, pl. furūq) in their title; indeed, the most common title by far 
is Kitāb al-Furūq (The Book of Legal Distinctions). This way of defining the boundaries of a 
genre, while perhaps overly simplified, has merit. It was clearly viewed as an effective 
way for authors to signal their participation in the genre and it was the way books are 
remembered and discussed in in the biobibliographical tradition. We have also seen 
that some books of legal distinctions are remembered as “Book of Legal Distinctions (Kitāb 
al-Furūq)” in spite of the actual title given to them by their author. Based on manuscript 
evidence, for instance, it would appear that al-Juwaynī’s work on legal distinctions is 
titled Al-Jamʿ wa-l-Farq; according to the ṭabaqāt literature, however, this book is called 
Kitāb al-Furūq.502  
The discussion of the histories of legal distinctions in the previous chapters has 
been, to a certain extent, tautological. I have assumed an outline for the history of legal 
distinctions and also that there existed prehistories for legal distinctions, i.e. various 
trends which contributed to the development of the concept of a legal distinction. 
Allowing for a multiplicity of origins for this concept has granted us insight into the 
complex intellectual world from which distinctions emerged. There are clear 
intertextual relationships between books of lexicographic, medical, and legal 
distinctions, which highlight the shared intellectual world of these scholarly pursuits. 
                                                             
501 See, for instance, Devin Stewart, “Muḥammad b. Dāʾūd al-Ẓāhirī.” 
502 See Chapter Three, pp. 171-172 for a fuller discussion.  
 225 
 
At the same time, the connections between legal disputation and the development of 
legal distinctions has been made clear, both in terms of legal reasoning and in terms of 
the content of books of distinction.  
Further still, books of legal distinction represent the refinement of the science 
of Islamic law at a certain stage of development in the history of Islamic legal writing. 
Nevertheless, the previous chapters have focused on books of legal distinctions as an 
ending point. While that focus is useful for an analysis of legal distinctions, it is 
nevertheless convenient to claim that a concept I term “legal distinction” terminates in 
the genre of legal distinctions. It is not necessarily the case that the genre of legal 
distinctions and the concept of legal distinctions are coterminous. In fact, one of the 
claims that I have made is that the concept of legal distinctions can be found outside of 
the context of books of legal distinctions. What makes a book of legal distinctions 
unique is that it consists almost entirely of these distinctions; this fact has been seen 
repeatedly in the works examined above. What, however, of works that seemingly fit 
this criterion in their contents but do not announce themselves as works of legal 
distinction?  
One interesting feature of distinctions writing is the convergence of writing on 
legal distinctions and legal riddles (al-alghāz al-fiqhiyya). Riddles increasingly take on 
the form of legal distinctions; and second, legal distinctions take on the particular 
presentation style of riddles. This trend, which can be seen almost from the beginning 
of the writing of distinctions, reaches its height during the Mamluk period, especially 
in Cairo. The history of legal riddles has yet to be written, but even a cursory look at 
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books on legal riddles suffices to show the growing convergence between them and the 
genre of legal distinctions.  
While both genres overlap, as will be shown below, it is not the case that they 
converged completely. The boundaries between these genres became blurred so that it 
is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether certain legal books belong to the genre of 
distinctions or to that of riddles. A case in point is manuscript Esad Efendi 884 in the 
Suleymaniye Library, which is a collection (majmūʿ) of works on legal riddles. The table 
of contents on the first page states this clearly, “The following books of Ḥanafī legal 
riddles (alghāz) are included in this codex…”503 Nevertheless, two of the three works in 
this collection are works of legal distinctions entitled Kitāb al-Furūq.504 
This chapter begins with an overview of the tradition of literary and intellectual 
salons in Arabo-Islamic culture, with a particular focus on their style and popularity in 
Mamluk Cairo. In part, the spread of salons went hand-in-hand with the spread of 
riddles. This chapter therefore continues with a brief introduction to riddles and legal 
riddling. Due to the paucity of scholarship on legal riddles, this chapter offers a 
preliminary exploration of this style of writing and and begins an analysis of the logic 
undergirding them. Then, the three main sections of this chapter highlight the 
convergence between works of riddles and distinctions, a convergence that peaked in 
Mamluk Cairo, and discusses the implications of this for our understanding of genre. 
The first part of this chapter explores the history of majālis—literary salons, study 
                                                             
503 Esad Efendi 884, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul, 1a. 
504 Esad Efendi 884, 1a. The two works, according to this table of contents, are Kitāb al-Furūq li-l-Imām al-
Farghānī and Kitāb al-Furūq. The first work in this collection is simply entitled Kitāb al-Tahdhīb. 
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circles, and more--in Arabo-Islamic culture. The second part explores the tradition of 
legal riddles, focusing on the way in which legal riddles package the information of 
Islamic law. Finally, the third part looks at the convergence of riddles and distinctions 
of and some of the implications of this convergence. 
 
Literary Salons, Learning, and Culture 
Understanding the social context in which legal knowledge was performed is crucial to 
understanding the motivations for changes in legal literary aesthetics.505 The social 
contexts were quite varied and deserve explanation. Almost all of this knowledge 
performance, however, took place in venues referred to as majālis. Majālis (sg. majlis; 
teaching sessions, literary gatherings, salons) were a widespread phenomenon in the 
premodern Islamic world. Undoubtedly, majālis took on different forms and functions 
as they manifested over a broad geographic and chronological scope. George Makdisi 
suggests that the term majlis was used by scholars in almost all fields of learning to 
refer to scholastic gatherings of different kinds. He thus speaks of “literary clubs” for 
the “institutionalized learning” of medicine, philosphy, and philosophical theology;506 
                                                             
505 Links between social realities and the writing of books of Islamic law can yield interesting conclusions 
in most areas of Islamic law. For instance, David Vishanoff argues that al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla can be best 
understood as a composite work made up of three separate treatises combined into one work. The 
second and third treatises, according to Vishanoff, represent actual dialogues between al-Shāfiʿī and his 
critical contemporaries. Importantly, Vishanoff understands from this that the Risāla was therefore 
composed and disseminated over time and in parts. See David R. Vishanoff, “A Reader’s Guide to al-
Shāfiʿī’s Epistle on Legal Theory (al-Risāla).” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Published online 2/14/2017, 
See also http://david.vishanoff.com/wp-content/uploads/readers-guide.pdf.  
506 George Makdisi, The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West: With Special Reference to 
Scholasticism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 60-61. 
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“humanist circles” for the study of belles-lettres (adab);507 and “academies” attended by 
grammarians.”508  
In the Encyclopaedia of Islam majālis are described as places “where political and 
judicial decisions were adopted, plaintiffs, panegyrists and other visitors gathered, and 
questions of literature or law were debated.”509 Of particular interest for this study are 
the sessions in which “questions of literature or law were debated.” In order to 
understand the reasons for which books of legal riddles were produced and the reasons 
for their merging with books of legal distinctions, it is necessary to understand the 
contexts in which law was discussed publicly. “In these public audiences, plaintiffs and 
petitioners were present, but poets and scholars… also participated.”510 The term majālis 
thus had a very broad semantic range. It could refer to almost any gathering of people, 
so that the court of a sovereign, a teaching-session, a poetry reading, and a gathering of 
friends all fall within the scope of the word majlis, as could the lesson taught there, or 
even the people in attendance. In large part, majlis was the premier term for scholastic 
gatherings outside of the madrasa context.511 Scholarly and literary gatherings, 
however, are the concern of the following discussions and I use the term majlis to 
discuss only scholarly and literary gatherings. 
                                                             
507 Makdisi, Rise of Humanism, 61. 
508 Makdisi, Rise of Humanism, 61. 
509 EI2 s.v. “maḏjḻis” (ed.), citing R. Brunschvig, La Berbérie orientale sous les Ḥafṣides des origines à la fin du XV 
siècle (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1940-1947), 2:37. 
510 EI2 s.v. “maḏjḻis” (ed.). 
511 It is possible that teaching hospitals as well should be exempted along with madrasas, but the precise 
terminology associated with the teaching of medicine falls outside the scope of the present study. See as 
well the detailed discussion of the semantic range of the premodern term majlis. George Makdisi, Rise of 
Colleges, 10-12; idem., Rise of Humanism, 60-64. 
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Although majālis differed greatly across time and space, there were a few 
constants about them which demand our attention. The first is the simultaneous 
existence of courtly majālis at the court of the sultan or caliph and non-courtly majālis 
held by private individuals. The difference between these two kinds of majālis is not 
necessarily in the activities conducted therein, but in the stakes of the performance. As 
will be seen, courtly majālis were moments to compete for patronage, either direct 
patronage to compose works or indirect patronage through lucrative governmental 
appointments. Non-courtly majālis were pivotal moments for the discussion, 
evaluation, and spread of books, ideas, and scholars. Scholarly circles took place in non-
courtly majālis while the majālis for entertainment encompassed both. In terms of 
literary salons, it was the goal of those participating in the majālis to put the depth and 
scope of their knowledge on display.512  
There has been work done on the literary salons during the Abbasid period and 
scholarly salons in Ottoman urban centers. The majālis of the Mamluk era, however, 
have been studied in a much more cursory fashion.513 The convergence of riddles and 
distinctions begins in Abbasid times and then seems to peak during the Mamluk period 
and continue into the Ottoman era. We will therefore look first at Abbasid-era majālis 
and then at some studies of early Ottoman majālis, and in so doing assume continuity 
with Mamluk-period trends.  
                                                             
512 I use the term literary salon to refer to gatherings of intellectuals to discuss intellectual matters, 
including but not limited to literature (adab).  
513 Christian Mauder of the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen is currently writing a dissertation on the 
majālis held at the court of the Mamluk Sultan al-Ghawrī.  
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According to Samer Ali, literary salons “proliferated in the [third/]ninth 
century, enabling more littérateurs to cultivate the adab skills needed to participate, 
socialize, and gain personal influence.”514 For him, literary salons, referred to as 
mujālasa rather than majālis during this period, were occasions for scholars to embed 
themselves within literary communities and learn the skills necessary to garner 
patronage.515 Régis Blachère likewise characterizes the salon in this period as having “a 
high standing, no one could hope for public admiration if he were not a man of the 
world, an agreeable conversationalist, having a sharp mind and quick with wordplay, 
skilled in creating situations which he could turn to his advantage.”516 It was the skills 
cultivated by attending and performing in such salons and the desire “to impress one’s 
audience, in fidelity to shared standards of competence” that impacted much of how 
“adab-type speaking” was structured.517  
                                                             
514 Samer Ali, Arabic Literary Salons in the Islamic Middle Ages (South Bend, IN.: Notre Dame University Press, 
2010), 192. 
515 Ali also argues that literary salons were sites in which a shared historical memory was created and 
cemented. I do not address this aspect of salons directly in this chapter, but it reaffirms the importance 
of literary salons as sites of knowledge production, not just sites for the display of knowledge. 
516 Régis Blachère, Un poète arabe du IVe siècle de l’Hégire (Xe siècle de J.-C.): Abou ṭ-Ṭayyib al-Motanabbî (Paris: 
Adrien-Maissonneuve, 1935), 130. Translation based on citation in EI2 s.v. “madjlis” (ed.). 
517 Ali, Arabic Literary Salons, 192. The impact that live performance had on the composition and content of 
adab and poetry should not be understated. Performance mattered a great deal in Arabic literature and 
also, as Dominic P. Brookshaw has shown, for Persian poetry in medieval Iran as well. Joel Blecher has 
even found references to scenes from majālis in Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī’s hadith commentary al-Fatḥ al-bārī 
fī Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. See Dominic P. Brookshaw, “Palaces, Pavilions, and Pleasure-Gardens: The Context and 
Setting of the Medieval Majlis” Middle Eastern Literatures 6.3 (2003): 199-223; and Joel Blecher, “Ḥadīth 
Commentary in the Presence of Students, Patrons, and Rivals: Ibn Ḥajar and Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī in Mamluk 
Cairo,” Oriens 41 (2013): 261-87. 
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It was not only in courtly contexts that such skills mattered. This pattern of 
communicating knowledge “[held] good for those who, at an inferior social level, 
stayed simply in the home of well-to-do poets and writers and even in the shops of 
merchants who practiced in their own way a form of patronage.”518 In other words, 
there was a continuity of sorts in the patterns of knowledge production and display 
that held currency in intellectual salons frequented by different social groups.519 The 
extent and strength of these connections between courtly and private salons suggest 
the existence of a broad intellectual community which maintained certain standards 
and expectations for what constituted knowledge or artistic production and for the 
forms in which it ought to be expressed. 
Although these remarks on the nature and importance of majālis are based on 
studies of literary salons, the relevant aspects of such salons seem to extend beyond 
discussions of language and literature. L.E. Goodman finds that the debate contexts 
between Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyāʾ al-Rāzī (d. ca. 312/925) and Abū Ḥātim Aḥmad al-
Rāzī (d. ca. 322/934) are crucial in understanding the ways in which these philosophers 
understood, presented, and defended their ideas, both in person and in their works. In 
his study, the context of the majālis is instrumental to a correct and full understanding 
of the works of these authors. The contours of philosophical debates and philosophical 
writing do not necessarily align in all respects with literary debates. For instance, 
Goodman finds these philosophical majālis to be “informal gatherings,” and “not public 
                                                             
518 EI2 s.v. “maḏjḻis” (ed.). 
519 The continuities between different kinds of salons, point to shared societal standards of knowledge 
and knowledge presentation, in spite of potential differences between salons held in various contexts.  
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performances of a formal nature.”520 The literary salons discussed by Samer Ali have a 
much more formal context, particularly those majālis that involved the recitation of 
poetry. Even so, both literary and philosophical sessions were high-level scholarly 
exchanges between socially significant members of society.  
There are several important conclusions that can be drawn about the function 
and activities of these literary salons. The most important is the parallel between the 
intellectual activity of the majlis and the written intellectual record.521 Cultural context 
affects literary production and intellectual production is related to a certain kind of 
social life. Further, the existence of intellectual majālis among various social strata 
signals the potential relevance of intellectual production to different social groups 
including merchants, scholars, and political elites. This is particularly important to 
keep in mind for discussing intellectual trends in the Mamluk Sultanate. These trends 
include (i) the role of imported Mamluks—primarily Turkic people from Northwest 
Asia—and their children in seeking education, (ii) the expansion of majālis to include a 
wider spectrum of socioeconomic classes, and (iii) the rising interest in riddling in 
these majālis.  
The role of the Mamluks themselves cannot be overlooked for understanding 
the cultural history of the Mamluk Sultanate. Mamluks were enslaved young boys, 
                                                             
520 L.E. Goodmann, “Rāzī vs Rāzī — Philosophy in the Majlis” in The Majlis: Interreligious Encounters in 
Medieval Islam, ed. Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Mark R. Cohen, Sasson Somekh, and Sidney Griffith (Harrasowitz 
Verlag: 1999), 101. 
521 Goodman says that “[t]he language…of the debate is rapid fire and conversational.” A “rapid fire and 
conversational” tone is not indicative of most philosophical writing, suggesting certain discontinuities 
between the presentation of philosophical activity in in-person interactions and writing. Goodman, “Rāzī 
vs Rāzī,” 101. 
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primarily Qipchaks and Circassians, brought to Cairo to be trained as part of the ruling 
military class. As imported youths striving for a career in the military or government 
bureaucracy, the Mamluks and their children represented a new bloc of people for 
whom education and learning became an important social goal. Since the children of 
the Mamluks could not follow in the footsteps of their fathers in the military, Mamluks 
actively sought out education for their children, focusing primarily on “Arabic, 
calligraphy, and the fundamentals of religious sciences.”522 These fundamentals 
comprised the basis for the education and learning of their children and the cultural 
lives that they later developed for themselves as adults often reflected this early 
training. Ulrich Haarman emphasizes the importance of “the cultural life [found] in the 
houses of the lowly Mamluk private soldiers (jundī) who often quite understandably 
sought and found comfort for a disappointing military and public career in the bliss of 
piety, poetry, and scholarship.”523 While many of them may have found only “bliss” in 
pursuing intellectual activities, others were able to use this to achieve renown. 
Intellectual and literary interests, of course, were found among more than just the 
professional scholars. “Several Mamluks are described as authors of good verse and as 
literary entertainers.”524 Displays of knowledge could also take the form of book 
ownership. Indeed, “[b]ook-collecting was an expensive yet widespread hobby of 
                                                             
522 Ulrich Haarman, “Arabic in Speech, Turkish in Lineage: Mamluks and Their Sons in the Intellectual 
Life of Fourteenth-Century Egypt and Syria” Journal of Semitic Studies, 33.1 (1988), 86-87. 
523 Haarman, “Arabic in Speech,” 85-86. 
524 Haarman, “Arabic in Speech,”95. 
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cultured Mamluks.”525 These Mamluks and their children were also known for 
“sponsor[ing] salons that included both Turkish and Arabic entertainment.”526 
 At the same time, the breadth of learning valued at salons was also important 
for the professional lives of the non-military elite. “The literary skills [a member of the 
civilian elite] acquired qualified him for a wide range of careers, and one of the 
characteristic features of the man of learning was his multicompetence—his ability to 
hold positions in diverse occupational fields at the same time.”527 These factors led to 
an expansion of the ways in which socially diverse groups interacted with and 
consumed knowledge.528 This expansion can be seen in part, in the participation of a 
non-scholarly middle class of artisans at the public reading of books. Konrad Hirschler 
has documented their presence at the readings of Ibn ʿAsākir’s (d. 571/1176) History of 
Damascus. “Considerable numbers of craftsmen, traders and other non-scholars not 
only interacted…in these readings with the scholarly world, but the various sources 
show that their participation started to be taken seriously.”529 The social life of Mamluk 
                                                             
525 Haarman, “Arabic in Speech,” 93. 
526 Margaret Larkin, “Popular Poetry in the Post-Classical Period”Cambridge History of Arabic Literature: 
Arabic Literature in the Post-Clasical Period ed. Roger Allen and D.S. Richards (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 221. 
527 Carl F. Petry The Civilian Elite of Cairo in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1981), 312. 
528 It is possible that a similar trend could be found earlier, but it is documented clearly for the first time 
in the Mamluk Empire. This is due, in part, to the mass-movement of scholars resulting from the Mongol 
invasions and the rise of Cairo as the major center of Arabic learning. 
529 Konrad Hirschler, The Written Word in the Medieval Arabic Lands: A Social and Cultural History of Reading 
Practices (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 69. 
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Cairo (and Damascus) thus placed a high premium on learning and knowledge.530 This 
high value of learning and culture can be seen acutely in the ways that knowledge was 
performed and in the role of the majālis.  
Helen Pfeifer has shown the recurrence of majālis in accounts of scholarly 
networks in the 16th century, especially in exchanges between scholars from the 
Mamluk Sultanate and the Ottoman Empire. “In general, these particular majālis can be 
thought of as by-invitation-only gatherings attended by well-to-do Muslim men for the 
purpose of social and intellectual exchange.”531 Because of the importance of Mamluk 
Cairo and Damascus as centers of learning in the period before the sixteenth century, 
knowledge of Arabic and the Arabic tradition was key to these gatherings, all the more 
so in light of the prevalence of non-Arab elites among the Mamluks and the 
Ottomans.532 These salons “were an integral part of elite travel… and functioned as key 
venues in which men from different parts of the empire encountered one another.”533 
They served as meeting points for travelling elites, and were also opporutnities for 
local scholarly communities to interact with outside communities, as represented by 
the scholarly traveler. In addition, salons were important venues for “Rumis [i.e., 
Anatolians] serving as chief judges in the Arabic provinces… [They] produced high-
pressure situations in which judges themselves were judged, both on their intellectual 
                                                             
530 The accessibility of learning and the exposure to knowledge production and performance in non-
urban areas remains unclear.  
531 Helen Pfeifer, “Encounter after the Conquest: Scholarly Gatherings in 16th-Century Ottoman 
Damascus,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 47 (2015), 221. 
532 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 221. 
533 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 221 
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prowess and on their ability to engage in polite conversation.”534 The social place of 
these majālis in the Ottoman period is reminiscent of that in the Abbasid-period majālis: 
in both cases majālis served as venues for the movement of scholars and ideas. 
Pfeifer also shows that in late 16th and early 17th centuries, literary salons were 
venues for book circulation, and thus served as ways for books to acquire positive 
reviews which could then spread with them, “books rarely traveled without a 
reputation in tow. Literary salons thus reveal a very dynamic process of Ottoman canon 
formation.”535 Salons were an initial venue for book publication, a semi-public way of 
introducing a book to a scholarly audience to judge its merit. In this way, the stakes of 
the salon were high, and scholars needed to impress audiences with their knowledge in 
order to succeed. Poets similarly used literary salons to circulate their poetry. “The 
majlis also played a vital role in the dissemination of poems: scholars commented on 
them, musicians were inspired by them and listeners spread their renown.”536  
Due to their high scoial standing, salons were important for cultivating friends 
and social networks. The scholar and biographer al-Ḥasan al-Būrīnī (d. 1024/1615) “was 
widely appreciated for his ability to captivate salon audiences: ‘he was never at a 
scholarly majlis without being its nightingale.’”537 More importantly, biographical 
                                                             
534 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 223. 
535 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 229. 
536 Brookshaw, “Palaces,” 200. 
537 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 230, quoting Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, Luṭf al-samar wa-qaṭf al-thamar min tarājim 
aʿyān al-ṭabaqāt al-ūlā min al-qarn al-ḥādī ʿashr, ed. Maḥmūd al-Shaykh (Damascus: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-
Irshād al-Qawmī, 1981), 359. Ḥasan al-Būrīnī was a Shāfiʿī jurist, biographer, and poet and studied with 
Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī (d. 984/1577) in Cairo. 
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dictionaries relied on literary salons for information on contemporaries.538 That 
biographical dictionaries could transmit information learned at scholarly salons 
further confirms their high social and intellectual standing. However, it is hard to know 
what exactly transpired even at elite salons. While a book may transmit an event from, 
or a piece of information learned during, a salon, actual transcripts of the exchanges or 
conversations are rare. It seems likely that civilian, non-scholarly salons functioned 
within a similar rubric. It has been established that there were literary-intellectual 
salons held by non-professional scholars and non-scholarly educated elites, and that 
these people participated, at least as a public, to public readings of books and in this 
way participated in Mamluk intellectual life.  
An important facet of the majālis is their often contenious nature; they involved 
disputations with varying degrees of formality. Inasmuch as salons were venues for the 
public display of knowledge, they were also opportunities to prove the superiority of 
one’s own knowledge. Indeed, in her study Pfeifer stresses “the competitive nature of 
salons.”539 This underlying spirit of competition is one of the aspects that sharply 
distinguished literary salons from other venues for knowledge-performance, such as a 
study circle. The Fatḥ al-bārī, Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī’s (d. 852/1449) commentary on al-
Bukhārī’s (d. 256/870) al-Ṣaḥīḥ provides a good example of the importance of social 
settings for the production and display of knowledge in ninth/fifteenth century Cairo.  
                                                             
538 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 230-31.  
539 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 233. 
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Al-Fatḥ al-bārī was a text that took form in study circles and then was used by al-
ʿAsqalānī in salons. The history of this particular commentary is well-documented, but 
its history is in many ways smilar to that of other large commentaries. “Commentators 
not only attacked one another from the safety of their written texts but also face to 
face during commentary sessions on the Ṣaḥīḥ in the presence of the political and 
judicial élite.”540 The Fatḥ in particular shows this history and demonstrates how 
important majālis were to the study of hadith. This book “emerged amidst the 
discussion of the Ṣaḥīḥ in the live presence of his [Ibn Ḥajar’s] students.”541 Coming from 
this background, al-Fatḥ was formed through al-ʿAsqalānī’s exchanges with his 
students. Once parts of this book emerged as a written commentary, these discussions 
could and did move from oral to written, from the majlis to the text. The text, however, 
was used in later majlises, when the information moved from text back to majlis. 
Joel Blecher has located a particularly compelling case of this interchange, from 
majlis to text and back, in a series of exchanges between Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī and 
Shams al-Dīn al-Harawī (d. 829/1426), a rival for the Shāfiʿī judgeship who had recently 
arrived at the court in Cairo. At a scholarly gathering in the Sultan’s garden, Ibn Ḥajar 
challenged al-Harawī over who had greater mastery of the hadith. Ibn Ḥajar was able to 
solve a vexing question related to the nature of the everlasting shade in heaven 
referred to in the Quran, in Q Raʿd 13:35. With his superior knowledge and 
understanding of the Quran, Ibn Ḥajar bested al-Harawī in a face-to-face meeting. Not 
                                                             
540 Blecher, “Ḥadīth Commentary,” 274. 
541 Blecher, “Ḥadīth Commentary,” 266, see also 265-268. 
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only did this result in a judgeship for Ibn Ḥajar, but he later recounted this episode in 
his commentary Fatḥ al-Bārī.542 This episode demonstrates the way in which knowledge 
could and did move from book to majlis and then from majlis to book. There could be, 
and often was, a reciprocal relationship between written knowledge and performed 
knowledge.543 
The encounter between Ibn Ḥajar and Shams al-Dīn al-Ḥarawī involved 
interpretation of the Quran and hadith. Episodes like this dealing with issues in Islamic 
law are harder to find. The few transcripts of Mamluk-era salons that remain are of the 
majālis at the courts of the Sultans; though almost all of these works are still in 
manuscript. They nevertheless present interesting records of the proceedings in salons 
as they unfolded. These are probably sanitized transcripts that only indirectly 
represent the discussions that took place, rather than verbatim transcripts recording 
each interaction. Nevertheless, they allow us an interesting glimpse into how 
knowledge was performed at the court of the Sultan. In salons of the Sultan al-Qanṣūh 
Ghawrī, Islamic law was one of the topics discussed. We can see here that riddles were a 
component of their legal discussions, “Question Two: Shaykh Tanum544 read from the 
                                                             
542 This session is remembered in Ibn Ḥajar’s Fatḥ al-bārī, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Bāz (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 
1970), 2:143-44, citation from Blecher, “Ḥadīth Commentary,” 278-280, where he translates the relevant 
passage. 
543 The process through which this book has been described in detail by Joel Blecher. He describes how 
Ibn Ḥajar would first compose this work in private, but that the final version “emerged amidst the 
discussion of the Ṣaḥīḥ in the live presence of his students,” that is, in a teaching-majlis. Joel Blecher, “In 
the Shade of the Ṣaḥīḥ: Politics, Culture and Innovation in an Islamic Commentary Tradition,” Ph.D. Diss., 
Princeton University, 2013, 18-19. 
544 The identity of this Shaykh Tanum is uncertain. 
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Book of [Legal] Riddles…”545 What follows is a riddle on prayer. While the result of this 
exchange is unclear, their use of and reliance on books of legal riddles is evident. 
In three articles on Mamluk prose, Muhsin al-Musawi has similarly argued for 
the connection between the active and diverse intellectual culture and the composition 
of books in the Mamluk Sultanate. “The sheer variety of prose-writing… attests to the 
existence of a dynamic culture characterized by the active involvement of littérateurs, 
widespread networks and a magnanimous devotion to the world of writing.”546 The 
importance of both littérateurs and social networks to the production and consumption 
of knowledge also explains, according to al-Musawi, the prevalence of encyclopedic 
writing during this period. “Islamic medievalists usually focused on the compendium as 
a treasury of knowledge; the compiler is thus a producer who aims to provide readers 
with a reservoir which would otherwise by inaccessible in its original form, found in 
scattered books.”547 Al-Musawi here places the author qua compiler as the driving force 
behind book composition; however, it is as likely that competing demands from readers 
helped shape the texts that were being composed. Given the prominence of majālis in 
Mamluk culture, the role of social networks in the spread and dissemination of books, 
and the importance of majālis towards opinion shaping, however, the possibility of 
books being written for a public, i.e. of demand driving book production, cannot be 
                                                             
545 Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Sharīf, Nafāʾis majālis al-sulṭāniyya fī ḥaqāʾiq asrār al-Qurʾāniyya, MS Topkapı 
Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 2680, Istanbul, 60. 
546 Muhsin al-Musawi, “Pre-Modern Belletristic Prose,” in Cambridge History of Arabic Literature: Arabic 
Literature in the Post-Clasical Period ed. Roger Allen and D.S. Richards (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 132. 
547 Muhsin al-Musawi, “The Medieval Islamic Literary World-System: The Lexicographic Turn” Mamluk 
Studies Review, 17 (2013), 52. 
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overlooked. This is not to say that such supply and demand were the only market forces 
at play in the production of scholarly works, but rather that they were an important 
force that should be kept in mind. More importantly, it will be shown below how books 
of legal distinction in particular, can be seen as responding to this demand from a 
public interested in consumption of a particular kind of legal knowledge. 
The proliferation of these literary salons in Mamluk Egypt was so great that al-
Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī composed a parodistic commentary that takes place in a 
fictional literary gathering. This commentary, Ikhtiraʿ al-khurāʿ, is a commentary on two 
nonsense verses of Arabic poetry.548 For our purposes, however, the frame story into 
which the Ikhtirāʿ is set is of particular importance. “Abū Khurāfah [the protagonist of 
the story] narrates that he was at a party one night with a number of other people—an 
evening of the literary folk… They are sitting around chatting about literature, reciting 
lines for each other.”549 When the guests hear Abu Khurāfah’s nonsense lines, they 
struggle to understand the beauty he sees in them and they propose finding a 
commentary for this poetry in order to better understand it. The commentary in 
Ikhtirāʿ al-khurāʿ is on the nonsense lines provided by Abū Khurāfah. The scene invented 
by al-Ṣafadī, though a caricature, represents one possible example of the kind of 
literary salons common in Mamluk Cairo. Here, we see a group of educated elites 
(ẓurafāʾ) gathered together discussing poetry. These characters are not presented as 
scholars per se, but nevertheless spend part of their free-time engaged in intellectual 
                                                             
548 Kelly Tuttle has studied this work in her dissertation, see Kelly Tuttle “Expansion and Digression: A 
Study in Mamlūk Literary Commentary,” (PhD Diss. University of Pennsylvania, 2013), 79-108.  
549 Tuttle, “Expansion and Disgression,” 85-86. 
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and literary activities. They vie to impress each other through their knowledge of 
poetry and seek the aesthetic pleasure of reciting and hearing lines of beautiful poetry, 
as well as of understanding and explaining these lines. It is from this that the parody of 
Ikhtirāʿ gains its currency. 
The role of the majlis as a site for knowledge-performance remained even after 
the end of Mamluk power. As we learn from Nelly Hanna’s recent work on Ottoman 
Cairo, salons continued to be an important part of life in the 16th-18th centuries. She 
focuses particularly on the importance of the salon as part of a middle-class intellectual 
exchange, noting that it included, “the diverse forms existing for the transmission of 
learning and knowledge such as the spread of a book culture, the coffeehouse, the 
literary salon—and their significance for our understanding of the way that the middle-
class culture was shaped during [this] period.”550 By this period, the majlis was not the 
only social venue for knowledge-performance, but it nevertheless remained 
important.551 Majālis covered a wide variety of topics. The kind of salons that Hanna 
finds in Ottoman Cairo are Sufi salons that included dhikr, literary salons in which 
“people recited literature, composed poetry, improvised verses, and read books out 
loud;” arenas for “entertainment, with musical instruments, singing, and games of 
chess;” and “serious majalis focused on scholarly issues, with the participants discussing 
                                                             
550 Nelly Hanna, In Praise of Books: A Cultural History of Cairo’s Middle Class, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century, 
(Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2004), 14. 
551 Hanna, In Praise of Book, 73. 
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fiqh or tafsir.”552 It is important to note that these salons were an important part of 
middle-class culture, but were also gatherings held by intellectuals and political elites.  
It is likely that the middle-class majālis discussed by Hanna are extensions of the 
‘popular poetry’ salons prevalent in Mamluk Cairo. Of these, Margaret Larkin says 
“Much was sung or delivered in informal gatherings.”553 These salons were attended by 
“patrons and consumers who hail, if not from the lower classes, at least from what 
might be considered a kind of petite bourgeoisie.”554 In speaking of popular scholarly 
culture, I refer to activities in which the participants were not only observers but had 
opportunities to be performers as well. It is this potential for participation that allows 
attendees an opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge. There was, of course, 
another kind of popular scholarly performance, such as staged readings of poetry, 
popular preaching, or even the performance of shadow-plays. The popularity of these 
performances is likely also related to popular interest in knowledge and learning, but 
the performances are not directly related to the discussion at hand.555  
However all that may be, modern discussions of ‘middle-class salons’ and ‘the 
rise of popular poetry’ involving some members of the ‘merchant class’ remain vague 
due to a lack of information regarding what exactly occurred during these meetings. 
For instance, it seems likely that someone who could be described as a ‘middle class 
                                                             
552 Hanna, In Praise of Books, 73. 
553 Larkin, “Popular Poetry,” 194 
554 Larkin, “Popular Poetry,” 193-94. 
555 These broad phenomena have been studied in some detail, but there is still need for study of more 
specific contexts, see Jonathan P. Berkey “Popular Culture under the Mamluks: A Historiographical 
Survey” Mamluk Studies Review 9.2 (2005): 133-146; and Boaz Shoshan, Popular Culture in Medieval Cairo 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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merchant’ would have had a lower degree of familiarity with religious sciences than 
professional scholars, although it seems likely merchants might have been quite 
familiar with contract law. In other words, any discussion of a specialized intellectual 
topic such as fiqh or hadith criticism that took place at such a salon cannot be expected 
to have carried the same level of sophistication as in a majlis at the court of the Sultan. 
That does not mean, however, that such topics were not discussed in non-elite or non-
courtly salons, in addition to various kinds of poetry and literature. 
Other evidence that points to a transference between oral and written 
exchanges in majālis exists, but it is circumstantial. As mentioned in Chapter One, the 
distinctions book attributed to Najm al-Dīn al-Naysābūrī states explicitly that it is was 
meant to be used in majālis. In one manuscript of this work, the author says: “A 
colleague (baʿḍ ikhwānī) asked me to write a book (an uhadddhiba)… that you can consult 
during discussions in majālis (yastadilluhu fī al-majālis) and from which you can find 
guidance in schools (yustaḍīʾa bihi min al-madāris).”556 This is a strange passage, and it 
seems to have given copyists trouble as well, as no two manuscript witnesses provide 
the same reading.557 The juxtaposition of majālis and madāris in this context, in addition 
to providing a rhyme, perhaps indicates that the majālis are not study sessions. 
                                                             
556 Giresun Yazmalar 44, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul, 1b.  
557 The Giresun Yazmalar manuscript, in general, is written in an exceptionally clear hand with full 
diacritical marks, i.e. with both dots and vowels markers (al-ḥarakāt). The phrase yastadilluhu fī al-majālis, 
however, has only the consonantal skeleton without any diacritical marks. The other reading of this 
phrase could be yasnadu lahu fī al-majālis. 
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Of the seven witnesses to this text, four omit this introduction entirely, yet 
these seven texts are all otherwise remarkably similar.558 The other three manuscripts 
of this text with an introduction are Halet Efendi 780, Yazma Baǧıșlar 1187, and Leiden 
Or. 481. Here, Halet Efendi 780 and Yazma Baǧıșlar 1187 read “to benefit from during 
majālis while doing without school training (li-yantfiʿa bi-hā fī al-majālis wa-yastaghnā ʿan 
al-madāris).”559 The Leiden manuscript has a third reading for this text. This text reads 
“to entertain with in majālis and to learn from in schools (yastahziʾu bihā fī al-majālis wa-
yastaḍīʿu bihā fī al-madāris).”560 In all three of these text, the text and the meaning of this 
phrase are different. The second variant presents law colleges as unimportant; instead 
of offering the book as a sort of cheat-sheet for Islamic law, it obviates the requirement 
of a complete formal legal education. The Leiden manuscript sees itself as a source of 
entertainment and a supplement to this education. In all of these readings, however, 
majālis and madāris are paralleled, suggesting that they each refer to different venues 
for the learning and performance of legal knowledge. 
 
The Literature of Riddles and Legal Riddling 
The history of legal distinctions cannot be fully explained without understanding their 
relationship to legal riddles. The tradition of legal riddling serves largely as play and 
                                                             
558 I discuss this issue in Chapter Six, see pp. 340-43. 
559 Halet Efendi 780, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul, 1b; Yazma Baǧıșlar 1187, Suleymaniye Library, 
Istanbul, 84b. The YB1187 has a slight variant in the second clause, reading: “yantafiʿu bihā fī al-majālis wa-
yastaghnā bihā ʿan al-madāris,” “to benefit from this book in salons and not need school training because 
of it.”  
560 Leiden, Or. 481, 3a. 
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entertainment, and authors in this tradition justify themselves by claiming their works 
as worthwhile diversions. In one book of legal riddles, for example, the Mālikī jurist Ibn 
Farḥūn (d. 799/1397) cites a proverb by ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib as an apology for the practice 
of riddling. “Divert the soul on occasion, for it rusts just as metal rusts.”561 A diversion, 
in this case riddling, serves as a kind of antioxidant to refresh and enliven the soul. Ibn 
Farḥūn continues his defense of riddling by discussing a prophetic hadith found in al-
Bukhārī’s al-Ṣaḥīḥ and in Mālik’s al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, among other hadith collections: 
Ismāʿīl said: Mālik related to me, on the authority of ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar, the 
following. 
The Messenger of God, may God’s prayers and peace be upon him, said, 
“here is a tree whose leaves never fall. It is, indeed, like a Muslim (wa-hiya mathal 
al-muslim). Tell me, what is it?” 
The people’s thoughts turned to the desert trees, but it occurred to me 
that it was the date-palm (al-nakhla), but I shied away from responding. 
“O, Messenger of God, will you tell us what it is?” we asked. 
“It’s the date-palm,” replied the Messenger of God. 
I talked to my father [ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb] about what I had thought 
and he said, “I would have liked nothing better than for you to have said that to 
him (la-an takūna qultahā aḥabbu ilayya min an takūna lī kadhā wa-kadhā).”562 
                                                             
561 Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Ibn Farḥūn al-Mālikī, Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ fī muḥāḍarat al-khawāṣṣ, ed. Muḥammad 
Abū al-Ajfān and ʿUthmān Baṭīkh (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth; Tunis: al-Maktaba al-ʿAtīqa[, 1980]), 62-63. 
562 Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Kitāb al-ʿIlm, Bāb al-ḥayāʾ fī al-ʿilm.  
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In this example Muḥammad himself participates in the act of riddling. He poses a riddle 
to a crowd gathered before him. If Muḥammad sanctions this activity, then it must be 
meritorious. At the same time, the ending of this hadith, with a father’s gentle chiding 
of his son for not having hazarded a guess, is suggestive. It is not just any father, but the 
“stern, strong-willed, [and] prone to anger” caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 23/644) 
reproaching his son, ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar (d. 73/693) for not participating in this 
game.563 While this aspect of the story does not involve Muḥammad directly, it is clear 
from the way that this tradition is preserved, that riddling is an approved (even 
edifying) activity and that audience participation is encouraged. The father’s longing 
for his son to answer correctly was because he saw it as an opportunity to impress 
Muḥammad and as an opportunity for diversion and play. The activity no longer 
becomes only a moment for scholars to hone their skills, but rather an activity for 
people to partake in for entertainment, or as ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib says, to find some 
entertaining diversion. With the examples of the Prophet and ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Ibn 
Farḥūn situates the legitimacy of scholarly entertainment with several foundational 
figures from early Islam. 
In starting his book in this fashion, Ibn Farḥūn models his book of legal riddles 
on a longer tradition of books on riddling. Riddles in the Arabo-Islamic tradition, as 
described in the above hadith, share the main characteristics of riddles as generally 
understood. The discussion of riddles in the Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics 
                                                             
563 EI2 s.v. “ʿUmar (I) ibn al-Khaṭṭāb” (G. Levi Della Vida and M. Bonner). 
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explains the function of riddles clearly. Riddles are exercises in wordplay, punning, or 
the use of metaphors, imagery, and more.  
Typically, an intentionally misleading question presents an enigma that can be 
resolved only by a clever ‘right’ answer. In a ‘true riddle,’ the question presents 
a description, which usually describes something in terms of something else, 
and a ‘block element,’ a contradiction or confusion that disrupts the initial 
description. 564  
In the question that Muḥammad poses, the comparison between believers and trees 
supplies the misleading question, and the answer of the palm-tree is the clever 
solution. This template holds for linguistic riddles as well as for legal riddles. Riddles 
are either seemingly simple questions with elusive answers or opaque statements that 
invite the participation of the reader or listener. The purpose of books of riddles is to 
provoke the curiosity and intellectual engagement of readers or of an audience. 
Discerning the answer is difficult and a test of skill; falling short, however, still allows 
readers to contemplate the answer and enjoy the word-play in the riddle that elicits the 
correct response. 
The act of riddling is an inherently social activity. A riddle is posed by one 
person to another person or to a group of persons. Riddles all involve question and 
                                                             
564 Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, s.v. “Riddles.” Interestingly, riddles do not seem to have been 
a popular genre within Persian writing. In fact, Seyed-Gohrab says that there are “no such collections[of 
riddles], and riddles are scattered throughout poetric dīvāns” (15). In his study, he finds that riddles as a 
literary technique were quite important in Persian literature, particularly within the qaṣīda form and 
that it “may, in fact, be regarded as a legacy of Middle Persian literature” (31). It is peculiar that books of 
riddles were very popular in Arabic but found no real currency in Persian. See A. A. Seyed-Gohrab, “The 
Art of Riddling in Classical Persian Poetry,” Edebiyat 12 (2001), 15-36. 
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answer, either through the direct positing of a question or through an allusive 
statement, the interpretation of which needs explanation. Riddles obtain their value by 
exploiting a knowledge disparity between the one posing the riddle and the audience. 
This disparity makes them useful for the performance of knowledge as a status-
enhancing activity. Nevertheless, riddles also thrived as a textual genre, in which a 
book’s narrator assumes the role of questioner or riddler. Ḥājjī Khalīfa, for example, 
sees alghāz as primarily a textual genre. “It is the science from which the precise and 
more or less unknown meaning of words are known (yutaʿarrafu minhu dalālat al-alfāẓ 
ʿalā al-murād dalāla khafiyya fī al-ghāya).”565 For him, alghāz is a science, i.e. a textual 
tradition. The very inclusion of alghāz as a written genre in its own right in the 
bibliographic work written by Ḥājjī Khalīfa signals the importance of riddles as a mode 
of writing in the classical tradition.  
In spite of this importance, only recently have scholars begun to analyze riddles 
as a serious form of Arabo-Islamic literature.566 Because of this lack of study, there are 
many important questions still unanswered about the history of Arabic riddling. We 
have yet to pinpoint major works or authors within this field, let alone define the 
relationship between riddles and other forms of knowledge and entertainment. As will 
be discussed below, riddling thrived as a social activity in classical Arabo-Islamic 
                                                             
565 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn 1:149.  
566 See, for instance, Thomas Bauer’s entry in EI3 on Khālid ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Azharī, a grammarian from 
15th century Egypt. In this entry, Bauer discusses al-Azharī’s writings, but his al-Alghāz al-naḥwiyya, The 
Grammatical Riddles, are mentioned only in passing in the bibliography. “Several works of al-Azharī were 
published in early prints that are hardly accessible today or are still in manuscript, among them al-
Alghāz al-naḥwiyya (“Grammatical riddles”), probably printed in Cairo 1281/1864.” In part, the study of 
ridldes is due to the lack of printed editions. EI3 s.v. “al-Azharī, Khālid ibn ʿAbdallāh” (T. Bauer). 
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culture, but the relationship between this activity and books of riddles has yet to be 
established. A brief overview of riddles as both social and textual practices shows their 
importance to the classical Arabo-Islamic tradition. One of the main findings of my 
research into riddling as a social practice shows an increasing interest in riddling as a 
manner of presenting information starting from the 11th century and seemingly 
reaching a plateau in Mamluk Cairo.  
 As implied by Ḥājjī Khalīfa in his definition of alghāz, riddles encompass much 
more than just legal riddles; indeed the most common kind of riddles are linguistic or 
lexicographic. The most recent study of Arabic riddles is Muḥammad Sālimān’s essay, 
Fann al-alghāz ʿinda al-ʿarab. Sālimān’s study focuses exclusively on linguistic riddles, 
both grammatical and lexicographic. Fann al-alghāz is published together with four 
works of linguistic riddles, selections from al-Ifṣāḥ fī sharḥ abyāt mushkilāt al-iʿrāb by al-
Ḥasan ibn Asad al-Fāriqī (d. 487/1074), al-Alghāz al-naḥwiyya by Khālid ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-
Azharī (d. 905/1499), al-Ṭāʾir al-maymūn fī ḥall lughz al-kanz al-madfūn by Jamāl al-Dīn al-
Qāsimī (d. 1332/1914), and al-Lafẓ al-lāʾiq wa-l-maʿnā al-rāʾiq by Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 
Hārūn (d. unknown). The fact that Sālimān chose to publish these works in particular 
alongside his essay underscores the precedence that he sees in linguistic riddles over 
that of other kinds of riddles.567 
                                                             
567 Muḥammad Sālimān, Fann al-alghāz ʿinda al-ʿarab wa-maʿhu al-Lafẓ al-lāʾiq wa-l-maʿnā al-rāʾiq. Al-Alghāz al-
naḥwiyya. Al-Ṭāʾir al-maymūn fī ḥall lughz al-Kanz al-madfūn, ed. Muḥammad Sālimān (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-
Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, 2012). 
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There are, however, books of riddles in various scholarly disciplines including 
law.568 Indeed, the history of legal riddles in the Arabic tradition incorporates, however, 
not only works of Islamic law, but also ought to include literary (adab) works including 
the figure of the Jurist of the Arabs (Faqīh al-ʿArab).569 Nevertheless, the specific motives 
for telling and recording legal riddles remains to be discovered. 
Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and ʿUthmān Baṭīkh, the editors of Ibn Farḥūn’s work 
on legal riddles, Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ fī muḥāḍarat al-khawāṣṣ, suggest that interest in 
riddles is a result of jurists’ desire for ever more complete understandings of 
substantive law.  
Perhaps the secret to the profusion of legal riddles is the jurists’ need (ḥurṣ) for 
diversifying their research methods for substantive law (asālīb baḥth al-furūʿ al-
                                                             
568 See EI2 s.v. “Lughz” (Bencheheb). 
569 The Faqīh al-ʿArab seems to be a trickster figure prominent in early Islamic writings. He makes 
appearances in the maqāma collection of al-Harīrī, particularly the 32nd maqāma, al-maqāma al-ṭībiyya, but 
also in such works as Futyā faqīh al-ʿarab by the lexicographer Aḥmad ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004). Ibn al-Jawzī 
includes a refutation of fatwas issued by the faqīh al-ʿarab in his Tablīs Iblīs. The existence of this figure 
signals us towards intersections of intellectual play and Islamic law that seem to prefigure a more 
formalized genre of riddles within the textual world of Islamic law. This history remains to be written. 
The existence of a jurist-figure in works of adab and the collections of his fatwas may grant us insight 
into contestations over legal authority and the status required to interpret the Quran and hadith, in a 
manner similar to Joseph E. Lowry, “The First Islamic Legal Theory: Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ on Interpretation, 
Authority, and the Structure of the Law” Journal of the American Oriental Society 128 (2008): 25-40 and idem., 
“The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba: A Reconsideration” Islamic Law and Society 11 
(2004): 1-41. See also, Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, Maqama: A History of a Genre (Weisbaden: Harrassowitz, 
2002), 157-58, 269-70, 344. I thank Matthew L. Keegan for alerting me to the importance of the faqīh al-
ʿarab figure for the history of legal riddles and for these references. Abū al-Faraj ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAlī 
Ibn al-Jawzī, Talbīs Iblīs, no ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, 1403[/1983]), 123; Abū Muḥammad al-Qāsim ibn ʿAlī 
al-Ḥarīrī, Maqāmāt al-Ḥarīrī (Beirut: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, 1873), 325-48; Abū al-Ḥusayn Aḥmad ibn Fāris al-
Lughawī, Kitāb Futya faqīh al-ʿarab, ed. Ḥusayn ʿAlī Maḥfūẓ in Majallat al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿArabī 33.3 
(1377/1958): 441-466 and Majallat al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī a-ʿArabī 33.4 (1377/1958): 633-56.  
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fiqhiyya). Riddles also provide opportunities for examining the scope and 
substance of what is known (li-ikhtibār madā tarkīz al-maʿlūmāt) and help jurists 
remember the most obscure rulings (wa-li-daʿm al-ʿawīṣ minhā fī al-adhhān).570 
The relationships that Abū al-Ajfān and Baṭīkh establish between riddles, research into 
substantive law, and debating styles are clear. This claim can be pushed further, 
however: riddles were also a status-related social practice in which professionals and 
cultural elites participated. Further, the direction of causality Abū al-Ajfān and Baṭīkh 
establish is less clear. It seems more likely that social practices led to the composition 
of these books rather than the composition of a genre of books altering existing social 
practices. This is similar to the claim made in Chapter Three of the present study, that 
the need to overcome farq objections in actual disputations provided a major impetus 
for the composition of books of legal distinctions. 
While the word alghāz (sg. lughz) seems to be the most commonly used word to 
describe riddling, it also competes with other terms such as aḥājī (pl. uḥjiyya), 
muʿammayāt (pl. muʿammā), muʿāyāt (pl. muʿāyat), imtiḥānāt (sg. imtiḥān) and even al-asʿila 
wa-l-ajwiba. Certain authors seem to believe in strong distinctions between these terms. 
Ibn Farḥūn seems to relate each term to a different branch of learning. “Scholars have 
written numerous books on this subject.571 Jurists call this kind of writing ‘riddles’ 
(alghāz), scholars of inheritance call it ‘enigmas’ (al-muʿammiyāt), grammarians 
                                                             
570 Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and ʿUthmān Baṭīkh, “Introduction” to Ibn Farḥūn, Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm 
Ibn Farḥūn al-Mālikī, Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ fī muḥāḍarat al-khawāṣṣ, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and ʿUthmān 
Baṭīkh (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth; Tunis: al-Maktaba al-ʿAtīqa[, 1980]), 37. 
571 Ibn Farḥūn is specifically discussing the asking and answersing of very obscure questions (al-masāʾil al-
ʿawīṣāt). 
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‘puzzlers’ (al-muʿammā), and lexicographers call it ‘quandaries’ (aḥājī).”572 Ibn Farḥūn 
claims to write his book because of the importance of this kind of riddling and the lack 
of such books in the Mālikī school.573 According to Ibn Farḥūn, the use of alghāz to refer 
to riddles is a usage of the jurists, but in Muḥammad Sālimān’s recent essay on alghāz, 
legal riddles are not even mentioned. 
Writing in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, however, Bencheheb says “a lughz is 
an ‘enigma’, muʿammā (pl. muʿammayāt ) ‘word puzzle, verbal charade’, uḥjiyya (pl.aḥājī) 
‘riddle, conundrum’, three Arabic terms often used in a figurative sense, but basically 
referring to three kinds of literary plays upon words which are fairly close in type to 
each other.”574 According to Bencheheb, the lughz and uḥjiyya are both riddles in the 
style of question and answer, while the muʿammā is a riddle without the question and 
answer. The word muʿāmmā, however, can also be used to mean a code or secret 
writing.575 The works discussed by Bencheheb on riddles and puzzles are primarily 
lexicographical or linguistic. “The enigma [(lughz)] is generally in verse, and 
characteristically is in an interrogative form.”576 A riddle demands to be solved, the 
answer almost certainly involving a play on words or a double-entendre. All three 
styles are generally, but not always, in verse. In other words, his study of riddles found 
differences based on the form of these puzzles, not in the fields in which they were 
applied. 
                                                             
572 Ibn Farḥūn, Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ, 64-65. 
573 Ibn Farḥūn, Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ, 65. 
574 EI2 s.v. “Lughz” (Bencheheb). 
575 See EI2, “Muʿammā” (Bosworth). 
576 EI2 s.v. “Lughz” (Bencheheb). 
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It does not seem that these three terms for riddles have relevance in the legal 
realm. Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm al-Bashar, in his study on Abū al-ʿAbbās al-
Jurjānī’s work of legal riddles, finds no difference between the various terms for riddles, 
alghāz, muʿammā, uḥjiyya, etc. as used in al-Jurjānī’s book. Al-Jurjānī’s book, he says, “is 
not a book of alghāz in the technical meaning of the word (al-maʿnā al-muṣṭalaḥ ʿalayhi), 
even though it is counted among these works and considered one of them. The author, 
may God have mercy on him, had a different goal with this book.”577 Further, al-Bashar 
discounts the idea of riddles as a genre. “It did not become an independent branch of 
legal studies at all (lam takun ʿilman qāʾiman bi-dhātihi ʿinda ʿulamāʾ al-sharīʿa), even if 
some scholars dedicated books to this topic.”578 Note the elision of alghāz, aḥājī, and 
muʿāyāt in this quotation, terms he also refers to as basically synonyms (alfāẓ 
mutaqāriba). It is unclear why al-Bashar does not accept this as a branch of legal studies, 
in spite of the number of books written on legal riddles. 
The riddles themselves in such books are generally presented in dialogue form, 
just as are legal riddles. Ibn Farḥūn’s book is a series of consecutive simulated dialogs. 
Each riddle is introduced with a conditional protasis, the phrase, “If you were to ask… 
(fa-in qulta),” and the answer provides the apodosis, “I would reply… (wa-qultu).” The 
dialogues are blueprints, similar to the inclusion of diputations in certain books of legal 
                                                             
577 Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm al-Bashar “Introduction” to Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-
Jurjānī, Kitāb al-Muʿāyāt fī al-fiqh ʿalā madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī, ed. Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm al-
Bashar (PhD. Diss.: Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1415[/1994]), 37.  
578 Al-Bashar “Introduction” to al-Jurjānī, Kitāb al-Muʿāyāt, 37. 
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distinctions discussed earlier in this dissertation.579 Given the importance of riddles at 
majālis, it seems likely that the dialogic presentation in these works was a blueprint for 
performance. Arriving at the solution to a legal riddle involves a high degree of 
sophisticated legal and linguistic education. Fortunately for the reader, these books not 
only pose complicated legal riddles but also provide the solution. In this way, not only 
did a book of riddles potentially prepare one for participation in a majlis, but the act of 
reading a book of riddles could function as a simulation of attending a majlis. The book 
poses questions for the reader to answer. The reader can attempt to solve the riddle 
and then verify their answer with the one provided in the text. The possibility for 
enjoyment comes through attempting to solve the puzzle, or failing to solve it, through 
understanding the solution to the puzzle on reading it. 
The Ḥanafī jurist Ibn al-Shiḥna’s (d. 1447-48/1515-16) al-Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya fī 
alghāz al-Ḥanafiyya is also typical of the genre. The majority of the riddles are posed 
with the conditional “If someone were to say… (in qīla…)” and the solution to the riddle 
is introduced with the formula “the reply is… (wa-l-jawāb).”580 The majority of these 
riddles come from Ibn al-Shiḥna himself. He also includes riddles from a book entitled 
al-Tahdhīb fī dhihn al-labīb by a certain Ibn al-ʿIzz.581 The daunting riddles from al-
                                                             
579 See Chapter Three. 
580 See ʿAbd al-Birr ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-Shiḥna, Alghāz al-Ḥanafiyya li-Ibn Shiḥna al-Musammā al-Dhakhāʾir 
al-ashrafiyya fī alghāz al-Ḥanafiyya, ed. Fāṭima Shihāb (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 2014). 
581 I believe this refers to Abū al-Maḥāsin ʿAlī ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad Ibn Abī al-ʿIzz (d. 792/1389). See 
Muʾassat Āl al-Bayt, al-Fihrisal-shāmil li-l-turāth al-ʿarabī al-islāmi al-makhṭūṭ 2nd edition (Amman: 
Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt, n.d.), 41:29. See also Markaz al-Malik al-Fayṣal li-l-Buḥūth wa-l-Dirāsāt al-
Islāmiyyah, Khizānat al-turāth: Fihris shāmil li-ʿanāwīn al-makhṭūṭāt wa-amākinihā wa-arqām ḥifẓihā fī maktabāt 
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Tahdhīb have different phrasing than those in al-Dhakhāʾir and are followed by their 
solutions.582 Generally, solving the riddles involves either thorough mastery of 
substantive law, a mastery of the Arabic language and linguistic interpretation, or both.  
For instance, Ibn al-Shiḥna asks:  
Question (fa-in qīla): Which wells (ayy biʾr) cannot be used for ablutions 
until one bucketful of water has been poured out from it? 
Answer (fa-l-jawāb): A well with a bucket that has previously been used to 
draw water from a different well which has sufficiently impure water and may 
not be used for ablutions (biʾr wajaba nazḥ dalāʾ minhā). Performing ablutions 
with the water from such a well is only permitted once one bucketful of water 
has been poured out from it. This ruling is applied in a proportionally consistent 
manner; the number of buckets of water poured out should be equivalent to the 
number of times the impure bucket was used (yaṭṭaridu al-suʾāl fī al-dalwayn wa-
thalātha wa-arbaʿa bi-ḥasab al-maṣbūb fīhā).583  
Here the riddle consists of a difficult legal question and the solution rests in knowing 
the details of purity law. Water in a well is pure. It can, however, be tainted by the 
addition of impurities. The riddle posed here asks why or how a well could be purified 
by extracting exactly one bucket of water, indeed how can removing rather than 
adding pure water purify the well. In order to solve the riddle, one has to know purity 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
al-ʿālam, CD-ROM #5919. The Khizānat al-turāth catalog is also available online at al-Maktaba al-Shāmila, 
http://shamela.ws/browse.php/book-5678. 
582 He discusses his use of Ibn al-ʿIzz’s work on page 3. For an example, see below. 
583 Ibn al-Shiḥna, Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya, 8. 
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law, the status of water in a well, its potential pollutants, and the remedies for the 
pollution. In other words, in order to understand and solve this riddle, one must know 
the intricacies of substantive law. 
Other riddles, however, require an exercise in linguistic interpretation, as in a 
riddle cited from Ibn al-ʿIzz. This riddle is posed to Abū Ḥanīfa, who provides a solution. 
“It is said that someone asked Abū Ḥanīfa, ‘What do you think about someone who says 
to his wife, ‘I do not wish for Heaven, nor do I fear Hell. I eat carrion and blood. I take 
the word of (uṣaddiqu) Jews and Christians and I loathe God (abghuḍu al-ḥaqq)…”584 The 
man continues in this way making statement after statement that appears to repudiate 
his Muslim faith. Instead of answering the question, however, Abū Ḥanīfa defers to his 
companions (aṣḥābuhu), in order to gauge their opinions. “They all respond, the one 
who says this is an infidel!” Upon hearing this, Abū Ḥanīfa smiled and said, ‘No, he is a 
true believer (muʾmin).”585 At this point the riddle has been fully sketched out. The 
anonymous questioner posed a straightforward question about the status of someone 
who seemingly repudiates Muslim dogma. Abū Ḥanīfa’s companions confirm this 
repudiation with their opinion that he is an infidel. The case seems clear cut. Abū 
Ḥanīfa, however, disagrees. He sees this person as a good, believing Muslim. How can 
this be? 
The answer, supplied by Abū Ḥanīfa, involves a prodigious act of linguistic 
interpretation. His solution involves a linguistic re-interpretation of every single one of 
                                                             
584 Ibn al-Shiḥna, Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya, 199. 
585 Ibn al-Shiḥna, Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya, 199. 
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the speaker’s statements in order to show how each aligns with proper behavior and 
belief. Further, not only is this person shown to be a Muslim in good standing, but Abū 
Ḥanīfa’s interpretations demonstrate that this speaker has attained a high level of 
religious knowledge and piety. Abū Ḥanīfa explains each one of the speaker’s sentences 
as having a pious meaning: “When the speaker says, ‘I do not wish for Heaven, nor do I 
fear Hell,’ this is only because he wishes for and fears their Creator. When he says, ‘I eat 
carrion and blood,’ he means that he eats fish and locusts and liver and spleen.”586 Abū 
Hanīfa continues in this way finding an interpretation for each of the speaker’s 
statements. After reading Abū Ḥanīfa’s explanations, the reader is compelled to agree 
with Abū Ḥanīfa’s assesment.587  
In the example I quoted above, Abū Ḥanīfa interprets the phrase “‘I do not wish 
for Heaven…” as implying an elided phrase (al-ḥadhf). The speaker’s full meaning is, 
according to this interpretation, “I do not wish for Heaven, I wish for God,” but the 
second clause has been elided by the speaker. In interpreting the second statement, 
Abū Ḥanīfa interprets it favorably with a presumption of legality. Only animals that 
have been ritually slaughtered are permissible for eating and consuming blood is never 
acceptable. In spite of this, Abū Ḥanīfa understands that this statement is not about 
eating carrion and blood, but rather an allusion a made by the Prophet Muḥammad. 
“There are two kinds of carrion and two kinds of blood that have been made licit for us. 
                                                             
586 Ibn al-Shiḥna, Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya, 190. 
587 Ibn al-Shihna, Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya, 199-200. 
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The carrion is fish and locust, the blood, liver and spleen.”588 The statement is therefore 
to be understood as an allusion to this prophetic hadith and not as a general statement. 
In making this allusion, the speaker is demonstrating his own knowledge of the 
Prophetic tradition. His words not only echo those of the Prophet, but this hadith is 
also used as an authoritative prooftext in legal discussions of what is permissible to 
eat.589 He is quoting Muḥammad, and quoting him in a correct context. All of the 
speaker’s statements are interpreted in this fashion by Abū Ḥanīfa and the deep 
religious learning of the speaker is brought to the fore. 
These are two examples of the kind of reasoning and presentation found in 
works of legal riddles. A broader survey of riddles would likely expand much more on 
the style and presentations of riddles and likely find diachronic changes in both the 
style of these books and the style of individual legal riddles themselves. For the present 
discussion, however, these examples bring two conclusions to light. The first is the 
legal content of riddles makes books of riddles serious legal works. One must have a 
thorough grounding in substantive doctrine, legal theory, and the Arabic language in 
order to solve the riddles presented in these books. A reader lacking the knowledge to 
answer a riddle can nevertheless learn about the law by reading these works. He can 
                                                             
588 See ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ fī tartīb al-sharāʾiʿ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
1406/1998), 5:58. This hadith appears in Ibn Mājah in his chapter on ṣayd, and his chapter on Foods 
(aṭʿima), in Sunan Abī Dāwūd in the chapter on Foods (aṭʿima), in Mālik’s Muwaṭṭaʾ on Descriptions of the 
Prophet (ṣifat al-nabī), and in the Musnad of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, see Arent Jan Wensinck, Concordance et 
indices de la tradition musulmane: les six livres, le Musnad d’al-Dārimī, le Muwatta’ de Mālik, le Musnad de Aḥmad 
ibn Ḥanbal (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1933-1938), 1:226. 
589 See Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, 5:58; al-Ḥasan ibn Manṣūr al-Uzjandī Qāḍīkhān, Sharḥ al-Ziyādāt (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ 
al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 2005/1426), 5:2117. 
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understand the relationship between the question and answer given knowledge of 
both.  
The second point is perhaps more important. These books show the degree to 
which jurists could indulge in intellectual play within their professional discipline of 
Islamic law. These books show us moments of sustained enjoyment in the intricacies of 
Islamic law and legal theory. At the same time, however, they remain serious and 
valuable works of Islamic law. Moreover, these books show that play was an acceptable 
way to interact with Islamic legal knowledge. Not only do the author and reader 
interact in games of riddles, but as the second example shows, Abū Ḥanīfa is given a 
prominence within this tradition. He himself, the eponym of the legal school, is shown 
taking part in the tradition of riddling.  
My understanding of play in the context of Islamic law is inspired by the work 
of Norman Calder, particularly his Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era.590 His 
discussion of play comes largely from his understanding of Islamic law as a more or less 
stable set of rules and relationships that jurists constantly attempt to reinvent and 
redescribe. For him, play is in many ways the primary literary feature of Islamic law. 
“[T]he most characteristic features of development through time are those that reflect, 
not an interest in new rules, but a self-reflective interest in the tradition itself and in 
the modes of expressing inherited rules.”591 Accordingly, any interesting development 
in Islamic law might occur on a literary – not a legal – level. In this legal context, play 
                                                             
590 See also, however, the discussion of Calder’s earlier ideas about play in Islamic law in “Alta Discussion” 
in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Boston; Leiden, 2006), 413-14. 
591 Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence, 71. 
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involves two activities. The first activity is a richer linguistic analysis and maker more 
intricate connections between the issues inherent in legal texts—such as grammar and 
lexicography, but also investigations of passages cited from the Quran and hadith 
corpus. The second activity involved in this intellectual play is the pursuit of greater 
stylistic refinement and organizational clarity. “Real measurable development, 
implying a process that is more or less continuous through time and in a definable 
direction, can be distinguished only in relation to organisational technique, linguistic 
presentation, and syntactical virtuosity.”592 In Calder’s telling, it was this aspect of legal 
thinking that made the study of law “a joy and delight” for pre-modern jurists.593 While 
I do not agree entirely with Calder’s dismissal of substantive developments, his focus on 
the aesthetic dimensions of legal literature is compelling and worthy of further 
research.594 
                                                             
592 Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence, 35. 
593 Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence, 86. 
594 Calder is convincing in his analysis in terms of the genres that he studies, the mabsūṭ and the 
mukhtaṣar. Other scholars, however, have shown doctrinal development in other genres of Islamic legal 
writing. In particular, Baber Johansen has demonstrated how Ottoman legal commentaries showed 
important changes in substantive law. Other studies have also shown development occurring in fatwa 
literature. Wael Hallaq discusses development from a theoretical standpoint and David Powers and Yosef 
Rappaport have demonstrated this from a social historical perspective. These important studies do not 
undermine or go against Calder’s conclusions for the two genres he studies nor his general approach to 
Islamic legal texts. See Baber Johansen, “Legal Literature and the Problem of Change,” Islam and Public 
Law: Classical and Contemporary Studies, ed. Chibli Mallat (London: Graham and Trotman, 29-47; idem., The 
Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent: The Peasants’ Loss of Property Rights under the Hanafite Doctrine (London; 
New York: Croom Helm, 1988); Wael Hallaq “From Fatwās to Furūʿ: Growth and Change in Islamic 
Substantive Law,” Islamic Law and Society 1 (1994): 29-65; David Powers, Law, Society, and Culture in the 
Maghrib, 1300-1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Yossef Rapoport, Marriage, Money, 
and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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We can see this kind of intellectual play at work in books of legal riddles and we 
will see that books of legal distinctions employ similar tools. For Calder, play involves 
ways to improve the presentation of legal information. He discusses how play is used to 
increase the precision of legal language and clarify the relationship between laws and 
ideas. In riddles, of course, the play works in an opposite way. The riddle itself makes 
the law ambiguous or obscure; the answer involves perceiving the straightforward 
application of law through this obscurity. Both steps involve a high degree of linguistic 
play and creative exploration of linguistic and legal issues. The intellectual dexterity 
involved in solving a riddle made this activity not only enjoyable, but also appropriate 
as a way of honing one’s legal mind. Ibn Farḥūn makes a statement to this effect in the 
introduction to his book on legal riddles. “[I]t is necessary for a scholar to test (an 
yumarrina) his colleagues by asking them the most obscure questions possible (ilqāʾ al-
masāʾil al-ʿawīṣāt ʿalayhim) to test their minds’ ability to clarify difficult questions 
(muʿaḍḍalāt) and decipher obscure questions (īḍāḥ al-mushkilāt).”595 Ibn Farḥūn’s 
quotation implies that some of the most obscure questions possible are to be found in 
the form of legal riddles, and that solving legal riddles was a way of maintaining a sharp 
legal mind. It was not only legal riddles, however, where some of these obscure 
questions were to be found. 
Many works of legal distinctions packaged the law as riddles or quasi-riddles, 
comparing laws in ways that seem confusing or unintelligible, but in such a way that 
the prolonged comparison actually reveals the straightforward distinction, much in the 
                                                             
595 Ibn Farḥūn, Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ, 64. 
 263 
 
way that the question and answer in riddles are packaged. Interestingly, however, the 
relationship between riddles and distinctions as legal concepts was not a one-way 
affair. It was not only that riddles led to a newfound sense of play in certain works of 
legal distinctions, but the reasoning of legal distinctions showed itself to be a 
compelling way of presenting legal riddles. 
 
Legal Distinctions as Play  
The style of presentation of legal riddles proved useful to authors of works on legal 
distinctions. The form and logic of works of legal distinctions were equally useful for 
the presentation of legal riddles and many works of legal distinctions, particularly 
those written during the Mamluk Sultanate, adopt the rhetorical style of the riddle-
form.  
Riddle-influenced legal distinctions can be seen clearly in the chapter on legal 
distinctions in Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir; I focus in particular on his section on 
ritual purity.596 The first distinction in this section says, “If a piece of animal dung 
(buʿra) falls into a well, it does not render the water impure. However, if half of a piece 
of animal dung (naṣfuhā) falls into a well, it does render the water impure.”597 This 
                                                             
596 Ibn Nujaym claims that all of his distinctions come from the “the legal distinction work written by 
Imām al-Karābīsī titled Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī.” The first part of this statement likely refers to Asʿad ibn 
Muḥammad al-Karābīsī and his book al-Furūq. The Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī, however, refers to a different work 
by a different author, the Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī al-furūq by Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh al-Maḥbūbī (d. 640/1243), 
also known as Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Awwal. 
597 Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn Ibrāhīm Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī, Kitāb al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir with Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad 
al-Ḥamawī Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir sharḥ Kitāb al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, no ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, 1985/1405), 4:285. This is the first distinction in the sixth chapter.  
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distinction seems to challenge the most basic laws of logic. How can a greater amount 
of an impure substance be less impure than a lesser amount? This logical affront prods 
the reader to reflect, to understand how these two situations can result.  
The next distinction is just as confusing. “It is not incumbent on a man to help 
his sick wife perform her minor ablutions, but it incumbent on him to help his sick 
slaves, male or female, perform their minor ablutions.”598 In this instance, a husband 
has a greater legal obligation to help his slaves perform their religious duties than he 
has to his wife. Again, this situation seems to defy common sense. Privileging the 
religious duties of one’s slaves at the expense of one’s wife contravenes the expected 
social order. Not only would this devalue marriage in relation to slavery and 
concubinage, but this distinction also seems to place the religious needs of an enslaved 
person above those of a free person. Again, this distinction stokes a sense of curiosity in 
the reader, highlighting the allure of what is to come. Because the distinction seems so 
absurd, the reader expects the author to resolve this uncomfortable state of affairs. The 
explanation Ibn Nujaym provides has to resolve not only the contradiction between the 
laws compared, but also the seeming incongruity between these substantive laws and 
common sense. The anticipation established by the comparison and the resolution 
thereof through the discussion of the distinction is a clear borrowing of the 
presentation style of riddles, which functions similarly in order to gain the attention of 
a reader or an audience. While the claims that Ibn Nujaym makes in his comparisons 
are provocative, his explanation of the distinction between the compared laws places 
                                                             
598 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, 4:286. This is the second distinction in the sixth chapter. 
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them squarely within the normal doctrinal parameters of Islamic law. Further, the 
reasoning makes the seeming incongruity clear and shows the outcomes to be logical. 
With the rationale presented, the strange case of the conflicting laws no longer appears 
absurd, but rather as an anomaly that results from normal processes of legal reasoning.  
In the case of animal dung falling into a well, why would a lesser quantity be 
more polluting than a greater quantity? Ibn Nujaym explains “The distinction is that 
one piece of animal dung, when it falls into a well, is covered by an outer crust that 
prevents the pollutants from spreading (tamnaʿu min al-shuyūʿ), whereas this is not the 
case with half of a piece.”599 Ibn Nujaym’s explanation functions on two separate levels. 
The first which functions largely on stylistic grounds explains the absurdity involved in 
the phrasing. Contrary to the way this distinction was presented, this distinction does 
not say that less of a pollutant pollutes more, but rather that the two entities compared 
are not alike. It is only through this highly specific comparison that the lesser quantity 
can be understood to be more polluting. The second level on which Ibn Nujaym’s 
explanation functions involves the legal rulings in regard to ritual purity. Here, the 
idea is that a polluting substance pollutes a pure substance by penetrating the pure 
substance. The lesser quantity of a pollutant is capable of seeping into the well water, 
whereas the greater quantity is, in effect, in a sealed container and therefore not 
polluting. It is a curious situation, but no longer perplexing. 
The case of performing ablutions for others resolves itself with a similar logic. 
Ibn Nujaym explains, “The distinction is that the slave is his property and its upkeep is 
                                                             
599 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, 4:285. This is the first distinction in the sixth chapter. 
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incumbent upon him, whereas his wife is not his property.”600 In the case of a slave, 
there is no marital obligation, there is not even a religious obligation per se incumbant 
on the owner. The requirement for helping a slave with her ablution, instead, is part of 
the requirement for the upkeep (iṣlāḥ) of one’s property. Since a slave is human, and in 
this case Muslim, part of the upkeep of the property is to maintain the Muslim slave’s 
religious duties. Therefore, it is necessary for the slave’s owner to help the slave in this. 
Since a man’s wife is not his property, this same obligation does not arise. Once more, 
this explanation renders the distinction comprehensible. At first, the distinction makes 
it seem as though a man has a greater religious duty to a slave than to his wife. This is 
the effect of the linguistic play involved in this legal distinction. The description of the 
distinction, however, explains that this is actually a case of religio-ethical duties that 
can arise in certain specific cases of property ownership. A man has ownership of his 
slaves but he does not own his wife. Still, there may be times when a slave is owed 
something that a wife is not, but this is due to the conjunction of the slave’s status as 
both property and a Muslim with religious obligations, not laws of ritual purity. 
Of course, Ibn Nujaym was writing these words playfully; his goal was to cement 
in the mind of the reader why the seemingly outrageous results are not, in fact, 
outrageous. They come within the context of his Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, a work which in 
certain ways offers a comprehensive survey of Ḥanafī law as understood by 16th-
century jurists. In many ways, his book is a snapshot of the then contemporary 
understandings of fiqh. The chapters in his book treat: (i) general principles (al-qawāʿid 
                                                             
600 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, 4:286. This is the second distinction in the sixth chapter. 
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al-kulliya), (ii) useful remarks on points of law (al-fawāʾid), (iii) similar and different 
cases (al-jamʿ wa-l-farq),601 (iv) riddles (al-alghāz), (v) legal stratagems (ḥiyal), (vi) 
distinctions (al-furūq), and (vii) stories and correspondence (al-ḥikāyāt wa-l-murāsalāt). 
Taken together, a reader can see the literary interests of these jurists, but moreso, the 
prominence that different genres had within the writing of Islamic law and the 
widespread sense of intellectual play among elite jurists. Ibn Nujaym has a separate 
chapter on riddles, but the chapters three, five, six, and seven all focus on interesting 
and peculiar points of law; and instances of stretching and bending of the law in 
unusual ways. Indeed, only the second chapter on fawāʾid seems to correspond to a 
traditional, straightforward approach to Islamic law. 
 
The Merging of Alghāz and Furūq 
Ibn Nujaym’s legal distinctions seem clearly to be influenced by or responding to the 
form of legal riddles. The influence, however, went in both directions; the influence of 
distinctions on riddles is perhaps even more noticeable. Many jurists wrote books that, 
in terms of content, seem to be books of legal distinctions, but are titled as if they were 
books of legal riddles. The connection seems to have been widespread; there is much 
scattered material evidence that these two forms of writing were seen as related.  
                                                             
601 This section is not on legal distinctions, even though its title suggests it may be so. It instead consists 
of broad comparisons of different legal ideas or concepts, rather than specific comparisons of laws and 
their outcomes. For instance, topics treated include “The Differences between the Minor and Major 
Ablutions,” “The Differences between Wiping over a Shoe (masḥ al-khuff) and Washing the Foot,” and 
“The Differences between Menstruation and Childbirth (al-nifās).” It is more reminiscent of a applied 
lexicographic distinctions. See Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, 3:287-479, 4:5-286. 
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Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad al-Jurjānī’s al-Muʿāyāt fī al-fiqh is perhaps the best example 
of this convergence; it is a book ostensibly about legal riddles that has almost always 
been received as a book of legal distinctions. The term al-muʿāyāt (sg. al-muʿāya) in the 
title refers to a particular kind of riddle and should most likely be understood in the 
context of the title as a synonym for alghāz.602 Nevertheless, when reading through this 
book, it becomes clear that the majority of it does not consist of riddles per se. Instead, 
this book is largely a list of legal distinctions. A manuscript of this work in the Egyptian 
National Library even refers to it as Kitāb al-Furūq li-l-Jurjānī.603  
The work begins with a short introduction in which al-Jurjānī says:  
The following are questions fit to be asked as riddles or to test someone’s 
knowledge (al-muʿāyāt wa-l-imtiḥān). I present them organized by legal topic to 
expand the usefulness of this book and to make consulting the book easier for 
whoever wishes to reference it.604  
The book presents a series of legal puzzles, the majority of which juxtapose pairs of 
seemingly contradictory legal rulings. Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm al-Bashar, the 
editor of al-Muʿāyāt, mentions in his introduction that this work consists of “legal 
distinctions, legal maxims and precepts (al-qawāʿid wa-l-ḍawābiṭ), and legal riddles, but 
                                                             
602 Further research into riddles need to be conducted before this statement can be made with 
confidence. 
603 This manuscript is catalogued under Fiqh Shāfiʿī, Fiqh Shāfiʿī 915, I thank Noha Abou Khatwa with 
helping me identify the accession number of this manuscript. It is also the manuscript used in the Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya edition of this work, see Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt fī 
al-ʿaql aw al-Furūq, ed. Muḥammad Fāris with an introduction by Kamāl al-Dīn al-ʿInānī (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1993), 14-15. 
604 Al-Jurjānī, Kitāb al-Muʿāyāt, 144. 
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the primary topic of the book is [legal distinctions].”605 These three categories which 
make up the book are all being used as riddles.  
Al-Jurjānī’s use of distinctions in this book signals yet another function for legal 
distinctions. Here, distinctions serve primarily as a vehicle for posing difficult 
questions that require specific answers. Previously we have seen distinctions function 
(i) as a specific objection within formalized disputational procedures, (ii) as a concept 
that shows relationships between substantive laws, and (iii) as a genre through which 
to organize Islamic legal knowledge. Al-Jurjānī’s statements in his introduction were 
accepted by other Shāfiʿī scholars; they too understood his book as being primarily 
about riddles. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba says that the Kitāb al-Muʿāyāt “included different kinds 
of ways to test someone’s knowledge (al-imtiḥān), such as riddles, distinctions, and 
exceptions from legal precepts (istithnāʾāt min al-ḍawābiṭ).”606 
The introduction and title of this book both signal a purpose different from that 
of the books of legal distinctions discussed in the previous chapters. The ostensible 
purpose of the distinctions included in this book is to perplex and to provoke the 
reader into a deeper contemplation. The use of three different legal forms—furūq, 
qawāʿid, and ḍawābiṭ—to convey this information signals the creative potential of a 
complex discursive tradition such as that of Islamic law. Further, it points to the way in 
which different concepts could be employed and combined for the sake of intellectual 
play. Here, the intellectual play is different from that discussed above. One aspect of al-
                                                             
605 Al-Bashar “Introduction,” 91. 
606 Ibn Qadi Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 1:260. 
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Jurjānī’s play here involves the appropriation of distinctions, maxims, and precepts, all 
of which belonged to recognizable legal categories, and his repackaging of them as legal 
riddles. The function of works of legal distinctions may not be straightforward, but the 
function of these works of riddles seems to revolve around the creative intellectual 
manipulation of knowledge of Islamic law for purposes of pedagogy and entertainment.  
The distinctions themselves that al-Jurjānī provides are in large measure 
indistinguishable from those found in books that self-identify as books of legal 
distinctions. Certainly, they would not be out of place in a book of legal distinctions. 
The following is an example of a legal distinction from his chapter on prayer.  
If, while praying, someone decides to stop his prayer, the prayer is 
nullified, even if he does not actually stop it. 
If, however, while reciting the Quran, someone decides to stop his 
recitation, it is not nullified as long as he does not stop reciting. 
The distinction between these two is that prayer requires an intention to 
pray (taftaqiru ilā al-niyya) and becomes void by any action that negates this 
intention. Thus, a prayer is nullified by the mere intention of stopping it. 
Reciting the Quran, however, does not require such intention, thus it is not 
nullified by the intention of stopping.  
The hajj pilgrimage is not treated according to this principle (wa-lā 
yalzimu ʿalā maʿnā al-aṣl al-ḥajj), for it is not nullified by an action that negates 
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the intention to perform it. Because of this, a hajj pilgrimage is not voided by an 
intention of stopping.607  
This passage first compares the role of intention in two ritual acts, prayer and Quran 
recitation. The distinction between how intention functions in these two acts lies in the 
way that each of them requires intention. While prayer is completely invalid without 
intention, a recitation from the Quran is still ritualy valid even without prior intention. 
This is a relatively straightforward distinction related to the factors underlying the 
validity of each act. Once the role of intention in regard to these two acts is esablished, 
al-Jurjānī brings in a third ritual act, the hajj pilgrimage. The status of the hajj 
pilgrimage is perplexing, as it seems to fit with both camps. It requires intention to 
begin, but it does not require a continuous intention throughout.  
In many ways, this would be a typical legal distinction if not for its inclusion in a 
book that presents itself as a book of legal riddles. The book’s genre, signaled by the 
book’s title, suggests that we understand this distinction differently. In part, it is no 
longer a distinction functioning as as a distinction, but rather a distinction functioning 
interactively, as a riddle to be solved and a question to be answered. The primary 
difference is not one of content, but of context, social performance in a majlis. The 
manner in which the discussion of this distinction is packaged emphasizes the 
seemingly paradoxical nature of ritual intention. Since the book primes the reader to 
look for moments of contemplation, the riddle inherent in this distinction is readily 
                                                             
607 Al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt, 191. 
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apparent. The use of legal maxims and precepts (al-qawāʿid wa-l-ḍawābiṭ) in this book 
should be understood similarly.  
Al-Jurjānī’s use of maxims and precepts follows a set pattern. He states a broad 
precept or maxim and then lists the exceptions to it. The fifth legal question in the 
chapter on ritual purity uses this format. It starts by stating a legal maxim, which, as is 
typical, comes in the form of a pithy statement. “Water can never remain pure inside of 
an impure container (lā yuʿrafu māʾ ṭāhir fī ināʾ najas).” The statement expresses a 
general truth about Islamic legal doctrine: pure water, placed in an impure container, 
becomes contaminated and loses its state of purity. As often happens with broad 
generalizations, “there are, however, two exceptions (illā fī masʾalatayn).”608 It seems as 
though it is the exception that proves the rule. The knowledge of these two exceptions 
serves as the solution to the puzzle.  
The first exception is a container made from the skin of carrion. When a lot of 
water is poured into it, the water does not become impure (jild mayyita ṭuriḥa fīhi 
māʾ kathīr wa-lam yataghayyar). The second is a pure vessel from which a dog has 
drunk. When a lot of water has been poured into it, it does not become impure 
(wa-lam yakun mutaghayyiran). The water in these cases is pure, but the vessel is 
impure.609  
The underlying rationale for both of these exceptions is that pouring a large quantity of 
water into these vessels renders them pure. In both exceptions, the vessel is only 
                                                             
608 Al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt, 151. 
609 Al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt, 151. 
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temporarily impure but becomes purified, i.e. they are accidentally, not essentially, 
impure objects. Because of this, water in them can be pure once the impurity has been 
removed. This removal, however, can occur in these cases by the very act of filling the 
vessel. 
 Finally, al-Jurjānī also includes a relatively small number of alghāz in his work. 
Some of the riddles are presented straightforwardly, while others are only alluded to. A 
straightforward riddle presents a complex scenario to solve, sometimes in question-
and-answer form. There are no riddles in the chapters on prayer and purity, so I will 
cite an example from the chapter on inheritance: “A deceased person leaves behind a 
group of heirs that includes men and women. He leaves them 600 gold coins. One of his 
heirs receives exactly one gold coin. This question (hādhihi al-masʾala) is known as the 
‘Question of the Gold Coins (al-dīnāriyyah).’”610 This is the extent of the riddle; the 
solution involves knowing the make up of the heirs such that the quranically 
prescribed inheritance laws grant one of them exactly one coin, or one six-hundredth 
of the inheritance. It is, in effect, a math problem and solving it requires a full 
understanding of the different shares owed to different heirs. Al-Jurjānī continues, 
providing the solution to the riddle. “The solution is that he leaves behind a wife, a 
mother, two daughters, twelve brothers, and one sister. His sister gets one gold coin. 
The remainder (al-bāqī), after the required shares to his mother, sister, and daughters, 
(baʿd al-furūḍ) is twenty-five gold coins. His brothers get twenty-four gold coins, and the 
                                                             
610 Al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt, 560. 
 274 
 
sister is left with one.”611 As can be seen, the solution involves creating just the right 
group of heirs such that one of them is entitled to exactly one gold coin. This question 
can also be understood as asking that one devise a situation in which an heir is entitled 
to receive one six-hundredth of the estate.612  
The riddles (alghāz) in al-Jurjānī’s work function similarly to the distinctions and 
exceptions. Of course, the different forms he uses allow him to present the information 
in different ways. In the context of this book, which aims to provoke the reader into 
contemplating the intricacies of Islamic law, the general rule serves no purpose 
without enumerating the exceptions to it. The exceptions, as seen above, are the 
specific situations which simultaneously serve to prove the validity of the rule and 
establish its limits. In contrast, the riddle is the statement of a highly specific situation, 
both a set of actions and a set of outcomes. The riddle’s formulation attracts the 
attention of the reader, who attempts to understand how it is that the situation 
described can come about. The legal problem in a lughz provides the necessary 
information to solve a legal puzzle, but leaves unstated the particularities which make 
the outcomes match the situation. The specificity of the situation in the above riddle is 
a sharp contrast to his statement of a general rule, “water can never remain pure inside 
                                                             
611 Al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt, 560. 
612 See Noel J. Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 
35-39. The division of shares is as follows. Since the deceased has children, his wife gets one eighth. 
Similarly, his mother received one sixth. His daughters each receive one third, since there are multiple 
daughters and the man had no sons. The sum of the inheritance given to his vertical relations is 23/24 of 
his wealth, or 575 dinars. The rest of his heirs should then split one twenty-fourth of his inheritance, 25 
dinars, with the sister receiving half of a brother’s share.  The brothers each receive two gold coins, 
leaving one gold coin for the sister.  
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of an impure container.” The latter provides an underdetermined statement that could 
be used as part of an argument in support of a particular legal ruling. In this sense, 
distinctions and riddles both serve to elucidate specific situations while the exceptions 
to general rules reinforce broader legal frameworks. We can see how al-Jurjānī 
manipulates these legal forms—distinctions, maxims, precepts, and riddles—to 
highlight both the enigmatic nature of particular legal doctrines and the overall 
coherence of the law. In his al-Muʿāyāt, the difference between distinctions and riddles 
is minimized. 
 
Separating Riddles and Distinctions: The Case of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī 
There is a clear convergence between riddling and distinctions writing in this period. 
This convergence was not, however, complete or ubiquitous. Not all books of legal 
distinctions adopted the logic of riddling and not all books of riddles adopted the 
presentation styles of legal distinctions. A particularly interesting figure who seems to 
only partially embrace the coming together of riddles and distinctions is Jamāl al-Dīn 
al-Asnawī (d. 772/1370). Al-Asnawī was a Shāfiʿī jurist who lived in Cairo in the 14th 
century. He was born in the town of Asnā (or Isnā) in Upper Egypt in 704/1305 and 
moved to Cairo around the age of 17, in the year 721/1321. 613 He moved there to study 
religious sciences and the biographical dictionaries detail his studies in Islamic law, 
grammar, and the rational sciences (al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya), as well as his teachers in those 
                                                             
613 The sources differ on the month of his birth. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba states that he was born in Rajab, but 
Brockelmann states that Asnawī was born in Dhū al-Ḥijja. See Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya, 3:98. 
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subjects. He was given the post of lector and recitation (intaṣaba li-l-iqrāʾ wa-l-ifāda) in 
the year 727/1327. He taught at various law-colleges around Cairo and taught tafsīr at 
the Ibn Ṭūlūn Mosque. Eventually, he began working with the Treasury (wallā wikālat 
bayt al-māl) and became a market inspector. He eventually left market inspection, 
withdrew from the Treasury, and dedicated himself to teaching and writing (taṣaddā li-
l-ishghāl wa-l-taṣnīf). His scholarly fame in Cairo grew and “he was one of the primary 
religious authorties there.”614 
 The biographical tradition tells us that al-Asnawī was a tremendously important 
and influential scholar. Reports refer to him as the leader of the Shāfiʿī scholars of his 
time (shaykh al-Shāfiʿiyya) and the author of the some of the most important books of 
the the madhhab.615 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba says that, “[m]any people studied closely with him; 
the majority of the scholars from all of Egypt were his students (akthar ʿulamāʾ al-diyār 
al-miṣriyya ṭalabatuhu).”616 Al-Asnawī here is positioned as the leader of his legal school, 
its most respected member, the author of some of its most important books, and the 
teacher of the majority of Egypt’s scholars. It is, of course, possible that all of these 
claims are exaggerations; they nevertheless paint a picture of al-Asnawī as a leading 
intellectual figure within 14th century Mamluk Cairo. While he is best remembered 
today for having written a biography of the Shāfiʿī school, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya, al-
                                                             
614 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 3:98-99.  
615 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 3:100. 
616 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 3:100. 
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Asnawī was a prolific author who wrote approximately thirty-five books.617 Among 
these works, he wrote a book of legal distinctions, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ 
wa-l-fawāriq, and a book of legal riddles, Ṭirāz al-maḥāfil fī alghāz al-masāʾil. 
 Due both to his prominent status as a Shāfiʿī and to his involvement in shaping 
the general intellectual outlook of many of the important scholars in Mamluk Cairo, his 
views on these two disciplines are of particular interest for the present study. Not only 
do they represent one way distinctions and riddles could be viewed in the 
eighth/fourteenth century, but his participation in both genres shows that they had 
become mainstream vehicles for literary and pedagogical expression, at least for the 
Shāfiʿī school.618 His book on legal distinctions is very much in the model of the work by 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī. Unsurprisingly, al-Asnawī mentions al-Juwaynī’s book in his own 
introduction, in which al-Asnawī situates his book within the wider Shāfiʿī legal 
tradition. His book not only continues the traditional presentation of seemingly 
contradictory laws established by the first phase of legal distinctions writing, but even 
reflects the disputational origins of legal distinctions by including, much like ʿAbd Allāh 
al-Juwaynī, moments of extended discussion apparently designed to counter potential 
objecions. Even so, his blueprints for disputation are in general much more elaborate 
than those found in al-Juwaynī’s text, as can be seen from the following passage on 
                                                             
617 See Naṣr al-Dīn Farīd Muḥammad Wāṣil’s introductory volume to Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, Matāliʿ al-
daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-daqāʾiq, 2 vols. ed. Naṣr al-Dīn Farīd Muḥammad Wāṣil (Cairo: Dār al-
Shurūq, 2007), esp. 161-194. 
618 Being the head of the Shāfiʿī school in the capital of the sultanate, however, undoubtedly gave al-
Asnawī’s views special importance. The legal system in Mamluk Cairo was complex, but the Mamluk 
Sultanate priviledged the Shāfiʿī school over the other legal schools. See Joseph H. Escovitz, The Office of 
Qāḍī al-Quḍāt in Cairo under the Baḥrī Mamlūks (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1984). 
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fasting, which concerns, at least initially, use of the siwāk, a particular kind of twig used 
to clean one’s teeth for ritual purification:  
 The common ruling in our school (al-maʿrūf ʿindanā) is that it is 
reprehensible for someone fasting to use a siwāk after the sun sets. This is due to 
the hadith in which Muḥammad says “The scent (al-khulūf) of someone’s breath 
is sweeter to God than the scent of the siwāk.” This is told on the authority of 
Abū Hurayra and is in both the Saḥīḥ of Muslim and of al-Bukhārī.619 Khulūf, with 
a ḍamma on the khāʾ, means change or alteration (al-taghayyur). The legally 
salient issue (wajh al-dalāla), as al-Rāfiʿī said,620 is that the evidence of worship is 
affirmed by the scent (annahu athr ʿibāda mashhūd lahu bi-l-ṭīb).621 Because of this, 
getting rid of the scent is reprehensible. 
                                                             
619 The hadith is in Bukhārī in two chapters, on Fasting (ṣawm), Clothing (libās) and in Muslim in his 
chapter on Fasting (ṣiyām). It is also found in Tirmidhī’s Jāmiʿ, Nisāʾī’s Sunan, Ibn Mājah Sunan, Dārimī’s 
Sunan, Mālik’s Muwaṭṭaʾ, and the Musnad of Ạhmad ibn Ḥanbal. See Wensinck, Concordance, 2:69.  
620 This refers to the famous Shāfiʿī jurist, ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Muḥammad al-Rāfiʿī (d. 623/1226). Along 
with Abū Zakariyyāʾ al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277), al-Rāfiʿī was one of the two most important Shāfiʿī jurists 
from the Mamlūk period. See El Shamsy, “The Ḥāshiya in Islamic Law: A Sketch of Shāfiʿī Literature,” 
Oriens 41 (2013); 292-93.  
621 The citation is likely to al-Rāfiʿī’s al-Sharḥ al-kabīr, although there is a verbatim passage found in Abū 
Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī’s al-Muhadhdhab as well as al-Nawawī’s commentary al-Majmūʿ sharḥ al-muhadhdhab and 
Shams al-Dīn al-Ramlī’s (d. 1596/1004) Nihāyat al-muḥtāj. Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, al-Muhadhdhab fī fiqh al-
Imām al-Shāfiʿī, ed. Muḥammad al-Zuḥaylī (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam; Beirut: Al-Dār al-Shāmiyya, 
1416/1996), 1:67; Abū Zakariyyā Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, Kitāb al-Majmūʿ sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab li-l-Shīrāzī, 
ed. Muḥammad Najīb al-Muṭīʿī (Jedda: Maktabat al-Irshād, 1992) 1:330-31; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn 
Aḥmad al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-muḥtāj ilā sharḥ al-Minhāj fī al-fiqh ʿalā madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī wa-maʿahu 
Ḥashiyat Abī al-Ḍiyāʾ Nūr al-Dīn ʿAlī al-Shabrāmallisī al-Qāhirī al-mutawaffī 1087 H [wa-] Ḥāshiyat Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd 
al-Razzāq ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-maʿrūf bi-l-Maghribī al-Rashīdī, no ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, 1424/2003), 1:182. 
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 Moreover, we also avoid the siwāk before sunset (wa-innamā aḥtaraznā 
ʿanhu mā qabl al-zawāl), because the change in breath most often occurs because 
of food, not because of fasting (li-anna al-taghayyur fīhi ghāliban yakūnu min athr 
al-ṭaʿām), as al-Rāfiʿī says. This necessitates the distinction between someone 
who has a meal before daybreak (man yatasaḥḥaru) and someone who does not, 
as well as a distinction between someone who eats something at night 
(yatanāwalu bi-l-layl shayʿan) and someone who, because of a malady or an illness 
(li-ʿajz aw maraḍ), does not. Due to this, al-Ṭabarī,622 who wrote a commentary on 
al-Tanbīh, says: If the scent of his mouth is altered after sunset because of some 
other reason, such as sleeping and the like, his use of the siwāk is not 
reprehensible.  
 It is said, however, that, a siwāk is not reprehensible for someone who is 
fasting until after the afternoon prayer (al-ʿaṣr), as the above-mentioned al-
Ṭabarī related.  
 Others, however, hold that it is never reprehensible (lā yukrahu 
muṭlaqan). This was mentioned in al-Nawawī’s Rawḍa,623 and it is mentioned in 
his commenteray on the Muhadhdhab.  
 Yet others hold that using a siwāk in this fashion is not reprehensible for 
superogatory prayers but reprehensible for required prayers, to guard against 
ostentation (khawfan min al-riyāʾ). Al-Rāfiʿī mentioned this in his chapter on 
                                                             
622 Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ṭabarī (d. 694/1295). 
623 See note 612, above. For more on al-Nawawī, see Fachrizal A. Halim, Legal Authority in Premodern Islam 
(Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY, 2015). 
 280 
 
fasting (kitāb al-ṣiyām) on the authority of al-Qāḍī al-Ḥusayn.624 You will learn in 
the Chapter on Funerals (Kitāb al-janāʾiz), that cleansing the blood of a martyr 
(izālat dam al-shahīd) is forbidden by the rules laid out therein. The purpose of 
this (wa-ḥikmatuhu) is what the Prophet alluded to: “On the Day of Resurrection, 
they will come and their jugular veins will spurt liquid (awdājuhum yashkhubu 
daman) the color of blood but with the scent of musk.”625 
Here, one might ask, “What is the distinction between the prohibition 
here, in the case of martydom, even though the scent of breath is like the scent 
of musk, and its only being reprehensible there, in the case of prayer, even 
though it is better smelling than it (aṭyab minhu), i.e. better than the scent of 
musk?” 
Perhaps the distinction is the certainty regarding that topic [i.e. 
martyrdom] and its heightened importance, since it involves them exposing 
their souls to death because of their glorification of the religion (iʿzāz al-dīn). 
Therefore, a prohibition on the removal of all traces of martyrdom serves to 
help proclaim (tanbīhan) the wondrousness of his fate (ʿaẓm qadarihi). The 
blood’s remaining on his body is like a banner (ḥāmilan) that demonstrates his 
                                                             
624 Al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Marwazī (d. 462/1070-71). 
625 This hadith can be found in the Sunan of al-Nisāʾī, in his chapter on Taḥrīm and Qasāma, in al-
Tirmidhī’s Jāmiʿ on his Tafsīr of Sura 4, and in the Musnad of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. See Wensinck, 
Concordance, 3:73.  
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true nature for anyone who is unaware or unmindful of it (li-yakūna baqāʾuhu 
ḥāmilan ʿalā istḥḍār ḥaqīqatihi liman jahalahā aw dhahila ʿanhā).626 
This is a work that in its contents does not reflect the convergence of the two genres, 
distinctions and riddles. The presentation of this work is straightforward, clearly 
explaining contrasting legal rulings and how to defend them. There is not a 
presentation of a curious or unexpected circumstance requiring a clever interpretation. 
It is rather a straightforward comparison of substantive laws together with their legal 
rationales. 
Similarly, al-Asnawī’s work on legal riddles does not reflect a convergence with 
works of distinctions. In Ṭirāz al-maḥāfil, the reader encounters a work of legal riddles 
set up very much in the tradition of question and answer writing (al-asʾila wa-l-ajwiba). 
The questions ask about the permissibility of situations that are seemingly 
impermissible or the identity of a seemingly impossible legal entity. The answer 
clarifies the obstacles given in the question. 
Masʾala: [What is a] prayer that must be performed (yajib adāʾuhā), but that 
cannot be made up. Indeed, making it up is not permissible. 
Ṣūratuhu: The Friday prayer (al-jumʿa), which is not made up if it is missed. 
Rather, you make up the noon prayer (innamā tuqḍī al-ẓuhr). The noon prayer is a 
different prayer, not a replacement for the Friday prayer. However, someone 
could say (wa-li-qāʾil an yaqūla): ‘Why can it not be made up in a different mosque 
                                                             
626 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, 2:22-23 
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(fī jumʿa ukhrā) that is not required for him because of travel or another 
legitimate reason (bi-sabab safr wa-naḥwihi)?627 
This riddle hinges on the peculiar status of the jumʿa prayer. It is required at the same 
time as the noon prayer (al-ẓuhr), but it has an additional requirement that it be 
performed in a communal mosque with others. Since, in theory, each city has only one 
communal mosque (jāmiʿ), a missed communal prayer cannot be made up because there 
is only one occasion for prayer per city per week.628 However, the trick to the riddle is 
understanding that a communal prayer is an additional requirement added to the 
Friday noon prayer, such that while the communal prayer can not be made up, the 
noon prayer still can. Presumably, the audience is aware that missing a jumʿa prayer 
does not excuse a Muslim from performing the noon prayer, but the riddle involves 
knowledge of the difference between the jumʿa and the ẓuhr prayers. It is interesting 
that this riddle ends with an unanswered question that potentially undermines the 
solution to the riddle. The riddle should have a clear answers, yet al-Asnawī only 
provides a provisional answer. 
In terms of content, these works do not appear affected by the phenomenon of 
convergence discussed in this chapter. Yet the activities of riddling and distinctions 
writing necessarily intersect. Distinctions by their nature seem initially confusing and 
riddles involve being able to differentiate among confusing legal minutiae. 
                                                             
627 ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Asnawī, Al-Alghāz al-fiqhiyya wa-huwa al-kitāb al-musammā Ṭirāz al-mahāfil fī alghāz al-
masāʾil, ed. Muḥammad ʿUthmān and Ṭaha ʿAbd al-Ruʾūf Saʿd (Cairo: Al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 
1433/2012), 109. 
628 For more on the history of communal mosques, see Baber Johansen, “The All-Embracing Town and Its 
Mosques,” Revue de l’Occident musulman et de la Mediterranée 32 (1981): 139-61. 
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Nevertheless, al-Asnawī’s distinctions do not present themselves as intractable 
problems and his riddles are not given in the form of distinctions. In this regard, his 
two works are an important reminder that this convergence did not affect all works 
produced after a certain period. Rather, the convergence of distinctions and riddles 
signals the beginning of new possibilities within these two legal genres. 
 A comparison of the introductions to these two works, however, reveals that al-
Asnawī nevertheless saw them as belonging to almost identical traditions of legal 
writing. Al-Asnawī begins each of these works with a discussion that situates each book 
historically in a preexisting and well-known tradition in order to provide readers a 
framework through which to read the book. He claims that there are two kinds of 
works in the Shāfiʿī school that deal with legal distinctions. The first deals directly with 
the topic. In this, he situates his Matāliʿ al-daqāʾiq as a work of legal distinctions and 
cites al-Farq wa-l-jamʿ by ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī and al-Wasāʾil fī furūq al-masāʾil by Abū al-
Khayr Salāma ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Jamāʿa al-Maqdisī (d. 480/1087) as his predecessors.  
These are the only two books that directly tackle the subject of legal distinctions 
in the Shāfiʿī madhhab, according to al-Asnawī.629 The second strand of writing deals 
with legal distinctions indirectly. This strand encompasses “something broader than 
legal distinctions per se (mā huwa aʿamm minhu).”630 In this second vein, he cites al-
Muṭāraḥāt by Abū ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Qaṭṭān’s (d. 359/970), al-Muskit by Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-
Zubayrī, and al-Muʿāyāt by Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Jurjānī.631 On the one hand, this discussion 
                                                             
629 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, 2:8. 
630 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, 2:7. 
631 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, 2:8-9.  
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complements and affirms the idea of furūq as a genre of Islamic legal writing. Al-
Asnawī’s statement highlights the currency that genre had for al-Asnawī and his 
readers and demonstrates the expectation they had for a genre dealing only with a 
particular topic, i.e. distinctions. At the same time, however, this discussion shows how 
permeable genres could be, at least in the case of the legal genres of distinctions and 
riddles.  
When introducing Ṭirāz al-maḥāfil, al-Asnawī begins similarly, discussing books 
that directly deal with the topic of legal riddles and those that tackle the subject only in 
part or indirectly. He thus places his book on legal riddles within a tradition 
encompassing al-Muṭāraḥāt by Abū ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Qaṭṭān, al-Muskit by Abū ʿAbd Allāh 
al-Zubayrī, al-Ḥiyal by Abū Ḥātim al-Qazwīnī, al-Muʿāyāt by Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Jurjānī, al-
Iʿjāz fī al-alghāz by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Jīlī (632/1234), and Simṭ al-farāʾid wa-ghurar al-fawāʾid 
by Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Ṭabarī (690/1291).632 Not only does this list include all of the works 
listed in Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʿiq, but further, when mentioning works dealing with legal 
riddles but not devoted principally or direclty to the subject, he expressly includes 
“works of distinctions, stratagems (ḥiyal), and difficult to answer questions (al-asʾila 
dhāt al-ajwiba al-ʿawīṣa).”633 In each of these lists, al-Asnawī brings these two traditions 
together, even though he does not conflate the two genres. He demonstrates a 
particular understanding of these two genres. His statements show that scholars in the 
Mamluk era already saw these two trends as closely interrelated.  
                                                             
632 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, Ṭirāz al-maḥāfil, 32-36. 
633 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, Ṭirāz al-maḥāfil, 32. 
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 In the introduction to this chapter, I discussed one general idea for the 
classification of genres in the Arabo-Islamic tradition, namely, an approach to genre 
through title. This approach is certainly one way to understand genre, and it is even 
one which the tradition itself embraces.634 Al-Asnawī, however, is clearly operating 
with a different approach to the idea of literary genre. First, he seems to understand 
genre as something porous. For him, books can easily and unproblematically belong to 
multiple generic traditions. He mentions several of the same works as belonging to 
both genres. In discussing the literary background to both traditions, al-Asnawī alludes 
to the permeability of genre in saying that there have been books in “this genre 
exclusively” (li-hādhā al-nawʿ bi-khuṣūṣihi) while others “comprise something broader 
(yashtamilu ʿalā mā huwa aʿamm minhu).”635  
It is interesting to note that Ibn Farḥūn, al-Asnawī’s approximate 
contemporary, also uses the word nawʿ to refer to “genre” in his book of legal riddles, 
Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ fī muḥāḍarat al-khawāṣṣ. “I have not found a book of this genre within 
the writings of the Mālikī school (lam aqif li-l-mālikiyya ʿalā taʾālīf min hādhā al-nawʿ).”636 
Apparently the first Mālikī book on riddles is Ibn Farḥūn’s. His use of the term nawʿ to 
describe his contribution with Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ suggests both an awareness of the 
existence of modalities of writing, of which riddles is one category, something also 
suggested by al-Asnawī’s comments in his own books. Their use of the same term to 
                                                             
634 Not only do biobibliographical sources use something like this as a shorthand when referring to works, 
but the existence of rhyming titles, both in terms of rhyming with the content and commentaries 
rhyming with the title of the work on which they are commenting. 
635 Al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, 2:7. 
636 Ibn Farḥūn, Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ, 65. 
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describe something akin to literary genre, however, suggests a shared understanding of 
genres and legal genres between these two authors. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter studied the interactions between styles of legal writing and the social 
consumption of knowledge from the late Abbasid period into the beginnings of 
Ottoman control over Egypt, and identified the Mamluk period as the period of greatest 
importance for the conjunction between interests in riddling as an art form and the 
proliferation of intellectual majālis that served as venues for the performance of 
knowledge. The spread of literary salons and the attendant growth in a market for 
riddling as a minor form of social capital are characteristic of cultural life in this period. 
The effect of such developments on intellectual production can easily be seen in the 
changes undergone by legal distinctions in this period. These trends affected the 
writing of works of legal distinctions by promoting their integration with riddles and 
pushed books of riddles towards greater popularity. These two trends were not, of 
course, confined to legal writings, nor to the composition of original works. Most, if not 
all, writing in the Mamluk period was impacted by these trends. 
Everett Rowson has addressed some of the conjunctions between majālis, and 
the consumption and production of knowledge during this period in an article on two 
commentaries on the works of Ibn Zaydūn produced in Mamluk Cairo. He stresses the 
importance of these commentaries as aiming in part to be encyclopedic. Of their two 
authors, he says,  
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[B]oth Ibn Nubātah and al-Ṣafadī were addressing several audiences, and 
accomplishing several intentions, at once. Their commentaries offered students 
a panorama of the world of literary learning… At the same time, peers… were 
expected to congratulate themselves on recognizing, and even anticipating, the 
information and allusions as they were presented… A broader audience was 
offered a smorgasbord of ‘fawāʾid,’ ‘useful bits.’ which they could savor and 
incorporate into their dinner conversation.637  
Rowson’s analysis highlights some of the themes discussed in this chapter, namely the 
important links between social practices relating to the production and manipulation 
of legal knowledge and the composition of scholarly literature. His work also highlights 
the reciprocal interactions between socio-cultural developments and writing. Rowson’s 
comments on reading publics resonate in particular with our discussion of legal riddles 
and their contexts. The rhetorical style of riddles, partially adapted and adopted by 
books of legal distinctions, also offers various levels of engagement. Riddles can be 
enjoyed by “peers…recognizing and even anticipating the riddles and their solutions. 
Riddles can also offer enjoyment for a reader when looking at the answer and working 
backwards to understand its connection to the riddle. While some majlis participants 
may have been able to recognize the content of these commentaries and solutions to 
these riddles, others were exposed to and entertained by new information that they 
could deploy later.  
                                                             
637 Everett Rowson, “Alexandrian Age” Mamluk Studies Review 8 (2003), 109-110. 
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 More importantly, however, the later history of legal distinctions shows how 
important social factors could be for long-term changes in the aesthetics of scholarly 
writing. The convergence of riddles and distinctions was, on the one hand, a minor 
development in this history of legal writing that started towards the end of the Abbasid 
period and continued through the Mamluk Sultanate. It is indicative, however, of a 
larger change in legal writing that occurred during this period. The changes that 
brought about increased interest in riddling were not simply limited to a narrow 
corpus of text. Instead, the integration of this corpus into the fiqh tradition made the 
rhetoric of riddling into a new style of legal writing. In other words, the reification of 
the textual tradition made these works (or at least some of them), a permanent part of 
the legal tradition, thereby marking a new aesthetic style within the classical fiqh 
tradition. In addition, the reification of such works, as seen in Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh 
wa-l-naẓāʾir, denudes the aesthetics of riddling from particular performance contexts 
and makes this another aesthetic mode of legal writing.  
 While these trends impacted legal writing, they did not dominate the 
production of written legal scholarship during the Mamluk period. Indeed, much of the 
legal-literary output of this period was driven by the institutional needs of the 
madhhabs, madrasa educational practices, or even the personal interests and concerns 
of individual scholars.638 At the same time, the personal needs and interests of 
individual jurists, or perceived institutional needs of the madhhab, created the 
                                                             
638 On the institutional background, see Ahmad El Shamsy, “The Ḥāshiya in Islamic Law: A Sketch of Shāfiʿī 
Literature” Oriens 41 (2013): 289-315, for a discussion of the importance of commentaries, for instance, for 
Islamic law. 
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conditions for texts that attempt to rewrite the tradition according to 
contemporaneous standards of aesthetics.639 The realities of legal writing involved 
combinations of all these trends and likely include more yet to be discovered. This 
chapter showed in particular how the social uses of legal knowledge and its various 
forms contributed to a convergence between legal riddling and legal distinctions, and 
how a variety of social and institutional settings contributed to the production of 
Islamic legal legal knowledge.  
 
                                                             
639 See, for instance, Norman Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence, especially Chapter 2 and Éric Chaumont 
“L’autorité des textes au sein du šāfi‘isme ancien,” paper presented at the conference “Rethinking 
Islamic Law: Can Fiqh be Applied Law?,” Rabat, Morocco, 13 – 15 November, 2013. 
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Chapter Six: A Bibliographic Survey of the Distinctions Genre 
 
The previous chapters of this dissertation studied the history of Islamic legal 
distinctions by surveying the prehistory and history of the disciplinary scope and 
generic boundaries of legal distinctions writing. The story of legal distinctions as a 
scholastic enterprise comes to an end with the sixth chapters (al-fann al-sādis) of both 
Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī’s (d. 911/1505) Kitāb al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir and Ibn Nujaym’s (d. 
970/1563) Kitāb al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir.640 This dissertation’s earlier chapters also 
described the various contexts from which the concern with legal distinctions arose 
and the complications in attempting to establish the limits of legal distinctions as a 
genre of Islamic legal literature. Although in those previous chapters I traced the 
history of legal distinctions in detail, I have reserved until the present chapter a 
comprehensive discussion of the books that make up the genre of legal distinctions. 
This chapter presents a critical bibliography of primary books of legal distinctions and 
their known manuscripts.641 An analysis of the manuscripts of works of legal 
distinctions, that is, of the material history of legal distinctions writing, adds two 
separate facets to our understanding of this tradition.642 
                                                             
640 The sixth section of each work is on legal distinctions. 
641 See Appendix I and II. 
642 I use the term material history broadly, as defined by Ian Woodward. “Objects are the material things 
that people encounter, interact with and use. Objects are commonly spoken of as material culture… The 
field of material culture studies… incorporates a range of scholarly inquiry into the uses and meanings of 
objects.” Ian Woodward, Understanding Material Culture (London; Thousand Oaks, CA; New Delhi; 
Singapore: Sage, 2007), 3. 
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The first is that the manuscript tradition shows just how widespread use of 
books of legal distinctions was. Their popularity can be seen in the chronological and 
geographical spread of the copying and production of new manuscripts of extant works 
of legal distinctions. While the manuscript record does not necessarily tell us the role 
that these manuscripts had in the societies or specific social or curricular contexts in 
which they were produced, the continuous production of these works indicates steady 
interest in these books. Second, a close look at the manuscript evidence reveals a 
tradition of two anonymous, untitled works of legal distinctions that circulated widely, 
alongside the better-known works discussed in the previous chapters. The 
biobibliographical tradition is silent on the date or authorship of the two texts in 
question. Since the biobibliographical tradition is concerned primarily with original 
works written by known authors, and not the copying and spread of manuscripts, let 
alone of anonymous texts, it is not surprising that these two anonymous works are not 
discussed. However, their existence in numerous manuscript copies shows that we 
cannot rely solely on the biobliographical works to reconstruct the history of genres of 
legal (and probably other kinds of) writing.643 Equally important, the two anonymous 
works in question may sound a note of caution in regard to assumptions about 
authorship and Islamic legal culture.  
                                                             
643 The biobibliographical tradition, in particular works of legal ṭabaqāt, is concerned with recording the 
names of those who wrote novel works of legal distinctions, but largely unconcerned with the copying of 
already existing works. Ṭabaqāt works have been discussed in various studies, see, for instance, Chase F. 
Robinson, Islamic Historiography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 55-82 and Stephen 
Humphreys, Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry, Rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 
187-209. 
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Analytic studies of furūq works are few; however, there have been several 
attempts to summary accounts of the literary history of legal distinctions. Almost every 
modern edition of a book of legal distinctions includes a partial bibliography of such 
texts. Most of these lists are not comprehensive, but they nevertheless help point to 
how the works have been received in Arabophone scholarship. The three primary 
bibliographies are the chapter “Standalone Books of Legal Distinctions” in Yaʿqūb al-
Bāḥusayn’s al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya;644 the list compiled by Wolfhart Heinrichs;645 and ʿUmar 
al-Sabīl’s introduction to al-Zarīrānī’s book of legal distinctions.646 These three lists 
complement each other and each is worth consulting. Al-Bāḥusayn’s bibliography 
includes brief discussions of the contents of each work, when known, either through 
his own inspection or through secondary reports from contemporary and post-classical 
authors. Al-Sabīl’s list of works is also quite extensive. Unfortunately, he seems to have 
very broad criteria of inclusion and he lists several books that are not really works of 
legal distinctions.647 There are, nevertheless, several works that would have remained 
otherwise unknown if not for his work.648 Finally, Heinrich’s list is the most preliminary 
                                                             
644 Al-Bāḥusayn, Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya: 83-105. 
645 Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341-44. 
646 ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Sabīl, “Introduction” to ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh Zarīrānī, 
Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī al-farq bayna al-masāʾil, ed. ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh Sabīl. (Mecca: al-Mamlaka 
al-ʿArabiyya al-Saʿūdiyya, Wizārat al-Taʿlīm al-ʿĀlī, Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, Maʿhad al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyya 
wa-Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1414/1993), 28-41. 
647 He cites, for example, al-Istighnāʿ fī al-farq wa-l-istithnāʾ also known as al-Iʿtināʿ fī al-farq wa-l-istithnāʾ by 
Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Sulaymān al-Bakrī (d. ninth/fifteenth c.), a work on legal maxims, and 
Qurrat al-ʿayn wa-l-samʿ fī bayān al-farq wa-l-jamʿ by Badr al-Dīn ibn ʿUmar ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-
ʿĀdilī al-ʿAbbāsī al-Shāfiʿī (d. ca. 970/1562), a work on Sufism, not Islamic law. 
648 These often appear as well in al-Bāḥusayn, but he his list is based in large part on al-Sabīl’s. 
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and is in part derived from that provided in the introduction to Muslim al-Dimashqī’s 
Kitāb al-Furūq,649 with additions from the bibliography compiled by Schacht and 
references to Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur (GAL) and Geschichte des Arabischen 
Schriftums (GAS).650  
The sixteen years since the publication of Heinrichs’s article have rendered his 
list outdated, and needless to say, the list compiled by Joseph Schacht in 1927 should, at 
this time, not be considered more than a historical artifact. An immense number of 
manuscripts have been discovered since the publication of Schacht’s article and 
numerous new editions of works of legal distinctions have appeared as well. In 
addition, the spread and accessibility of digital technologies have shown the 
deficiencies of these earlier lists. The digitization of manuscript catalogs has made it 
possible to search more catalogs faster than ever before.651  
It seems likely that my own efforts will also be superseded once even more 
catalogs are put online and further collections are digitized. Nevertheless, as will be 
seen below, I have ‘discovered’ many manuscripts unattested in other published 
sources, identified manuscripts of works considered to be no longer extant, and erased 
some doubts about the identity of several manuscripts. While the critical bibliography I 
                                                             
649 See Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū al-Fāris, “Introduction,” 37-43. 
650 Joseph Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 508-10. 
651 This is particularly true for most manuscript libraries in the United States, Europe, and Turkey. As of 
the writing of this chapter, however, the already digitized catalog of the Suleymaniye Library is not 
available online, but only accessible in the reading room at the Suleymaniye library. The other public 
libraries in Turkey, however, are all available via http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr. 
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present below represents a marked advance over previous efforts, this is in part 
because it draws heavily from them and in part due to emerging technologies. 
There are three works that require a brief preliminary discussion: al-Qarāfī’s (d. 
684/1285) Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ al-burūq, Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, and al-
Suyūṭī’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir. These works, because they are so important and so 
successful, were very frequently copied and thus exist in many manuscripts. My 
attempts at cataloging Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓaʾir, for example, ended after 
searching only libraries in Turkey. Through Turkey’s digital portal for manuscripts, I 
found 127 manuscript copies of this work in the cataloged public libraries of Turkey, 
not including those at the Suleymaniye, the largest collection of manuscripts in the 
country.652 After compiling this list, it became apparent that following through with 
this endeavor would yield minimal benefits for the present study for a number of 
reasons. First, a comprehensive account of the manuscripts of this work would lead to a 
seemingly infinite number of copies. Second, and more importantly, a worthwhile 
survey of the manuscript data cannot rest on manuscript catalogs alone; it requires 
visual inspection as well. Works are often miscataloged. Since these works are not 
available freely online, it would require an enormous amount of time, effort, and 
money for only the manuscripts in Turkey.653 Similar situations obtain for the works by 
al-Qarāfī and al-Suyūṭī. Al-Qarāfī’s Furūq and Ibn Nujaym’s Ashbāh raise a further 
difficulty, which is that they were the subject of many, many commentaries. There are 
                                                             
652 https://yazmalar.gov.tr/, accessed August 26, 2016. 
653 From the list compiled on the manuscripts in Turkey, there are copies of this work in Ankara, 
Erzurum, Manisa, Konya, Diyarbakır, Çorum, Amasya, Kastamonu, and Istanbul. 
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dozens commentaries known to me on these works, and doubtless many more of which 
I am unaware. They, together with their commentaries, have nearly become genres 
unto themselves and deserve a separate study through their commentary traditions. 
Additionally, none of these three works fits squarely within the genre of legal 
distinctions. Including a comprehensive bibliographic account of these three works and 
their commentaries is not only unfeasible, but would exceed the scope of this study. For 
this reason, my survey merely acknolwedges the existence of these three works and 
does not treat them as comprehensively as the other works of legal distinctions.  
There are several historiographical problems in compiling a bibliography of 
legal distinctions writing. The first is resisting the temptation of overreliance on Ḥājjī 
Khalīfa’s (d. 1068/1657) Kashf al-ẓunūn. This work aimed to provide a complete 
bibliographical survey, organized alphabetically by title, of the entirety of Islamicate 
scholarship up to the author’s lifetime. Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s work, encyclopedic in scope, 
remains a vital resource and a necessary first step in compiling bibliographies of the 
earlier Arabo-Islamic tradition. It especially lends itself to a bibliography on a 
particular genre, since, for example, all of the works titled Furūq are listed together. 
This is a necessary work, of course, but should be used with caution. Judging only by 
Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s work it would seem that both the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī did not participate 
in composing works of legal distinctions. “Distinctions in the Shāfiʿī School” and 
“Distinctions in the Ḥanafī School” are the only two madhhab-specific titles he 
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includes.654 This presents a skewed picture of the field of distinctions literature. More 
problematic, however, are the several errors and misattributions that are present in his 
work. Ḥājjī Khalīfa does not usually tell us where he got his information. In describing 
his methodology for writing the Kashf al-ẓunūn, he says that he included “the names of 
many thousands of volumes in the libraries that I personally examined.”655 From this 
statement, it seems that Kashf al-ẓunūn was not an effort to catalog all works in the 
manuscript libraries of Turkey, or the Ottoman Empire, but rather all those that Ḥājjī 
Khalīfa himself could inspect. 656 In other words, it was a personal research effort on his 
part, not a large-scale collaborative project. 
I list here a couple of representative problems with the Kashf as it relates to the 
study of distinctions writing. Ḥājjī Khalīfa gives Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī as an alternate title 
for Asʿad al-Karābīsī’s book. He says, “Furūq al-Karābīsī, also called Talqīh al-Maḥbūbī; the 
author of the Ashbāh [i.e. Ibn Nujaym] mentions this at the beginning of his section on 
                                                             
654 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 2:1257-58. He does mention, however, al-Qarāfī’s Furūq under the title 
Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʿ al-furūq (1:186). 
655 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Mīzān al-ḥaqq fī ikhtiyār al-aḥaqq, (Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa Abū al-Ḍiyāʾ, 1306/1889), 142. This 
translation comes from Eleazar Birnbaum, “Kātib Chelebi (1609-1657) and alphabetization: a 
methodological investigation of the autographs of his Kashf al-Ẓunūn and Sullam al-Wuṣūl” in Scribes et 
manuscrits du Moyen-Orient, ed. François Déroche and Francis Richard (Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de 
France, 1997), 241. 
656 Other authors have noticed specific errata in the Kashf al-ẓunūn, but there has not been much 
scholarship that has explored the limits of this work. Frank Griffel, for instance, notices a “confusion of 
names” in an entry for a book on arithmetic, but does not extend his observation. Similarly, Jan Just 
Witkam has noted that “[a] number of doubtful readings and dubious bibliographical references in the 
Kashf al-Ẓunūn… can only be explained and corrected by comparison with Ibn al-Akfānī’s [Irshād al-
Qāṣid].” Frank Griffel, “On the Character, Content, and Authorship of Itmām Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma and 
the Identity of the Author of Muntakhab Ṣiwān al-ḥikma,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 133.1 
(2013), 11n53; Witkam, “Ibn al-Akfānī (d. 749/1348) and his bibliography of the sciences,” 40. The best 
study of the reliability of this work is Birnbaum, “Kātib Chelebi (1609-1657) and alphabetization.” 
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furūq.”657 This information comes from Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, the sixth 
chapter of which book has a discussion of furūq proper. In introducing that chapter, Ibn 
Nujaym says, “This is the chapter on furūq, and I discuss here something from every 
legal topic. I selected and compiled this chapter from the al-Furūq of [Asʿad?] al-
Karābīsī, which is called Talqīh al-Maḥbūbī (dhakartu fīhā min kull bāb shayʾan, jamaʿtu min 
furūq al-imām al-Karābīsī al-musammā bi-Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī).” The identification of al-
Karābīsī’s Furūq by Ibn Nujaym as the Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī is erroneous on two levels. First, 
as mentioned above, al-Karābīsī’s book is entitled Kitāb al-Furūq, and this seems to be 
the only name this book has in the historical record up to the time of Ibn Nujaym. The 
alternate title that he gives, however, “Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī,” is the title of a wholly other 
work of legal distinctions. The Talqīḥ is a furūq work entitled Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-
manqūl, which is written by Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh al-Maḥbūbī (d. 640/1242), also 
known as Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Awwal.658 
This error is repeated in the various editions of Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh that I 
consulted. It seems, indeed, to be an error made by Ibn al-Nujaym himself, faithfully 
transmitted across manuscripts. Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥamawī (d. 1099/1687-88) 
makes a note of this error in his commentary on this work, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir. He 
says:  
The correct thing to say would be al-Maḥbūbī’s book on furūq, which is called 
Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī. These are two separate books, not one book. The claim that he 
                                                             
657 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “Furūq al-Karābīsī,” 2:1258. 
658 There are many alternate titles given as well for this book, see Appendix I. 
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was confused about these two books (ishtabaha ʿalayhi aḥad al-kitābayn) is 
unlikely to be correct, owing to the contents of this chapter. What probably 
occurred (ghāyat mā fī al-bāb) is that there was a slip of the pen of the original 
scribe (al-nāsikh al-awwal).659 
Still, the error has been enshrined into the text by later copyists, inscribed into the 
tradition by Ḥājjī Khalīfa, and normalized by Ismail Bāshā al-Baghdādī (d. 1922) in 
Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn, where, under Asʿad ibn Muḥammad al-Karābīsī, his work of legal 
distinctions is cited as “Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūd fī al-furūq min al-furūʿ al-ḥanafiyya.”660  
 It is unclear how exactly this confusion came about. It is intriguing, and merits 
further research. The origin of the error was perhaps an unwitting mistake from Ibn 
Nujaym or from the original scribe of this work. It is also possible that Ibn Nujaym and 
his circle were confused about the identity of these two works. In either case, it is 
worth nothing that later copyists generally refused to correct this error and that the 
tradition accepted this erroneous identification.  
 
Listing of Furūq Works 
In what follows, I describe the record of all the works of legal distinctions of which I am 
aware. Before describing these works, however, it is important to address some 
limitations to this survey, in addition to the issues mentioned above. There are several 
books included in the published bibliographies of legal distinctions that are not, in fact, 
                                                             
659 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥamawī, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir Sharḥ Kitāb al-Ashbāh wa-l-nazāʾir printed with Ibrahīm 
Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī, al-Ashbāh wa-l-Naẓāʾir, no ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1985/1405), 4:284. 
660 Ismāʿīl Bāshā al-Baghdādī, Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn, 1:204. 
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part of the genre of legal distinctions at all. There are many reasons for the mentions of 
these works. They all have titles that seemingly indicate their membership in this 
genre, but other evidence discounts this classification. For instance, some of these 
works have not survived, but the surviving evidence suggests that they were not works 
of legal distinctions, but rather works of law in related genres, such as riddles, question 
and answer, and ashbāh. These works include al-Muskit by al-Zubayrī (d. 317/929-30),661 
al-Muṭāraḥāt by Ibn al-Qaṭṭān (d. 359/969-70),662 and al-Naẓāʾir al-fiqhiyya by Abū ʿImrān 
al-Qayrawānī (d. ?).663 Other works are works of distinctions, but not legal distinctions: 
al-Furūq by al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s (d. ca. 320/932),664 Qurrat al-ʿayn wa-l-samʿ fī bayān al-
farq wa-l-jamʿ by Badr al-Dīn ibn ʿUmar al-Ḥuraythī (d. ca. 970/1562),665 Furūq al-uṣūl by 
pseudo-Kemalpașazade,666 and al-Furūq by ʿUmar ibn Raslān al-Bulqīnī (d. 805/1403).667 
All of these appear to be works of applied lexicographical distinctions, some regarding 
Arabic lexicography in general and others dealing with technical vocabulary in Sufism 
or Islamic law. Several books have also been published recently that attempt to extract 
the distinctions-like analyses that appear in early works of Islamic law. These books can 
                                                             
661 This is likely a work of legal riddles.  
662 This is likely a work of legal riddles. 
663 This is likely a work of legal maxims. See al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 86. 
664 This work is a work of lexicographic distinctions, not legal distinctions. 
665 This is a work of applied lexicographic distinctions about Sufism. See al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 
104. 
666 This is a work of applied lexicographic distinctions about legal theory. This attribution is made in the 
published edition, Kemalpașazade, Furūq al-uṣūl, ed. Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Mubārak (Beirut: Dār 
Ibn Ḥazm, 2009). Most manuscripts of this work, however, do not attribute the book to any author. 
667 This is a work of applied lexicographic distinctions about Islamic law. It may refer to his al-Farq bayna 
al-ḥukm bi-ṣiḥḥa wa-l-ḥukm bi-l-mūjib. See al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 160. 
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appear to be part of the genre of legal distinctions, but are not.668 They include books 
such as al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-Imām Mālik edited by Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl Jalāl and the legal 
distinctions of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350).669 
Another preliminary remark is necessary, concerning whether there are Shi’i 
works on distinctions. The following list looks like a list of Sunni works. As mentioned 
earlier, there does not seem to be a developed Shi’i tradition of works of legal 
distinctions, or at least I have only been able to find a comparatively tiny number of 
Shi’i works of legal distinctions. I have, however, identified two works, no longer 
extant, that may have been works of legal distinctions. The first is in Ibn al-Nadīm’s (d. 
ca. 388/998) entry for al-Ḥasan ibn Maḥmūd al-Sarrād (or al-Zarrād, fl. mid 
second/eighth c.), in which Ibn al-Nadīm attributes a Kitāb al-Furūq to Aḥmad ibn 
Muḥammad al-Barqī (d. third/ninth c.).670 Specifically, in this entry, Ibn al-Nadīm says, 
“I read in the handwriting of Abū ʿAlī ibn Hammām, ‘The Kitāb al-Maḥāsin by al-Barqī 
comprises some seventy-odd books, maybe even eighty. My father, ʿAlī ibn Hamām, had 
these books and they included…Kitāb al-Furūq.”671 The Maḥāsin is a work of law in the 
Twelver Shi’i tradition, and this entry on al-Ḥasan ibn Maḥmūd is included within the 
chapter on “Shi’i Jurists.” While the evidence of the Fihrist points to this being a work of 
                                                             
668 It is likely, however, that detailed and careful work such as this on the specific doctrine of individual 
jurists can give us a better understanding of the changes and dynamism inherent in legal compendia. 
669 Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl Jalāl, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-Imām Mālik (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2007). Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s legal distinctions have been collected and published twice, Yūsuf al-Ṣāliḥ, al-Furūq 
al-fiqhiyya li-Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya muntazaʿ min aghlab kutub Ibn Qayyim raḥimahu Allāhu taʿāllā (Riyadh: 
Yūsuf al-Ṣāliḥ, 2009) and Abū ʿUmar Sayyid Ḥabīb ibn Aḥmad al-Madanī al-Afghānī, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya 
ʿinda Imām Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya jamʿan wa-l-dirāsa, 3 vols (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd Nāshirūn, 2009). 
670 Ibn al-Nadīm, Al-Fihrist, 2.1:73. 
671 Ibn al-Nadīm, Al-Fihrist, 2.1:73.  
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legal distinctions, the work’s early date seems at the same time to militate against that 
conclusion. Unfortunately, the modern published edition of al-Maḥāsin that I consulted 
did not have a section entitled Kitāb al-Furūq.672 
The other possible Shi’i work of legal distinctions is al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by ʿAlī ibn 
Yaḥyā ibn Rāshid al-Washlī al-Zaydī al-Yamanī (d. 777/1375-76). As his nisba al-Zaydī 
indicates, ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā was almost certainly a Zaydī Shi’i. Al-Sabīl, however, in his 
bibliography of legal distinctions, includes ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā as a Shāfiʿī scholar and omits 
“al-Zaydī” from ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā’s name. He also does not cite a death date, but rather 
states that ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā was born in 662/1264-65.673 There is very little information 
recorded about this work. Writing around the turn of the previous century, Muḥammad 
ibn Zabāra mentions this work in his appendix to Muḥammad al-Shawkānī’s al-Badr al-
ṭāliʿ and he includes it as one of ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā’s works and says, “In his al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 
he wrote things which no one previously has written (wa-atā bi-l-jamʿ wa-l-farq bi-mā lam 
yaʾti bihi aḥad).”674 ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā does not seem to be particularly prominent in the 
historical record but appears primarily as a hadith transmitter.675 Since I cannot rule 
                                                             
672 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khālid al-Barqī, al-Maḥāsin, 2 vols., ed. Al-Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī 
(Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya 1370/1951). There are other editions of this text which I have not 
been able to consult. 
673 Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Jandārī, Tarājim al-rijāl al-madhkūra fī Sharḥ al-Azhār (no place: Maṭbaʿat al-
Tamaddun, 1913/1332), 25. A birth date of 662 makes a death date of 777 unlikely, though by no means 
impossible. 
674 Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Zabāra al-Ḥasanī al-Yamanī, Mulḥiq al-badr al-ṭāliʿ bi-maḥāsin man baʿd 
al-qarn al-sābiʿ (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, n.d.), 1:183-84.  
675 See, for instance, the citations in Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim wa-l-qawāṣim fī al-
dhabb ʿan sunnat Abī Qāsim, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Nashr wa-l-
Tawzīʿ, 1415/1994). 
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out the possibility that either of these two works belongs to the genre of distinctions 
writing, I include them in my survey. At the same time, the existence of two works that 
may be part of the genre perhaps prove the rule that there is, generally speaking, no 
Shi’i tradition of writing books of legal distinctions. 
In addition to the following critical bibliographical narrative, I provide two 
versions of my bibliography in schematic form. The first, Appendix I, is the most 
detailed and is arranged by legal school (madhhab). The second, Appendix II, contains 
only summary information from Appendix I, arranged by date. Appendix I attempts to 
categorize every work of legal distinctions according its madhhab. The works for which 
no madhhab could be determined are listed as well, and the final category in the 
appendixed bibliography includes works that are often listed as being of legal 
distinctions, but that are not. Some of these are works that certain scholars claim to be 
works of legal distinctions, but are clearly not, such as al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s Kitāb al-
Furūq. This work is extant and clearly deals with lexicography, as suggested by its 
alternate title, Kitāb al-Furūq wa-manʿ al-tarāduf (Book of Distinctions and the 
Impossibility of Synonymy). Nevertheless, this work is routinely included in discussions 
of legal distinctions.676 Others are works that never existed, but through bibliographic 
corruption are now cited as having existed, such as Furūq al-Maḥbūbī by Asʿad al-
                                                             
676 See, for example, Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 40; Aḥmad ibn 
Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥabīb, “Introduction,” to ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq ibn Muḥammad al-Ṣiqillī, al-Nukat wa-l-
Furūq li-masāʾil al-mudawwana qism al-ʿibādāt, ed. Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥabīb, PhD Diss., 
Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1416/1996, 90. 
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Karābīsī (d. 570/1174).677 I decided to include these other works for the sake of 
completeness. References are often found to them, either in ṭabaqāt works or in the 
introductions to books of legal distinctions, yet their inclusion in lists of works of legal 
distinctions must be corrected according to the present state of the evidence. 
The main difficulty in compiling a list of all works in a genre comes in 
establishing the boundaries of the genre. The permeability of the genre of legal 
distinctions is one of the most important observations of this study. As difficult as it is 
to determine the content and generic identity of earlier works no longer available, the 
classification of later well-attested and even published works can be difficult. On one 
end of the spectrum, it is hard to determine the veracity of the claim that Ibn Surayj (d. 
306/918) wrote a book of legal distinctions, even though some sources do attribute a 
work to him entitled al-Furūq.678 At the same time, however, it is not clear whether al-
Jurjānī’s (d. 482/1089) al-Muʿāyāt is, as its title claims, a work of legal riddles, or, if it 
should be considered, as its content suggests, a work of legal distinctions. In general, I 
have chosen to be overly inclusive regarding such difficult-to-classify works. For 
instance, I include both al-Furūq by Ibn Surayj and al-Jurjānī’s Muʿāyāt in my 
bibliography, even though I refute the classification of these works as works of legal 
distinctions in Chapters Three and Five.679 I chose to include both types of dubious 
works, works no longer extant about which little is known, and works seemingly at the 
                                                             
677 I discuss this corruption above. 
678 This is unlikely to be a work of legal distinctions, based on its early date and on the description of it as 
“A Commentary on al-Muzanī.” See Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-al-shāfiʿiyya,” 
2:1257-58, I discuss this in further detail in Chapter Three, see 195-98. 
679 See Chapter Three, 195-98 and Chapter Five, 253-55. 
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boundaries of the genre of legal distinctions. Perhaps with further study, these works 
will be included or excluded from the genre. In particular, until a better understanding 
of genre within Islamic law is established, it seems best to be inclusive. This reasoning 
applies as well to works such as Ibn al-Turkumānī’s (d. 744/1343) Kitāb al-Furūq, which 
is no longer extant, but was written at a time when Kitāb al-Furūq meant, within the 
legal sphere, a book of legal distinctions.  
The following bibliography of works on legal distinctions shows that the genre 
of al-furūq al-fiqhiyya is relatively small. My survey of books of legal distinctions has 
found only thirty-six works of legal distinctions. The spread of these works among the 
legal schools is somewhat uneven. I count thirteen for the Shāfiʿī school, nine Ḥanafī 
books, eight for the Mālikī, and four Ḥanbalī ones. This leaves two texts by scholars 
who seem to belong to Shi’i schools of law. Chronologically, there were two clear peaks 
of furūq-book production. The first three books of legal distinctions were written in the 
third/ninth century. The fifth/eleventh century saw a burst of activity, with ten books 
of legal distinctions produced during this time. The sixth/twelfth century once again 
only saw two books of legal distinctions. This was followed by the period of highest 
furūq activity, the seventh/thirteenth and eighth/fourteenth centuries each saw eight 
books produced. After this peak of activity, the ninth/fifteenth century saw only two 
new works of legal distinctions, the tenth century only al-Wansharīsī’s (d. 914/1508) 
ʿIddat al-burūq. Al-Wansharīsī’s was the last new work of legal distinctions written until 
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the modern period when ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Nāṣir al-Saʿdī wrote his work on Ḥanbalī 
distinctions in the early 20th century.680 
 
The Fourth/Tenth Century 
As discussed in Chapter Four, pinning down the first work of legal distinctions is not 
easy. There are several contenders: Ibn Surayj (d. 306/918),681 al-Zubayr ibn Aḥmad al-
Zubayrī (d. 317/929-30),682 al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. 320/932),683 Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn 
Aḥmad al-Nasawī (d. ca 320/932),684 and Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī (d. ca. 
322/934).685 Identifying the first work in the genre is not only a difficult historical task, 
it is also complicated by madhhab polemics. Did Shāfiʿīs first discover the usefulness of 
thinking through distinctions and therefore write the earliest works in this genre? Or 
was it Ḥanafī scholars who have pride of place in developing this new style?  
None of these works can be clearly seen as an early work of legal distinctions. In 
spite of its title, Ibn Surayj’s book seems only to be a commentary on al-Muzanī’s 
mukhtaṣar,686 the surviving selections of al-Zubayrī’s book do not talk about legal 
                                                             
680 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Nāṣir al-Saʿdī al-Najdī, Al-Qawāʿid wa-l-uṣūl al-jāmiʿa wa-l-furūq wa-l-taqāsīm al-badīʿa 
al-nāfiʿa (Riyad: Maṭbaʿat al-Madanīf, 1956). 
681 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 68, 72-73, 84; al-Sabīl, 
“Introduction,” 1:34. 
682 Al-Bāḥusayn al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 68, 73-74; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:35. 
683 Al-Bāḥusayn al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 69-70. 
684 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 509. 
685 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 69, 74, 84; al-Sabīl, 
“Introduction,” 28. 
686 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1257-58. 
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distinctions,687 al-Nasawī is mentioned only in the al-Fihrist and not remembered by any 
other author,688 al-Tirmidhī’s book of distinctions is about lexicography,689 and the book 
attributed to al-Karābīsī’s survives, but this attribution is almost certainly spurious.690 
The question of the origins of this genre really becomes one of the construction of 
narratives about the past. Why did it become important to claim that so many 
fourth/tenth-century jurists were the first to have written these works? This question 
does not concern this early period as much as it concerns the period when most of 
these attributions were being ascribed and repeated, the Mamluk era (13th-16th 
centuries). Indeed, it is only in the ninth/sixteenth century that Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ 
al-Karābīsī becomes credited with his book, an attribution that not only appears 
suddenly in several bibliographic sources, but also on several manuscripts. 
 
The Fifth/Eleventh Century 
This was a momentous century for the history of legal distinctions; during this century 
the genre of legal distinctions became established and widespread. The Shāfiʿī madhhab 
produced five works of legal distinctions during the fifth/eleventh century: al-Kifāya fī 
al-furūq wa-l-laṭāʾif by Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ṭabarī (d. ca 
                                                             
687 See Chapter Four, pp. 209-12 of the present study. 
688 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 302. 
689 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī, al-Furūq wa-manʿ al-tarāduf, ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm al-
Juyūshī (Cairo: al-Nahār, 1998). 
690 See Chapter Four, pp. 213-20 of the present study. 
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fifth/eleventh c.);691 al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Yūsuf al-
Juwaynī al-Shāfiʿī (d. 438/1046);692 al-Wasāʾil fī furūq al-masāʾil by Salāma ibn Ismāʿīl ibn 
Jamāʿa al-Maqdisī al-Shāfiʿī (d.480/1087);693 al-Muʿāyāt by Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Jurjānī;694 and 
al-Furūq by Abū al-Maḥāsin ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Ismāʿīl al-Rūyānī al-Ṭabarī (d. 
502/1108).695  
ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī’s book was by far the most important work of legal 
distinctions ever written in the Shāfiʿī school.696 It was also, he claims, one of the first 
works written on legal distinctions within the Shāfiʿī school, a claim that gives us 
circumstantial evidence for concluding that Ibn Surayj did not in fact compose a work 
in this genre. Al-Zarkashī (d. 794/1392), in his al-Manthūr fī al-qawāʿid, lists al-Juwaynī’s 
work and that by Salāma ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Jamāʿa as the two exemplars of this style of 
                                                             
691 The author of this work is Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ṭabarī. This is confirmed by all 
of the biographies of al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh, with the exception of that written by al-Shīrāzī, who does 
not mention this work. See Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 90-91; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya, 
1:181 no.142; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya, 2:61-62 no.767; al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt, 126. Other sources, 
however, attribute this work to Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ḥannāṭī al-
Ṭabarī (d. ca 495/1101), see al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:37; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:636 no.4795; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, 
Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1499; al-Baghdādī, Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn 1:311. These 
sources, however, are all late. Earlier biographies of al-Ḥannāṭī do not attribute this work to him. See Ibn 
Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:179-81 no.141; al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, 4:367-371 no.397; al-Asnawī, 
Ṭabaqāt, 1:193-94, no.362; al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 118. 
692 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 87; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:35-36. 
693 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 88-89; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:36. 
694 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, 89-90; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
36-37. 
695 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 92; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:37. 
696 I discuss this issue in Chapter Three, pp. 169-172. 
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writing.697 Unfortunately, it seems that this latter work has not survived, so it is 
difficult to ascertain anything about its form or content. The evidence from the 
bibliographical tradition, however, points toward it being a work of legal distinctions.698 
Similarly, al-Kifāya fī al-furūq by Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ṭabarī and 
the Kitāb al-Furūq by al-Rūyānī do not appear to be extant, but I nevertheless include 
them because the bibliographic traditions consider them part of this genre, and they 
contain the word furūq in their titles.699 This was also the century in which Abū al-
ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Jurjānī wrote his al-Muʿāyāt. While this dissertation 
has argued that al-Jurjānī’s work is perhaps best understood as a work of legal riddles, 
it nevertheless consists overwhelmingly of legal distinctions and has been considered 
part of the genre by recent scholars and is so identified on the cover of a manuscript of 
this work catalogued as 915 fiqh shāfiʿī in the Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya in Cairo.700 
There was only one Ḥanafī work of distinctions written in this century: al-Ajnās 
wa-l-furūq by Abū ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Nāṭifī al-Ṭabarī al-Ḥanafī (d. 
                                                             
697 Al-Zarkashi, al-Manthūr fī al-qawāʿid, 1:69. 
698 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn,, “al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq,” 1:601 and “al-furūq fī furūʿ al-al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1258; GAL 
1:385-86, S1:667; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:307 no.8443; Shihāb al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥayy ibn Aḥmad Ibn al-ʿImād, 
Shadharāt al-dhahab fī akhbār man dhahab, ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Arnāʾūṭ and Maḥmūd al-Arnāʾūṭ (Damascus: 
Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1410/1989), 5:176-77; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:165-66 no.305; Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya 
al-kubrā, 5:73-94 no.439; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:209-11 no.171. 
699 For al-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarī, see references in note 642 above. For al-Rūyānī, see Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-
shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā 7:193-204 no.901; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:272 no.518; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:332 no.8626. Ibn 
al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 6:8; Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām 4:175; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:287 no.256. 
700 Carl Brockelmann referred to this work as a “furūq work in the strictest sense” (GAL S1:505). I discuss 
this book at length in Chapter Five at pp. 267-75. 
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446/1054).701 This work is exists in at least two copies at the Suleymaniye Library in 
Istanbul.702 It is also remembered in most of the biographical literature, although no 
information is given as to its contents. Ḥājjī Khalīfa records the alternate title al-Ajnās fī 
al-furūʿ.703 ʿUmar Riḍā al-Kaḥḥāla’s Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn seems to suggest that al-Ajnās and 
al-Furūq are two separate works, even though most other sources consider this the title 
of one book.704 The title, nevertheless, is intriguing. While it does seem to suggest a 
work of legal distinctions, the phrase al-ajnās wa-l-furūq could also mean something like 
“[Legal] Types and The Differences between Them,” in which case the book might have 
explained different ways to group and categorize substantive doctrine. While furūq can 
have a very specific technical meaning, it nevertheless retained its general meaning of 
“differences.” 
The Mālikī madhhab, meanwhile, produced four works of legal distinctions in 
this period, only the very earliest of which, by Ibn al-Kātib (d. 408/1017-18), has not 
survived.705 Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ (d. 544/1149) describes this as a work of distinctions, and 
writes that he has heard from Abū al-Qāsim al-Ṭābithī that this book contains forty-one 
                                                             
701 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 88; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:28. See also GAL 1:372; GAL S 1:636; Zayn al-Dīn Qāsim Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim fī ṭabaqāt al-
ḥanafiyya, Die Krone der Lebensbescheibungen enthaltend die Classen der Hanefiten, ed. Gustav Flügel (Leipzig: 
In Commision bei F. A. Brockhaus, 1862), 6-7 no.12; Muḥyī al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn 
Muḥammad al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-muḍiyya fī ṭabaqāt al-ḥanfiyya, ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥulw 
(Giza: Hajr lil-Ṭabāʻah wa-al-Nashr wa-a-Tawzīʻ wa-al-Iʻlān, 1413/1993), 1:297-98 no.221; al-Ziriklī, al-
Aʿlām, 1:213; Taqī al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir Tamīmī al-Dārī al-Ghazzī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya, 2:71-72, no.343. 
702 See al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:28. Suleymaniye Library, Nuruosmaniye 1371; Suleymaniye Library, Esad 
Efendi 542. 
703 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Ajnās fī al-furūʿ,” 1:11. 
704 Kaḥḥāla. Muʿjam, 1:287 no.2086. 
705 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 84-85. 
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distinctions.706 The earliest preserved work is that by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-
Baghdādī (d. 422/1031).707 One of his students, Abū al-Faḍl Muslim al-Dimashqī (d. 5th 
c.) also wrote an extant work on legal distinctions.708 Muslim al-Dimashqī’s book is 
virtually identical to that of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. Jalāl al-Jihānī, the editor of al-Qāḍī 
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s work, argues that one of the manuscripts thought to be a copy of al-
Dimashqī’s Furūq is actually a copy of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s work, even though Abū 
al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris consider the manuscript in question to be a copy of al-
Dimashqī’s Kitāb al-Furūq and use it in their edition of al-Dimashqī’s Kitāb al-Furūq.709 
This manuscript even preserves the attribution to al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.710 Al-Jihānī 
presents compelling evidence that this is indeed a copy of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s 
work of distinctions. Al-Mawwāq includes a verbatim quotation from al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb’s Furūq in his al-Tāj wa-l-iklīl. The passage cited by Al-Mawwāq is found in the 
manuscript bearing al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s name, but not in the copies attributed to 
                                                             
706 See al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik wa-taqrīb al-masālik li-maʿrifat aʿlām madhhab Mālik, ed. Saʿīd Aḥmad 
Aʿrāb ([Rabāt?:] al-Mamlaka al-Maghribiyya Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1402/1982), 
7:253. Other editions, however, refers to Abū al-Qāsim al-Ṭābithī as Abū al-Qāsim al-Ṭāʿī. According to Ibn 
Farḥūn’s al-Dībāj al-mudhahhab, there was an Abū al-Qāsim al-Ṭābithī, Ṭābith being a village in the 
province of al-Baṣra, who studied in Egypt and Iraq, although no death date is given. See Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī 
Ibn Farḥūn, al-Dībāj al-mudhahhab, 2:103. Heinrich’s claim that al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ knew this “by autopsy” may 
be a misreading (341). 
707 Heinrichs says that this book is not extant. Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-
Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 85-86; al-Sabīl, “Introduction” to Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil, 31 
708 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 86-87; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
31. 
709 Jalāl al-Jihānī, “Introduction,” to Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī ibn ʿAlī al-Qāḍī. Al-Furūq al-
Fiqhiyya, ed. Jalāl ʿAlī al-Qadhdhāfī al-Jihānī (Dubai: Dār al-Buʿūth li-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya wa-Ihyāʾ al-Turāth, 
1424/2003), 17-21. 
710 al-Jihānī, “Introduction,” 18. See also the manuscript, Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Mujāhidīn al-Lībiyīn 588. 
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Muslim al-Dimashqī.711 Maḥmūd Ghiryānī, who discusses the relationships between 
these two texts in more detail, also concludes that the Libyan manuscript in question 
should be correctly attributed to al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb712 
At the close of the fifth/eleventh century it seems that the genre of legal 
distinctions had fully emerged. The literary record gives a picture of the fourth/tenth 
century as a time when this genre was underdeveloped and perhaps not yet underway. 
The only supposedly surviving work from the fourth/tenth century is that by 
Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī, and the manuscripts of this work are highly 
problematic. Not only is the attribution to al-Karābīsī dubious, but the text itself is 
highly corrupt and riddled with lacunae. In the fifth/eleventh century, however, we see 
a tremendous burst of activity in the composition of works of legal distinctions. The 
foundational furūq works of the Shāfiʿī madhhab were composed; the Mālikī madhhab 
began to adopt the genre with several important works. The Ḥanafī jurist al-Nāṭifī 
wrote his work on distinctions in this century. 
As with other legal genres, the Ḥanbalī madhhab would adopt distinctions later, 
as will be seen below. Importantly, the furūq works of this period start to have the 
organization and presentation that comes to define the genre. Most of the books in this 
genre are organized in a traditional legal style (al-tabwīb al-fiqhī), with chapters 
dedicated to particular areas of the law, starting with ritual matters (ʿibādāt) and 
                                                             
711 Al-Jihānī, “Introduction,” 35. 
712 See Maḥmūd Salāmah Ghiryānī, “Introduction,” to ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī, Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-
Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī wa-ʿalāqatuhā bi-Furūq al-Dimashqī, ed. Maḥmūd Salāmah Ghiryānī (Dubai: 
Dār al-Buḥūth li-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya wa-Ihyāʾ al-Turāth, 1424/2003).  
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moving to transactions (muʿāmalāt). In terms of presentation, the characteristic style of 
books of legal distinctions involves comparing and contrasting two (or more) laws that 
appear to, but do not actually, contradict each other.  
 
The Sixth/Twelfth Century 
The sixth century saw only one book written on legal distinctions, the Kitāb al-Furūq by 
Abū al-Muẓaffar Asʿad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Naysābūrī al-Karābīsī al-
Ḥanafī.713 This work is the first extant work from the Ḥanafī madhhab that can be safely 
attributed to its author and is undoubtedly part of the legal distinctions tradition. In his 
introduction, Asʿad al-Karābīsī mentions that he came across the distinctions contained 
in his book through his studies with Abū al-ʿAlāʾ Ṣāʿid ibn Muḥammad (d. 502/1109). 
“These legal cases I gleaned from books…I heard the imam and judge Abū al-ʿAlāʾ…bring 
out the distinguishing factor (iẓhār al-furqān) between them.”714 He does not mention, 
however, his knowledge of this writing style as a genre nor any precedents for 
distinctions writing within the Ḥanafī school. It is curious that he would be unaware of 
the books by Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ and al-Nāṭifī, since Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ was a 
Ḥanafī scholar who lived in Samarqand, the city in which Asʿad al-Karābīsī also lived. 
Asʿad’s silence on this matter is one piece of evidence that calls into question the 
authenticity of the attribution of a book of legal distinctions to Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-
Karābīsī. Asʿad al-Karābīsī’s book became quite important as a work of Ḥanafī 
                                                             
713 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 91-92; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:28-29. 
714 Asʿad ibn Muḥammad al-Karābīsī, Al-Furūq li-l-Karābīsī, 1:33. 
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distinctions. Ḥanafī authors used it as a model when writing later works of legal 
distinctions and it is the main book for which Asʿad al-Karābīsī is remembered. It is 
mentioned often in the sources and many manuscript witnesses to it exist.715 It has also 
been edited and published three times, even though other important Ḥanafī works of 
legal distinctions continue to exist only in manuscript. The attention paid to editing 
and publishing this work in the later 20th century signals its continued importance 
today.  
 
The Seventh/Thirteenth Century  
The seventh century consitutes the beginning of a second golden age in the 
composition of works on legal distinctions. There were two Shāfiʿī books written in this 
period, al-Furūq by Abū al-ʿAbbās Kamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Kashāsib al-Shāfiʿī al-Dizmārī 
(d. 643/1245)716 and al-Fuṣūl wa-l-furūq by Abū al-ʿAbbās Najm al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 
Muḥammad ibn Khalaf ibn Rājiḥ al-Maqdisī al-Ḥanbalī, al-Shāfiʿī (d. 638/1241).717 
Neither of these two works is extant. Both authors are, however, mentioned frequently 
in the biographical literature.  
Ibn Kashāsib was a jurist in Damascus who was known for his piety and virtue. 
More importantly, however, he was also known for travelling often. Specifically, the 
                                                             
715 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “furūq fī furūʿ al-Ḥanafiyya,” 2:1257; GAL 1:375, GAL S 1:642, Kaḥḥāla, 
Muʿjam, 1:351 no.2603; Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,”508; al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-muḍiyya, 1:386, no.314; Ibn 
al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 4:4; Tamīmī al-Dārī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya, 2:171, no.473; al-Baghdādī, 
Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn, 1:204; Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 12 no.44. 
716 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 95-96; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:37. 
717 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343. Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 95; Shadharāt al-dhahab, 7:331; 
al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:37. 
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biographical sources quote Abū Shāma’s statement that Ibn Kashāsib “goes on the 
pilgrimmage often and performs many good deeds (kathīr al-ḥajj wa-l-khayr).”718 Ibn 
Kashāsib’s many pilgrimages likely brought him into contact with scholars and ideas 
from throughout the Islamic world; it represents both a potential inspiration for his 
book on legal distinctions and a potential opportunity for Ibn Kashāsib to promote his 
book and ideas.  
Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥanbalī was a Ḥanbalī jurist who lived in Damascus, Baghdad, 
Hamadan, and Bukhara. The sources indicate that it was in Bukhara, after a thorough 
education in the Ḥanbalī school, that Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥanbalī transferred to the Shāfiʿī 
school. After this ‘conversion,’ he returned to Damascus, where he seems to have 
enjoyed a successful career as a jurist and teacher. It was after his change in madhhab-
affiliation and return to Damascus that he began teaching and writing law books, 
including his al-Fuṣūl fī al-furūq. Al-Asnawī mentions that he remained known by his 
nisba al-Ḥanbalī in spite of his later adherence to the Shāfiʿī school.719 
There was only one Ḥanafī book of legal distinctions written in the seventh 
century, Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl by Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh al-Maḥbūbī al-
                                                             
718 See Shihāb al-Dīn Abū Shāma ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Maqdisī, Tarājim rijāl al-qarnayn al-sādis wa-l-sābiʿ al-
maʿrūf bi-l-dhayl ʿalā al-Rawḍatayn, ed. Ibrāhīm Shams al-Dīn (Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 1422/2002), 5:270, 
although in this edition his name is erroneously listed as “Aḥmad ibn Kātib al-Zumārī.” For citations of 
this phrase, see Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya al-Kubrā 8:30 no.1054; al-Asnawī’s Ṭabaqāt 1:152 no.289; Ibn Qāḍī 
Shuhba 2:100 no.401. See also Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:232 no.1695; al-Baghdādī, Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn, 1:94. 
719 It is perhaps the repeated references to him as “al-Ḥanbalī,” that led Heinrichs to include Najm al-Dīn 
as a Ḥanbalī scholar in his bibliography. See, however, al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt 1:211-12, no.404, and Ibn Qādī 
Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt 2:71 no.371. Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:262-63 no.1896. For references to this work, see Badr al-
Dīn Muḥammad ibn Bahādur al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, no ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutubī, 
1414/1994), 7:220; 7:245; 7:394; and 8:38. 
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Ḥanafī, Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Awwal (d. 640/1242).720 This was likely the most important 
work of Ḥanafī distinctions in premodern times. A large number of manuscript 
witnesses for this work are preserved in major manuscript libraries and it is mentioned 
quite often in the secondary literature though it remains unpublished.721 Al-Sabīl says 
that this work was edited as part of an MA thesis in Egypt. Unfortunately, this edition 
was never published.722 The lack of a readily-available published edition, however, has 
meant that Asʿad al-Karābīsī’s text has now become the most popular Ḥanafī work of 
legal distinctions.723  
As important as al-Maḥbūbī’s work was, its author seems to have been a 
relatively obscure figure. Ibn Quṭlūbughā in his Tāj al-tarājim tells us that “ʿUbayd Allāh 
ibn Masʿūd ibn ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Maḥmūd Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Maḥbūbī was a critical and 
meticulous scholar…”724 This is likely a reference to Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh’s father, 
although here the father is referred to as Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa. This is odd since scholars 
                                                             
720 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 94; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:29.  
721 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūd fī furūq al-manqūl,” 1:481, “furūq fī furūʿ al-Ḥanafiyya,” 
2:1257; GAL 1:380; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:191 no.1415. 
722 Al-Sabīl and al-Bāḥusayn state that this work was edited as part of an MA thesis at al-Azhar University 
by ʿAbd al-Hādī Shīr al-Afghānī. Curiously, however, online resources suggest that this edition was 
completed as an MA thesis at Ain Shams University in 1984, not at al-Azhar University. Al-Bāḥusayn, al-
Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 94; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:29. See 
http://drepository.asu.edu.eg/xmlui/handle/123456789/49817, accessed August 30, 2016. 
723 It is difficult to understand the causality in this situation. Was al-Karābīsī’s work printed so many 
times because of its contemporary importance to Ḥanafī scholars? Or, is al-Karābīsī so well-known 
among Ḥanafī scholars because this work is readily available in a printed edition? A study of this issue 
would shed much light into the processes by which the classical tradition has been and continues to be 
received by contemporary Arabophone scholarship. 
724 Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 29-30 no.118. 
 316 
 
make a point of referring to Aḥmad al-Maḥbūbī as Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Awwal, that is, 
“the first,” in contrast to ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Masʿūd ibn Aḥmad al-Maḥbūbī al-Bukhārī (d. 
747/1346), his descendent, who is known as Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī, i.e. “the second.” 
Ibn Quṭlūbughā also mentions a book entitled Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī al-furūq, a title bearing a 
very close resemblance to that by Aḥmad al-Maḥbūbī. However, this title is attributed 
by Ibn Quṭlūbughā to Aḥmad ibn Ḥubb Allāh ibn Ibrāhīm and no further information is 
given about the author.725 Similarly, Taqī al-Dīn al-Ghazzī’s al-Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya has two 
listings that seem to refer to this author. The first is for “Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn 
Ibrāhīm Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ḥanafī” who wrote Tanqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl.726 We also 
find, however, a different entry for “Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Aḥmad… 
al-Maḥbūbī” to whom is attributed a book entitled “Tanqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl.”727 
Unfortunately, al-Ghazzī does not give death dates for either scholar.  
It was also in this century that the noted Egyptian jurist Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad 
ibn Idrīs al-Qarāfī wrote his Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ al-furūq, also referred to as Kitāb al-
Furūq.728 This is perhaps the most well known work of legal distinctions from any 
school. Numerous manuscripts of this work survive into the present day together with 
many commentaries on this work. The number of manuscripts and printed editions of 
this work dwarfs the combined number of manuscripts and printed editions for almost 
every other work of legal distinctions. At the same time, however, this is a very peculiar 
                                                             
725 Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 9 no.29. 
726 Tamīmī al-Dārī, al-Ṭabaqat al-saniyya, 1:364, no.208. 
727 Tamīmī al-Dārī, al-Ṭabaqat al-saniyya, 1:376, no.220. 
728 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341-2; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 152-154; al-Sabīl, 
“Introduction,” 1:32-33. 
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work. While Heinrichs includes this work in his bibliography, along with a brief list of 
commentaries on it, al-Bāḥusayn omits it from his own survey of works of legal 
distinctions, considering it instead a work of “al-furūq al-uṣūliyya.”729 This is likely 
because al-Qarāfī’s work does not fit neatly into the genre of legal distinctions, despite 
seemingly being its most famous example. Al-Qarāfī’s work is more like a work of legal 
maxims (al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya) than it is a work of legal distinctions. Al-Qarāfī himself 
states that he “made the beginnings of research into legal maxims (qawāʿid) by 
discussing distinctions and asking, in a disputation, for the distinction between two 
derived cases (al-furūq wa-l-suʾāl ʿanhā bayn farʿayn) or two legal maxims.”730 His work is 
as concerned with maxims and general principles as it is with minute distinctions 
between rules of positive law. Indeed, al-Qarāfī’s use of the term furūq seems more 
aligned to the usage of lexicographical distinctions than with legal distinctions.731 Al-
Qarāfī is sometimes credited with a second work on legal distinctions, al-Iḥkām fī tamyīz 
al-fatāwā ʿan al-aḥkām wa-taṣarrufāt al-qāḍī ʿind al-imām. This work, however, is not a 
work of legal distinctions, but rather, as its title indicates, a work on judges, muftis, and 
their procedures and rulings.732 
                                                             
729 With this term, al-Bāḥusayn means something quite similar to the notion of “applied linguistic 
distinction” developed in Chapter Four; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 152-154.  
730 Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Idrīs, al-Qarāfī, Al-Furūq aw Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ al-furūq. Printed with Idrār 
al-shurūq ʿalā anwāʾ al-furūq by Ibn al-Shāṭṭ; Tahdhīb al-Furūq ; and al-Qawāʿid al-sanniyya fī al-asrār al-
fiqhiyya by Muḥammad ʿAlī ibn Ḥusayn al-Makki, ed. Khalīl Mansūr (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
1418/1998), 1:9. 
731 See the discusion of applied lexicographic distinctions above, Chapter Four, pp. 184-87. 
732 Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David Powers, “Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal 
Interpretation,” in Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud, 
Brinkley Messick, and David Powers (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 18-19. See 
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Finally, this was the century in which members of the Ḥanbalī school began 
writing works of legal distinctions. I have found three Ḥanbalī works composed during 
this century: al-Furūq fī al-masāʾil al-fiqhiyya by Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn ʿAlī Ibn 
Surūr al-Maqdisī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 614/1212);733 al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Sāmarrī al-Ḥanbalī, Ibn Sunayna (d. 616/1219);734 and al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbd 
Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qawī ibn Badrān al-Maqdisī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 699/1299-
1300).735 The first of these works, by Ibrāhīm Ibn Surūr, is no longer extant. Ibn Surūr, a 
prominent Ḥanbalī jurist, was born in a small village called Jammāʿīl on the West Bank 
of the Jordan River.736 He lived most of his life in Damascus, though he also traveled to 
Ḥarrān, Medina, Baghdad and Mosul. The title of his work, al-Furūq fī masāʾil al-fiqhiyya, 
makes it seem likely that his work was indeed on legal distinctions.737 
The history of Ibn Sunayna’s work is more complicated. Joseph Schacht included 
a short description and transcription of excerpts from this treatise in his 1927 article. 
According to Schacht, this work was written by Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū al-Fatḥ ʿAbd Allāh 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
also the recent translation of this work, al-Qarāfī, The Criterion for Distinguishing Legal Opinions from Judicial 
Rulings and the Administrative Acts of Judges and Rulers, trans. Mohammad Fadel (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2017). 
733 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 94; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:40. 
734 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 93-94; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:40. 
735 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 96; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:40. 
736 At present, this village is called Jamma’in. 
737 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad Ibn Rajab, Al-Dhayl ʿalā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 
Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-ʿUthaymīn (Mecca: Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 1425/2005), 3:198-220, the book 
itself is mentioned on 3:200; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:42 no.312; Mujīr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad 
al-ʿUlaymī, al-Durr al-Munaḍḍad fī dhikr asḥāb al-imām Aḥmad, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Sulaymān al-
ʿUthaymīn ([Riyadh(?)]: Maktabat al-Tawba; Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Madanī, 1412/1992), 1:339, no.969; Ibn al-
ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 7:105-108. 
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ibn Hibat Allāh al-Sāmarrī (d. 545/1150).738 Based on Schacht’s attribution, Heinrichs 
also ascribed this work to Abū al-Fatḥ al-Sāmarrī.739 This work was in fact written by 
Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Sāmarrī (d. 616/1219).740 This is made 
clear by the manuscript of this work in the Ẓāhiriyya Collection in the Asadiyya Library 
in Damascus, together with the biographical tradition, which attributes a work of legal 
distinctions to Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad al-Sāmarrī, but not to Abū al-Fatḥ ʿAbd Allāh 
al-Sāmarrī.741 This work has been edited in two parts. The first, edited by Muḥammad 
ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā, was published 1418/1997 and contains only the 
section on ritual duties (al-ʿibādāt).742 The rest of the book was edited by Anas ibn ʿUmar 
ibn Muḥammad al-Subayyil as a master’s thesis from Umm al-Qurā University in Mecca 
in 1435/2014.743 Joseph Schacht also edited and published short selections from this 
text.744 
  
 
                                                             
738 Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 507-508. 
739 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343. 
740 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 93-94; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:40. 
741 Heinrichs lists this work as being written by Abū al-Fatḥ in his bibliography, even though in his note 
he admits that it is more likely that it is by Ibn Sunayna. Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343. For Abū 
al-Fatḥ, see Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 7:126-27; Dhayl, Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, 3:249-51. Muʿaẓẓam al-
Dīn’s name is written on the cover page of the manuscript in Damascus; this can be seen on the 
reproduction printed in al-Yaḥyā’s edition of this text, see al-Yaḥyā, “Introduction,” 112.  
742 Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Sāmarrī, Kitāb al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab al-Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, ed. 
Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā (Riyadh: Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, 1997). 
743 Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Sunayna al-Sāmarrī, al-Furūq min awwal kitāb al-jināyāt ilā nihāyat 
al-kitāban dirāsatan wa-taḥqīqan, ed. Anas ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Subayyil. MA Thesis, Medina: Umm 
al-Qurā University, 1435/2014. 
744 Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 525-37. 
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The Eighth/Fourteenth Century  
The eighth century continued to see the production of many works of legal 
distinctions. The Shāfiʿī madhhab saw three works of legal distinctions in the eighth 
century: al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by Sirāj al-Dīn Yūnus ibn ʿAbd al-Mujīd ibn ʿAlī al-Hudhalī al-
Armantī al-Shāfiʿī (d. 725/1325);745 al-Furūq by Abū Umāma Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad 
ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Yaḥyā al-Dukkālī al-Maghribī al-Miṣrī al-Shāfiʿī, Ibn al-
Naqqāsh (d. 763/1361);746 and Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq by Jamāl 
al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn al-Ḥasan al-Asnawī al-Shāfiʿī (d. 772/1370).747 Of these, only 
the work by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī is extant. Al-Asnawī was the head of the Shāfiʿī 
school in Cairo and wrote works in nearly all areas of Islamic law.748 Al-Asnawī’s book 
on distinctions is particularly interesting since it opens with a brief history of legal 
distinctions writing. His discussion does not include mention of the other two Shāfiʿī 
works from the eighth century, even though his book was likely the last of the three to 
be written.749  
Sirāj al-Dīn al-Armantī was a Shāfiʿī who held judicial posts throughout Egypt, 
specifically in Qus (Qūṣ), Cairo, Ikhmīm, al-Bakhnasā,750 and Bilbeis. His nisba Armantī 
refers to the village of Armant in Upper Egypt where he was born. Al-Armantī’s work is 
                                                             
745 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 96-97; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:37. 
746 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 96-97; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:37. 
747 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 100; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:38. 
748 I discuss him and his works in more detail above, in Chapter Five, pp. 275-86. 
749 The Maṭāliʿ appears to have been written late in al-Asnwaī’s life, by which time al-Armantī had already 
passed. It is less clear that he wrote this work before that by Ibn al-Naqqāsh. 
750 Known also today by its ancient Egyptian name, Oxyrhynchus. 
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remembered in the bibliographical tradition and appears to be a work of legal 
distinctions but is no longer extant.751  
The nature of Ibn al-Naqqāsh’s work, on the other hand, is less clear. Ibn al-
Naqqāsh was also a Cairene Shāfiʿī who travelled throughout the Levant, with stays in 
Damascus and Hama. His work is mentioned often in the bibliographical tradition, but 
is given several names: al-Furūq,752 al-Farq,753 and al-Naẓāʾir wa-l-furūq.754 It seems likely 
that al-Naẓāʾir fī al-furūq was the title of his book, since the earliest sources mention that 
as the name.755 Nevertheless, it seems to me that by this late date, once legal 
distinctions had become a fully formed and relatively widely recognized genre, calling 
a book al-furūq was a way of signaling that it belonged to this genre.756 A similar 
assumption, based on the word furūq in the title, may have led Ḥājjī Khalīfa to give al-
Furūq as the title for this book and drop the word “al-Naẓāʾir.”757 
As in the previous century, the eighth century saw only one Ḥanafī work of legal 
distinctions, al-Furūq by Tāj al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿUthmān ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muṣṭafā al-
                                                             
751 See Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, 10:430-33 no.1419; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:85-86 no.149; Ibn 
al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 8:125-26, Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:193 no.18608; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. 
“al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,” 1:601; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 2:301-302 no.574. 
752 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1258. 
753 Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn, 2:162. 
754 Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 8:339; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 3:132; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 3:521. 
755 Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-Kāmina fī aʿyān al-miʾa 
al-thāmina, no ed. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, [197-]), 4:71-74. Al-Durar al-kāmina says it is “a 
book about distinctions (ṣannafa… kitāban fī al-furūq).” 
756 It is also possible that given this assumption, later authors, in particular Ḥājjī Khalīfa, miscategorized 
this work as belonging to the genre of legal distinctions and that I am continuing this error by 
maintaining this assumption. 
757 Kashf al-ẓunūn does not include any books with the title “al-Naẓāʾir wa-l-furūq,” see Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf 
al-ẓunūn, 2:1920. 
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Turkumānī al-Mārdīnī al-Ḥanafī, known as Ibn al-Turkumānī (d. 744/1343).758 This work 
is likely not extant, although a manuscript on legal distinctions in the Ẓāhiriyya 
collection in the Asadiyya library in Damascus is attributed to him.759 Little is known 
about Ibn al-Turkumānī. The sources relate only that he was a notable Ḥanafī from a 
scholarly family who lived in Cairo.760  
The Ḥanbalī madhhab saw one book of legal distinctions written in this century, 
the Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī al-farq bayn al-masāʾil by Abū Muḥammad Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd al-
Raḥīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Zarīrānī al-Baghdādī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 741/1341).761 Al-Zarīrānī 
was a Baghdadi jurist and hadith scholar who traveled to Damascus and Cairo. There is 
some uncertainty as to the name of this author. Heinrichs refers to him as al-Zarīrātī 
and says that in the introduction to al-Dimashqī’s book of legal distinctions, this 
author’s “name [is] wrongly given as ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Zarīrānī.”762 Both nisbas, 
however, are given to this author in the biographical sources. His nisba almost certainly 
connects him to Zarīrān, a small village south of Baghdad.763 The edition of Ibn Rajab’s 
Dhayl al-ṭabaqāt that I cite gives his name as ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Zarīrānī, but notes that 
                                                             
758 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 98-99; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:29. 
759 It is unlikely that this work was actually written by Ibn al-Turkumānī. This manuscript is a copy of the 
work that I call Furūq-A, see below pp. 337-39. 
760 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “furūq fī furūʿ al-Ḥanafiyya,” 2:1257; al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-muḍiyya, 
1:197-98 no.139; al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-Kāmina, 1:198; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 8:243; Tamīmī al-
Dārī, Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya 1:389 no.240; GAL 2:64; GAL S 2:67-68; Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 9, no.30. 
761 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 97-98; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:28. 
762 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343. He corrects this statement in Heinrichs, “Qawāʿid,” 383n37, “The 
reading ‘al-Zarīrātī’ is apparently incorrect.” 
763 Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, Muʿjam al-buldān, 3:140. 
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the variant al-Zarīrātī is found on at least some of the manuscripts.764 Other sources, 
such as al-Durar al-kāmina and Shadharāt al-dhahab refer to him as al-Zarīrānī.765 The 
unicum manuscript in Princeton gives his name as ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Zarīrānī766 and is 
likely the source for the name given in the printed edition. Further, this work is 
sometimes referred to as Tanqīḥ al-Furūq. This alternate title, Refinements on the Furūq, 
alludes to the fact that this work is a commentary and expansion of Ibn Sunayna’s Kitāb 
al-Furūq. A work of distinctions that is self-consciously referencing a previous work 
suggests that distinctions writing had by this time become a part of the Ḥanbalī legal-
literary repertoire.  
The eighth/fourteenth century represents the high-water mark in the 
production of works of legal distinctions. Not only were many works written in this 
century, but it also appears that the legal distinctions literature had spread to many 
regions in the Islamic cultural landscape. It was at this time that ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā ibn 
Rāshid al-Washlī al-Zaydī al-Yamanī wrote al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq.767 This work, discussed 
above, seems to have dealt with legal distinctions. Its title, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, is both a 
direct allusion to the work written by ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī and also seemingly places 
                                                             
764 Ibn Rajab, Dhayl ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, 5:104. Al-ʿUthaymīn says that this variant appears in the 
manuscript abbreviated “ṭāʾ,” but in his introduction, does not label any manuscripts with this letter. See 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-ʿUthaymīn,”Introduction” to Dhayl ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, 
1:112-35. 
765 Ibn al-ʿImād in Shadharāt al-dhahab has his name as ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn ʿAbd al-Malik. This spelling 
likely reflects what was on the manuscripts since the editor notes that this name is unusual (8:228). 
766 Princeton University Library, Garrett 4577Y, 2b. 
767 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 100; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:38; Kaḥḥāla, 2:543 no.10254. 
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it in conversation with the Shāfiʿī tradition.768 Apart from this work by ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā, 
this title appears to be confined to works by Shāfiʿī authors.769 Unfortunately, this work 
has not survived and other sources do not preserve excerpts from it. 
 
The Ninth/Fifteenth Century 
After the boom of works of legal distinctions in the eighth century, we see many fewer 
works written in the following centuries. The ninth century saw only two works on 
legal distinctions, one from the Mālikī madhhab and one unusual Ḥanafī work. The 
Mālikī work is al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿAbdarī al-Gharnāṭī 
al-Mālikī, al-Mawwāq (d. 897/1492).770 This work appears no longer to be extant, 
although a manuscript of a book of Mālikī distinctions at the Maktabat Āl Ibn ʿĀshūr al-
Tūnisī in La Marsa is attributed to an author with a similar name, a Muḥammad ibn 
Yūsuf al-Andalusī.771 The manuscript in La Marsa is mentioned by Abū al-Ajfān and Abū 
Fāris, the editors of al-Dimashqī’s Furūq al-Dimashqī, and consequently by both al-
Bāḥusayn and Heinrichs. Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris believed that this was a separate 
person because of the slightly different names, or rather because of the missing nisbas 
in the name given in the manuscript.772 Al-Bāḥusayn agrees that the author of this 
                                                             
768 Such a dialogue, between Zaydī scholars and Shāfiʿī scholars in Yemen in the eighth/fourteenth 
century, would not be unusual. See Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad 
al-Shawkānī (Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press), 12-15. 
769 The main source of information on this work is a biographical dictionary by Muḥammad Zabāra.  
770 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 101-102; al-Sabīl, 
“Introduction,” 31. 
771 La Marsa, Maktabat Āl Ibn ʿĀshūr al-Tūnisī, fāʾ-alif 98-90. 
772 Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 40. 
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manuscript is not al-Mawwāq. He mentions it at the end of his survey and treats it as an 
anonymous work because the name associated with it, Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf, is so 
common.773 Heinrichs, meanwhile, finds it “highly unlikely” that the La Marsa 
manuscript is by someone other than al-Mawwāq, but nevertheless grants both works 
separate entries in his bibliography.774  
There is, however, one mention of a Mālikī work of legal distinctions by an 
otherwise unknown Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf. This comes in Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī’s ʿAlam al-
jadhal fī ʿilm al-jadal, who attributed a work of Mālikī legal distinctions to “al-Shaykh 
Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Andalusī al-Anṣārī al-Mālikī.”775 At first glance, 
this may seem to refer to al-Mawwāq, due to his prominence in the late Andalusi Mālikī 
school and his consistent self-description as “al-Anṣārī.” Al-Ṭūfī, however, died in 
716/1316, almost 180 years before the death of al-Mawwāq and so it is impossible that 
al-Ṭūfī could have known of al-Mawwāq’s work. It must, therefore, be that there were 
at least two scholars named Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf who wrote works of 
Mālikī legal distinctions. Based on this information, it seems likely to me that the La 
Marsa manuscript is not by al-Mawwāq, but only a study or edition of the text would 
help to answer this question.  
That al-Mawwāq, however, wrote a work of legal distinctions is certain. Ibn 
Dāwūd al-Balawī (d. 938/1532), in his Thabat, mentions that Abū Jaʿfar al-Baqanī 
received from al-Mawwāq himself a general license (al-ijāza al-ʿāmma) to transmit 
                                                             
773 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 105. 
774 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342. 
775 Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 73. 
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several works by al-Mawwāq, including al-Furūq.776 If al-Mawwāq granted a license to 
teach his Furūq, he must have authored such a work, and the fact that the tradition 
preserves this detail is strong evidence that he wrote this work and that it was well-
known by other scholars. 
The other work of legal distinctions from this century, entitled simply al-Furūq, 
was written in 802/1399-1400 by the Ḥanafī scholar Shaykh Bāyazīd ibn Isrāʾīl ibn Ḥājjī 
Dāwūd Marghāyatī(?) (d. early ninth/fifteenth c.). This is a peculiar work. Al-Bāḥusayn, 
consulting a microfilm version of the manuscript, says that it is thirty-two pages long, 
although the first ten pages of the manuscript are missing.777 Unfortunately, he does 
not give any other information about the original manuscript, such as its location or 
accession number. Al-Sabīl says that Marghāyatī “is a minor figure (muʾallif ṣaghīr) who 
followed the style of Asʿad al-Karābīsī,” and goes on to describe the work as “written by 
a foreigner with poor style and grammar (uslūb al-kitāb rakīk wa-fīhi laknat al-aʿājim).”778 
Al-Sabīl says that a microfilm of this manuscript is found in the King Faisal Center for 
Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, on microfilm 812, without mentioning where 
the original manuscript is kept. Marghāyātī is unknown aside from this manuscript. I 
have not been able to consult the manuscript or its microfilm myself, but presumably 
its colophon mentions that it was finished in 802/1399-1400, a date that both al-
                                                             
776 See also Ibn Dāwūd al-Balawī, Aḥmad, al-Thabat, Ed. ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿImrānī. (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-
Islāmī, 1403/1983), 190. I thank Josef Ženka for this last reference. 
777 “Wa-huwa kitāb mūjiz yaqaʿa fī 32 waraqa saqaṭa min al-nuskha allatī aṭṭalaʿnā ʿalayhā ʿasharat awrāq min 
awwalihā.” Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 101. It is not clear to me from his statement whether this 
manuscript was originally 42 pages and only 32 survive, or if it was originally 32 pages and only 22 
survive.  
778 Al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 29.  
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Bāḥusayn and al-Sabīl mention, and its contents indicate that Marghāyatī was a Ḥanafī 
scholar.779 
 
The Tenth/Sixteenth Century 
Furūq writing seems to have come to something of a halt during the tenth/sixteenth 
century. There were three works written during this century which are part of the 
tradition of furūq-literature: al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī; al-Ashbāh wa-
l-naẓāʿir by Ibn Nujaym; and ʿIddat al-burūq fī jamʿ mā fī al-madhhab min al-furūq by Abū al-
ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Wansharīsī al-Mālikī. Of these three works, only the one by 
al-Wansharīsī can be said to be a book of legal distinctions; the other two have only 
individual sections devoted to legal distinctions. 
Wansharīsī’s ʿIddat al-burūq, a massive work of legal distinctions, was written by 
one of the most celebrated North African Mālikī scholars of the century. While it may 
not have eclipsed al-Qarāfī’s work, which enjoyed great popularity and exercised 
tremendous influence, it was a very important work for the Mālikī madhhab. The title of 
al-Wansharīsī’s book rhymes with al-Qarāfī’s book; the rhyme is clearly an allusion to 
al-Qarāfī’s book, but they are nonetheless fundamentally different. As discussed earlier, 
al-Qarāfī’s book is not quite a work of legal distinctions, but rather a broader work 
encompassing applied linguistic distinctions, legal distinctions, legal maxims, and 
more. While there are traces of al-Qarāfī’s style and presentation in Wansharīsī’s ʿIdda, 
                                                             
779 Al-Bāḥusayn says that occassionally “he reveals the distinction by way of a question, as though it were 
a riddle or examination (lughz wa-imtiḥān)” (101). 
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the ʿIdda is much more straightforwardly a work of legal distinctions. Stylistically, his 
work differs slightly from other books in the distinctions tradition, most notably, by 
omitting the phrase “the distinction between these is…” Nevertheless, ʿIddat al-burūq 
reads much like other works of legal distinctions.780  
The other two works from this century, by al-Suyūṭī and Ibn Nujaym, are both 
entitled al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir. Both can be seen, in a way, as one end-point for the 
tradition of distinctions writing. Neither of these works is exclusively dedicated to legal 
distinctions, but both include chapters devoted exclusively to legal distinctions.781 Each 
of these chapters is essentially a small work of legal distinctions, not noticeably 
different from many of the other works on this list. These two works are notable, 
however, for how their authors fit what are recognizable treatments of legal 
distinctions into broader conceptual legal organizations.  
All three works from this century were written by towering figures who 
remained highly influential long after their deaths. It is intriguing that a genre so often 
characterized by little-known authors and texts of uncertain provenance terminates 
with works by three authors of such renown. Ibn Nujaym’s work in particular became a 
cornerstone of Ḥanafī legal study in the Ottoman Empire, which officially adopted the 
                                                             
780 Interestingly, although the title of his work suggests a relationship between his work and that by al-
Qarāfī, the introduction to this book has many resonances with the other Mālikī furūq texts, Abū al-
ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Wansharīsī, ʿIddat al-furūq fī jamʿ mā fī al-madhhab min al-jumūʿ wa-l-furūq, ed. 
Ḥamza Abū Fāris (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1990/1410), 79-80. 
781 See the Sixth Section (al-fann al-sādis) in each of these works. 
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Ḥanafī school.782 Ibn Nujaym’s text, and his chapter on legal distinctions, achieved a 
level of canonicity within Ottoman legal culture similar to that achieved by al-Qarāfī in 
North Africa a few centuries earlier. Commentaries on Ibn Nujaym’s text are numerous 
and continued to be written well into the 19th century. 
 
Works of Indeterminate Date 
In addition to the above, there are several works of legal distinctions that cannot be 
securely dated. These works, which exist only in manuscript and are identified in the 
bibliographies complied by al-Bāḥusayn and al-Sabīl, are either not attributed to any 
author or attributed to an otherwise unknown author. Because of the problems of 
attribution, the time and location from which these works originated is not easily 
discernable. Further, I have found that the indeterminate Ḥanafī works are all copies of 
one of two books, which I refer to as Furūq-A and Furūq-B.783 The indeterminate Ḥanafī 
works include the following: al-Furūq by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Arzustānī (d. ?), al-
Furūq by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Urdustānī (d. ?); al-Furūq fī al-furūʿ by Najm al-Dīn 
ʿAlī ibn al-Sayyid Abī Bakr al-Naysābūrī al-Ḥanafī (d. ?); and al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab Abī 
Ḥanīfa, which has no attribution. 
I have been able to consult all of manuscripts of all of these works except the 
one attributed to al-Urdustānī (Baghdad, Maktabat al-Awqāf 3677). Al-Sabīl says that 
                                                             
782 Samy Ayoub says that “the works, opinions, and fatāwā of [Ibn Nujaym] define the discussions of 
Ḥanafī legal development over the 17th-19th centuries.” Samy Ayoub, “We’re not in Kufa Anymore: The 
Construction of Late Ḥanafism in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire, 16th-19th Centuries CE,” Ph.D. Diss., 
University of Arizona, 2014, 24. 
783 I discuss these works below. 
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this work exists in two copies, the manuscript in Baghdad and a manuscript in Berlin, 
Peterman II Nachtrag 4 at the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin.784 The manuscript in Germany 
is not attributed to any author, so “al-Urdustānī” must be mentioned in the manuscript 
in Baghdad. This Berlin manuscript, however, is a copy of the work that I have labelled 
Furūq-A.785 If this Berlin and Baghdad manuscripts are copies of the same work, then the 
Baghdad manuscript attributed to al-Urdustānī must be a a copy of Furūq-A as well.  
Note, finally, that Chester Beatty 4507, al-Furūq fī al-aḥkām ʿalā madhhab al-
mālikiyya is not attributed to any author and the Chester Beatty catalog lists no author; 
al-Bāḥusayn and al-Sabīl treat this as a separate and otherwise unknown work of legal 
distinctions.786 This manuscript is, however, a copy of Muslim ibn Dimashqī’s book of 
legal distinctions.787  
 
Geographical Trends 
There do not seem to be particular geographical trends in the composition of works of 
legal distinctions. It might be said that Baghdad in the fifth/eleventh century seems to 
have been a center of distinctions writing, but then it was a center for most kinds of 
legal writing and intellectual production and scholarly activity in general, so this is not 
surprising. For example, the Mālikī al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb lived in Baghdad and 
                                                             
784 I have been unable to ascertain the current name of the Baghdadi library in question. The Germany 
manuscript is often referred to as Berlin 4848, its number in the Ahlwardt catalog. 
785 See below for a discussion of Furūq-A. 
786 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 103-104; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:34. 
787 It was used by Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris in their edition of this work, Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, 
“Introduction,” 49-50. 
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Muslim al-Dimashqī was his student.788 Similarly, The Shāfiʿī scholars al-Ḥusayn al-
Ṭabarī and ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī lived in Baghdad.789 There is even an interesting 
convergence between the Mālikī and Shāfiʿī schools. When ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣiqillī 
performed his pilgrimage, he is said to have met and had discussions with Imām al-
Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, the son of ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī.790 Baghdad was not, however, 
the only center of legal learning and distinctions writing. Several Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī 
scholars spent time in Khurasan, notably in Nishapur, and Ibn al-Kātib lived in North 
Africa.791 Thus, the centers of furūq-writing in the fifth century seem to reflect the 
centers of intellectual production more generally and most new works of legal 
distinctions came from large, intellectually important urban centers. In the 
eighth/fourteenth century Cairo emerged as a center of distinctions-writing. Of the six 
works of legal distinctions composed during this period, four were written in Cairo.792 
The other two works are Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil by Sharaf al-Dīn al-Zarīrānī and al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq 
                                                             
788 For al-Qāḍī Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, see Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Khallikān, Wafāyāt al-
aʿyān 3:219-22 no.400; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 5:112; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:344 no.8711; Muḥammad 
ibn Muḥammad Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya fī ṭabaqāt al-mālikiyya (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Salafiyya 
wa-Maktabatihā, 1349[/1930-31]), 103-104; al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik 7:220-27. For Muslim al-
Dimashqī, see Ibn Farḥūn, al-Dībāj al-mudhahhab 2:347; al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik 8:57. 
789 For al-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarī, see Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:181 no.142; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 2:61-62 no767; 
al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 126. For ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, see Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 5:176-
77; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:165-66 no.305; Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā 5:73-94 no.439; al-
Zarkashī, al-Manthūr fī al-qawāʿid, 69; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:209-11 no.171. 
790 Ibn Farḥūn, al-Dībāj, 2:56; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 116. 
791 al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik 7:252; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 106. 
792 These works are (i) al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by Sirāj al-Dīn Yūnus ibn ʿAbd al-Mujīd ibn ʿAlī al-Hudhalī al-
Armantī Al-Shāfiʿī; (ii) al-Furūq by Tāj al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿUthmān ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muṣṭafā al-Turkumānī 
al-Mārdīnī al-Ḥanafī, Ibn al-Turkumānī; (iii) Al-Furūq by Abū Umāma Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī 
ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Yaḥyā al-Dukkālī al-Maghribī al-Miṣrī al-Shāfiʿī, Ibn al-Naqqāsh; (iv) Maṭāliʿ al-
daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq by Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn al-Ḥasan al-Asnawī. 
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by ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā al-Zaydī. Although Sharaf al-Dīn al-Zarīrānī spent the majority of his 
life in Baghdad, the sources tell us that he travelled to Cairo and Damascus.793 Little is 
known about ʿAli ibn Yaḥyā, aside from the fact that he lived in Yemen and it does not 
appear that he had any connection to Cairo.794  
 The movement of these texts is not yet clear. The results of my bibliographic 
survey clearly demonstrate a sustained historical interest in the genre of legal 
distinctions. They also show a certain amount of geographic spread for individual texts, 
with a large grouping of Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī texts in both Cairo and Istanbul. Owing to 
the large number of manuscripts surveyed, this study has not taken ownership marks, 
reading notes, and other marginalia into consideration. This limits, to a great extent, 
my capacity to discuss geographic spread. The presence of texts in various imperial 
centers, however, suggests that works of legal distinctions were important enough to 
preserve in capital cities.  
Additionally, the presence of certain works, such as al-Qarāfī’s al-Furūq in 
Istanbul, or al-Jurjānī’s al-Muʿāyāt in Rabat, is worth noting. Istanbul was not known to 
be a center of Mālikī law, and the Mālikī works there are few. The same can be said for 
Rabat and Shāfiʿī law. The preservation of certain works may perhaps be a signal of the 
importance those works held historically. Al-Qarāfī’s al-Furūq was perhaps the most 
important work of Mālikī law from the post-formative period, so in this sense it is not 
                                                             
793 Ibn Rajab, Dhayl ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, 5:104-115, no.581; al-ʿAsqālānī, al-Durar al-Kāmina 2:357, no.2390; 
Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 8:228-29. 
794 Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:543 no.10254; Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Zabāra al-Ḥasanī al-Yamanī, Mulḥiq 
al-badr al-ṭāliʿ, 1:183-84. 
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surprising to find it in Istanbul, but al-Jurjānī’s work has not been understood to have a 
particularly large impact in the history of the Shāfiʿī school. More research is needed, 
however, to understand the role of these works and the historical distribution of 
particular books of legal distinctions.  
The lack of a clear early center of distinctions-writing perhaps indicates that the 
pre-history of legal distinctions was robust and widespread, such that early works 
emerging from disparate parts of the world were remarkably similar in style and 
content. However, that may be, distinctions-writing had currency throughout the 
premodern and Ottoman Muslim world. The reasons for its relevance have shifted over 
time and across geographies, for instance from use in legal disputation to use as 
intellectual entertainment in literary salons, but the distinctions genre nevertheless 
remained enduringly relevant.  
 
Manuscripts 
As important as it is to understand the contexts in which new works of distinctions 
were being written, it is necessary as well to see where these works were being copied 
and recreated, i.e. their manuscript histories. I was able to conduct research in many 
manuscript libraries, but unable to visit Egypt or Syria, both of which have significant 
manuscript collections.795 Nevertheless, this study offers some preliminary remarks on 
the spread and rewriting of legal distinctions manuscripts. An analysis of manuscripts, 
                                                             
795 Research in Syria was not possible due to the Syrian Civil War. A planned research trip to Cairo was 
cancelled because of the August 2013 Rabaa massacre, and the resulting temporary closure of the 
research facilities and the general curfew.  
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the material record of premodern knowledge-production, can be helpful for 
reconstructing the use-history of texts. “The reception of a work can be traced 
indirectly through its transmission and indicates how audiences utilized it, so that the 
evidence of its transmission documents its circulation and use.”796 The results of the 
survey into the material history of legal distinctions are similar to the survey of works 
and authors above. Among manuscripts, we see a very wide geographic and 
chronological spread in the reproduction of books of distinctions.  
 At the outset of this project, I attempted to gain a sense of furūq literature by 
reading the literary histories of Brockelmann (GAL) and Sezgin (GAS). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the contents of GAL suggested the Suleymaniye Library in Istanbul as a 
promising manuscript archive for my research. The discovery of untitled, semi-
anonymous manuscripts of legal distinctions made the use of this library much more 
interesting than I had initially thought. I not only found the manuscripts listed in the 
catalogs, but I also looked at every manuscript with the word furūq in the title, as well 
as every work cataloged under various transliterations of risāla fī al-fiqh. The holdings of 
the Suleymaniye represent a sample of distinctions manuscripts. It is also worth noting 
that although I include Ibn al-Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir as a work of distinctions 
in Chapter 4, that chapter ignores the material history of this work. As mentioned 
previously, al-Ashbāh became one of the central Ḥanafī texts in Ottoman legal study, to 
judge from the many surviving manuscripts of the work. There are 127 manuscripts of 
                                                             
796 Dagmar A. Riedel, “Searching for the Islamic Episteme: The Status of Historical Information in 
Medieval Middle-Eastern Anthological Writing” PhD Diss., Indiana University, 2004, 25. 
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Ibn Nujaym’s Ashbāh in the regional libraries of Turkey, that is, public libraries other 
than the Suleymaniye.797 Many of these copies are incomplete or only fragments, but 
they nevertheless reveal the scope of interest in this book within the Ottoman Empire. 
According to the catalog, the most popular work of distinctions at the 
Suleymaniye was al-Qarāfī’s Furūq, with eight copies.798 It is closely followed by Shams 
al-Dīn al-Maḥbūbī’s Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl, which remarkably remains without a modern edition 
in spite of its status as an important work of legal distinction and an important work 
within the Ḥanafī school. There are six copies of al-Maḥbūbī’s work. This library also 
has two copies of the Kitāb al-Furūq attributed to Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ and of the Kitāb 
al-Furūq by Asʿad al-Karābīsī, and one copy each of the distinctions books of ʿAbd Allāh 
al-Juwaynī and Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī.  
It was easy to identify these works based solely on the manuscript catalog. The 
catalog, however, also turned up several other Ḥanafī works of legal distinctions. These 
were six books with no known author, another copy of Asʿad al-Karabīsī’s work on legal 
distinctions,799 and a book attributed to Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī.800 On closer, examination, 
however, most of these works were actually different copies of the same text. 
                                                             
797 The catalogs for these libraries can be accessed online at https://www.yazmalar.gov.tr, accessed 
August 30, 2016. 
798 The results reported in this paragraph rely quite heavily, though not exclusively, on the digitized 
catalog at the Suleymaniye Library. While visual inspection of manuscripts can help to identify false 
positives, it is very, very difficult to detect false negatives. In other words, I can see the manuscripts that 
the catalog believes are works of distinctions by these authors and verify the information provided. It is 
very likely, however, that there are works of legal distinctions that have been miscataloged and 
therefore not included in this study. 
799 Suleymaniye Library, Halet Efendi 780. 
800 Suleymaniye Library, Osman Holdi 50. 
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Specifically, seven manuscripts, five of the anonymous works and both wrongly-
attributed works, were all manuscript variants of the same work. This work is usually 
attributed to Najm al-Dīn al-Naysabūrī; I refer to this work as Furūq-B, below. Taking 
these manuscripts together as one group, this is the second-most represented work of 
legal distinctions in the Suleymaniye collections. The remaining manuscript was 
another semi-anonymous work sometimes attributed to al-Urdustānī and other times 
to al-Arzustānī; I refer to this work as Furūq-A.801 
 
Works with Unknown or Dubious Attribution 
The anonymous untitled manuscripts on the topic of legal distinctions found 
throughout manuscript archives are intriguing, as their existence has not been studied 
previously. Yaʿqūb al-Bāḥusayn includes a brief mention of the existence of these works 
in his survey discussed above. He references them at the end of his overview of 
distinctions writing: “Finally, we know of no later works works [after al-Wansharīsī] 
other than a few manuscripts with no known author (muʾallifāt qalīla majhūlat al-
muʾallaf). It is unclear when they were written.”802 This statement establishes the 
existence of these manuscripts but does little else. Al-Bāḥusayn’s interest is in 
establishing a chronology of books of distinctions and the uncertain dating and 
provenance of these manuscripts explains his disinterest in these works. Other 
                                                             
801 Al-Sabīl and al-Bāḥusayn attribute this work to al-Urdustānī, presumably based on a manuscript in 
Baghdad. Princeton University Library, Garrett 4185Y, however, attributes the work to al-Arzustānī (64b). 
The only trace remaining of these authors is their nisbas. I discuss this issue below. Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq 
al-fiqhiyya, 103; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:30. 
802 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 76. 
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scholars, such as al-Sabīl and Schacht, simply list the works by whatever title and 
author is given in catalogues, but do not explore further.803 These manuscripts, 
however, are much more interesting than they may appear from al-Bāḥusayn’s 
description. My own manuscript research has revealed copies of these manuscripts in 
several major manuscript repositories. Moreover, I have discovered at least one 
anonymous work of legal distinctions in every major repository of Arabic manuscripts 
that I have consulted.804 The widespread existence of manuscripts of two anonymous 
works on distinctions signals that they played an important role in Islamic legal 
culture. 
Even in my limited research, I have found multiple similar manuscripts that are 
of dubious attribution. Their presence in various manuscript libraries suggests that the 
manuscripts in question circulated relatively widely and were used for study and 
teaching. The first composition of these two anonymous works is particularly difficult 
to date because they were copied and recopied widely both geographically and 
temporally. I believe that these manuscripts can be divided into two discrete books, 
which I refer to as Furūq-A and Furūq-B. It may be the case, however, that the groups 
that I have identified are two different versions of a similar text. Here, I briefly discuss 
these two groups, their manuscripts, and their contents, although more research on 
them is required.  
                                                             
803 Al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:30; Schacht “Furūq-Büchern,” 510. 
804 I have found such manuscripts at the Bibliotheque Nationale de France, the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, 
the University of Leiden Library, the Suleymaniyye, and the Princeton University Library. Libraries in 
which I have not found such works are those which have only relatively small collections of Arabic 
manuscripts, such as the New York Public Library and the Libraries at the University of Pennsylvania. 
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Because these two works are often catalogued as anonymous, generic works of 
fiqh they works can only be recognized by careful analysis of individual manuscripts. It 
is possible that a more in-depth search for manuscripts of these two works could lead 
to more conclusive results than what I am able to provide. At a minimum, the 
collections in the British Library and the Dār al-Kutub in Cairo would have to be 
consulted. Nevertheless, even the results from a partial sample tell us a great deal 
about these two works and alerts us to the importance of the material history of legal 
distinctions. 
I have found six witnesses for the distinctions text that I call Furūq-A: Halet 
Efendi 807 (HE 807), in the Suleymaniye Library in Istanbul; Peterman II Nachtrag 4 in 
the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin; and Princeton University Library, Garrett 4185Y (G 
4185Y); Ẓāhiriyya 4501 in Damascus; , Maktabat al-Ḥaram al-Makkī in Mecca, Fiqh 
Ḥanafī 2089; Khazāʾin Kutub al-Awqāf 3677 in Baghdad.805 These manuscripts all share a 
common title, Kitāb al-Furūq.806 Apart from the title, however, these manuscripts show a 
high degree of variance.807 These works start with similar chapter divisions, but as the 
work progresses, the manuscripts disagree on the placement of subdivisions and the 
ordering of subsections within the text, and even on the number and ordering of 
distinctions within the text. The Princeton manuscript further includes a section not 
                                                             
805 Of these, I have only been unable to consult the copy in Baghdad. I rely on the brief description given 
by al-Sabīl, “Introduction” 1:30. 
806 The Princeton and Damascus manuscripts have this exact title. The Istanbul and Berlin copies are 
titled Kitāb al-Furūq fī al-fiqh. 
807 Asadiyya Library, Ẓāhiriyya 4501 is heavily damaged, a fact which partly explains many of its 
differences from the other MSS.  
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found in any of the other manuscripts. This suggests that the extant manuscripts are 
based on different manuscript stems for this work, but a closer examination is 
necessary in order to understand the relationship between them.  
The Istanbul and Berlin manuscripts do not attribute this work to any author. 
The manuscript in Mecca is attributed to the Ottoman scholar Ismail Hakkı. The 
Ẓāhiriyya manuscript is attributed, however, to Ibn al-Turkumānī.808 Meanwhile, the 
copy at Princeton is attributed to a certain al-Arzustānī [sic], while the Baghdad copy is 
ascribed to al-Urdustānī. The readings of al-Arzustānī and al-Urdustānī is perhaps 
explained by a simple scribal error. Identifying an author based only on a nisba and 
madhhab-affiliation is nearly impossible, especially with so little knowledge about when 
and where this work was first composed.  
In terms of the legal content, Furūq-A is very reminiscent of other works of legal 
distinctions, particularly Asʿad al-Karābīsī’s Kitāb al-Furūq. It is written in a very concise 
style that quickly presents each legal problem in the legal distinction and minimally 
explains the distinction between them. There are few references to other books of law 
and minimal reference to other scholars. Abū Ḥanīfa, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, and Abū 
Yūsuf are the three jurists who appear most often. This is unsurprising since they are 
the three founding figures of the Ḥanafī school. Princeton’s G 4185Y contains no 
mention of a scholar outside of the three founders, while the Sulaymaniye’s HE 807 
                                                             
808 The biographical tradition attributes a work of legal distinctions to Tāj al-Dīn Ibn al-Turkumānī. Tāj al-
Dīn is likely the Ibn al-Turkumānī meant here. This is discussed above. 
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includes a mention of both “Naṣīr ibn Yaḥyā [al-Balkhī (d. ca. 268/881)]”809 and “Abū al-
Layth [al-Samarqandī (d. ca. 383/993) ?].”810 There are also occasional references to 
passages from the Quran or to the hadith, as well as statements on the authority of 
unnamed individuals, “a Ḥanafī scholar said… (qāla baʿḍ ʿulamāʾinā or qāla baʿḍ 
aṣḥābinā).” The different manuscripts of Furūq-A also demonstrate the permeability of 
the genre of legal distinctions, in particular the section on “Miscellaneous Legal Issues 
(masāʾil mutafarriqa; masāʾil mutashābiha)” contains some distinctions in the form of 
question and answer, and HE 807 ends with a section on legal strategems, (ḥīla).811 The 
final sections of HE 807 and G 4185Y are quite different, and seem to be works added 
appended to the end of each respective manuscript. 
Furūq-B is work is a book of legal distinctions normally titled Kitāb al-Furūq and 
occasionally attributed to an Abū Bakr Najm al-Dīn al-Naysabūrī.812 The manuscript of 
this work in Leiden, Leiden Or. 481 (LO481), is one of the two works that Joseph Schacht 
relies on in his article on distinctions.813 Apart from the Leiden copy, I have found seven 
other copies of this same work, all of which are now at the Süleymaniye Library in 
Istanbul: Giresun Yazmalar 44 (GY44), Halet Efendi 780 (HE780), Esad Efendi 884 (EE884), 
                                                             
809 Istanbul, Suleymaniye Library, Halet Efendi 807, 7b l.16. See also Abū al-Ḥasanāt Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd 
al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī, al-Fawāʾid al-bahiyya fī tarājim al-Ḥanafiyya, ed. Muḥammad Badr al-Dīn Abū Firās al-
Naʿsānī (Cairo: Aḥmad Nājī al-Jamālī wa-Muḥammad Amīn al-Khānjī, 1905), 221. 
810 Istanbul, Suleymaniye Library, Halet Efendi 807, 19b l.3. 
811 Istanbul, Suleymaniye Library, Halet Efendi 807, 30b-33b. 
812 It is most easily recognized from its opening phrase, “Praise be to God, who guides us with Islam and 
commands us to submit to Him (al-ḥamd lillāh alladhī hadānā bi-l-islām wa-amaranā bi-l-istislām),” and the 
first distinction in the book, which begins, “When a man prays wearing an impure garment that was in 
his possession… (rajul ṣallā fī thawb kāna ʿindahu ghayr ṭāhir).” 
813 See Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern.” 
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Esad Efendi 542 (EE 542), Asir Efendi 453 (AE453), Osman Huldi 50 (OH50),814 and Yazma 
Baǧıșlar 1187 (YB1187). These manuscripts are all in good condition and complete, they 
start with the basmala and seem to end appropriately without any pages missing on 
either end.815 The manuscripts in the category of Furūq-B exhibit a much higher degree 
of completeness and similarity than those of Furūq-A.816 
The text itself does not reveal much about its author, other than his having 
been a Ḥanafī, as can be seen from his Furūq. The title pages for these works, similarly, 
lack information about the author such as a more complete name or a date of death, 
features commonly found on the title pages of manuscripts. Two of these manuscripts, 
GY44 and LO481, attribute this work to a certain Najm al-Dīn ʿAlī al-Naysābūrī.817 It is 
not been possible to identify such a person with any certainty. The problem lies almost 
entirely in the insignificance of the name itself. It reveals virtually nothing about the 
author. Other scholars who have studied this manuscript have also been at a loss when 
attempting to identify this individual.818 This name consists of an honorific (laqab), a 
                                                             
814 This is listed in the catalog as Furūq Ibn Nujaym. This title is written on the outer and inner cover of the 
MS. 
815 The only partial exception is OH50, of which the top of the first page is missing, affecting the first 
eight lines of the text on the first folio. 
816 See Appendix III and Appendix IV for a table of contents. The three copies of Furūq-A show greater 
variance than the eight copies of Furūq-B. 
817 In the bibliographies compiled by al-Bāḥusayn and al-Sabīl, his first name (ism) is added, and given as 
ʿAlī. They do not cite a source for this, but it is likely from Ismāʿīl Pāshā al-Baghdādī, Kitāb Īḍāḥ al-maknūn 
fī al-dhayl ʿalā Kashf al-ẓunūn (Istanbul: Millî Eǧtim Basımevi, 1972), 1:232 and 2:188. 
818 See Peter Voorhoeve, Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts in the University of Leiden and other collections in the 
Netherlands, 2nd ed. (The Hague; Boston: Leiden University Press, 1980), 85; GAL S II, 956; P. De Jong and 
M.J. De Goeje, Catalogus Codicum Orientalium Bibliothecae Academiae Luguno Batavae, vol. 4 (Leiden: Brill, 
1861), 155; Schacht “Furūq-Büchern,” 506. 
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patronym, and a geographic marker. Further, while the author’s honorific and 
geographic origin are given in three manuscripts, his patronym is given alternatively as 
“ibn Abī Bakr” and “ibn Bakr.”819 With such little information, it is almost impossible to 
track down the identity of this author. It is curious that no patronymic (kunya) is given 
for him since it was a common part of a person’s name. Curiously, his death date is 
never mentioned, even though the author’s name is written multiple times on a single 
manuscript, i.e. on a cover page, a table of contents, and at the beginning of the book’s 
text.820 It is possible that the author was well-known when these manuscripts were 
copied, although such a supposition also raises interesting questions about the 
reliability of the bibliographic sources. It is surprising that a work which is seemingly 
important has almost entirely escaped notice. 
Further complicating the identification of the author is that many of the 
manuscripts attribute this work to authors other than Najm al-Dīn al-Naysābūrī. As 
mentioned above, HE 780 (Halet Efendi, Instabul) attributes this work to Asʿad al-
Karābīsī and OH50 (Osman Huldi, Istanbul), lists the author as Ibn Nujaym. For now, it 
seems safest to consider the author of this work unknown. 
As mentioned above, there is a great deal of overlap between this work and 
Furūq-A. Consequently, the contents of Furūq-B are similar to those of Furūq-A. The style 
of Furūq-B is similarly terse. Furūq-B mentions few jurists, primarily Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 
150/767), Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/898), and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. ca. 
                                                             
819 For ibn Abi Bakr, see Leiden Or. 481; for ibn Bakr, see Suleymaniye Library, Giresun Yazmalar 44. 
820 See Leiden, Or. 481. 
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189/805), but also Muḥammad ibn Muqātil al-Rāzī (d. 248/862),821 al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 
321/933),822 Abū Bakr al-Iskāfī (d. 333/944),823 and both of the figures cited in Halet 
Efendi 780, Naṣīr ibn Yaḥyā (d. ca. 250/864)824 and “al-Faqīh Abū al-Layth,” presumably 
al-Samarqandī (d. ca. 383/993).825 
 There are several similarities between Furūq-A and Furūq-B. While they do not 
seem to have exactly the same content, much of the material they contain overlaps. 
They both rarely mention Ḥanafī authorities or books. The similarities may be 
coincidental, and may be due to the fact that they are both short works of Ḥanafī legal 
distinctions. Alternatively, their similiarities may signify that these works were written 
in a similar cultural context; that is, it may be that the two works were composed 
around the same time and for similar purposes.  
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an up-to-date, critical bibliography of all known premodern 
works of legal distinctions, based on textual, material, and manuscript evidence. It has 
established the corpus of works of legal distinctions, identified the authors of these 
works, and traced their remaining records, if any. From the results of this survey, it 
should be clear that while the genre of legal distinctions is relatively limited, it was 
                                                             
821 GY 44, 4b, l. 7. Muḥhammad ibn Muqātil was a student of Muḥammad al-Shaybānī. See GAS 1:436. 
822 GY 44, 6a, l.13.   
823 GY 44, 10a, ll.3-4. The passage in which Abū Bakr al-Iskāf appears is found in GY 44 and HE 807, 
although he is not mentioned in HE 807. 
824 GY 44, 10a l.9. The passage in which Naṣīr ibn Yaḥya appears is found in GY 44 and HE 807. 
825 GY 44, 30a l.15. The passage in which Abū al-Layth appears is found in GY 44 and HE 807. See GAS 1:445-
50. 
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nevertheless important, and interest in this genre perservered across time and space. 
The genre’s vitality was reflected in both the composition of new works and the 
production of manuscripts of existing books. The results of my empirical survey of 
manuscripts thus tally well with the analytical conclusions of the previous chapters.  
Nevertheless, the results of this survey suggest questions for future study. One 
is why interest in works of legal distinction, perhaps as exemplified in particular by 
Furūq-A, Furūq-B, and the Kitāb al-Furūq attributed to Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī, 
had such staying power in the Ottoman context. This interest makes the almost 
complete lack of new works of legal distinction at this time surprising. These texts had 
been largely unknown before the Ottoman era; the factors behind their popularization 
could shed light on the role of legal distinctions writing in the legal culture of the 
Ottoman Empire. Such a study may also yield insights into larger issues pertaining to 
the role of Islamic law in Ottoman-era intellectual culture. 
Ibn Nujaym would seem to be a central figure in the story of legal distinctions in 
the Ottoman Empire. Ibn Nujaym was an outsider in the Ottoman legal system, having 
not graduated from the Ottoman madrasa system. Nevertheless, his “al-Asbāh wa’l-
naẓāʾir… drew the attention of senior members of the Ottoman learned hierarchy and 
was eventually incorporated into the imperial jurisprudential canon.”826 It was 
eventually sanctioned as a part of the Ottoman canon by the chief mufiti, Ebû-Sʿûd (d. 
982/1574). After receiving his blessing, “the text entered circulation, which means that 
                                                             
826 Burak, Second Formation, 136. 
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it was taught within in[sic] the imperial madrasa system.”827 Nevertheless, Ibn Nujaym’s 
text was not universally admired. Guy Burak notes that “several members of the 
Ottoman learned hierarchy remained perplexed as to the status of al-Ashbāh wa’l-naẓāʾir 
in the decades following its completion and its approbation by Ebû-Sʿûd.”828 As a 
canonical text for the Ottoman educational system, the final work of Ḥanafī legal 
distinctions was disseminated widely by Ottoman scholars. A look at the reception of 
and commentaries on the al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir and particularly the sixth section on 
distinctions would be worthwhile. 
 Another line of inquiry, which fell outside the limits of the present study, would 
be a more intensive analysis of the manuscript record. The present study was only able 
to touch on these matters briefly. A richer history, however, could perhaps be written 
of the interest in the knowledge of legal distinctions. Such an analysis could look into 
the ownership history of several manuscripts, for instance, to see where these 
manuscripts were kept, who were the people and institutions interested in them, and 
where and when they moved from one location to another. Combined with the 
biobibliographical record and the general history of legal distinctions uncovered in the 
present study, this avenue could yield insights into the later history of Islamic law. 
  Further, it is clear that Furūq-A and Furūq-B deserve greater scrutiny. Although 
the manuscripts categorized as Furūq-A vary considerably, it seems clear to me that the 
manuscripts all represent the same work, but perhaps a closer study will show that 
                                                             
827 Burak, Second Formation, 138-39. 
828 Burak, Second Formation, 136, see also 137-39. 
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they in fact represent different works or different versions of the same book. Relatedly, 
there are some similarities as well between Furūq-A and Furūq-B that should be 
explored in a future study.  
 It is clear from this bibliography that legal distinctions were an important part 
of Islamic legal literature. Although legal distinctions is a small genre, books in this 
genre were composed throughout the Islamic world for nearly one thousand years, 
spanning a considerable geographical and chronological breadth. With this in mind, it 
is possible to claim that legal distinctions became a critical component of later Islamic 
legal literature. 
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Conclusion 
 
This study has focused on the history of the genre of legal distinctions. It has shown 
that this genre was a small but important component of the literature of Islamic law. It 
also demonstrates the importance of genre as an important framework for Islamic legal 
research. Through our analysis of this genre, we gained a great deal of insight into 
Islamic legal history. Some of the findings of this study reinforce already understood 
facts about the development of Islamic law, such as the close connections between the 
disciplines of law and grammar, the importance of the fifth/eleventh century as a 
turning point in the development of legal literature, and the importance of formalized 
disputation in advancing legal thought and legal writing. At the same time, however, it 
has made several new contributions to the study of Islamic legal history and suggested 
a few lines of furture inquiry.  
Chapter Two contains a brief survey of lexicographic distinctions. Lexicographic 
distinctions have not received much scholarly attention, yet they can shed light on 
many issues important for understanding the development of Arabic philological 
practices. A more thorough analysis of the Kitāb al-Furūq al-lughawiyya by Abū Hilāl al-
ʿAskarī is desirable. It seems likely that a close reading of al-ʿAskarī’s work would help 
shed light on the important connections between lexicography and theology. Al-ʿAskarī 
is a well-known figure about whom not much is known; a study of his work on 
lexicographical distinctions could be helpful in further understanding his theological 
views, which in turn may shed light on his other writings, and grant us new insights 
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into the linguistic worldview of Muʿtazilite theology at the end of the fourth/tenth 
century. 
Similarly, the history of lexicographical distinctions deserves further scrutiny. 
As understood in Chapter Two, lexicographical distinctions could be seen in two ways: 
as theological treatises on synonymy and as thesauruses concerned with proper usage. 
That chapter speculates that the thesauric aspect gave the genre longevity; 
nevertheless, it may be that works of lexicographical distinctions retained their 
theological resonances throughout their history. A study of the lexicographic 
distinction books by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī and İsmail Hakkı Bursevi may help in 
understanding Sunni theological developments in the early modern period. 
In a different vein, Chapter Three looked at the relationship between formalized 
legal disputation and legal distinctions. This chapter relied, in part, on three Arabic 
encyclopedias of the sciences: Ibn al-Akfānī’s Irshād al-qāṣid ilā asnā al-maqāṣid, ʿIṣām al-
Dīn Ṭaşköprüzāde’s Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, and Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s Kashf al-ẓunūn. These three 
works provide a window into the various ways that scholars organized knowledge, with 
special reference to genres related to the genesis, pre-history, and history of legal 
distinctions. Given that the connections between these three works are generally 
understood, a more thorough study of their legal content of these works will help us 
form a more complete picture of how Islamic law has been understood from the late 
pre-modern to the early modern period. The works by Ibn al-Akfānī and ʿIṣām al-Dīn, 
particularly, are arranged by scientific discipline and may prove especially useful. 
There are likely other encyclopedias that should be consulted as well that I did not 
include in my discussion. 
 349 
 
Finally, Chapter Six raises questions about our understandings of the written 
traditions of Islamic law. As concerns legal distinctions, the prevalence of works with 
dubious or unknown authorship is high. It is not clear to me whether the popularity of 
such works is something particular to the genre of legal distinctions, or if other genres 
of legal literature also have various popular works with unclear authorship. This is a 
question that should be pursued as it may help to clarify the role and and the 
relationship between authorship and the possible production of anonymous study 
texts. Chapter Six showed the importance of claims to authorship in the 
biobibliographical tradition. Certain claims known to be erroneous, such as the 
existence of a Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī attributed to Asʿad al-Karābīsī, were nevertheless 
preserved in the bibliographic tradition. It appears that there may be a tension 
between the importance of authorship and the prevalence of works with no known 
author.  
One particular contribution of this study is its demonstration of the connection 
between certain changes in the social practices of Islamicate societies and intellectual 
production among legal scholars. In this regard, our understanding of genre as a kind of 
Wittgensteinian language game was productive. The idea of genre as a language game 
takes genre as a recurring activity that is structured by rules but open to change over 
time.829 The first chapters of this dissertation attempted to establish some of the rules 
which govern the game that is the genre of legal distinctions. Some of these rules are 
readily apparent: organization by legal topic, the comparison of two or more 
                                                             
829 I discuss this idea in the Introduction, pp. 16-18. See also Jacques, Authority, 17-23. 
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apparently similar but different legal problems, the disconnected narrative between 
one comparison and another, and the wording of book titles.  
Other rules, however, were more clearly tied to developments in the public 
demand for particular presentations of knowledge. In part, the legal logic of 
comparison found in works of legal distinctions is directly tied to the institution of 
formalized disputation, as shown by the handbooks of disputation studied in Chapter 
Three. Moreover, the logic of legal distinctions is closely connected to the 
popularization of formal disputation among Muslim jurists in the fifth/eleventh 
century and the need for resources to participate successfully in these disputations. 
Similarly, the convergence between riddles and distinctions was fueled by the 
popularization and spread of majālis and the changing aesthetic preferences that 
accompanied the spread of majālis.  
This dissertation demonstrated this change clearly for legal distinctions and for 
legal riddles. It has been seen in other genres of legal literature as well, such as the 
supercommentary (al-ḥāshiya) studied by El Shamsy, and should be expected in many 
other genres as well.830 It should not be surprising to see Islamic legal literature change 
in response to shifting demands from reading publics. The changes documented in this 
dissertation, however, are changes in the presentation or packaging of legal 
information, not necessarily substantive changes to the legal content itself. The 
changes described here should not be understood as mere aesthetic changes, but rather 
can inform us about changes regarding the consumption of Islamic legal knowledge. My 
                                                             
830 El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya.” 
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findings suggest that an increased focus on genre would likely contribute greatly to our 
understanding of Islamic law and legal development. Genre, at least in the post-
formative period (after the fifth/eleventh c.), responded to the demand of consumers 
of legal knowledge and their interestes likely contributed to formal innovation of ideas, 
reasoning strategies, and the organization of knowledge. 
At the same time, however, the results of this study also raise several new and 
important questions about Islamic law. The first involves the identity of a genre. One of 
the main difficulties encountered in understanding the genre of legal distinctions was 
in establishing the boundaries of this genre vis-à-vis other genres of Islamic law. The 
porousness between legal distinctions and legal riddles was established in Chapter Five, 
but there are other genres with which it seemingly shares overlapping borders. In her 
study of legal maxims, for instance, Khadiga Musa says some scholars believed that “al-
ashbāh wa’l-naẓāʾir is actually the science of furūq.”831 There are clear overlaps between 
these two fields; the al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir works by both Ibn Nujaym and Jalāl al-Dīn al-
Suyūṭī contain important sections dealing with legal distinctions. At the same, time, 
however, Ibn al-Subkī’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir does not contain a section on legal 
distinctions at all, perhaps because the “discipline of al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir was not fully 
developed in Ibn al-Subkī’s time.”832 Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir could also be seen as “the 
science of al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya.”833 It is clear that more research is needed to 
understand the identity, contours, and function of each of these genres. Once 
                                                             
831 Musa, “Legal Maxims,” 334. 
832 Musa, “Legal Maxims,” 338. 
833 Musa, “Legal Maxims,” 339. 
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understood, we are likely to gain new understandings about the nature of Islamic legal 
thought and its development outside of the two major genres of legal theory and 
substantive law. 
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Appendix I: Bibliography of Furūq Works by Madhhab. 
 
Below in outline form is a comprehensive list of works on legal distinctions, which is 
based on my research into the genre of al-furūq al-fiqhiyya. It contains all of the 
published editions and manuscripts known to me. The outline is arranged by legal 
school (madhhab), and then chronologically by author within each school. Authors for 
whom death dates are unknown are listed last within each legal school. The footnotes 
for each main entry contain the relevant bibliographical information about the author 
and/or the work described. If printed editions discuss particular manuscripts, I include 
a reference to the description for the manuscript in a footnote. For the reasons noted 
above, this survey includes al-Furūq by al-Qarāfī, al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir by al-Suyūṭī, and 
al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir by Ibn al-Nujaym, but mentions only the most important 
printings and editions for those works. All other works are treated in detail. 
 
Shāfiʿī 
1. Al-Furūq by Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿUmar Ibn Surayj al-Shāfiʿī (d. 306/918).834 
a. Not extant.  
 
                                                             
834 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 68, 72-73, 84; al-Sabīl, 
“Introduction,” 1:34; Hājjī Khalīfa Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1257-58; Schacht, 
“Furūq-Büchern,” 509; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:218 no.1596; Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, 3:21-39 
no.85; al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 108-109; al-Asnawī, Tabaqāt, 1:311 no.593; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-
dhahab, 4:29-31; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:89-91 no.35. This is unlikely to be a work of legal distinctions. 
I discuss this in Chapter Three, pp. 207-209. 
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2. Kitāb al-masāʾil wa-l-ʿilal wa-l-furūq by Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-Nasawī (d. 
ca 420/1030).835 
a. Not extant. 
 
3. Al-Kifāya fī al-furūq wa-l-laṭāʾif by Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-
Ṭabarī (d. ca. fifth/eleventh c.).836  
a. Not extant.  
 
4. Al-Furūq by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī al-Shāfiʿī (d. 
438/1046).837 
a. Alternate Titles: 
i. Al-Jamʿ wa-l-Farq 
ii. Al-Wasāʾil fī furūq al-masāʾil.838 
                                                             
835 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 509; Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 302.  
836 The author of this work is Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ṭabarī. This is confirmed by all 
of the biographies of al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh, with the exception of al-Shīrāzī, who does not mention 
this work. See al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 90-91; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:181 no.142; al-Asnawī, 
Ṭabaqāt, 2:61-62 no.767; al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 126. Other sources, however, attribute this work to 
Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ḥannāṭī al-Ṭabarī (d. ca 495/1101), see al-Sabīl, 
“Introduction,” 1:37; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:636 no.4795; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 2:1499; al-Baghdādī, 
Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn, 1:311. These sources are all late, however. Earlier biographies of al-Ḥannāṭī, moreover, 
do not attribute this work to him, see Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:179-81 no.141; Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-
shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, 4:367-371 no.397; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:193-94 no.362; al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 118. 
837 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 87; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:35-36; Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 73; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq,” 1:601 
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878 Hājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn s.v. “Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūd fī furūq al-manqūl,” 1:481; al-Baghdādī, Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn 
1:204. 
879 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 94; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:29n2. Both of these sources say that this 
thesis was submitted to al-Azhar University, but it seems to be from Cairo University. See 
http://drepository.asu.edu.eg/xmlui/handle/123456789/49817, accessed August 27, 2016.  
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v. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Carullah 604, n.d. 
vi. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Haci Mehmud Efendi 984, 
995/1586-87. 
vii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Murat Molla 1009. 
viii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Șehid Ali Pașa 900. 
ix. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Arabe 923, n.d. 
x. Princeton, Princeton University Library, New Series no. 298, n.d. 
 
5. Al-Furūq by Tāj al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿUthmān ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muṣṭafā al-
Turkumānī al-Mārdīnī al-Ḥanafī, Ibn al-Turkumānī (d. 744/1343-44).880  
a. Not extant 
b. MSS: 
i. Damascus, al-Maktaba al-Asadiyya, Ẓāhiriyya 4501(?).881 
 
6. Al-Furūq by Shaykh Bāyazīd ibn Isrāʾīl ibn Ḥājjī Dāwūd Marghāyatī? (d. early 
ninth/fifteenth c.).882 
a. Extant.883 
                                                             
880 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 98-99; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:29; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:192 no.1420; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-Ḥanafiyya,” 
2:1257; al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-muḍiyya, 1:197-98 no.139; al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-Kāmina, 1:198; Ibn al-
ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 8:243; Tamīmī al-Dārī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya, 1:389 no.240; GAL 2:64 and S2:67-68; 
Ibn Quṭlūbughā Tāj al-tarājim, 9 no.30. 
881 Although this work is attributed to Ibn al-Turkumānī, this attribution seems erroneous. This is a copy 
of Furūq-A, which has been attributed to many different jurists, see above Chapter Six, pp. 337-40. 
882 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 101; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 29.  
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7. Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir by Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī (d. 970/1563).884 
 
8. Furūq-B; al-Furūq fī al-furūʿ by pseudo-Najm al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr al-Naysābūrī 
al-Ḥanafī (d. ?).885 
a. Alternate title  
i. Taḥrīr al-furūq.886 
b. MSS: 
i. Leiden, Leiden University Library, Or. 481 
ii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Așir Efendi 453. 
iii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Esad Efendi 542, 1057/1647-
48. 
iv. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Esad Efendi 884, 774/1372-73. 
v. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Giresun Yazmalar 44. 
vi. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Halet Efendi 780. 
vii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Osman Huldi 50, 
1126/1714.887 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
883 Noneof the sources that mention this manuscript relay its location. It is available, however, in 
microfilm at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, microfilm 812. 
884 Al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:30; GAL 2:310-11, GAL S2:425-27; Ḥajjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “Al-Ashbāh 
wa-l-naẓāʾir fī al-furūʿ,” 1:99-100; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 10:523; Tamīmī al-Dārī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-
saniyya, 3:275, no. 894. 
885 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 103; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:29; al-Baghdādī, Īḍāḥ al-maknūn, 1:232 
and 2:188. GAL S2:956. See also excerpts in Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 515-24. 
886 Al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 29. 
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viii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Yazma Bağișlar 1187, 
960/1552-53. 
 
9. Furūq-A; al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab Abī Ḥanīfa.888 
a. MSS: 
i. Baghdad, Khazāʾin kutub al-awqāf, 3677, n.d.889 
ii. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Peterman II Nachtag 4 p2. 
iii. Damascus, Asadiyya Library, Ẓāhiriyya 4501, n.d. 
iv. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Halet Efendi 807, n.d. 
v. Mecca, Maktabat al-Ḥaram al-Makkī, Fiqh Ḥanafī 2089, n.d.890 
vi. Princeton Garrett 4185Y, n.d.891 
 
Mālikī 
1. Furūq masāʾil mushtabiha fī al-madhhab by Abū al-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAlī 
ibn Muḥammad al-Kanānī al-Mālikī, Ibn al-Kātib (d. 408/1017-18).892  
a. Not extant.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
887 This manuscript is attributed to Ibn Nujaym in the catalog. 
888 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 103-104; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:30. 
889 Attributed to Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Urdustānī. 
890 Attributed to Ismāʿīl Ḥaqqī. 
891 Attributed to al-Arzustānī. 
892 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 84-85; al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-
madārik, 7:252; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 106. 
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2. Al-Jumūʿ wa-l-furūq by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn ʿAlī al-Baghdādī al-Mālikī (d. 
422/1031).893 
a. Alternate titles:  
i. Kitāb al-Furūq fī masāʾil al-fiqh;894  
ii. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya. 
b. Editions: 
i. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya. Edited by Jalāl ʿAlī al-Qadhdhāfī al-Jihānī. 
Dubai: Dār al-Buḥūth li-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya wa-Ihyāʾ al-Turāth, 
1424/2003.  
ii. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī wa-
ʿalāqatuhā bi-Furūq al-Dimashqī. Edited by Maḥmūd Salāmah 
Ghiryānī. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1411/1991.895 
iii. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī wa-
ʿalāqatuhā bi-Furūq al-Dimashqī. Dubai: Dār al-Buḥūth li-l-Dirāsāt 
al-Islāmiyya wa-Ihyāʾ al-Turāth, 1424/2003.  
c. MSS: 
i. Tripoli, Libya, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Mujāhidīn al-Lībiyīn 588, n.d.896 
                                                             
893 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 85-86; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:31; Ibn Farḥūn, al-Dībāj, 2:26-29; al-Mawwāq, al-Tāj wa-l-iklīl, 2:7; Ibn Khallikān, Wafāyāt al-aʿyān, 2:387; 
Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 5:112; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:344 no.8711; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-
zakiyya, 103-104; al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik, 7:220-27; Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 73. 
894 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341. 
895 Although it appears that this edition is the original of the next edition, the Dubai volume includes 
numerous citations of works printed after 1991. I have been unable to consult this edition, but see 
http://www.aruc.org/en/web/auc/general-search?page=FullDisplay&mId=2765814. Accessed August 16, 
2016. 
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3. Al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-mudawwina by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq ibn 
Muḥammad ibn Hārūn al-Qurashī al-Sahmī al-Ṣiqillī al-Mālikī (d. 466/1074).897 
a. Editions: 
i. Al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-mudawwana. Edited by Aḥmad ibn 
Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥabīb. Ph.D. Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 
1416/1996.898  
ii. Kitāb al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-mudawwana wa-l-Mukhtalaṭa. 2 
volumes. Edited by Abū Faḍl al-Dimyāṭī Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī. 
Casablanca: Markaz al-Turāth al-Thaqāfī al-Maghribī; Beirut: Dār 
Ibn Ḥazm, 2009. 
b. MSS: 
i. Rabat, al-Khizāna al-Malakiyya 261, n.d.899 
ii. Rabat, al-Khizāna al-Malikiyya 350 qāf/2, written 743/1342-43.900 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
896 Neither edition of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s Furūq gives an accession number, Jihānī, “Introduction,” 17-19 and 
al-Ghiryānī, “Introduction,” 19-20. This is the same MS attributed al-Dimashqī by Abū al-Ajfān and Abū 
Fāris as Maktabat al-Awqāf bi-Ṭarābulus 588 (49). It is unclear to me whether the manuscript is now at the 
Markaz al-Lībī li-l-Maḥfūẓāt wa-l-Dirāsāt al-Tārīkhiyya or al-Hayʾat al-ʿĀmma li-l-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-
Islamiyya.  
897 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 88; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:31; GAS 1:471 and S1:661; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:6635 no.6635; al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām 3:282; Ibn Farḥūn, al-Dībāj, 
2:56; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 116; al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik, 8:71-74; Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, 
ʿAlam al-jadhal, 73. 
898 See Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 38. 
899 Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥabīb “Introduction,” to ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Siqillī, Abū Muḥammad 
ibn Muḥammad ibn Hārūn al-Sahmī, Al-Nukat wa-l-Furūq li-Masāʾil al-Mudawwina, ed. Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm 
ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥabīb (Ph.D. Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1416/1996), 126. 
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iii. Marrakesh, Khizānat Ibn Yūsuf 499, written 740/1339-40.901 
iv. Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España 5231 (autograph copy), 
written 459/1067.902 
v. Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhariyya, Rawwāq al-Maghāriba 3156, n.d.903  
 
4. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya by Abū al-Faḍl Muslim ibn ʿAlī al-Dimashqī al-Mālikī (d. 
fifth/eleventh c.).904 
a. Alternate titles: 
i. Furūq muttafiq ẓāhirihā mukhtalif bāṭinihā 
b. Editions: 
i. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya. Edited by Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and 
Ḥamza Abū Fāris. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1992. 
c. MSS: 
i. Fez, Khizānat al-Qarawiyīn, 1193, n.d.905 
ii. Tunis, Dār al-Kutub al-Waṭaniyya, 1692, Shaʿbān 
1399[sic]/December 1978.906 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
900 Aḥmad al-Ḥabīb, “Introduction,” 125. 
901 Aḥmad al-Ḥabīb, “Introduction,”127-28. 
902 According to GAL, this is Madrid 78, but this appears to be an old designation. See Guillén Robles, Mss. 
árabes BNM, p. 38, n. LXXVIII; http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?id=0000014499&page=1. Aḥmad ibn 
Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥabīb gives the new number based on his visit to the library, see Aḥmad al-
Ḥabīb, “Introduction,” 124-25. 
903 Aḥmad al-Ḥabīb, “Introduction,” 127-28. 
904 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 86-87; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
31. See also Tartīb al-madārik 2:765; Dībāj al-mudhahhab 2:347; Tartīb al-madārik 8:57 
905 Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 47. 
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iii. Tunis, Dār al-Kutub al-Waṭaniyya, 14862, 1291/1874-75.907 
iv. Dublin, Chester Beatty 4507, n.d.908 
v. Tunis, Dār al-Kutub al-Waṭaniyya, 1694, n.d.909 
 
5. Al-Furūq aw anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ al-furūq by Abū al-ʿAbbās Shihāb al-Dīn 
Aḥmad ibn Idrīs ibn al-Raḥmān al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285). 910 
 
6. Al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿAbdarī al-Gharnāṭī al-
Mālikī, Al-Mawwāq (d. 897/1492).911  
a. MSS:  
i. La Marsa, Maktabat Āl Ibn ʿĀshūr al-Tūnisī fāʾ-alif 98-90, n.d.(?)912 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
906 Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 48. 
907 Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 48-49. According to Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, it was 3217 
in (min raṣīd) the Maktabat al-Aḥmadiyya collection.  
908 Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 49-50. This manuscript is identified by al-Bāḥusayn as al-
Furūq fī al-aḥkām ʿalā madhhab al-Mālikiyya by an anonymous author since this is what appears on the title 
page of this manuscript (104). However, it is clearly identified by Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris as a copy of 
Muslim al-Dimashqī’s Furūq. 
909 Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 50. 
910 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341-2; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 152-154; al-Sabīl, 
“Introduction,” 1:32-33; GAL 1:385 and S1:665; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:100 no.750; Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 
509; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 188-89. 
911 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 101-102; al-Sabīl, 
“Introduction,” 31; GAL S2:375-76; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 3:787 no.16479; Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 262. See also 
Ibn Dāwūd al-Balawī, Aḥmad, al-Thabat, Ed. ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿImrānī. (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 
1403/1983), 190. I thank Josef Ženka for this last reference. 
912 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342. This manuscript is likely not a copy of the work by al-Mawwāq, 
but is often attributed to him. 
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7. ʿIddat al-burūq fī jamʿ mā fī al-madhhab min al-furūq by Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn 
Yaḥyā ibn Muḥammad al-Wansharīsī al-Mālikī (d. 914/1508).913 
a. Editions: 
i. ʿIddat al-furūq fī jamʿ mā fī al-madhhab min al-jumūʿ wa-l-furūq. 
Edited by Ḥamza Abū Fāris. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 
1990/1410. 
ii. ʿIddat al-furūq fī jamʿ mā fī al-madhhab min al-jumūʿ wa-l-furūq fī 
madhhab al-Imām Mālik wa-yalīhi Īḍāḥ al-masālik ilā qawāʿid al-Imām 
Mālik kilāhumā taʾlīf al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Wansharīsī al-
Tilimsānī. Edited by Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazyadī. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-ʿIlmiyya, 2005 
iii. Fez Lithograph edition.914 
b. MSS:  
i. Tunis, al-Maktaba al-Waṭaniyya 4725, n.d.915 
ii. Tunis, al-Maktaba al-Waṭaniyya 15087, n.d.916 
iii. Tunis, al-Maktaba al-Waṭaniyya 14889, n.d.917 
                                                             
913 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 102; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:32; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:325 no.2389; GAL 2:248; GAL S2:348; Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 274-75. 
914 Abū Fāris mentions this edition in his introduction. He claims it is “the famous and widely circulated 
Fez lithograph edition (ṭabaʿat Fās al-mashhūra al-mutadāwala),” but I have not been able to find another 
reference to this work. 
915 Ḥamza Abū Fāris, “Introduction” to Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā ibn Muḥammad al-Wansharīsī, 
ʿIddat al-furūq fī jamʿ mā fī al-madhhab min al-jumūʿ wa-l-furūq, ed. Ḥamza Abū Fāris (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-
Islāmī, 1990/1410), 55. 
916 Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 55-56. 
917 Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 56. 
 372 
 
iv. Tunis, al-Maktaba al-Waṭaniyya 4859, 1288/1872-73.918 
v. Rabat, al-Khizāna al-Malikiyya 1563, n.d.919 
 
8. Furūq bayna masāʾil fiqhiyya mutashābihat al-aḥwāl mutakhālifat al-iʿtibār by Abū 
ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf (d. ?).920 
a. MSS: 
i. La Marsa, Maktabat Āl Ibn ʿĀshūr al-Tūnisī fāʾ-alif 98-90, n.d.921 
 
Ḥanbalī 
1. Al-Furūq fī masāʾil al-fiqhiyya by ʿImād al-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn ʿAlī 
Ibn Surūr al-Maqdisī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 614/1212).922 
a. Not extant. 
 
2. Al-Furūq by Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-
Sāmarrī al-Ḥanbalī, Ibn Sunayna (d. 616/1219).923 
                                                             
918 Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 56. 
919 Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 56-57. 
920 This is perhaps the author referred to by al-Ṭūfī as “al-Shaykh Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf 
al-Andalusī al-Anṣārī al-Mālikī” (73). Although this may appear at first glance to be a clear reference to 
al-Mawwāq, al-Ṭūfī died in 716/1316, while al-Mawwāq died almost two hundred years later, in 897/1492. 
921 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342. 
922 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 94; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:40; Ibn Rajab Dhayl Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila 
3:198-220; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:42 no.312; al-ʿUlaymī, al-Durr al-Munaḍḍad, 1:339 no. 969; Ibn al-ʿImād 
Shadharāt al-dhahab 7:105-108. 
923 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 93-94; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:40; GAL S1:689; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 7:126-27; Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 73; Ibn 
Rajab, Dhayl Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila 3:249-51. 
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a. Alternate title: 
i. Al-Furūq al-mushtabih ṣuwarihā al-mukhtalif aḥkāmihā. 
b. Editions: 
i. Kitāb al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab al-Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. Edited by 
Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā. Riyadh: Dār 
al-Ṣumayʿī, 1997. 
ii. Al-Furūq min awwal kitāb al-jināyāt ilā nihāyat al-kitāban dirāsatan 
wa-taḥqīqan. Edited by Anas ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-
Subayyil. MA Thesis, Medina: Umm al-Qurā University, 
1435/2014. 
c. MSS: 
i. Damascus, Asadiyya Library, Ẓāhiriyyah, 19 Muḥarram 
856/February 2, 1452.924 
ii. Baṣra, ʿAbbāsiyya Library, 39 jīm, n.d.925 
iii. Leipzig, Leipzig University Library, Vollers 389, n.d.926  
                                                             
924 Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā “Introduction” to Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh 
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Sāmarrī, Kitāb al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab al-Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, ed. 
Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā (Riyadh: Dār al-Ṣumayʿī), 99. The editions of this book 
cite this manuscript but do not give its accession number. 
925 al-Yaḥyā “Introduction,” 99; Anas ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Subayyil, “Introduction” to Muʿaẓẓam 
al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Sāmarrī, al-Furūq min awwal kitāb al-jināyāt ilā nihāyat 
al-kitāban dirāsatan wa-taḥqīqan, ed. Anas ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Subayyil, MA Thesis (Medina: 
Umm al-Qurā University, 1435/2014), 90. 
926 Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 507-508; al-Subayyil, “Introduction,” 89. This manuscript is available 
digitally, http://www.refaiya.uni-leipzig.de/receive/RefaiyaBook_islamhs_00000858. Accessed August 22, 
2016. 
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3. Al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qawī ibn Badrān al-Mardāwī 
al-Maqdisī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 699/1299-300).927 
a. Not extant. 
 
4. Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī al-farq bayn al-masāʾil by Abū Muḥammad Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd al-
Raḥīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Zarīrānī al-Baghdādī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 741/1341).928 
a. Alternate title: 
i. Tanqīḥ al-furūq.929 
b. Editions: 
i. Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī al-farq bayna al-masāʾil. Edited by ʿUmar ibn 
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Sabīl. 2 volumes. Mecca: Al-
Mamlaka al-ʿArabiyya al-Saʿūdiyya, Wizārat al-Taʿlīm al-ʿĀlī, 
Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, Maʿhad al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa-Iḥyāʾ al-
Turāth al-Islāmī, Markaz Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1414[/1993-
94]. 
                                                             
927 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 96; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:40; Ibn Rajab, Dhayl ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, 
2:343; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 7:789-90; al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 6:214; al-ʿUlaymī, al-Durr al-Munaḍḍad, 
442 no.1176; al-Baghdādī, Hadiyyat al-ʿĀrifīn, 2:139. 
928 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 97-98; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 
1:28; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:132 no.7117; Ibn Rajab, Dhayl, 5:104-115 no.581; al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-Kāmina 
2:357 no.2390; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 8:228-29. 
929 This title is given on the cover page of Princeton University Library, Garrett 4577Y. 
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ii. Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī al-farq bayna al-masāʾil. Edited by Muḥammad 
Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, 1424/2003. 
iii. Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī al-farq bayna al-masāʾil. Edited by ʿUmar ibn 
Muḥammad al-Sabīl. Dammam, Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
1431[/2009-2010]. 
c. MSS: 
i. Princeton, Princeton University Library, Garrett 4577Y, n.d.930 
 
Shi’i Works 
1. Kitāb al-Furūq by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Barqī (d. third/ninth c.).931 
a. Not extant. 
2. Al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā ibn Rāshid al-Washlī al-Zaydī al-Yamanī (d. 
777/1375-76).932 
a. Not extant. 
Works Incorrectly Said to Be of Legal Distinctions: 
1. Al-Muskit by al-Zubayr ibn Aḥmad ibn Sulaymān ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Zubayrī (d. 
317/929-30).933 
                                                             
930 This is likely a unicum, as implied by the printed editions. See al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:126-27; 
Muḥammad Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl, “Introduction” to Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn ʿAbd 
Allāh al-Zarīrānī, Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī al-farq bayna al-masāʾil, ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1424/2003), 9. 
931 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 309-310. 
932 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 100; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:38; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:543 no.10254. 
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a. There is not enough information to classify this work.934 
 
2. Al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. ca. 
320/932).935 
a. This work is on lexicographic distinctions. 
 
3. Al-Muṭāraḥāt by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Baghdādī, Ibn al-Qaṭṭān 
(d. 359/969-70).936 
a. This is a work of law, but not on distinctions. 
 
4. Al-Iḥkām fī tamyīz al-fatāwā ʿan al-aḥkām wa-taṣarrufāt al-qāḍī wa-l-imām by Abū al-
ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Idrīs al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285).937 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
933 Al-Bāḥusayn al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 68, 73-74; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:35; Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 108; 
Ibn Khallikān, Wafāyāt al-aʿyān, 2:69; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 2:1626; Ibn al-Subkī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-
shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, 3:295; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:606  
934 See Chapter Four, pp. 209-12. 
935 Al-Bāḥusayn al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 69-70; Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, 2:20; GAL S1:356; al-
Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 6:272; ; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 3:502 no.14648; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-furūq fī furūʿ 
al-al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1258; al-Bāḥusayn also claims that the attribution of a book of legal distincitons to 
Tirmidhī is doubtful, but most likely a confusion stemming from his having written a book of 
lexicographic distinctions and having been a Shāfiʿī. 
936 Al-Bāḥusayn al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 69, 71-72; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:35; al-Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya al-
Kubrā 3:295; Shadharāt al-dhahab 4:306; Hājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn 2:1714. But also see al-Zarkashī, al-
Manthūr, 1:70., also al-Bāḥusayn says that it is erroneously attributed to this Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, but instead 
was by Abū ʿAbd ʿAllāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Qaṭṭān who died between the fifth and sixth 
centuries. See al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, 3:163, and that it is not really about furūq, but rather 
question and answer, citing Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 2:146. 
937 Al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:34, Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Introduction,” 39; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-
ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Iḥkām fī tamyīz al-fatāwā ʿan al-aḥkām wa-taṣarrufāt al-qāḍī ʿand al-imām,” 1:21. 
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a. This is a work on fatwas and legal rulings. 
 
5. Al-Furūq by al-Qāḍī Muḥammad ibn Kāmil ibn Muḥammad ibn Tammām al-
Tadmurī al-Shāfiʿī (d. after 741/1340).938  
a. It is not clear that this work was composed. 
 
6. Al-Furūq. ʿUmar ibn Raslān al-Bulqīnī (d. 805/1403).939 
a. This is a work on Sufism. 
 
7. Furūq al-uṣūl by pseudo-Kemalpașazade (d. 940/1534).940  
a. This work is on applied linguistic distinctions in law. 
 
8. Qurrat al-ʿayn wa-l-samʿ fī bayān al-farq wa-l-jamʿ by Badr al-Dīn ibn ʿUmar ibn 
Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-ʿĀdilī al-ʿAbbāsī al-Ḥuraythī(?) al-Shāfiʿī (d. ca. 
970/1562).941 
a. This is a work on Sufism. 
 
                                                             
938 This work is only mentioned in Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 3:606 no.15326. This scholar has entries in al-
ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-Kāmina 5:411; and al-ʿUlaymī, al-Uns al-Jalīl bi-taʾrīkh al-Quds wa-l-Jalīl, 2:140, but they 
do not mention this book. 
939 Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 9:80-81. 
940 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn s.v. “Furūq al-uṣūl,” 2:1257. He describes this work as “a useful (mufīda) 
treatise by a later jurist (baʿḍ al-mutaʾakhkhirīn).” 
941 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 104; al-Sabīl, “Introduction,” 1:39; Fihrist Makhṭūṭāt al-baḥrayn 1:99; 
Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 3:557 no.14995. Al-Bāḥusayn says this is actually a work of sufism, not a legal work and 
therefore is not a work of legal distinctions. I have not been able to examine this work itself. 
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9. Talqīḥ al-Karābīsī.942 
a. This work does not exist, but was erroneously cited by Ibn Nujaym in his 
al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, at the beginning of section six. 
 
10. Muwaḍḍiḥ Awhām al-Jamʿ wa-l-Tafrīq by al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Aḥmad 
ibn ʿAlī ibn Thābit 
a. This is a work of hadith criticism. 
 
11. Al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya li-l-Imām Mālik by Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl Jalāl 
a. This is a work of legal distinctions, but compiled recently. 
 
12. Al-Furūq li-Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya: Muntazaʿ min Aghlab Kutub Ibn Qayyim Raḥimahu 
Allāhu Taʿālā by Yūsuf al-Ṣāliḥ  
a. This is a work of legal distinctions, but compiled recently. 
 
13. Al-Naẓāʾir al-fiqhiyya by Abū ʿImrān Mūsā ibn ʿĪsā al-Fāsī al-Ṣanhājī al-Qayrawānī 
(d. ?).943  
a. This is a work of legal maxims. 
                                                             
942 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “Furūq al-Karābīsī,” 2:1258. 
943 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 86. 
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Appendix II: Chronological Furūq Bibliography. 
 This appendix includes a bibliography of all known works of legal distinctions, 
arranged chronologically. For more information on a specific work or its author, refer 
to Appendix I. 
 
Third Century 
1. Kitāb al-Furūq by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Barqī (Shiʿī, d. third/ninth c.). 
 
Fourth Century 
1. Al-Furūq by Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿUmar Ibn Surayj (Shāfiʿī, d.306/918).  
 
2. Al-Furūq by Abū al-Faḍl Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī (Ḥanafī, d. 322/934).  
 
3. Kitāb al-masāʾil wa-l-ʿilal wa-l-furūq by Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-Nasawī 
(Shāfiʿī, d. ca. 420/1030).  
 
Fifth Century  
1. Al-Kifāya fī al-furūq by Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ṭabarī (Shāfiʿī, 
d. ca. fifth/eleventh c.).  
 
2. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya by Abū al-Faḍl Muslim ibn ʿAlī al-Dimashqī (Mālikī, d. 
fifth/eleventh c.).  
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3. Furūq masāʾil mushtabiha fī al-madhhab by Abū al-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn 
Muḥammad al-Kanānī, Ibn al-Kātib (Mālikī, d. 408/1017-18).  
 
4. Al-Jumūʿ wa-l-furūq by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn ʿAlī al-Baghdādī (Mālikī, d. 
422/1031).  
 
5. Al-Furūq by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī (Shāfiʿī, d. 
438/1046).  
 
6. Al-Ajnās wa-l-furūq by Abū ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Nāṭifī al-Ṭabarī 
(Ḥanafī, d. 446/1054).  
 
7. Al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-mudawwina by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq ibn 
Muḥammad ibn Hārūn al-Qurashī al-Ṣiqillī al-Mālikī (Mālikī, d. 466/1074).  
 
8. Al-Wasāʾil fī furūq al-masāʾil by Abū Khayr Salāma ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Jamāʿa al-
Maqdisī (Shāfiʿī, d. 480/1087).  
 
9. Al-Muʿāyāt by Abū ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Jurjānī (Shāfiʿī, d. 
482/1089).  
 
Sixth Century 
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1. Al-Furūq by Abū al-Maḥāsin ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Ismāʿīl al-Rūyānī al-Ṭabarī 
(Shāfiʿī, d. 502/1108).  
 
2. Al-Furūq by Abū al-Muẓaffar Asʿad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Naysābūrī 
al-Karābīsī (Ḥanafī, d. 570/1174). 
 
Seventh Century 
1. Al-Furūq fī masāʾil al-fiqhiyya by ʿImād al-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn ʿAlī 
ibn Surūr al-Maqdisī (Ḥanbalī, d. 614/1212).  
 
2. Al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Sāmarrī, Ibn Sunayna 
(Ḥanbalī, d. 616/1219).  
 
3. Al-Furūq by Abū al-ʿAbbās Kamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Kashāsib al-Shāfiʿī al-
Duzmārī (Shāfiʿī, d. 634/1245). 
 
4. Al-Fuṣūl wa-l-furūq by Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khalaf Najm al-
Dīn Ibn Rājiḥ al-Maqdisī (Shāfiʿī, d. 638/1241).  
 
5. Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl by Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh al-Maḥbūbī, Ṣadr al-
Sharīʿa al-Awwal (Ḥanafī, d. 640/1243).  
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6. Al-Furūq aw Anwār al-Burūq fī Anwāʾ al-Furūq by Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Idrīs al-
Qarāfī (Mālikī, d. 684/1285).  
 
7. Al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qawī ibn Badrān al-Maqdisī 
(Ḥanbalī, d. 699/1299-1300).  
 
Eighth Century 
1. Al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by Sirāj al-Dīn Yūnus ibn ʿAbd al-Mujīd ibn ʿAlī al-Hudhalī al-
Armantī (Shāfiʿī, d. 725/1325).  
 
2. Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī al-farq bayn al-masāʾil by Abū Muḥammad Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd al-
Raḥīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Zarīrānī al-Baghdādī (Ḥanbalī, d. 741/1341).  
 
3. Al-Furūq by Tāj al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿUthmān ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muṣṭafā al-
Turkumānī al-Mārdīnī, Ibn al-Turkumānī (Ḥanafī, d. 744/1343-44).  
 
4. Al-Furūq by Abū Umāma Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn 
Yaḥyā al-Dukkālī al-Maghribī al-Miṣrī al-Shāfiʿī, Ibn al-Naqqāsh (d. 763/1361).  
 
5. Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq by Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn 
al-Ḥasan al-Asnawī (Shāfiʿī, d. 772/1370).  
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6. Al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā ibn Rāshid al-Washlī al-Zaydī al-Yamanī 
(Zaydī, d. 777). 
 
 
Ninth Century 
1. Al-Furūq by Shaykh Bāyazīd ibn Isrāʾīl ibn Ḥājjī Dāwūd Marghāyatī? (Ḥanafī, d. 
early ninth/fifteenth c.).  
 
2. Al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿAbdarī Al-Mawwāq al-
Gharnāṭī (Mālikī, d. 897/1492).  
 
Tenth Century 
1. Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir by Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī (Shāfiʿī, d. 
911/1505).  
 
2. ʿIddat al-burūq fī jamʿ mā fī al-madhhab min al-furūq by Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn 
Yaḥyā al-Wansharīsī (Mālikī, d. 914/1508).  
 
3. Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir by Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī (Ḥanafī, d. 970/1563)  
 
Unknown 
1. Furūq-A or Al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab Abī Ḥanīfa by Anonymous (Ḥanafī). 
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2. Furūq-B or Al-Furūq fī al-furūʿ attributed to Najm al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn al-Sayyid Abī Bakr 
al-Naysābūrī al-Ḥanafī (Ḥanafī, d. ?).  
 
3. Al-Furūq by Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Andalusī al-Anṣārī (Mālikī, d. ?). 
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Appendix III: The Six Manuscripts of the Furūq text attributed to Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ 
al-Karābīsī 
 
Library, City MS Number Date of Copy 
Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, Cairo Fiqh Ḥanafī 1923 After 1003/1595 
Maktabat al-Awqāf, Baghdad  3533 undated 
Maktabat al-Azhar, Cairo  2076 Rāfiʿī 26,Fiqh Ḥanafī 915  1052/1642 
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin Or. 5013 1025/1616 
Suleymaniye, Istanbul Feyzullah Efendi 921/1 9th/15th century (?) 
Suleymaniye, Istanbul Ahmet III 1181/1 1003/1595 
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Appendix III: The Manuscripts of Furūq A 
Garrett 4185Y, 
Princeton University 
Library 
Peterman II Nachtrag 
4, Staatsbibliothek zu 
Berlin  
Halet Efendi 807, 
Suleymaniye 
Library, Istanbul 
Fiqh Ḥanafī 2089, 
Maktabat al-
Haram al-Makki, 
Mecca 
Ẓāhiriyya 4501, 
Damascus944 
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction  Introduction 
Kitāb al-Ṭahāra Kitāb al-Ṭahāra Kitāb al-Ṭahāra Kitāb al-Ṭahāra Kitāb al-Ṭahāra 
Kitāb al-Ṣalāt Kitāb al-Ṣalāt Kitāb al-Ṣalāt Kitāb al-Ṣalāt Kitāb al-Ṣalāt 
Kitāb al-Zakāt Kitāb al-Zakāt Kitāb al-Zakāt Kitāb al-Zakāt Kitāb al-Zakāt 
Kitāb al-Ṣawm  Kitāb al-Ṣawm Kitāb al-Ṣawm Kitāb al-Ṣawm Kitāb al-Ṣawm 
Kitāb al-Ḥajj Kitāb al-Ḥajj Kitāb al-Ḥajj Kitāb al-Ḥajj Kitāb al-Ḥajj  
Kitāb al-Nikāḥ  Kitāb al-Nikāḥ Kitāb al-Nikāḥ Kitāb al-Nikāḥ Kitāb al-Nikāḥ 
Kitāb al-Ṭalāq  Kitāb al-Ṭalāq Kitāb al-Ṭalāq Kitāb al-Ṭalāq Kitāb al-Ṭalāq  
Kitāb al-ʿItāq Kitāb al-ʿItāq Kitāb al-ʿItāq Kitāb al-ʿItāq Kitāb al-ʿItāq 
Kitāb al-Aymān Kitāb al-Aymān Kitāb al-Aymān Kitāb al-Aymān Kitāb al-Ṣayd  
Kitāb al-Buyūʿ  Kitāb al-Buyūʿ Kitāb al-Buyūʿ Kitāb al-Buyūʿ Kitāb al-Buyūʿ  
Kitāb al-Shufaʿa  Kitāb al-Shufaʿa Kitāb al-Shufaʿa Kitāb al-Shufaʿa Kitāb al-Shufaʿa 
Kitāb al-Rahn Kitāb al-Rahn Kitāb al-Rahn Kitāb al-Rahn Kitāb al-Rahn 
Kitāb al-Ijāra Kitāb al-Ijāra Kitāb al-Ijāra Kitāb al-Ijāra Kitāb al-Ijāra 
Kitāb al-Ṣayd  Kitāb al-Ṣayd Kitāb al-Ṣayd Kitāb al-Ṣayd Kitāb al-Hiba 
Kitāb al-Hiba  Kitāb al-Hiba Kitāb al-Hiba Kitāb al-Hiba Kitāb al-Waṣāyā 
Kitāb al-Waṣāyā Kitāb al-Waṣāyā Kitāb al-Waṣāyā Kitāb al-Waṣāyā  
                                                             
944 This manuscript has been heavily damaged. It has significant wear around the binding, the pages are 
out of order, and the end is missing.  
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Kitāb al-Ḥudūd wa-l-
saraqa 
Kitāb al-Ḥudūd wa-l-
saraqa 
Kitāb al-Ḥudūd Kitāb al-Ḥudūd 
wa-l-saraqa 
 
Kitāb al-Wikāla Kitāb al-Wikāla Kitāb al-Wikāla Kitāb al-Wikāla  
Kitāb al-Maʾdhūn Kitāb al-Maʾdhūn Kitāb al-Maʾdhūn Kitāb al-Maʾdhūn  
Kitāb al-Ḥawāla wa-
l-kafāla 
Kitāb al-Ḥawāla wa-l-
kafāla 
Kitāb al-Ḥawāla wa-
l-kafāla 
Kitāb al-Ḥawāla  
Masāʾil mutafarriqa Masāʾil mutafarriqa Kitāb al-Daʿwā Masāʾil 
mutafarriqa  
 
Kitāb al-Iqrār  Kitāb al-Shahāda   
Kitāb al-Diyāt  Kitāb al-Iqrār   
Masāʾil shattā  Kitāb al-Diyāt   
Masāʾil mutashābiha  Masāʾil shattā   
Masāʾil farqiyyah 
fiqhiyya 
 Kitāb al-Muḍāraba   
  Masāʾil mutashābiha   
  Masāʾil al-ḥīla    
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Appendix V: The Manuscripts of Furūq-B (Najm al-Dīn Naysābūrī, attrib.) 
Giresun Yazmalar 
44, Suleymaniye 
Library, Istanbul 
Halet Efendi 780, 
Suleymaniye 
Library, Istanbul 
Leiden Or. 481, 
Leiden University 
Library 
Esad Efendi 884 
Suleymaniye, 
Library, Istanbul 
Esad Efendi 542 
Suleymaniy,e 
Library, Istanbul 
Așir Efendi 453 
Suleymaniye, 
Library, Istanbul 
Osman Huldi 50 
Suleymaniye, 
Library, Istanbul 
Yazma Baǧıșlar 
1187, Suleymaniye 
Library, Istanbul 
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction [missing] Introduction  
Ṣalāt [Bāb al-Ṣalāt] Ṣalāt Masāʾil al-ṣalāt wa-
l-zakāt 
[Ṣalāṭ] [Ṣalāt] [title, if any, 
missing] 
[ṣalāt] 
Zakāt Zakāt Zakāt   Kitāb al-zakāt Kitāb masāʾil al-
ṣawm 
Kitāb al-zakāt 
Ṣawm Ṣawm Masāʾil al-ṣawm  Kitāb masāʾil al-
ṣawm945 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
ṣawm 
Kitāb al-ṣawm Kitāb al-ḥajj Kitāb al-ṣawm 
Ḥajj Ḥajj Masāʾil al-ḥajj Kitāb al-ḥajj Kitāb masāʾil al-
ṣawm 
Kitāb al-ḥajj  Kitāb al-nikāḥ Kitāb al-ḥajj 
Nikāḥ Masāʾil al-nikāḥ  Masāʾil al-nikāḥ  Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-nikāḥ Kitāb al-ṭalāq Kitāb al-nikāḥ 
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nikāḥ nikāḥ 
Ṭalāq Masāʾil al-ṭalāq  Masāʾil al-ṭalāq Kitāb al-ṭalāq Kitāb masāʾil al-
ṭalāq 
Kitāb al-ṭalāq Kitāb masāʾil al-
ʿitāq 
 
ʿItāq Masāʾil al-ʿitāq  Masāʾil al-ʿitāq Kitāb masāʾil al-
ʿitāq 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
ʿitāq 
Kitāb al-ʿitāq Kitāb al-buyūʿ  
Aymān Masāʾil al-aymān  Masāʾil al-aymān  Kitāb al-aymān Kitāb masāʾil al-
aymān 
Kitāb al-aymān Kitāb al-shufaʿa  
Buyūʿ Buyūʿ  Buyūʿ  Kitāb masāʾil al-
buyūʿ  
Kitāb masāʾil al-
buyūʿ 
Kitāb al-buyūʿ  Kitāb masāʾil al-
rahn  
 
Shufaʿa Masāʾil al-shufaʿa  Masāʾil al-shufaʿa  Kitāb al-shufaʿa Kitāb masāʾil al-
shufaʿa  
Kitāb al-shufaʿa  Kitāb masāʾil al-
ijāra 
 
Rahn Masāʾil al-rahn Masāʾil al-rahn Kitāb masāʾil al-
rahn 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
rahn 
Kitāb al-rahn Kitāb masāʾil al-
ṣayd 
 
Ijārāt Masāʾil al-ijāra Masāʾil al-ijāra Kitāb masāʾil al-
ijāra 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
rahn 
Kitāb al-ijāra Kitāb masāʾil al-
hiba 
 
Ṣayd Masāʾil al-ṣayd Masāʾil al-ṣayd Kitāb masāʾil al-
ṣayd 
Kitāb masāil al-ṣayd Kitāb al-ṣayd Kitāb masāʾil al-
waṣāyā 
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Hiba Masāʾil al-hiba  Masāʾil al-hiba Kitāb masāʾil al-
hiba 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
hiba 
Kitāb al-hiba Kitāb masāʾil al-
ḥudūd 
 
Waṣāyā Masāʾil al-waṣāyā Masāʾil al-waṣāyā Kitāb masāʾil al-
waṣāyā 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
waṣāyā 
Kitāb al-waṣāyā  Kitāb al-wakāla  
Ḥudūd  Masāʾil al-ḥudūd 
wa-l-saraqa 
Masāʾil al-ḥudūd 
wa-l-saraqa 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
ḥudūd 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
ḥudūd wa-l-saraqa 
Kitāb al-ḥudūd  Kitāb masāʾil al-
maʾdhūn 
 
Wakāla Masāʾil al-wakāla  Masāʾil al-wakāla Kitāb al-wakāla Kitāb masāʾil al-
wakāla 
Kitāb al-wakāla Kitāb al-ḥawāla wa-
l-kafāla 
 
Maʾdhūn Masāʾil al-maʾdhūn Masāʾil al-maʾdhūn Kitāb masāʾil al-
maʾdhūn 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
maʾdhūn 
Kitāb al-maʾdhūn Kitāb masāʾi lal-
daʿwā 
 
Ḥawāla wa-l-Kafāla Masāʾil al-ḥawāla Masāʾil al-kafāla 
wa-l-ḥawāla 
Kitāb al-ḥawāla wa-
l-kafāla 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
ḥawāla wa-l-kafāla 
Kitāb al-ḥawāla Kitāb masāʾil al-
iqrār 
 
Daʿwā Masāʾil al-daʿwā Masāʾil al-daʿwā Kitāb masāʾil al-
daʿwā 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
daʿwā 
Kitāb al-daʿwā Kitāb masāʾil al-
diyāt 
 
Iqrār Masāʾil al-iqrār Masāʾil al-iqrār Kitāb masāʾil al-
iqrār 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
iqrār 
Kitāb al-iqrār Kitāb masāʾil shattā  
Diyāt Masāʾil al-diyāt Masāʾil al-diyāt Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-jināyāt Kitāb masāʾil al-  
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diyāt diyāt muḍāraba 
Masāʾil Masāʾil shattā Masāʾil shattā Kitāb masāʾil shattā Kitāb masāʾil al-
muḍāraba 
Kitāb al-muzāraʿa Kitāb masāʾil 
mutashābiha 
 
Masāʾil ukhrā Masāʾil al-
muḍāraba946 
Al-Masāʾil al-
mutāshabiha 
Kitāb masāʾil al-
muḍāraba 
Kitāb masāʾil 
mutashābiha 
Kitāb al-muḍāraba    
 Masāʾil al-
mutāshabiha 
Masāʾil al-ḥiyal  Kitāb masāʾil 
mutashābiha 
 Kitāb al-mushābiha   
     Kitāb al-ḥīla    
     Kitāb al-ḥiyal    
                                                             
 
 
 392 
 
Bibliography 
Manuscripts 
Anonymous, Kitāb al-Furūq, MS Suleymaniye Library, Halet Efendi 780, Istanbul. 
Anonymous. Risāla fī al-fiqh [= Kitāb al-Furūq], MS Halet Efendi 780, Suleymaniye Library, 
Istanbul.  
Anonymous. Kitāb al-Farq. Yazma Baǧıșlar 1187, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul. 
Anonymous. Furūq Ibn Nujaym. MS Suleymaniye Library, Osman Holdi 50, Istanbul. 
Anonymous. Kitāb al-Furūq, MS. Suleymaniye Library, Esad Efendi 884, Suleymaniye 
Library, Istanbul. 
Al-Arzustānī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Kitāb al-Furūq. MS Princeton University Library, 
Garrett 4577Y, Princeton. 
Al-Gharnāṭī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿAbdarī al-Mālikī. al-Furūq. MS 
Maktabat Āl Ibn ʿĀshūr al-Tūnisī, fāʾ-alif 98-90, La Marsa. 
Ibn Ḥalwān al-Ṭabīb, Aḥmad. Kitāb al-furūq. MS Suleymaniye Library, Ayasofya 4838, 
Istanbul.  
Ibn al-Kutubī. Mā lā yasaʿu al-ṭabīb jahluhu. MS Library of Congress, Mansuri Collection 
R128.3.I127 1682, Washington DC. 
Ibn al-Turkumānī, Tāj al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿUthmān ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muṣṭafā. Kitāb al-
Furūq. MS Asadiyya Library, Ẓāhiriyya 4501, Damascus. 
Al-Jurjānī, Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Kitāb al-Muʿāyāt fī al-fiqh ʿalā madhhab 
al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī. MS Fiqh Shāfiʿī 915, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, Cairo. 
Al-Sharīf, Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad. Nafāʾis majālis al-sulṭāniyya fī ḥaqāʾiq asrār al-
Qurʾāniyya, MS Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 2680, Istanbul. 
 393 
 
Al-Nāṭifī, Abū ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. al-Ajnās wa-l-furūq MS Suleymaniye 
Library, Nuruosmaniye 1371, Istanbul 
Al-Nāṭifī, Abū ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. al-Ajnās wa-l-furūq MS Suleymaniye 
Library, Esad Efendi 542, Istanbul. 
Al-Naysābūrī, Najm al-Dīn. Kitāb al-Furūq, MS Suleymaniye Library, Giresun Yazmalar, 
Istanbul. 
Al-Naysābūrī, Najm al-Dīn. Kitāb al-Furūq, MS Or. 481, Leiden University Libraries, 
Leiden. 
Al-Naysābūrī, Najm al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Bakr. Kitāb al-Furūq, MS Suleymaniye Library, Giresun 
Yazmalar 44, Istanbul. 
Al-Zarīrānī, Abū Muḥammad Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh. Kitāb Īḍāḥ al-
dalāʾil fī al-farq bayn al-masāʾil MS. Princeton University Library, Garrett 4185Y, 
Princeton. 
 
Printed Sources 
ʿAbd al-Tawwāb, Ramaḍān. Introduction to Kitāb al-farq by Ibn Fāris al-Lughawī. Edited 
by Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-Tawwā. Cairo: Maktabat al-Khātimī; Riyadh: Dār al-Rifāʿī, 
1402/1982. 
Abū al-Ajfān, Muḥammad and Ḥamza Abū Fāris. Introduction to al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya by 
Abū Faḍl Muslim ibn ʿAlī al-Dimashqī. Edited by Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and 
Ḥamza Abū Fāris. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1992. 
Abū al-Ajfān, Muḥammad and ʿUthmān Baṭīkh. Introduction to Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ fī 
muḥaḍārat al-khawāṣṣ by Ibn Farḥūn, 5-53. Edited by Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān 
and ʿUthmān Baṭīkh. Cairo: Dār al-Turāth; Tunis: al-Maktaba al-ʿAtīqa[, 1980]. 
 394 
 
Abū Shāma Shihāb al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Maqdisī. Tarājim rijāl al-qarnayn al-sādis wa-
l-sābiʿ al-maʿrūf bi-l-Dhayl ʿalā al-Rawḍatayn. 5 vols. Edited by Ibrāhīm Shams al-
Dīn. Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 1422/2002. 
Al-Afghānī, Abū ʿUmar Sayyid Ḥabīb ibn Aḥmad al-Madanī. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya ʿinda 
Imām Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya jamʿan wa-l-dirāsa. 3 vols. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd 
Nāshirūn, 2009. 
Agrama, Hussein Ali. “Ethics, tradition, authority: Toward an anthropology of the 
fatwa.” American Ethnologist 37.1 (2010): 2-18. 
Ahmad, Ahmad A. Structural Interrelations of Theory and Practice in Islamic Law: A Study of 
Six Works of Medieval Islamic Jurisprudence. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006. 
Ali, Samer. Arabic Literary Salons in the Islamic Middle Ages. South Bend, IN.: Notre Dame 
University Press, 2010. 
Al-ʿĀmilī, Muḥsin al-Ḥusaynī. Aʿyān al-Shīʿa. Edited by Ḥasan al-Amīn and Muḥsin al-
Amīn. 28 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Taʿāruf li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, 1998. 
Amīn, Aḥmad. Duḥā al-islām. 2nd ed. 3 vols. Cairo: Lajnat al-Taʾlīf wa-l-Tarjama wa-l-
Nashr, 1938. 
Arazi, Albert and Haggai Ben-Shammai, “Mukhtaṣar.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New 
Edition. Edited by H.A.R. Gibb et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960-2004. 
Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations. On Coming-to-be and Passing Away. On the Cosmos. 
Edited and translated by E.S. Forster and D.J. Furley. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1955. 
Al-ʿAskarī, Abū Hilāl. al-Furūq al-Lughawiyya. Edited by Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Salīm. 
Cairo: Dār al-ʿIlm wa-l-Thaqāfa li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1998. 
———. Kitāb al-Awāʾil. Edited by Muḥammad al-Miṣrī and Walīd Qaṣṣāb, 2 vols. 
Damascus: Manshūrāt Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1975. 
 395 
 
———. Kitāb al-Ṣināʿatayn al-kitāba wa-l-shiʿr. Edited by ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī and 
Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm. [Cairo:] Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, 
1371/1952. 
Al-Aṣmaʿī, ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Qurayb. Kitāb al-Farq. Edited by Ṣabīḥ al-Tamīmī. Beirut: 
Dār Usāmah, 1987. 
Al-Asnawī, Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn al-Ḥasan. Al-Alghāz al-fiqhiyya wa-huwa al-
kitāb al-musammā Ṭirāz al-mahāfil fī alghāz al-masāʾil. Edited by Muḥammad 
ʿUthmān and Ṭaha ʿAbd al-Ruʾūf Saʿd. Cairo: Al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-
Turāth, 1433/2012.  
———. Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq. 2 Vols. Edited by Naṣr al-Dīn 
Farīd Muḥammad Wāṣil. Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2007. 
———. Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya. Edited by Kamāl Yūsuf al-Ḥūt. 2 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, 1407/1987. 
Al-ʿAsqalānī, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ḥajar. al-Durar al-kāmina 
fī aʿyān al-miʾa al-thāmina, no ed. 4 vols. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 
[197-]. 
Awass, Omer. “Fatwa: The Evolution of an Islamic Legal Practice and its Influence on 
Muslim Society.” Ph.D. Diss., Temple University, 2014. 
Ayoub, Samy. “We’re not in Kufa Anymore: The Construction of Late Ḥanafism in the 
Early Modern Ottoman Empire, 16th-19th Centuries CE.” Ph.D. Diss., University of 
Arizona, 2014. 
Baalbaki, Ramzi. The Arabic Lexicographical Tradition: From the 2nd/8th to the 12th/18th 
Century. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2014. 
———. “Kitāb al-ʿAyn and Jamharat al-Lugha.” In Early Medieval Arabic: Studies on al-Khalīl 
ibn Aḥmad, edited by Karin C. Ryding, 44-62. Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 1998. 
 396 
 
Badawi, Muhammad ed. Modern Arabic Literature: The Cambridge History of Arabic Literature 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992. 
Al-Baghdādī, Ismāʿīl Bāshā. Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn asmāʾ al-muʿallifīn wa-āthār al-muṣannifīn. 2 
vols. 1951-55. Reprint, Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d. 
———. Kitāb Īḍāḥ al-maknūn fī al-dhayl ʿalā Kashf al-ẓunūn. Istanbul: Millî Eǧtim Basımevi, 
1972. 
Al-Bāḥusayn, Yaʿqūb ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya wa-l-uṣūliyya: 
muqawwamātuhā shurūṭuhā nashʾatuhā taṭawwuruhā dirāsa naẓariyya waṣfiyya 
tārīkhiyya. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd; Sharikat al-Riyāḍ li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 
1419/1998. 
———. Al-Qawāʿid al-fiqhiyyah: al-mabādiʾ al-muqawwimāt, al-maṣādir al-dalīliyya al-
taṭawwur, dirāsa naẓariyya taḥlīliyya taʾṣīliyya tārīkhiyya (Riyadh: Maktabat Ibn 
Rushd, Shirkat al-Riyāḍ, 1418/1998) 
Al-Bājī, Sulaymān ibn Khalaf. Kitāb al-Minhāj fī tartīb al-ḥijāj. Edited by ʿAbd al-Majīd 
Turkī. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1987. 
Al-Bakrī, ʿĀdil. Introduction to al-Furūq bayna ishtibāhāt al-ʿilal by Ibn al-Jazzār. Edited by 
Ramziyya al-Aṭraqjī. Baghdad: Wizārat al-Taʻlīm al-ʻĀlī wa-al-Baḥth al-ʻIlmī, 
Jāmiʻat Baghdād, Bayt al-Ḥikmah, 1989. 
Al-Bakrī, Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr. Al-Istighnāʾ fī al-farq wa-l-istithnāʾ. Edited by Saʿūd ibn 
Musʿad ibn Musāʿid al-Thubaytī. Mecca: al-Mamlaka al-ʿArabiyya al-Saʿūdiyya, 
Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, Maʿhad al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa-Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-
Islāmī, Markaz Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1988.  
———. Al-Iʿtināʾ fī al-farq wa-l-istihnāʾ kitāb yabḥathu fī qawāʿid al-fiqh al-islāmī wa-furūʿihi. 
Edited by ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwad. Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1991. 
Al-Baqqūrī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. Tartīb al-furūq wa-ikhtiṣārihā. Edited by ʿUmar ibn 
ʿAbbād. Morocco: al-Mamlakah al-Maghribiyya Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn 
al-Islāmiyya, 1414/1994. 
 397 
 
Al-Barqī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khālid. al-Maḥāsin, Edited by al-Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn 
al-Ḥusaynī. 2 vols. Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya 1370/1951. 
Al-Bashar, Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm. Introduction to Kitāb al-Muʿāyāt fī al-fiqh ʿalā 
madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī, by Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Jurjānī, 1-
106. Edited by Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm al-Bashar. PhD. Diss.: Jāmiʿat Umm 
al-Qurā, 1415[/1994]. 
Bauer, Thomas. “al-Azharī, Khālid ibn ʿAbdallāh.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Edited 
by Kate Fleet, et. al. Leiden: Brill, 2008-. 
———. Die Kultur der Ambiguität: Eine Andere Geschichte des Islams. Berlin: Verlag der 
Weltreligionen, 2011. 
Becker, C. H. “Christliche Polemik und islamische Dogmenbildung.” Zeitschrift für 
Assyriololgie und verwandte Bebiete, 26 (1912): 171-195 
Bencheheb, M. “Lughz.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. Edited by H.A.R. Gibb et 
al. Leiden: Brill, 1960-2004. 
Berkey, Jonathan P. “Popular Culture under the Mamluks: A Historiographical Survey.” 
Mamluk Studies Review 9.2 (2005): 133-146. 
Bernards, Monique. “Grammarians’ Circle of Learning: A Social Network Analysis.” In 
ʿAbbasid Studies II: Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies, Leuven, 28 June – 
1 July 2004, edited by John Nawas, 143-164. Leuven; Paris; Walpole, MA: Uitgeverij 
Peeters en Departement Oosterse Studies, 2010. 
———. “Ṭalab al-ʿIlm amongst the Linguist of Arabic during the ʿAbbāsid Period” in 
ʿAbbāsid Studies: Occassional Papers of the School of ʿAbbāsid Studies, Cambridge, 6-10 
July 2002, edited by J.E. Montgomery, 111-128. Leuven; Dudley, MA: Uitgeverij 
Peeters en Departement Oosterse Studies, 2004.  
Birnbaum, Eleazar. “Kātib Chelebi (1609-1657) and alphabetization: a methodological 
investigation of the autographs of his Kashf al-Ẓunūn and Sullam al-Wuṣūl.” In 
Scribes et manuscrits du Moyen-Orient, edited by François Déroche and Francis 
Richard, 236-63. Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de France, 1997. 
 398 
 
Blachère, Régis. Un poète arabe du IVe siècle de l’Hégire (Xe siècle de J.-C.): Abou ṭ-Ṭayyib al-
Motanabbî. Paris: Adrien-Maissonneuve, 1935. 
Blecher, Joel. “Ḥadīth Commentary in the Presence of Students, Patrons, and Rivals: Ibn 
Ḥajar and Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī in Mamluk Cairo.” Oriens 41 (2013): 261-87. 
———. “In the Shade of the Ṣaḥīḥ: Politics, Culture and Innovation in an Islamic 
Commentary Tradition.” Ph.D. Diss., Princeton University, 2013. 
Boaz Shoshan, Popular Culture in Medieval Cairo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993) 
Bosworth, C. E. “Muʿammā.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. Edited by H.A.R. Gibb 
et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960-2004. 
Bowers, Fredson. “Multiple Authority: New Problems and Concepts of the Copy-Text,” 
Library 5th ser. 27 (1972): 81-115. 
Brockelmann, Carl. Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur. 2 vols and suppl. Second revisted 
edition. Leiden: Brill, 1943. 
Brookshaw, Dominic P. “Palaces, Pavilions, and Pleasure-Gardens: The Context and 
Setting of the Medieval Majlis.” Middle Eastern Literatures 6.3 (2003): 199-223. 
Brown, Jonathan A. C. “New Data on the Delateralization of Ḍād and its Merger with Ẓāʾ 
in Classical Arabic: Contributions from Old South Arabic and the Earliest Islamic 
Texts on Ḍ / Ẓ Minimal Pairs” Journal of Semitic Studies 52.2 (2007): 335-368. 
Brunschvig, Robert. La Berbérie orientale sous les Ḥafṣides des origines à la fin du XV siècle. 
Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1940-1947. 
Burak, Guy. The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Ḥanafī School in the Early Modern 
Ottoman Empire. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
Cahen, Claude and Charles Pellat. “Ibn ʿAbbād.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. 
Edited by H.A.R. Gibb et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960-2004. 
 399 
 
Calder, Norman. Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era. Edited by Colin Imber and 
Robert Gleave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
———. “Al-Nawawī’s Typology of Muftis and Its Significance for a General Theory of 
Islamic Law.” Islamic Law and Society 3.2 (1996): 137-64. 
———. Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 
Carter, Michael. “Arabic Grammar.” In Cambridge History of Arabic Literature: Religion, 
Learning and Science in the ʿAbbāsid Period, edited by M.J.L. Young et al., 118-138. 
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
———. “Lexicography, Medieval.” In Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature, edited by Julie Scott 
Meisami and Paul Starkey, 2 vols. London, New York: Ashgate, 1998. 
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Ṭaşköprüzāde, ʿIṣām al-Dīn, 161-64, 166-67, 172-73, 348 
al-Thaʿālabī, 99 
Thābit ibn Abī Thābit, 95, 101-102, 105 
Thales, 122 
theology, 26, 68, 82, 84, 86-88, 92-93, 105, 108-109, 111-13, 118-19, 130, 134-39, 142, 149, 158n382, 
159n383, 160, 169, 227, 347-48 
Transoxiana, 171 
Todorov, Tzvetan, 15-16 
Toledo, 42n92 
al-Ṭūfī, Najm al-Dīn, 25, 45-46, 47n106, 49, 325 
Tyre, 106n258 
 
ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, 217n492, 246-47 
al-Urdustānī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, 329-30, 336, 339 
uṣūl al-fiqh, 2, 5, 7, 14, 17, 19, 23, 49, 53, 60, 78, 119, 126-28, 134, 148, 153, 158, 162-64, 184, 190, 
221, 222, 259-60, 299n666, 352 
ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān, 124n265 
 
Van Ess, Josef, 111n277 
Vishanoff, David, 227n505 
 
al-Wansharīsī, Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad, 52n124, 198, 201, 304, 327, 336 
 436 
 
Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭāʾ, 108 
Witkam, Jan Just, 161, 166, 296n656 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 16, 349 
 
Yaḥya ibn Yaḥya al-Laythī, 42n92 
al-Yaḥyā, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad, 319 
Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, 106, 108, 218, 219n497 
Yemen, 324n768, 332 
Young, Walter E., 133-37, 138n335, 147-55, 157-58, 166 
 
al-Zahrānī, ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Saʿīd ibn Aḥmad, 213-19 
Zarīrān, 322 
al-Zarīrānī, Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rahīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh, 52n124, 200, 292, 322-23, 331-32 
al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn, 25, 46-50, 172, 206, 307 
Zaydi, 3, 198, 200, 301, 324n768 
al-Ziriklī, Khayr al-Dīn, 120, 214, 219n497 
al-Zubayrī, al-Zubayr ibn Aḥmad, 207, 283-84, 299, 305 
Zysow, Aron, 159 
 
